ARISTOTLE'S POETICS

HENRY FROWDE, M.A.
PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD
LONDON, EDINBURGH, NEW YORK
TORONTO AND MELBOURNE

ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ ΠΕΡΙ ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗΣ

ARISTOTLE

ON THE ART OF POETRY

A REVISED TEXT
WITH CRITICAL INTRODUCTION, TRANSLATION
AND COMMENTARY

BY

INGRAM BYWATER

HONORARY FELLOW OF EXETER AND QUEEN'S COLLEGES, OXFORD

OXFORD
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
1909

OXFORD
PRINTED AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
BY HORACE HART, M.A.
PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY

PREFACE

The Translation, which faces the text in the present volume, is added in compliance with what seems to be now almost the rule with Greek texts of this description. The custom is perhaps one more honoured in the breach than the observance; but there is something to be said for it in the instance of the Poetics, because they are read by many whose study of Aristotle begins and ends with this one work of his. And there are certainly difficulties of a special kind throughout the book, which require a version or even a paraphrase to explain them. Aristotle's mode of statement here is often elliptical, allusive, and overcharged with meaning; and he not unfrequently omits to indicate the connexion of ideas in his sentences and paragraphs, so that the logical relation between them is left for us to perceive as best we can. Under these circumstances the freedom of a paraphrase may be at times the only means of making his statement intelligible to the modern reader. If Bernays thought it necessary to adopt this method of interpretation in a rendering of the Politics, there is still more reason for its adoption in one of a book like the Poetics. I have accordingly not scrupled to recast many of Aristotle's sentences, and also to insert here and there words or short clauses, in order to make the sense and sequence of ideas clearer—as I suppose he would have done himself, if

he had foreseen the modern reader, and the difficulties and obscurities he might find in his writings.

The Commentary has extended to a greater length than was originally contemplated owing to the accumulation of passages to be quoted from Aristotle or other writers in illustration of the language and terminology of the Poetics. It is hoped that they may prove of use to those who approach the text without previous study of Isocrates or the Rhetoric and other Aristotelian treatises. I venture to think, too, that some of the quotations will be seen to settle the meaning of certain passages which are not always rightly interpreted, and that others may serve to confirm the traditional text, and vindicate it from some of the doubts and suspicions which have been so freely cast on it. If the language of a passage is found from parallels elsewhere to be in accordance with the usage of Aristotle or other Greek writers, it is evident that corrections based on the assumption of its faultiness may be at once put out of court.

The Introduction is mainly on the two questions which divide the critics of the text at the present moment, the relation between the MS. known as A^c and the Renaissance MSS., and the value of the Greek readings which are, or are believed to be, recoverable from the Arabic Version. I have endeavoured to show that the new light we think to get from this Oriental quarter is often that of a mere ignis fatuus, and that the utmost caution is to be used before we allow ourselves to follow its guidance, when the Arabic text diverges in any serious degree from that of our Greek authority.

Aristotle's theory of epic and tragic poetry, as put before us in the Poetics, is presented with such ad-

mirable brevity that I have not deemed it necessary to go over the ground in a preliminary survey of the contents of the book. Nor have I ventured on a discussion of the problem of his general theory of Poetry and Art, as it would require a volume by itself to deal with a matter of such extreme complexity, and we should be taken away at times in the course of the inquiry into regions of thought remote from the avowed subject of the Poetics. The statements and hints in the book would have to be eked out by the aid of others in other writings, wherever passages are to be discovered which have, or seem to have, some sort of aesthetic import; and the data thus collected would have to be made to hold together as parts of a consistent theory. Aristotelian Theories of Art constructed in this way are not unlike the Aristotelian systems of Logic, of which we have seen so many; the parts are Aristotle's, but the synthesis is always to some extent our work, not his. And I cannot repress a suspicion that if he could come back to life again, he would be surprised to find how large a meaning we are able to read into some of his more incidental utterances. We must not forget, too, that the very idea of a Theory of Art is modern, and that our present use of this term 'Art' does not go further back than the age of Winckelmann and Goethe. Aristotle recognizes various analogies between the plastic arts and certain forms of poetry and music; he sees in them, for instance, a common element, 'imitation', by which he generally means the portrayal of humanity and life, 'what men do or suffer'—though the term has no doubt a wider sense in places even in the Poetics. And there are other ideas also in his writings which we should regard as coming under Aesthetics. But they were most of them already

current in his time; and there is very little to show that he had ever thought them out sufficiently to reduce them to system even in his own mind.

The book taken as it is, with perhaps an occasional side-light from some of his other works, is intelligible enough; after a brief introduction he gives us in outline all that he has to say on the subject immediately before him, the technique of the Drama and the Epic. He tells one in fact how to construct a good play and a good epic, just as in the Rhetoric he tells one how to make a good speech. And in doing this he has succeeded in formulating once for all the great first principles of dramatic art, the canons of dramatic logic which even the most adventurous of modern dramatists can only at his peril forget or set at naught.

It is but right to remember, however, that Tragedy, as Aristotle himself conceives it, is still in many important points and characteristics the Greek form of that art, and that it is limited in various ways by the conditions and conventions of the Greek theatre, not only in the accidents of its stage presentation, but also in its form and structure, its motives and its subjects; so that even as literature Aristotle's ideal play would have been an essentially Greek play. But if I am not mistaken, his theory has some further limitations. His ideal play would seem to be in many respects a compromise between the play of the great era and that of his own day; he was writing for men of a generation living some seventy years after the death of Euripides, and there is the mark of the age on a good deal of what his theory lays down or assumes. The diction of the tragic dialogue, he thinks, should approximate to that of conversation, the choice of words being like that in the stylistic prose of oratory—as we

may presume it was with Theodectes and some of his contemporaries. Though he disapproves in a well-known passage of the intercalary chorica of the Drama of the time, this is a merely academical expression of opinion and a counsel of perfection; it is clear that he has practically come to regard the Chorus as a sort of negligible quantity, and that that is the ultimate explanation of his persistent silence about it. Even in his theory of the Plot, which he has worked out with so much thought, he is ready to make concessions to the weakness of the audiences in an age which had become too humanitarian to accept the strong situations allowed in the older Tragedy. I mention this because one is apt to forget that in the seventy years before Aristotle Tragedy must have undergone many changes, though perhaps not for the better, and that we cannot always expect to reconcile the practice of the older poets with his rules, or his rules with the practice of the older poets. If his theory of Comedy had come down to us, we should probably find it more applicable to the New Comedy than to that of Aristophanes.

An editor in these days can hardly hope to do much to advance the interpretation of a book which has been so carefully studied and re-studied by a long succession of editors and translators, many of them among the more illustrious names in the history of classical learning. And apart from editions and translations, we have now an incalculable number of contributions to the criticism and illustration of the book, scattered about partly in special articles and monographs, and partly in other writings, which have often no direct or overt relation to the Poetics themselves. The references in the Adnotatio Critica and Commentary will show the extent to which I have been able to use this sporadic literature.

My first and chief debt is to Vahlen, whose *Beiträge* mark, as all know, an epoch in the modern history of the Poetics, and whose edition has done so much to put the criticism of the text on its true basis, and to keep it within the limits of philological reason. If I have not always found it possible to accept his views on doubtful points or passages, it was assuredly not through any lack of regard for them, or in forgetfulness on my part of his very great services to Aristotelian learning. Speaking of predecessors, an English editor may be permitted to render his tribute of recognition to his English predecessors, Goulston, Tyrwhitt, and Twining. Goulston's paraphrase, with the marginal commentary which accompanies it, is in a sense the most helpful of the earlier versions, since it is a definite attempt to explain the logical sequence of Aristotle's ideas, and thus to deal with difficulties of a kind of which the sixteenth-century interpreters would seem to have been unconscious. Tyrwhitt needs no eulogy; his Poetics, both in the translation and in the notes—the one fault of which is that they are so few—show a combination of originality and scholarship which puts him in the first rank among the scholars of the period between Bentley and Porson. And as to Twining, whatever one may think of his translation, his commentary must always have a value as the work of a remarkably well-read man—one familiar, as few are now, with all the best literature, whether ancient or modern.

It is difficult for me to say how much this book owes to the kind assistance of my old friend, Mr. A. O. Prickard, late Fellow of New College, who besides consenting to read the proofs gave me throughout on countless doubtful points the benefit of his own very accurate

knowledge and long study of the Poetics. In the Translation, I think, there is hardly a page to be found without amendments due to his insight and fine sense of language.

I have to thank Mr. R. W. Chapman of Oriel for much timely help in the last stage of the preparation of this volume. It is perhaps needless to add that the present, like so many other Oxford books, is not a little indebted to the attention it has received from the vigilant Corrector of the Clarendon Press.

I. B.

INTRODUCTION

I

The form and structure of the existing Poetics.

The text of the Poetics has been supposed to have suffered more seriously than most prose Greek texts in the process of transmission; and many scholars accordingly have allowed themselves a very free hand in dealing with its difficulties. One cannot help suspecting, however, that not a few of their doubts and suspicions start from a certain preconceived idea, inherited from the Middle Ages, of the general character of the Aristotelian writings—that the 'master of them that know' could never for a moment forget his logic; that his mind worked with all the sureness of a machine; and that a treatise of his must not only have been written throughout on the straightest lines, but also have left his hands as free from oversights and inconsistencies as a modern published work is expected to be. The untenableness of these assumptions, as thus stated, is obvious, and no one, I imagine, would confess to them in so many words. But it is impossible to read much of the current criticism on the Poetics without seeing that its working hypothesis is in many instances what I have said.

Aristotle, with all his scientific formalism, is even as a thinker much more human than we are apt to suppose; his writing, too, is marked by great inequalities, passages of admirable lucidity and finish being often followed by a stretch of text in a style so curt and crabbed as to be the despair of his interpreters, ancient as well as modern. The Poetics begin fairly well, but as the work advances there are signs of failing attention to form, and the statement becomes in places little better than a series of notes. The continuity also of the exposition is frequently broken by

parentheses, sometimes on matters of very minor importance for the immediate argument. The digression on the λύσις ἀπὸ μηχανῆς in chap. 15 is a clear instance of matter out of place. We may explain it psychologically, as arising by a natural association of ideas out of the preceding context (15, 1454 a 33–6); but its logical place was assuredly not in a chapter devoted to the ἤθη. Hermann went so far as to take it out of its present setting, and insert it after τέλους in 18, 1455 b 32, not seeing that in thus removing one difficulty he was only creating another.

Judged by our modern standards of literary correctness the Poetics are perpetually open to criticism; but the anomalies and informalities, if I may use the word, are too numerous to be removed by the ordinary emendatorial artifices. Among these anomalies of language or thought the following may be noted:—

(1) The anticipatory use of technical terms, which are defined afterwards; e. g.

ἁπλοῦς μῦθος: its meaning is assumed in 9, 1451 b 33; and it is defined later on, in chap. 10.

λόγος (as a term of grammar or logic): defined in 20, 1457 a 24; but the term had appeared before this in the same sense in 20, 1457 a 6.

λύσις: used without explanation in 15, 1454 a 37, and defined in 18, 1455 b 26.

περιπέτεια and ἀναγνώρισις: used in 6, 1450 a 34, and explained afterwards in chap. 11.

To account for this kind of procedure I have suggested elsewhere (Festschrift für Th. Gomperz p. 164) that most of these and similar technical terms may have been already sufficiently recognized and established in the language of the period, and that Aristotle only defines them for a special reason, in the interest of scholastic precision or clearness. This postponement of explanation, however, is not peculiar to the Poetics. We have an instance in the Nicomachean Ethics, where προαιρεῖσθαι, προαίρεσις, and προαιρετική are assumed in Bk. II and explained afterwards in Bk. III. Another instance is the use of κάθαρσις in Pol. 8. 6, the term being in the next chapter (8. 7, 1341 b 38) regarded as one requiring explanation.

(2) Variations of terminology. Aristotle does not always adhere to the same terms even when dealing with the same technical ideas. Thus in chap. 1 he has two terms for the musical element in poetry, *μέλος* and *ἁρμονία*; and two for the literary element also, *μέτρον* and *λόγος*. In the same way in chap. 18 the intrigue in a play is termed *δέσις* in one place and *πλοκή* in another.

(3) Inconsistency in the use of terms. The following are some of the instances of it:—

ἁπλοῦς μῦθος: the opposite of the *πεπλεγμένος μῦθος* in 10, 1452^{a} 12, and that of the *διπλοῦς μῦθος* in 13, 1453^{a} 13.

ἐπεισόδιον: sometimes a dramatic 'act', sometimes an 'insertion'.

ἐπιεικής: in 15, 1454^{b} 13 it is said that the tragic hero should be, and in 13, 1452^{b} 34 that he should not be, *ἐπιεικής*.

μιμεῖσθαι: in 3, 1448^{a} 20 and elsewhere it includes the narrative form of imitation; in 24, 1460^{a} 8 it excludes it.

ὅμοιος, said of a dramatic personage, has one sense in 2, 1448^{a} 6 and another in 15, 1454^{a} 24, ^{b} 10.

πάθος, though generally used in the theatrical sense defined in 11, 1452^{b} 11, has in two passages (17, 1455^{a} 31; 19, 1456^{a} 38) another sense, that of 'feeling' or 'emotion'.

συλλαβή: its use in 21, 1458^{a} 2, though recognized in common parlance, is not in accordance with the definition in 20, 1456^{b} 35.

These and similar inconsistencies of language are obviously mere accidents of expression, which mislead no one; and it would have been easy to remove them on revision, if the Poetics had ever undergone that process. But, if I am not mistaken, there is evidence, at any rate here and there, of a more serious kind of inconsistency, actual inconsistency of thought.

(4) Inconsistency of thought. The following seem to be instances of this:—

In 2, 1448^{a} 4 we are told that the tragic personage is not *ὅμοιος* but *βελτίων ἢ καθ' ἡμᾶς*, and in 13, 1453^{a} 5 that he must be *ὅμοιος*, one like ourselves. The discrepancy is not difficult of explanation. In chap. 2 Aristotle is thinking only of the distinction between Tragedy and Comedy. In chap. 13, on the other hand, where the question before him is the emotional effect of Tragedy, he has come to see that, if we

are to 'fear' for the tragic hero, he must be ὅμοιος, more or less like ourselves—that being the condition of our human sympathy with him. Aristotle appears to have been not unconscious of the change of view, since in the summary in 13, 1453^a 16 he modifies his second formula, and writes ἢ οἷον εἴρηται [i.e. ὅμοιος] ἢ βελτίονος μᾶλλον ἢ χείρονος, where the alternative ἢ βελτίονος is obviously intended to bring the statement into line, as far as can be, with that in chap. 2.

In 13, 1453^a 22 he approves of a drama with an unhappy ending even when kinsmen are concerned, and declares it to be the theoretically best form of tragedy, ἡ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην καλλίστη τραγῳδία. But in the following chapter (14, 1454^a 4) he tells us that there is something better than this: when kinsmen are concerned it is best for the unhappy ending to be evaded by means of a timely Discovery. It is clear that he has become aware of there being something μιαρόν in the ordinary tragic situations, and feels that it is to be avoided or reduced to a minimum.

In 23, 1459^b 1 the superior Unity in the two Homeric poems as compared with the later epics is distinctly asserted on the ground that the action in the latter is at best only a μία πρᾶξις πολυμερής. In 26, 1462^b 8, however, a different view is taken of the Iliad and Odyssey, which are said to be each made up of several actions or parts; in other words the action in them is conceived as being what Aristotle had previously described as a μία πρᾶξις πολυμερής. The exigencies of the argument in chap. 26 have betrayed him into a statement at variance with that in chap. 23; and he has omitted to bring them into formal concordance by modifying one or the other.

In 24, 1459^b 8 in his desire to find points of agreement between epic poetry and Tragedy he tells us that the species of the Epic correspond with those of Tragedy, i.e. with those enumerated in 18, 1455^b 32. But with the text as it stands in the tradition the correspondence cannot be made out. The only possible way of bringing the two statements into harmony is that adopted by Vahlen, who has to assume a lacuna in 18, 1455^b 34 and also to accept a very arbitrary and improbable conjecture, τερατῶδες, in 18, 1456^a 2.

(5) Lapses of memory. That his memory was sometimes at fault is the only explanation of his misleading account of the Peripety of the Oedipus in 11, 1452^{a} 24, and of his misquotations from the Iliad in 25, 1461^{a} 16. But there are also, I think, signs of haste and inexactitude even in some of his references to matters within the Poetics themselves—at any rate in the following instances:—

6, 1450^{b} 13 *ὥσπερ πρότερον εἴρηται.* The reference is to 5, 1449^{b} 34—where a different definition is given.
18, 1455^{b} 32 *τοσαῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ μέρη ἐλέχθη.*
18, 1456^{a} 11 *ὅπερ πολλάκις εἴρηται.*

The second and third of these three references are clearly nexact, and have even created a doubt as to the soundness of he text. At the same time one cannot but see that the first eference, that in 1450^{b} 13, is equally open to criticism, hough no one seems to have thought it necessary to suggest n alteration of text in that passage.

Difficulties and anomalies of this description, i.e. in isolated assages, are not peculiar to the Poetics; they are certainly o be found from time to time in other Aristotelian writings, . g. in the De Anima, the Rhetoric, and perhaps even the Nicomachean Ethics. I may now leave them, and pass on to larger question, the difficulties in the general plan and tructure of the whole. The scheme of the work as a whole s admirably simple and logical, comprising five main parts r sections:—

1. A preliminary discourse on Tragedy, epic poetry, and Comedy, as the chief forms of imitative poetry, and the ubject of the inquiry that is to follow (chaps. 1–5).
2. Definition of a tragedy, and the rules for its construction chaps. 6–22).
3. Rules for the construction of an epic (chaps. 23–4).
4. Enumeration of the criticisms to which an epic or agedy may be subjected, and of the various possible replies them (chap. 25).
5. A comparison of epic poetry and Tragedy, showing the tistic superiority of the latter (chap. 26).

The chief difficulties usually found in the book are in the contents and arrangement of the second section, that dealing with the rules for the construction of a tragedy. Read as it stands, with its matter in the traditional order, the main points in it may be said to be in brief as follows:—

1. Definition of a tragedy (6, 1449 b 24).

2. Analysis of a tragedy into its qualitative parts, *μῦθος, ἦθος, διάνοια, λέξις, μελοποιία, ὄψις*; the two last being set aside as not coming within an Art of Poetry (chap. 6).

3. The *μῦθος*: the general rules for the construction of a *μῦθος*, and the Unity of action required in every form of it (chaps. 7–11).

4. A note or postscript on the quantitative parts of a tragedy (chap. 12).

5. The special rules for the tragic *μῦθος* viewed as a means of producing the emotional effect of Tragedy (chaps. 13–14).

6. Rules for the *ἦθος* of the tragic personages, with a parenthetic note on the use of the *μηχανή* in Drama (chap. 15).

7. Appendix to the foregoing: i. the various forms of Discovery; ii. certain additional rules to be remembered in practice in the construction of a play (chaps. 16–18).

8. The *διάνοια* of the tragic personages (chap. 19).

9. The *λέξις* in Tragedy: i. the ultimate constituents of language; ii. the different kinds of terms; iii. the characteristics of the language of poetry, and the limits to be observed in the use of poetical words and forms (chaps. 20–22).

The above is a synopsis of this section as it might be read by any one prepared to accept the text in the form in which it has come down to us. The doubts which have been thrown on it are of two kinds: (1) the genuineness of certain chapters is questioned; and (2) the order in which the materials now appear is thought to deviate more or less from that of Aristotle himself.

1. The chapters which so many scholars reject as interpolations are chap. 12 and chap. 20. The argument on the other side I must reserve for the Commentary (on 12, 1452 b 14 and 20, 1456 b 20), as the question is too complex to be dealt with in an Introduction.

2. The difficulties in the traditional order of the matter have been met by a free use of transposition. Hermann, for instance, transfers the paragraph on the λύσις ἀπὸ μηχανῆς from chap. 15 (1454 ^{a} 37–^{b} 8) to chap. 18, inserting it there after μέχρι τοῦ τέλους in 1455 ^{b} 32. Susemihl goes further: he lifts the whole of chap. 15 out of its place, in order to make it come immediately after chap. 18. They were both only following *haud passibus aequis* in the steps of Daniel Heinsius, who went to much greater lengths in this direction. The following comparative table may give an idea of the liberties Heinsius took in his rearrangement of the text:—

Heinsius,	c. vii	=	chap. 12.
„	c. xiii	=	chap. 16.
„	c. xiv	=	11, 1452 ^{b} 9–13 + 13, 1452 ^{b} 30 sqq.
„	c. xv	=	chap. 14.
„	c. xvi	=	13, 1452 ^{b} 28–30 + chap. 17.
„	c. xvii	=	chap. 18.
„	c. xviii	=	chap. 15.

The changes Heinsius adventured were never wholly motiveless, but the section as thus reformed by him is almost a *reductio ad absurdum* of this mode of critical procedure. The underlying assumption is that Aristotle, having planned out his work from beginning to end with careful prevision and in accordance with a severely logical scheme, must have thought of everything he had to say in its predestined logical place, and was incapable of saying anything except in its logical place. We have no right to assume this of Aristotle; he was not writing, like Isocrates, for the great world, or with the responsibilities of publication ever before his eyes. But the chief objection to the procedure of the transpositionists is that no *vera causa* can be assigned for the structural disorder it presupposes. Our ordinary experience of MSS. and the textual faults they sometimes present supplies nothing analogous, nothing that will serve to explain the phenomena. The only conceivable hypothesis is that the Aristotelian materials survived at first simply on loose tablets, or sheets, as we should say; that each one of these contained a definite piece of text of varying

length, sometimes that of a chapter, and sometimes that of one of the sections or paragraphs of a modern edition; and that the whole was put into its present shape by an early editor. All this, however, is mere surmise. And if there ever was an early editor with a free hand to arrange the materials as he thought fit, the presumption is that his logical instinct would have led him to the same view of the position of chap. 15, for instance, as Heinsius, Susemihl, and others have taken in modern times.

II

The lost Second Book.

Victorius was the first to see that the treatise now known as the Poetics is only the surviving portion of a larger work. The fact is sufficiently assured by the note in the index of Aristotelian writings in Diogenes Laertius (5, 21), who describes the work as being in *two* Books:

πραγματείας τέχνης ποιητικῆς ᾱ β̄.

We have no further direct testimony to the existence of a Second Book. The additional evidence which is sometimes quoted, that of the Arabic version of the index ascribed to Ptolemaeus 'the Philosopher' (v. Berlin Aristotle 1470^{b}), may be set aside without discussion, as having little or nothing to do with our present Poetics (Rose, Aristotelis Fragmenta ed. Teubn. p. 20; Littig, Andronikos von Rhodos I p. 38).

Our present Poetics, if we may take the work at its face value, as a fairly complete and consecutive whole so far as it goes, may be regarded as Bk. I of the original treatise. There are certainly indications of there being more to follow; and its concluding paragraph also is in form exactly like the summaries which Aristotle so constantly introduces in other writings, to mark a transition from one section of his general subject to another. That there was even in the latest Aristotelian schools some faint tradition of another

Book is shown by the reference in Eustratius on the Ethics (p. 320 Heylbut) to Poet. 4, 1448 b 30, who speaks of the passage as being *ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ ποιητικῆς* [i. e. *ἐν τῷ ᾱ περὶ ποιητικῆς*]. As for Bk. II, one thing is quite clear, that it was wanting in the common archetype of Σ, the MS. before the eighth century Syriac translator, and A^c, our oldest Greek MS. We cannot fix the date of its disappearance; it is practically certain, however, that the loss must have occurred during the papyrus period of the text, when Bk. II was still on a separate roll, so as to be easily detached from Bk. I, which was on another roll. The view of Bernays (Zwei Abhandlungen p. 48) is that it survived into the fifth century, and that the statement in Proclus [v. Fr. V note] of the Aristotelian *Catharsis* theory was based on a first-hand knowledge of Aristotle's text. The actual words of Proclus hardly justify such a conclusion:—

> *τοῦτο δ' οὖν πολλὴν καὶ τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει παρασχὸν αἰτιάσεως ἀφορμὴν καὶ τοῖς ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιήσεων τούτων ἀγωνισταῖς τῶν πρὸς Πλάτωνα λόγων . . .*

It will be observed that Proclus refers not only to Aristotle but also to other apologists for the Drama; it is quite possible, therefore, that it was from one of the latter rather than Aristotle himself that he derived his knowledge of the Aristotelian idea of *catharsis*. And in the context in place of the Aristotelian term he substitutes as synonyms *ἀφοσίωσις* and *ἀπέρασις*—neither of these words being found either in this or in any other sense in the extant writings of Aristotle.

In Byzantine times Bk. II was so completely forgotten that the inscription of the existing Poetics in A^c is simply *Περὶ ποιητικῆς*, and not *Περὶ ποιητικῆς ᾱ*, as it would have been if the memory of Bk. II had survived. There is no evidence to show that the later Grammarians knew of Bk. II, or of the theory of Comedy which must have formed part of it. But there is evidence showing it to have been unknown to them. The so-called Tractatus Coislinianus (Kaibel, CGF. 1 p. 50–3) preserves a definition of Comedy, which has no doubt a certain Aristotelian look; any one can see, however, by simple inspection that it is nothing more than

an adaptation, or rather, as Bernays calls it, a travesty, of the well-known definition of Tragedy in the existing Poetics (6, 1449^{b} 24):—

Tract. Coisl.	Aristotle.
κωμῳδία ἐστὶ μίμησις πράξεως γελοίου καὶ ἀμοίρου μεγέθους τελείου χωρὶς ἑκάστου τῶν μορίων ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσι, δρώντων καὶ ⟨οὐ⟩ δι᾽ ἀπαγγελίας, δι᾽ ἡδονῆς καὶ γέλωτος περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν.	*ἔστιν οὖν τραγῳδία μίμησις πράξεως σπουδαίας καὶ τελείας μέγεθος ἐχούσης, ἡδυσμένῳ λόγῳ χωρὶς ἑκάστου* [so A^{c}] *τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοῖς μορίοις, δρώντων καὶ οὐ δι᾽ ἀπαγγελίας, δι᾽ ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν.*

It is evident that neither the compiler of the Tractatus nor the older writer from whom he may have been borrowing had the genuine Aristotelian definition of Comedy before him, and that the gap in knowledge had to be filled up by means of the above sorry fabrication. The same marks of origin are observable in what the Tractatus says of the 'matter' of Comedy:—

κωμῳδίας ὕλη, μῦθος ἦθος διάνοια λέξις μέλος ὄψις (comp. Poet. 6, 1450^{a} 9);

and of the parts into which Comedy is divided:—

μέρη τῆς κωμῳδίας τέσσαρα, πρόλογος χορικὸν ἐπεισόδιον ἔξοδος. πρόλογός ἐστιν μόριον κωμῳδίας τὸ μέχρι τῆς εἰσόδου τοῦ χοροῦ. χορικόν ἐστι τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ χοροῦ μέλος ᾀδόμενον ὅταν ἔχῃ μέγεθος ἱκανόν. ἐπεισόδιόν ἐστι τὸ μεταξὺ δύο χορικῶν μελῶν. ἔξοδός ἐστι τὸ ἐπὶ τέλει λεγόμενον τοῦ χοροῦ (comp. Poet. 12).

The date of this *rechauffé* cannot be determined; but an approximation to that of its 'source' may perhaps be hazarded, as the same enumeration of the 'parts' of Comedy appears in Tzetzes (Kaibel, C G F. 1 p. 21; comp. p. 28), who quotes it as that of a certain Euclides—a grammarian of doubtful date but apparently of the classical period. It would seem, therefore, that even at the time of this Euclides Bk. II of the Poetics was lost or inaccessible. It is difficult to believe that, in the course of a comparatively short treatise, Aristotle repeated himself in the purely mechanical fashion of these later compilations on Comedy.

Although Bk. II is now lost, there are indications in Aristotle himself which may give us some idea of the ground it must have covered. It may be taken to have comprised (1) the discussion on Comedy promised in Poet. 6, 1449 b 21, and (2) the *Catharsis* theory to which reference is made in Pol. 8. 7, 1341 b 32 (v. Fr. V). What we are told in more than one passage in the Rhetoric (v. Fr. III) is enough to show that τὰ γελοῖα, the appointed subject of Comedy, must have been considered and examined with the same analytical care as in the treatment of τὰ φοβερὰ καὶ ἐλεεινά in the surviving theory of Tragedy. And if his theory of Comedy was on much the same lines as that of Tragedy, Aristotle must have had something to say on the μῦθοι of Comedy, and also on the ἦθος and λέξις of the comic personages. The strange expression in Fr. IV, τὸ δὲ πάντων κυντότατον, may perhaps have been in its original setting an illustration of the possibilities in the way of diction in Comedy. As for the *Catharsis* theory, the only place we can imagine for it would be, as Vahlen (Aristotelische Aufsätze 3 p. 10) has seen, at the end of Bk. II. In such a position it would come in naturally enough, as a final word on the whole subject of the Drama, justifying the existence of both Tragedy and Comedy in reply to the polemic of Plato in the Republic. The discussion itself can hardly have been a brief one. The subject was too large and too controversial to be disposed of in some one or two short chapters.

III

History of the Poetics.

The history of the book in the classical period is obscure. Much of its teaching and terminology survives in the later literature of compilation, but the book itself seems to have been after a time either ignored or but little studied. There are no traces of an ancient commentary on it, and comparatively few citations, acknowledged or unacknowledged, in ancient writers. Several of the citations, too, are manifestly

second-hand. This may be said also even of the reminiscences of Aristotelian ideas in Polybius, and in the Ars Poetica of Horace; for there is reason to think that Polybius was only following Eratosthenes, and Horace his Greek authority, Neoptolemus of Parium. The more important of the 'Testimonia' are noted in their place in the Commentary. Many other more latent references are to be found in the Grammarians, as may be seen from the texts collected in the following monographs:—

Trendelenburg: Grammaticorum graecorum de arte tragica iudiciorum reliquiae (Bonn 1867).

Westphal: Prolegomena zu Aeschylus Tragödien (Leipz. 1869).

Kaibel: Die Prolegomena ΠΕΡΙ ΚΩΜΩΙΔΙΑΣ (Berl. 1898).

Adam: Die Aristotelische Theorie vom Epos (Wiesb. 1889).

Carroll: Aristotle's Poetics, c. xxv, in the light of the Homeric Scholia (Baltimore 1895).

Apart from the fact of our oldest Greek MS. (A^c) having been written somewhere about the year 1000, there is little or no indication of any interest in the book among the Greeks of the Middle Ages. It is clear, however, that it found readers in the East, as it was translated into Syriac in the eighth century, and from the Syriac into Arabic in the eleventh. The Commentary of Averroes, which was based on this Arabic version, was rendered before long into Hebrew, and also, under the title of *Aristotelis Poetria* (Jourdain, Recherches Critiques[2] p. 141), by Hermannus Alemannus into Latin. Roger Bacon (Op. Mai. I p. 101 Bridges) knew the work of Hermannus, but not the Greek Poetics or any Latin version made directly from the Greek. The Poetics were not among the many Aristotelian and other philosophic Greek books which found translators in the thirteenth century, when the Latin occupation opened up the Byzantine world to the Westerns. The Rhetoric was translated at this time, but its fellow treatise was left out in the cold.

The modern history of the book begins in the second half of the fifteenth century. The Greek text itself now became known among the learned in Italy; and at the end of the century (1498) the first translation from it, that by

G. Valla, was given to the world. It is difficult to see why the Poetics were not included in the great Aldine Aristotle of 1495–8. The many Renaissance MSS. which we still have are enough to show that the book must have been accessible and in the hands of not a few of the earlier humanists. Valla certainly had a MS. to work on. Politian is known to have been a former possessor of one of the Laurentian MSS. (LX. 14); and his acquaintance with the book is proved by his reference to a well-known passage (Poet. 1, 1447^{b} 21) in his *Panepistemon* (1483): *Tum illa obscuriora poematum genera, ithyphallicum, manerus* [i.e. *maneros*] *borimus, lytierces* [from Athenaeus]. *Et item qualis centaurus ille Chaeremonis: quae communi vocabulo poemata dicuntur.*

The *editio princeps* of the Greek text appeared at length in 1508 in what is usually reckoned as Vol. I of the Aldine Rhetores Graeci. It was no little misfortune to learning that, instead of following one of the better apographs, the editor, Demetrius Ducas, sent the text forth in a form which is an almost ideal instance of what a first edition should not be. Who was responsible for the systematic corruptions in the Aldine we cannot now say; one may suspect, however, that the chief offender was no other than Ducas himself—more especially as he claims credit in his preface for the pains he had taken in the correction of the texts in the new volume: *ταύτην τὴν βίβλον*, he says, *πολλὰ πονήσαντες καὶ μοχθήσαντες ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀντιγράφοις οἷς ἐνετύχομεν τοῖς φιλολόγοις διωρθώσαμεν.* The general characteristics of this Aldine text will be examined further on. Here it may be enough to note that the prestige of an Aldine caused it to hold its ground for more than three centuries as a sort of textus receptus; it was, in fact, with some few minor improvements, accepted by editor after editor, and scholar after scholar. In 1555 an effort was made to dislodge it from this position by Gu. Morel, whose recension was based on the MS. now known as Parisinus 2040, a fairly faithful apograph of A^{c}. Morel's edition, however, notwithstanding his great name among his contemporaries, left little or no mark on the general criticism of the book; its readings are all but ignored in the *Variae lectiones* in Sylburg's edition (1584). Several of the sixteenth

century editors (Paccius, Madius, Robortellus, Victorius) had access to MSS.; but they did little more than turn to them from time to time for a new reading in some particular passage; it does not seem to have occurred to them to raise the larger question of the value and credentials of the Aldine text. Even Victorius, who had had A^c^ in his hands before it left Florence, and was fully aware of its great antiquity, failed to see its superiority as a basis for the text to the Aldine vulgate. Writing in 1560 he says: *Videram ipse olim ac diligenter tractaram volumen quoddam antiquissimum in quo ... hic etiam liber esset, nihilo melior illic ille multis locis quam pervulgatus quilibet typisque excusus erat. Quare desperavi aliquid boni inde posse expectari.* And as late as 1831 Bekker, with a fairly complete collation of A^c^ before him, retained nevertheless not a few of the Aldine emblemata. This illusory idea of the value of the Aldine lasted on until 1839, when Ritter at last raised his voice against it, and set it aside as based on a MS. 'non solum multis vitiis librariorum culpa depravatum, sed etiam ab Aldo aliisque eruditis Italiae viris modo correctum modo interpolatum et corruptum.' It remained for Spengel (1865–6) and Vahlen (1867) to carry Ritter's theory a step further by recognizing the unique authority of A^c^ as the one record of the Greek textual tradition, and the ultimate parent of all our Renaissance texts. There is no doubt a tendency just at present to question this conclusion owing to the effect on opinion of the recently published Arabic Version, which is found to confirm some of the better readings in the Renaissance MSS.; the fact is supposed to imply the survival into Renaissance times of some memory of a text independent of that in A^c^. The point will have to be considered at length in a later section of this Introduction.

IV

The existing data for the constitution of the Text.

If we may disregard for the present the testimony of the Renaissance MSS., as being all of them apographs of the MS. known as A^c^, our authorities for the textual tradition

of the Poetics are reduced to two, (1) A^c, and (2) in a less definite way, the traces and indications of another Greek text recoverable from the Arabic Version and the surviving fragment of the lost Syriac Version.

A^c.

A^c, i.e. Parisinus 1741, is part of a volume which contains not only the Poetics but also the Rhetoric and several post-Aristotelian works on Rhetoric. In the sixteenth century it was examined by Victorius, while it was still in Florence. Since then it has been repeatedly collated; first by an unnamed friend of Burgess (perhaps Coray) for the critical Appendix to Tyrwhitt's edition (1794); then by Bekker for the Berlin Aristotle (1831); and lastly by Vahlen and others. A description of it, with a full account of its history, will be found in M. H. Omont's Introduction to the facsimile edition of the text published in 1891 by M. F. Allègre. The date of this fine specimen of Byzantine calligraphy is saec. x–xi.

It is hardly possible to overrate the critical value of the texts in the volume. For the non-Aristotelian writings preserved in it it is our first, if not our only, textual authority. In the case of Demetrius Περὶ ἑρμηνείας it is acknowledged to be the archetype of the later MSS., which 'are all derived from P. 1741, the better readings they present pointing rather to individual emendation than to difference of descent' (Rhys Roberts, after Usener). Usener recognizes it as our one great authority for the text of the various treatises of Dionysius included in the volume, and puts aside the later MSS. as being all of them 'apographa exempli Parisini'. Though it cannot be shown to be of such unique importance for Aristotle's Rhetoric, it is confessedly our best source for the text, and a more faithful representative of the common archetype than any of the later MSS. or the version of William of Morbeka (v. Roemer, Praef. p. xxv).

In the Poetics A^c must always claim the premier place, even if the Arabic Version now and then supplies a better reading or corrects some of its more patent scribal errors. Its general

credibility as a fairly faithful record of a much older text is sufficiently obvious. (1) It retains errors which go back to the uncial stage of the text; e.g. Διδόμενα for Ἀιδόμενα in 1456 a 28, ἰΔίασ for ἰλιάς in 1462 b 3, Μαθημάτων for Παθημάτων in 1449 b 28. (2) It retains in places traces of an antique spelling[1]; e.g. πάνμικρον and πανμέγεθες in 1450 b 37–9, ἔνχεα in 1461 a 2, πλέω in 1461 a 26. (3) Although the text of the ancient archetype was constantly misunderstood by the scribe responsible for accents and breathings, there are but few signs of an attempt to alter the actual letter of the original *scriptura continua* in order to accommodate it to his misconceptions of its meaning.

The following synopsis of errors in A^c may incidentally serve to indicate the kinds of assumption on which the more convincing corrections of the text are based. An asterisk is added when the amended reading is known to be confirmed by the Arabic Version or the Syriac fragment.

1. Confusions through similarity of letters:—

Διδόμενα = Ἀιδόμενα* 1456 a 28; Δειλίαν = Ἀεί, λίαν 1461 b 28; ἰΔίασ = ἰλιάς 1462 b 3; Μαθημάτων = Παθημάτων* 1449 b 28; ἐΠεὶ = ἔΤι 1455 b 19; Πρωιάδεσ = Τρωιάδες 1459 b 7; οΗσ = ὄψις 1456 a 2 and 1458 a 5.

2. Confusions through similarity of pronunciation; a few typical instances must suffice:—

ε and αι: ται = τε 1454 b 4, 1458 a 28; σκεπταίαι 1461 b 25.—κε = καί 1457 b 14; φαγάδενα 1458 b 23.

η and ι: οὐχὶ = οὐχ ἢ 1448 b 18; τιλέμαχον 1461 b 5.—σαλαμίνη 1459 a 25; μηγνύη 1460 a 2.

η and ει: ἂν εἴη = ἀνήει* 1455 a 27; εἴδει = ᾔδει 1460 b 31.—δὴ = δεῖ 1459 b 8, 1460 a 23; ἢ or ἣ = εἰ 1460 b 16 (etc.).

η and οι: τῆσ = τοῖς 1455 a 1; εἴπηι = εἴποι 1458 b 32; μηγνύη = μιγνύοι 1460 a 2.

ι and ει: πειθανόν (passim); εἰδεῶν 1456 b 3, 1458 b 18.—ὄψισ = ὄψεις 1450 a 13; ἰαμβίον (passim).

ο and ω: τὸ = τῷ (passim); τοῦτο = τούτῳ 1451 b 4; γλοττῶν 1458 a 26.—οὕτω = οὐ τὸ* 1451 a 36; χωροῦ = χοροῦ 1452 b 19; ἐπιτιμᾶ τῶι = ἐπετιμᾶτο 1455 a 26.

[1] Comp. Meisterhans, Gr.[3] p. 112, and Crönert, Memoria graeca Herculanensis p. 57.

3. Omission of ἰῶτα mutum, a frequent phenomenon not only in τραγῳδία, κωμῳδία, ᾄδειν, etc., but also in the inflexions of nouns and verbs :—

κοινὴ=κοινῇ 1447^{b} 15 ; *ἀρετὴ=ἀρετῇ* 1448^{a} 3 ; *ἡ πλείστη=ᾗ πλείστῃ* 1454^{b} 20 ; *ἡττήθη=ἡττηθῇ* 1456^{a} 23.

4. Omission of final N :—

οὐ=οὖν 1447^{b} 28, 1461^{a} 1 ; *ἐπεισοδίου=ἐπεισοδιοῦν* 1455^{b} 1 ; *νίπτρω=Νίπτρων* 1460^{a} 26 ; *οἰνοχοεύει=οἰνοχοεύειν* 1461^{a} 30 ; *αὐτὸ=αὖ τὸν* 1453^{a} 1 ; *ὁρῶντα=ὁρῶντ' ἂν* 1455^{a} 27.

5. Confusions through general resemblance :—

σατυριακοῦ=σατυρικοῦ 1449^{a} 20 ; *κίνησισ=μίμησις* 1459^{b} 37 ; *ἀνάλογον=ἄλογον* 1460^{a} 13 ; *ἀναγνωρίσει=ἀναγνώσει* 1462^{a} 17.

6. Errors through assimilation of terminations :—

πλειόνων συνδέσμων=πλειόνων συνδέσμῳ 1457^{a} 29 ; *ἐν τῷ ὀνόματοσ σημαίνοντοσ=ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι σημαίνοντος** 1457^{a} 33 ; *ἄλλου δὲ τούτου ὄντοσ =ἄλλο δὲ τούτου ὄντος* 1460^{a} 23 ; *τριῶν ὄντων τῶν ἀριθμῶν=τριῶν ὄντων τὸν ἀριθμὸν* 1460^{b} 9.

7. Errors in accents and breathings, these being often added on mechanically and without regard to rule or sense :—

μέγεθουσ 1451^{a} 15 ; *περιπετεῖαι* 1452^{a} 33 ; *ἀμφιβόλια (=ἀμφιβολίᾳ)* 1461^{a} 25 ; *θοίναται* 1458^{b} 24.—*Μεροπὴ* 1454^{a} 5 ; *Ἀγαθῶν* 1454^{b} 14 ; *κυκλωπᾶσ*, i.e. *κύκλῳ πᾶς (=Κύκλωπας)* 1448^{a} 15 ; *ἕνα λείψειε (=ἐναλείψειε)* 1450^{b} 1 ; *πᾶν μικρὸν (=πάνμικρον)* 1450^{b} 37 ; *ὡσ τοῦ (=ὥστ' οὐ)* 1451^{b} 23 ; *ἀλλ' ὥσ γε (=ἄλλως τε)* 1456^{a} 4 ; *ἀφήρῃ μὲν ὄντι (=ἀφῃρημένον τι* 1458^{a} 3 ; *οὐδένα ἤθη (=οὐδέν' ἀήθη)* 1460^{a} 11 ; *τότε νομίζον (=τότ' ἐνόμιζον)* 1461^{a} 3.

8. Haplographia :—

προσημαίνει 1457^{a} 17 ; *συμβάλεται* 1458^{b} 1 ; *κόμι* 1458^{a} 15 ; *πανύχιοι* 1461^{a} 17.

9. Omission of letters or syllables :—

⟨ἐκ⟩πλήξεωσ 1455^{a} 17 ; *⟨ἡ⟩μαρτῆσθαι* 1460^{b} 28 ; *τί (=ὅτι)* 1461^{b} 1 ; *⟨οἱ⟩δίπουν* 1462^{b} 2 ; *χ⟨ι⟩ωνίδου** 1448^{a} 34 ; *ὅτε (=οἵ τε)* 1452^{b} 12 ; *Λυ⟨γ⟩κεῖ** 1455^{b} 29 ; *ἄ⟨ρ⟩θρον* 1456^{b} 21 ; *κινοῦντα⟨ι⟩* 1461^{b} 30 ; *ἡδονὴ (=ἥδιον ἢ)* 1462^{b} 1.

10. Omission of words :—

*τοιαῦται** 1447^{a} 25 ; *ἀνώνυμος** 1447^{b} 9 ; *λύσις** 1455^{b} 31 ; *ἢ* 1460^{b} 11, 1461^{a} 9 ; *οὐ* or *οὔπω** 1450^{a} 30, 1455^{b} 17 ; *οὐδὲν** 1456^{a} 28 ; *ὁ* 1448^{a} 12, 1451^{a} 6 ; *τὸ* 1456^{b} 26 ; *τοῦ* 1461^{a} 19 ; *οἳ* 1462^{a} 3 ; *καὶ ἃ* 1448^{a} 25 ; *καὶ Σ** 1458^{a} 9 ; *ἢ μὴ* 1460^{b} 27.

11. Transposition, more especially of little words liable to omission:—

τὴν κατὰ=κατὰ τὴν 1447 b 15; *τὸ κατὰ=κατὰ τὸ* 1457 a 19; *ἡ μία=μία ἡ* 1462 b 3; *καὶ ταύτησ=ταύτης καὶ* 1451 a 32; *ἂν οἱ=οἳ ἂν* 1453 a 37.

12. Dittographia:—

τούτουσ=τούς 1455 a 34; *ἔπειτα τὰ=ἐπεὶ τὰ* 1460 a 14; *ἔτι δὲ ἔτι δὲ* 1459 b 7; *θείη θείη* 1462 b 2.

13. Repetition of words from the context:—

ὅτι 1448 b 35; *ἂν* 1458 a 24, 1460 b 7; *δὲ* 1456 a 12, 1462 a 1; *ὅσοισ* 1459 a 13; *ἡμαρτῆσθαι* 1460 b 28; *οὔτε* 1460 b 36; *ἐστὶ* 1462 a 7.

14. Marginalia in the body of the text. The following would seem to be instances of the intrusion of such adscripts:—

ἐποποιία 1447 a 28; *πέντε* 1450 b 16; *παράδειγμα σκληρότητοσ* 1454 b 14; *ἔξω τοῦ καθόλου* 1455 b 7.

15. Double readings in the text:—

ηναι

1449 a 8 *κρίνεται ἢ ναί*: it may be supposed to represent *κρινεται*, i. e. *κρίνεται* and *κρῆναι* (=*κρῖναι*).

λλικα

1449 a 11 *φαυλλικὰ=φαυλα*, i. e. *φαῦλα* (which is implied in the Arabic Version) and *φαλλικά*.

1452 a 3 *καὶ μάλιστα καὶ μᾶλλον*, i. e. *μάλιστα* and *μᾶλλον*.

ε

1457 b 14 *ἀερύσασ=αρύσας*, i. e. *ἀρύσας* and *ἐρύσας*.

ε

1461 a 33 *σημαίνοιε=σημαινοι*, i. e. *σημαίνοι* and *σημαίνει*.

16. Errors due to an attempt to emend:—

1450 b 39 *παμμέγεθες*] *πᾶν μέγεθοσ* A^c—the compound having been misread as two words.

1451 a 28 *οἷαν λέγομεν*] *οἷαν λέγοιμεν* A^c—apparently through ΟΙΑΝ having been misread as *οἷ' ἄν*.

1455 a 2 *ἀπολόγῳ*] *ἀπὸ λόγων* A^c—another instance of a misunderstood compound.

1455 a 16 *ποιῆσαι παραλογισμός**] *ποιῆσαι παραλογισμόν* A^c.

1455 a 26 *ἐπετιμᾶτο*] *ἐπιτιμᾶ τῶι* A^c.

1457 a 17 *τὸ δὲ βαδίζει*] *τὸ δὲ βαδίζειν* A^c.

1457 a 22 *βάδιζε*] *ἐβάδιζεν* A^c—to make it harmonize with the preceding *ἐβάδισεν*.

1457 a 27 *τῷ βαδίζει*] *τῷ βαδίζειν* A^c.

1461 b 2 *εἰρηκότος*] *εἰρηκότεσ* A^c—to accommodate it to the preceding *καταψηφισάμενοι*.

This last kind of error is assuredly a very serious one, because it implies a corrector who, instead of emending the text, left it worse than he found it. But corruptions like the above are not numerous; the general impression the MS. must produce is that it is a faithful record of a genuine textual tradition. A large proportion even of its mistakes have the stamp of antiquity upon them, since they often carry one back to the papyrus period of the text, before the accents and breathings were superimposed on the uncial *scriptura continua*. One of its more obvious faults is its tendency—which it shares with its fellow MS. of the Rhetoric—to omit words or little groups of words. The Arabic Version, which occasionally supplies the missing word or words, shows that the fault must have been in certain passages of comparatively late origin. There are other passages, however, in which the text underlying the Version seems to have been equally defective; in which case the common omissions point to omissions in the common archetype.

The Arabic Version.

Though the Arabic Version (A. V.) seems to have been long known to the French Orientalists, it was reserved for one of our own countrymen, Dr. D. S. Margoliouth, to face the manifold difficulties of the Arabic text, and give it to the world in a printed form in his 'Analecta Orientalia ad Poeticam Aristoteleam' in 1887. All students of the Poetics owe him a debt of gratitude for making the chief results of the Version accessible to them from the first by translating a series of select extracts into Latin, and by indicating in his notes the use that may be made of the Arabic renderings for the confirmation or criticism of the Greek text.

In the absence of a complete translation our estimate of the A. V. must be based on Dr. Margoliouth's notes and extracts; we may, however, supplement them to some extent from an article in Philologus LV. by O. Immisch, who had before him a German translation (by Socin) of a longer and more consecutive specimen (1449^a 9–31) of the Arabic Version. The interpretation of the text (which survives in

a single MS.) is, I understand, beset with difficulties. Even in the thirteenth century it was felt to be no easy matter by Hermannus Alemannus, an experienced translator from the Arabic, who gave the following as his excuse for evading the work of translation: *Postquam cum non modico labore consummaveram translationem rhetoricae Aristotelis ex Arabico in Latinum, volens manum mittere ad eius poetriam tantam inveni difficultatem propter disconvenientiam modi metrificandi in Graeco cum modo metrificandi in Arabico et propter vocabulorum obscuritatem et plures alias causas, quod non sum confisus me posse sane et integre illius operis translationem studiis tradere Latinorum* (Aristot. Rhet. lat. Ven. 1481 f. 1).

The use of the A. V. for us is that we are often able to look beyond it, so as to recover the readings of a Greek MS. which was at least three centuries anterior to A^c^. But it must always be remembered that it was not made directly from the Greek, but from a now lost Syriac translation of the Greek; it is, therefore, the version of a version, and we have thus to discern the original text as best we can, through the distorting medium of two Oriental translations. In such a work, too, one must not always expect the close literalness we find in medieval Latin translations of Greek writings; nor need we assume a very exact knowledge of Greek on the part of the Syriac interpreter. And in the instance of the Poetics some allowance has to be made for the misconceptions of an Oriental without an idea of the nature of the subject-matter of the treatise. The possibilities of Oriental ignorance may be seen writ large in the Paraphrase of Averroes, which was based on the A. V. Averroes is fairly at home in the more philosophical and grammatical parts of the book; but its meaning, as a theory of Greek Tragedy, was from first to last a hopeless enigma to the great Aristotelian of Cordova.

A word or two must be said here on one of the more marked characteristics of the A. V., its tendency to amplify the text by alternative renderings. Thus in 1449 ^{a} 16 ὑποκριτῶν is represented by 'the hypocrites and dissemblers' ('Heuchler und Versteller', Socin), and χοροῦ in the following line by 'chori et cordacis' (Margoliouth), or 'the dance and the

roundel' (Socin). In 1449^{a} 19 *τὸ μέγεθος ἐκ μικρῶν μύθων* becomes 'primus creavit ex parvis fabulis magnitudinem sermonis et vociferationem et tumultum in sermone', i. e. with three alternative renderings for *μέγεθος*. Again in 1453^{b} 36 *ἢ γὰρ πρᾶξαι ἀνάγκη ἢ μὴ καὶ εἰδότας ἢ μὴ εἰδότας* is expanded into 'necesse est enim aut faciat aut non faciat, cum faciat autem ut faciat sciens aut inscius sed scire destinans, praeterea aut scientibus aut insciis'; this plethora of words being primarily due to the translator's inability to make up his mind about the accusatives *εἰδότας ἢ μὴ εἰδότας*—whether they were to be taken as appositional to the subject, or as the object, of *πρᾶξαι*. It is clear that amplifications like these may be put down to the Syrian, the original translator—more especially as such alternative renderings are said to be not uncommon in Syriac translations from the Greek (v. Ryssel, Ueber den textkritischen Wert der syrischen Uebersetzungen griechischer Klassiker, II. p. 49).

In any use we may make of the A. V., two facts must always be borne in mind: (1) that the existing text, as it stands in the one MS. which preserves it, is disfigured by corruptions; and (2) that the Arabic translator was not incapable of misunderstanding the Syriac original. This Syriac original is no longer extant, but we need not suppose it to have been free from faults of its own; it is quite possible that its text was at times faulty, as also that the Syrian himself may have either misread or misinterpreted the Greek text before him. This last suspicion seems to be confirmed by the one fragment that survives of the Syriac Version, an excerpt from Poet. 6, 1449^{b} 24–1450^{a} 9. I give it as rendered into Latin by Dr. Margoliouth (A. O. p. 54), with the Greek of A^{c} *en regard* for purposes of comparison.

Tragoedia est imitatio actionis eximiae perfectae cui est magnitudo sermone iucundo absque una quaque specierum quae in partibus agunt; neque per pollicitationem sed per misericordiam et metum temperans pas-

Ἔστιν οὖν τραγῳδία μίμησις πράξεως σπουδαίας καὶ τελείας μέγεθος ἐχούσης, ἡδυσμένῳ λόγῳ χωρὶς ἑκάστου τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοῖς μορίοις, δρώντων καὶ οὐ δι' ἀπαγγελίας, δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαί-

siones et faciens purgationem eorum qui patiuntur. Facitque hoc quidem sermo iucundus cui est magnitudo [*l.* rhythmus] et harmonia et melos; illud vero quod sine speciebus quod propter metra perficiuntur partes nonnullae; rursus alias quod per melos dum recitant, efficiunt imitationem actionum. Necessario erit pars tragoediae decor personae; tum inter haec opus musicum et elocutio; his enim faciunt imitationem. Dico autem elocutionem quidem ipsam compositionem metrorum: opus musicum vim apertam quam tota possidet. Quoniam imitatio actionum est, agitur vero ab hominibus agentibus iis quos necessitas cogat ut quales homines sint consuetudinibus suis et ingeniis; per enim haec etiam narrationes esse dicimus quales; [et] naturā aptae quae existant duae causae ipsarum narrationum, ingenium et consuetudo sunt; secundum enim haec eae quoque inveniuntur scopum attingentes omnes per haec et a scopo aberrantes. Est autem fabula narrationis imitatio. Dico autem fabulam compositionem actionum; consuetudines vero, qualis quisque eorum qui narrant sit et dicatur; qui se tales esse ostendunt ingeniis suis, et talem esse opinionem suam apparet. Necesse est ergo ut sint unicuique tragoediae partes sex, quas supra diximus; secundum vim ipsam Tragoediae.

νουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων μαθημάτων κάθαρσιν. λέγω δὲ ἡδυσμένον μὲν λόγον τὸν ἔχοντα ῥυθμὸν καὶ ἁρμονίαν καὶ μέλος, τὸ δὲ χωρὶς τοῖς εἴδεσι τὸ διὰ μέτρων ἔνια μόνον περαίνεσθαι καὶ πάλιν ἕτερα διὰ μέλους. ἐπεὶ δὲ πράττοντες ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν, πρῶτον μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἂν εἴη τι μόριον τραγῳδίας ὁ τῆς ὄψεως κόσμος, εἶτα μελοποιία καὶ λέξις· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν. λέγω δὲ λέξιν μὲν αὐτὴν τὴν τῶν μέτρων σύνθεσιν, μελοποιίαν δὲ ὃ τὴν δύναμιν φανερὰν ἔχει πᾶσαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πράξεώς ἐστι μίμησις, πράττεται δὲ ὑπὸ τινῶν πραττόντων, οὓς ἀνάγκη ποιούς τινας εἶναι κατά τε τὸ ἦθος καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, διὰ γὰρ τούτων καὶ τὰς πράξεις εἶναί φαμεν ποιάς τινας, πέφυκεν αἴτια δύο τῶν πράξεων εἶναι, διάνοιαν καὶ ἦθος, καὶ κατὰ ταύτας καὶ τυγχάνουσι καὶ ἀποτυγχάνουσι πάντες. ἔστιν δὲ τῆς μὲν πράξεως ὁ μῦθος ἡ μίμησις· λέγω γὰρ μῦθον τοῦτον, τὴν σύνθεσιν τῶν πραγμάτων, τὰ δὲ ἤθη, καθ᾽ ὃ ποιούς τινας εἶναί φαμεν τοὺς πράττοντας, διάνοιαν δέ, ἐν ὅσοις λέγοντες ἀποδεικνύασίν τι ἢ καὶ ἀποφαίνονται γνώμην. ἀνάγκη οὖν πάσης τραγῳδίας μέρη εἶναι ἕξ, καθ᾽ ὃ ποιά τις ἐστὶν ἡ τραγῳδία.

It will be seen that in l. 7 the difficult word τοιούτων is ignored. In l. 5 the translator must have misconstrued the passage, taking δρώντων with the preceding εἰδῶν. He represents πράττοντες in l. 13 by 'dum recitant'; πράξεις in l. 26 by 'narrationes'; and τοὺς πράττοντας in l. 35 by 'qui narrant'. He expands εἶναί φαμεν in l. 35 into 'sit et dicatur'; in l. 14 he adds 'actionum', and in l. 40 'quas supra diximus'. And in l. 20, and again in ll. 36–8, his translation is obviously very wide of the mark. If the above, therefore, is a fair specimen of it, the Syriac Version cannot have been an accurate piece of work. This criticism, however, only applies to the translation as a translation. Our problem is to look beyond all this, so as to recover the Greek text—we may for short call it Σ—which the Syriac renderings would seem to presuppose. The following Σ readings recovered in this way deserve especial attention:—

l. 4. χωρὶς ἑκάστου τῶν εἰδῶν Σ, as also A^c.

l. 5. οὐ δι' ἀπαγγελίας, δι' ἐλέου] οὐ δι' ἐπαγγελίας ἀλλὰ δι' ἐλέου Σ—anticipating thus the twofold corruption in P^a (Parisinus 2038) and the Aldine.

l. 7. παθημάτων Σ—confirming the corrector's reading in P^a against A^c's μαθημάτων.

l. 11. χωρὶς τοῖς εἴδεσι] χωρὶς τῶν εἰδῶν Σ—anticipating the corruption in P^a Aldine.

l. 29. καὶ κατὰ ταύτας] κατὰ γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ αὗται Σ.

If the language of the fragment will bear the pressure thus put on it as a means of recovering the Σ readings, it is clear that the Σ text must have been at times faulty enough and vitiated by corruptions of a kind from which A^c is comparatively speaking exempt. The Σ readings, therefore, so far as they can be ascertained, must be considered on their individual merits, without any general assumption of their antecedent superiority to those of A^c. The greater antiquity of Σ is no decisive mark of superiority. In Plato an editor may have to follow an eleventh century MS. (T) in preference to the Clarkianus. For Strabo the eighth century Grotta Ferrata palimpsest is 'nullius pretii' according to Cobet (Misc. Crit. p. 87) by comparison with the Paris MS. of the eleventh century.

The fallibility, however, of the Σ text may be seen on a larger scale in some of the readings recovered from the A.V. The following instances will show that Σ must have had errors of its own, and in many passages errors of a very arbitrary description, which would sadly mislead us, or defy emendation, if we had not A^c to set things right.

1447^a 27 ὀρχηστῶν] ὀρχηστρῶν Σ.

1448^a 13 παρῳδίας] τραγῳδίας Σ.

— ^{a} 21 ἀπαγγέλλοντα] ἐπαγγέλλοντα Σ. Similarly in 1449^b 26 the Syriac (v. supra) presupposes ἐπαγγελίας, not ἀπαγγελίας.

— ^{b} 19 χροιὰν] χώραν Σ.

— ^{b} 27 ὥσπερ ἕτεροι ὕμνους καὶ ἐγκώμια] The A. V. 'postea panegyricum et laudem aliorum' implies ὕστερον ἑτέρων ὕμνους καὶ ἐγκώμια as the reading of Σ.

1449^a 11 φαλλικὰ] φαῦλα Σ. The A^c reading φαυλλικά is a conflation of φαῦλα and φαλλικά.

— ^{b} 16 ἔπεσιν] ἅπασιν ἔπεσιν Σ—a conflation of two readings.

1450^b 12 καθόλου τι] καθότι Σ.

— ^{b} 34 ἐπεὶ] ἐπὶ Σ (and again in 1451^a 31 and 1453^b 11).

1451^a 7 οὐ] ὁ Σ.

— ἑκατὸν] ἕκαστον Σ.

— ^{b} 21 ἐν τῷ Ἀγάθωνος Ἄνθει] ἐν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὃς ἂν θῇ Σ.

— ^{b} 26 ὀλίγοις γνώριμα om. Σ, through the homoeoteleuton.

1452^a 8 ἀνδριὰς] Ἀνδρέας Σ.

— ^{b} 4 ἕτερον] ἑταῖρον Σ.

— ^{b} 34 δεῖ] ἀεὶ Σ (also elsewhere).

1453^b 14 οὖν] οὐ Σ.

1455^a 2 ἀπολόγῳ] ἀπὸ λόγων Σ (with A^c).

— ^{a} 33 εὔπλαστοι] The rendering in A. V., 'simplices,' implies ἄπλαστοι in Σ—an instance of the confusion of α and ευ common in the minuscule script.

— ^{b} 25 τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν—δέσιν om. Σ.

— ^{b} 34 οἷον—ἠθική om. Σ, through the homoeoteleuton.

1456^a 25 ἕνα δεῖ] ἐν ᾄδῃ Σ.

1459^b 23 ἴδιον] Ἴλιον Σ.

1460^a 2 μιγνύοι] μὴ γνοίῃ Σ. The reading of the archetype of Σ and A^c was perhaps μηγνύοι; the Σ reading arose through a confusion of οι and υ, which is of comparatively late date.

— ^{a} 11 οὐδὲν' ἀήθη] The A.V. rendering 'non introducens rem non assuetam' seems to imply οὐδὲν ἄηθες—which would anticipate the corruption in P^a Aldine.

1460 a 13 ἄλογον] ἀνάλογον Σ (with A^c).

1461 a 18 ἀθρήσειεν] ἀθροίσειεν Σ—an instance of the confusion of η and οι, which points to the Byzantine period.

It is clear, from the above series of readings recovered from the A. V., that the Σ text was not free from corruptions, and also that some of its errors were of recent date, of the Byzantine rather than the classical period. There are a few instances, too, of glosses intruded into the text. Thus in 1454 a 31 Σκύλλη is represented in the A. V. by 'Scylla *maritima*', and in 1454 b 27 οὐλῆς by 'pustula *quae fuit in pede eius*'. And in 1461 a 17 we find Σ adding ἱπποκορυσταί, to make the quotation agree with the passage in Homer.

These indications of the Σ text, as known from the A.V., may be combined with those already observed in the Syriac Fragment, as leading to the general conclusion that, even if Σ were before us in its integrity, its readings would still have to be considered one by one on their merits. Its antiquity, as dating from the eighth century, would be only one element in the critical situation; we should still have to submit its readings to the usual tests; to judge of each by reference to the sense, the context, and the various criteria, internal and external, of philological probability. And we must never for an instant lose sight of the fact that after all Σ is not quite the same thing as an actual Greek MS. A Greek text recovered by art and inference from a version of a version—each of them in an Oriental language—is exposed at times to doubts and suspicions of a kind from which that of A^c is free.

Now that the first surprise of discovery is over, we may view the new readings, which seem to be implied in the A. V., with equanimity. Only a few of them need be accepted as of positive critical value; many of them are obviously either no improvement on the traditional text, or so illusive or misleading as to be almost a libel on the memory of Aristotle. The chief result of the A.V., in our present state of knowledge of it, is that it is seen to confirm a certain number of the emendations already suggested by Renaissance or modern scholars. It gives the sanction of tradition to φυσικόν (for μουσικόν) in 1447 b 16; to ἀπόπλουν or ἀνάπλουν (for

ἁπλοῦν) in 1454 b 2; to παραλογισμός in 1455 a 16; to κρατεῖσθαι in 1456 a 10; to κεκρᾶσθαι in 1458 a 31. It confirms the excision of ἐποποιία in 1447 a 28; of ὅτι in 1448 b 35; and of πέντε in 1450 b 16. It confirms some of the additions also that have been made in the A^c text; e.g. that of a negative in 1450 a 30 and 1455 b 17; that of τοιαῦται in 1447 a 25; that of ἀνώνυμος in 1447 b 2; that of λύσις in 1455 b 31; that of καὶ Σ in 1458 a 9; and that of καὶ εἰ ἀδύνατον (or something equivalent) in 1461 b 12. And besides all this it preserves in two instances traces of an orthography which, whether Aristotle's or not, was certainly antique, Κλυταιμήστρα in 1453 b 23, and Μενέλεως in 1454 a 29.

The better and more convincing of the readings recovered from the A.V. have all one noteworthy characteristic in common: they fall quite naturally into their place in the A^c text, and imply directly or indirectly the existing context; so that the area of disturbance in each instance is of the most limited extent. I am aware that the A.V. is often supposed to reveal in places indications of more extensive textual divergences, and to throw doubt on the soundness of larger portions of our existing Greek text. The only answer is that the evidence, such as it is, of the A.V. may be taken sometimes too seriously. One must never forget that its text is not always certain; that it is the version of a version; that the Arabian may have misunderstood the Syriac, and the Syrian the Greek text; and lastly, that they were both working in the dark, and dealing with matters wholly outside their own literary experience. However we may explain it, the fact itself is indisputable, that in a considerable number of passages, in which the existing Greek text is perfectly sound and satisfactory, the renderings in the A.V. have little or no recognizable relation to it. Many of these renderings we may safely disregard, as representing not a different form of Greek text, but the aberrations of one or other of the two Orientals. In cases of doubt, the antecedent probability must always be on the side of the readings of A^c. The A.V. suggests or confirms a certain number of minor and occasional improvements; but that is for the present at any rate the practical limit of its service. For anything beyond

that its evidence is insufficient—not clear enough to enable us to reconstruct the Σ text, and not certain enough to justify any considerable departure from that in A^c.

V

The Apographa.

The Renaissance MSS. of the Greek text, now usually known as the 'Apographa', require discussion because the whole question of their value and position has been recently reopened. Instead of acquiescing in Spengel and Vahlen's view of the unique importance of A^c as the ultimate source of the texts of the 'Apographa', many seem more than half inclined to think that some at any rate of the better readings in them, more especially those confirmed by the Arabic Version, point to the survival in the fifteenth century of another textual authority, a now lost Greek MS. independent of A^c and free from certain of its errors. The evidence, however, in favour of this remote possibility is as nothing compared with that which tells against it.

Our knowledge of these MSS. is not so complete as one could wish. For Urbinas 47 (B^c) we have a collation in Bekker's Aristotle, and for Riccardianus 46 one by Landi in the Studi Italiani 3 p. 68; I have also collations of my own of two Paris MSS., Parisinus 2038 (P^a) and Parisinus 2040 (P^b). But for the rest we have still to rely on the Variae lectiones at the end of Tyrwhitt and in Susemihl, and the occasional record of the readings of individual Apographa in Vahlen's notes.

The first and most obvious fact to be noticed in the Apographa is their textual divergence. Whereas in some of them the text is but one remove from that in A^c, in others it is seen to be constantly deviating from that, and moreover in a very marked degree. But there is one thing that must be said of them all, that their deviations from A^c are manifestly due in a large proportion of instances to a desire to amend the older text, or present it in an easier form. Many of the simpler among the amended readings we may put

down to copyists of the better class, since the scribe of a Renaissance MS. was often a scholar by profession and quite capable of improvising a simple correction of an ordinary clerical error. But this was certainly not the only cause of the appearance of amended readings in the MSS. of this period. As the Renaissance scholar annotated his books just as we do, one may well suppose that some of the textual suggestions thus made on the Poetics have survived and found a place in the text of later transcripts.

The sporadic origin of many of the improved readings scattered up and down the long series of Renaissance MSS. is easily shown. Several of them are not an original part of the text of any known MS.; e.g. *παθημάτων* in 1449^{b} 28, in which the *π* is due to correction in P^{a} and Laurentianus LX. 21; and *ἐπετιμᾶτο* in 1455^{a} 26, and *Αἰγεῖ* in 1461^{b} 21, which are both of them from the margin, not the text, of Riccardianus 16. Others again are found in the text of only one or at most two MSS.; e.g.

1448^{b} 35 *ἀλλὰ καὶ* Riccard. 46. 1451^{a} 17 *τῷ ἑνὶ* Guelferbytanus and Riccard. 46. 1455^{a} 16 *παραλογισμός* Riccard. 46.—^{a} 27 *ἀνῄει* Guelferbytanus (and marg. P^{b}).—^{a} 34 *ἐκστατικοί* Riccard. 46.—^{b} 19 *ἔτι* Riccard. 16. 1457^{a} 22 *βάδιζε* Riccard. 16.—^{a} 29 *συνδέσμῳ* Riccard. 16. 1458^{a} 9 *καὶ* Σ add. Riccard. 16.—^{a} 31 *κεκρᾶσθαι* Riccard. 46.—^{b} 25 *ἀεικής* Riccard. 46. 1460^{a} 30 *Λάιος* Riccard. 16.—^{b} 1 *ποιήσειε* Riccard. 46.

The Apographa, as I have said, fall into two main classes, according as they deviate but slightly, or in a more marked degree, from the text in A^{c}. It may be shown of each, with such probability at any rate as this kind of matter allows, that their texts presuppose that in A^{c}, and that the better lections they occasionally supply were originally due to conjecture. In order to simplify the inquiry, one may take B^{c} (Urbinas 47) and P^{b} (Parisinus 2040) as types of the first class, and P^{a} (Parisinus 2038) and the Aldine as types of the second.

(1) B^{c} P^{b} supply a certain number of very simple and necessary corrections of the A^{c} text; e.g.

1447^{b} 28 *οὖν*, for *οὐ*. 1448^{b} 38 *ὁ*, for *τὸ*. 1453^{b} 22 *δρᾷ*, for *δρᾶν*. 1455^{b} 1 *ἐπεισοδιοῦν*, for *ἐπεισοδίου*. 1456^{a} 12 *λέγω*, for *λέγω δὲ*.

1459^{b} 37 *μίμησις*, for *κίνησις*. 1460^{a} 14 *ἐπεὶ*, for *ἔπειτα*.—^{b} 32 *ἢ εἰ*, for *η η* (sic). 1461^{a} 19 *ἀντὶ* ⟨*τοῦ*⟩. 1462^{a} 8 *ὁ ὀπούντιος*, for *ὁ πούντιος*.

These readings, however, do not stand alone; they are only a few out of a large number of alterations, the general quality and character of which may be inferred from the following specimens:—

1448^{a} 10 *πάσας*, for *ταύτας*.—^{b} 35 *δραματικῶς*, for *δραματικὰς*.—^{b} 37 *ὑπῆρξεν*, for *ὑπέδειξεν*. 1451^{a} 8 *κλεψύδραν*, for *κλεψύδρας*.—^{a} 35 *ἐπίδηλον* ⟨*ὡς*⟩. 1455^{b} 30 *δὲ*, for *μὲν*. 1456^{b} 17 *μὴ* ⟨*ποιεῖν*⟩. 1457^{a} 3 *ἢν μὴ ἁρμόττῃ*, for *ἢν μὴ ἁρμόττει*.—^{a} 19 *σημαίνουσα*, for *σημαῖνον*. 1458^{b} 4 *λεγόμενον*, for *γιγνόμενον*. 1460^{b} 17 *αὕτη*, for *αὐτῆς*. 1461^{a} 34 *ὡδικῶς* or *ὠδικῶς*[1], for A^{c}'s *ωδιηως* (i.e. *ὡδὶ ἢ ὡς*).—^{b} 21 *αἰγινήτῃ*, for A^{c}'s *αἰγειήτη* (i. e. *Αἰγεῖ ἢ τῇ*).

If one compares the two sets of readings, one cannot but see that they are all on the same lines, and inspired apparently by the same motive; the only visible difference between them is that the first group represents the successes, and the second the failures of a Renaissance corrector. But after all the deviations in B^{c} P^{b} from the A^{c} text are few and far between, and of no great moment. The two MSS. are as a whole faithful reproductions of the A^{c} text, following it even in its accidental faults and errors with an exactness which admits of but one explanation, namely that they are really and truly Apographa, copies of the text of the older MS. we still have, made either from the MS. itself or from some direct transcript of it.

(2) The type of text represented by P^{a} Aldine reveals the same tendencies in a more pronounced form, as the corrector here has allowed himself to go to far greater lengths. It is to be observed that in several places the P^{a} text was, as originally written, in agreement with A^{c}, and that it was then altered (apparently by the same hand) to bring it into closer conformity with that now represented by the Aldine. As an explanation of this one may perhaps suppose that the Aldine additions appeared at first as mar-

[1] This portentous corruption originated in a mere misreading of the text of A^{c}, the tenth century *η* being read as a *κ* (comp. Bast, Comm. Pal. p. 716).

ginalia, and were thus neglected by the scribe of P^a, who had to work them in afterwards, when he came to revise his transcript. This point of difference, however, need not be taken into account, since the general agreement between the two texts is so marked that they may very well serve as representatives of one and the same recension.

One thing is quite clear, that the immediate basis of the P^a Aldine was an Apograph with a distinct textual affinity to B^c P^b. The following omissions will show this:—

1449 a 2 παραφανείσης—κωμῳδίας : om. P^a Ald. with P^b.
1456 a 2 όησ A^c : a lacuna here in B^c P^b and in P^a : om. Ald.
1457 a 33 πλὴν—ἀσήμου : om. P^a Ald. with B^c P^b.

Several of the actual readings also in P^a Aldine point to the same conclusion:—

1451 a 6 τοῦ A^c : τοῦ δὲ P^a Ald. with B^c P^b.
1454 b 37 ἤτοι τῆι A^c : τρίτη ἡ P^a Ald. with P^b.
1456 a 31 ἢ εἰ A^c : ἢ P^a Ald. with P^b.
1458 a 10 ἐκ τούτου A^c : ἐκ τούτου ἀφώνων B^c : ἔκ του τῶν ἀφώνων P^a Ald.
1460 a 11 οὐδέν' ἀήθη] οὐδένα ἤθη A^c : οὐδὲν ἀήθη B^c P^b : οὐδὲν ἄηθες P^a Ald.
1461 a 33 σημαίνοιε A^c : σημαίνειε Ald. with B^c P^b : σημήνειε P^a.
— 34 ωδιηωσ A^c : ὡδικῶς (or ὠδικῶς) B^c P^b : ὡδί πως P^a Ald.

The above instances of agreement may suffice as a proof of the dependence of the P^a Aldine text on that represented by B^c P^b; I pass on, therefore, to consider the differences between the two texts. The note of the P^a Aldine text is its utter disregard of the textual tradition. Every page of it betrays the hand of a reviser; we can almost see him at work, adding or omitting words, altering forms, and often rewriting clauses or sentences, so as to smooth away every sign of difficulty in the older text. All this was said long ago by Ritter, but for reasons already mentioned one cannot even now take the point for granted. The modern apparatus criticus, which gives only the better lections of the Apographa, is often a snare to the unwary reader, who sees their successes, and does not see their failures. It may be worth while, therefore, to look into the

P^a Aldine text more closely, in order to realize what sort of thing it is, and how it has come to be what it is.

(1) P^a Ald. add words freely; e. g.

1447 ^{a} 25 οὖσαι ⟨τοιαῦται⟩.
— ^{b} 22 ⟨οὐκ ἤδη⟩ καὶ ποιητήν.
1448 ^{a} 25 ⟨καὶ ἃ⟩ καὶ ὥς.
1449 ^{a} 3 οἱ ⟨δὲ⟩, to disguise the omission (with P^b) of the preceding clause παραφανείσης—κωμῳδίας.
1449 ^{a} 29 ⟨περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων τοσαῦτα⟩ ἔστω, to fill up a lacuna in P^b.
— ^{b} 27 ⟨ἀλλὰ⟩ δι' ἐλέου.
1450 ^{a} 30 ⟨οὐ⟩ ποιήσει.
1452 ^{a} 3 καὶ μάλιστα] μάλιστα ⟨τοιαῦτα⟩.
1453 ^{b} 18 μέλλων ⟨δείκνυσι⟩.
1454 ^{a} 19 προαίρεσίν τινα ⟨φαῦλον μὲν ἐὰν φαύλην⟩.
— ^{b} 34 A lacuna after ἐκεῖνος δὲ, and then ⟨ταῦτα οὖν⟩ αὐτὸς λέγει.
1455 ^{a} 30 συναπεργαζόμενον ⟨ποιεῖν⟩.
— ^{b} 13 ἐπεισόδια ⟨σκοπεῖν⟩.
1459 ^{b} 9 παθητικὴν ⟨δεῖ εἶναι⟩.
1460 ^{b} 21 ὁποίαν οὖν A^c] ⟨ταῦτ' οὖν⟩ ὁποῖα ἂν ᾖ.
1461 ^{a} 34 ⟨τὸ δὲ⟩ ποσαχῶς.
— ^{b} 13 ἀλλὰ ⟨καὶ πρὸς τὸ⟩ βέλτιον.
1462 ^{b} 6 ⟨ἀνάγκη⟩ ἢ βραχέως.
— ^{b} 7 ⟨ἐὰν δὲ πλείους⟩ λέγω.
— ^{b} 8 συγκειμένη ⟨οὐ μίαν, or οὐ μία⟩.

Some few of these insertions we may accept, as filling up real defects in the traditional text. But it must be seen that, as they appear in P^a Ald., they are only part of a series of similar additions, and may be presumed to have had a similar origin and motive. The fact of the reviser having been able to supply the missing word in some three or four instances is no proof that he must have found it in a then existing MS.

(2) Here and there the words thus added dispossess a portion of the original text. Thus in 1448 ^{a} 5, where ἀνάγκη μιμεῖσθαι is added, the preceding ἢ καὶ τοιούτους is omitted. The same thing has happened in 1455 ^{b} 31, where the added word λύσις has usurped the place of καὶ πάλιν ἢ αὐτῶν. The phenomenon is easily explained if we may suppose a scribe, with a revised text before him, to have taken some of the reviser's marginal or interlinear additions not as addenda but as corrections of the text.

(3) P^a Ald. are apt to ignore words in cases of difficulty. Thus they omit *τοιούτους ὄντας* in 1454^b 13, *ὡσ ῥῆτοι* (i. e. *ὅς ῥ' ἦ τοι*) in 1461^a 12, and *δειλίαν* (i. e. *ἀεί, λίαν*) in 1461^b 28. In this way the reviser has also removed most of the dittographies which disfigure the A^c text.

(4) The P^a Ald. text embodies a long array of textual depravations. The following specimens may perhaps give some idea of their general character and motive:—

1449^a 28 *ἐπεισοδίων πλήθη καὶ τὰ ἄλλ' ὡς ἕκαστα*] *ἐπεισοδίων πλήθει καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἕκαστα* P^a Ald.

1449^b 29 *χωρὶς τοῖς εἴδεσι*] *χωρὶς τῶν εἰδῶν* P^a Ald.

1450^a 17 *κακοδαιμονία*] *εὐδαιμονία* P^a Ald.

1453^b 33 *ὁ 'Αλκμαίων ὁ 'Αστυδάμαντος*] *ὁ ἀλκμαίωνοσ ἀστυδάμαντοσ* A^c: *ὁ 'Αλκμαίωνος 'Αστυδάμας* P^a Ald.

1454^b 13 *ἐπιεικεῖσ ποιεῖν παράδειγμα σκληρότητοσ* A^c: *ἐπιεικείας ποιεῖν παράδειγμα ἢ σκληρότητος δεῖ* P^c Ald.

1460^a 11 *οὐδέν' ἀήθη*] *οὐδένα ἤθη* A^c: *οὐδὲν ἀήθη* B^c P^b: *οὐδὲν ἄηθες* P^a Ald.

In some instances P^a Ald. no doubt supply readings which we accept as improvements on those in A^c; e.g. *ὧν* for *ὡς* in 1452^b 28; *⟨ἐκ⟩πλήξεως* in 1455^a 17; *ἑκάστου* in 1456^a 6; *δέῃ* for *δ' ἦ* in 1456^b 4. Readings of this kind, however, do not, all told, constitute a tithe of the peculiar readings in P^a Ald.; and there is nothing to mark them off from the rest except the fact that they happen to be successes. As the reviser, whoever he may have been, was evidently a man of some learning, and also of no little ingenuity of a certain rough-and-ready order, one need not be surprised to find in the multitude of his conjectures at any rate some few that have hit the mark.

Looking, therefore, at the actual texts of the Apographa, as seen in these typical instances, and the tendencies which they reveal, I think the facts point very clearly to the conjectural origin of all the improved readings in the later manuscripts. The doubt now thrown upon this view is largely resolvable into a feeling that some at any rate of these textual improvements are too good and too unexpected to be regarded as the suggestions of Renaissance scholars. The underlying assumption here is an injustice

to these early scholars. Their weakness in dealing with texts was want of critical caution and method; apart from that they had many of the gifts required for the work of textual emendation. They were often men of great natural ability, of surprising learning, and if anything, more completely at home in the classical languages than the moderns. We all know that in Latin the 'Itali' have left a permanent mark on many of our Latin texts. But there is no reason to suppose that the learned Greeks of that age, or their Italian pupils and followers, were as scholars on a much lower level, or that in the correction of Greek texts their limit was reached when some of the more patent clerical errors in them were cleared away. One has only to reflect what Chalcondyles did for the Homeric Hymns (v. Allen and Sikes, Introd. p. xxxiii) and Musurus for Hesychius. In the case of the Poetics, however, the work of revision cannot be connected with any one name. The book was even in the fifteenth century in the hands of many; so that the more striking of the amended readings, which we now gather up from various Apographa—a few from one, and a few from another—may very well have been the happier efforts at emendation of various acute and scholarly readers in the early Renaissance period of the study of the text.

The doubt as to the truth of Spengel and Vahlen's view of the Apographa has had new life put into it through the publication of the readings implied in the Arabic Version, which is found to confirm a certain proportion of the better readings in these manuscripts. A suspicion, accordingly, has arisen that some of these better readings may perhaps have survived in some now lost Greek MS., independent of A^c, and have found their way into the Renaissance manuscripts from that source. All that a coincidence, however, of this kind can be said to prove is the goodness of the readings; for it is no uncommon thing for a good conjecture to be confirmed by a newly-discovered document. In the Poetics the Arabic Version confirms several of Vahlen's emendations, as also many that were made in earlier days by Madius, Victorius Heinsius, and others. It confirms the ⟨οὐ⟩ μακρός

of Vulcanius in 1455^{b} 17 just as much as the ⟨οὐ⟩ ποιήσει of P^{a} Ald. in 1450^{a} 30. And in the latter instance the insertion of the negative would be no great feat, if one happened to remember the parallel in the Rhetoric, οὐ ποιήσει τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον (3. 2, 1404^{b} 3). Another P^{a} Ald. reading confirmed by the Arabic Version is οὖσαι ⟨τοιαῦται⟩ in 1447^{a} 25, but it loses its significance when one sees the reviser restoring μάλιστα ⟨τοιαῦτα⟩ in 1452^{a} 3, and observes his predilection for such stop-gaps. In 1454^{b} 2, where A^{c} has περὶ τὸν ἁπλοῦν, the rendering in the Arabic Version is *de conversione navium*, which supports in equal measure both the ἀνάπλουν of P^{a} and the ἀπόπλουν of Riccardianus 16. Which of the two, then, is to be supposed to have got into the text from the hypothetic lost Greek MS.? The question may be dismissed at once, when one reflects how easily ἀπόπλουν or ἀνάπλουν might occur to any one familiar with the Second Book of the Iliad.

The truth is that not a few of the more striking of the Apograph readings may be accounted for without difficulty, if one is at liberty to assume some critical ingenuity and a fair acquaintance with literature on the part of the early correctors. Λάιος, for instance, in 1460^{a} 30 implies nothing more than a knowledge of the Oedipus Tyrannus; and Αἰγεῖ in 1461^{b} 21 could hardly be missed by a reader who remembered the story of the Medea. συνδέσμῳ εἷς in 1457^{a} 30 is immediately suggested, not only by the context, but also by several parallels in other Aristotelian writings. In 1451^{a} 17 ἄπειρα τῷ ἑνὶ (for γένει) συμβαίνει stares one in the face, if one happens to have in mind the ἄπειρα γὰρ ἂν τῷ ἑνὶ συμβαίνῃ of the Physics. παθημάτων in 1449^{b} 28 may very well have been suggested by the parallel in the Politics; ἐκστατικοί in 1455^{a} 34 by that in the Problems; and ἀεικής in 1458^{b} 25 by the passage in the Homeric Scholia, in which it was independently discovered many years afterwards by Gu. Morel. Some of the amended readings, no doubt, show a higher degree of critical insight; e.g. βάδιζε (for ἐβάδιζεν) in 1457^{a} 22, παραλογισμός in 1455^{a} 16, ἀνῄει in 1455^{a} 27, ἀρύσας in 1457^{b} 14, and μίμησις (for κίνησις) in 1459^{b} 37. The provenance of these five instances is to be noted. The first is from Riccar-

dianus 16; the second from the margin of the Guelferbytanus; the third from Riccardianus 46 (and marg. P^b); the fourth from the Leidensis and *ex emendatione* Vaticanus 1400; and the fifth from $B^c P^b$. If they had ever existed together in the text of some one older and better MS., it is difficult to imagine how they came to be preserved in this separate way, one in one MS. and another in another.

ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ

ΠΕΡΙ

ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗΣ

SIGLA

A^c = cod. Parisinus 1741
* = littera in codice deleta
Ar. = interpretatio Arabica, vel ex ea eruta scriptura Graeca
apogr. = apographa quaedam

ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ ΠΕΡΙ ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗΣ

1447a Περὶ ποιητικῆς αὐτῆς τε καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν αὐτῆς, ἥν τινα δύναμιν ἕκαστον ἔχει, καὶ πῶς δεῖ συνίστασθαι τοὺς μύθους εἰ μέλλει καλῶς ἕξειν ἡ ποίησις, ἔτι δὲ ἐκ πόσων καὶ ποίων ἐστὶ μορίων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστι μεθόδου, λέγωμεν ἀρξάμενοι κατὰ φύσιν πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων. ἐποποιία δὴ καὶ ἡ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποίησις ἔτι δὲ κωμῳδία καὶ ἡ διθυραμβοποιητικὴ καὶ τῆς αὐλητικῆς ἡ πλείστη καὶ κιθαριστικῆς πᾶσαι τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι μιμήσεις τὸ σύνολον· διαφέρουσι δὲ ἀλλήλων τρισίν, ἢ γὰρ τῷ γένει ἑτέροις μιμεῖσθαι ἢ τῷ ἕτερα ἢ τῷ ἑτέρως καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι πολλὰ μιμοῦνταί τινες ἀπεικάζοντες (οἱ μὲν διὰ τέχνης οἱ δὲ διὰ συνηθείας), ἕτεροι δὲ διὰ τῆς φωνῆς, οὕτω κἂν ταῖς εἰρημέναις τέχναις ἅπασαι μὲν ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν ἐν ῥυθμῷ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἁρμονίᾳ, τούτοις δ' ἢ χωρὶς ἢ μεμιγμένοις· οἷον ἁρμονίᾳ μὲν καὶ ῥυθμῷ χρώμεναι μόνον ἥ τε αὐλητικὴ καὶ ἡ κιθαριστικὴ κἂν εἴ τινες ἕτεραι τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι ⟨τοιαῦται⟩ τὴν δύναμιν, οἷον ἡ τῶν συρίγγων· αὐτῷ δὲ τῷ ῥυθμῷ μιμοῦνται χωρὶς ἁρμονίας αἱ

1447a 12 λέγομεν A^c (utramque scripturam agnoscit Ar.) 13 τραγωδίασ A^c (in 1449a 37 τραγωιδίασ. ceteris in locis ἰῶτα mutum deest in hoc similibusque vocabulis) 17 γένει] ἐν Forchhammer 21 κἂν Parisinus 2038 : καὶ A^c 25 τυγχάνωσιν A^c τοιαῦται add. apogr. (confirm. Ar.) 26 αἱ Reiz : οἱ A^c : οἱ ⟨πολλοὶ⟩ Heinsius

ARISTOTLE'S POETICS

Our subject being Poetry, I propose to speak not only of 1 the art in general but also of its species and their respective capacities; of the structure of plot required for a good poem; of the number and nature of the constituent parts of a poem; and likewise of any other matters in the same line of inquiry. Let us follow the natural order and begin with the primary facts.

Epic poetry and Tragedy, as also Comedy, Dithyrambic poetry, and most flute-playing and lyre-playing, are all, viewed as a whole, modes of imitation. But at the same time they differ from one another in three ways, either by a difference of kind in their means, or by differences in the objects, or in the manner of their imitations.

I. Just as form and colour are used as means by some, who (whether by art or constant practice) imitate and portray many things by their aid, and the voice is used by others; so also in the above-mentioned group of arts, the means with them as a whole are rhythm, language, and harmony—used, however, either singly or in certain combinations. A combination of rhythm and harmony alone is the means in flute-playing and lyre-playing, and any other arts there may be of the same description, e.g. imitative piping. Rhythm alone, without harmony, is the means in the dancer's imita-

τῶν ὀρχηστῶν, καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι διὰ τῶν σχηματιζομένων ῥυθμῶν μιμοῦνται καὶ ἤθη καὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις. ἡ δὲ [ἐποποιία] μόνον τοῖς λόγοις ψιλοῖς ἢ τοῖς μέτροις καὶ τούτοις εἴτε
1447^{b} μιγνῦσα μετ' ἀλλήλων εἴθ' ἑνί τινι γένει χρωμένη τῶν μέτρων ⟨ἀνώνυμος⟩ τυγχάνει οὖσα μέχρι τοῦ νῦν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἔχοιμεν ὀνομάσαι κοινὸν τοὺς Σώφρονος καὶ Ξενάρχου μίμους καὶ τοὺς Σωκρατικοὺς λόγους οὐδὲ εἴ τις διὰ τριμέτρων ἢ ἐλεγείων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τινῶν τῶν τοιούτων ποιοῖτο τὴν μίμησιν—πλὴν οἱ ἄνθρωποί γε συνάπτοντες τῷ μέτρῳ τὸ ποιεῖν ἐλεγειοποιοὺς τοὺς δὲ ἐποποιοὺς ὀνομάζουσιν, οὐχ ὡς κατὰ τὴν μίμησιν ποιητὰς ἀλλὰ κοινῇ κατὰ τὸ μέτρον προσαγορεύοντες· καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἰατρικὸν ἢ φυσικόν τι διὰ τῶν μέτρων ἐκφέρωσιν, οὕτω καλεῖν εἰώθασιν· οὐδὲν δὲ κοινόν ἐστιν Ὁμήρῳ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ πλὴν τὸ μέτρον, διὸ τὸν μὲν ποιητὴν δίκαιον καλεῖν, τὸν δὲ φυσιολόγον μᾶλλον ἢ ποιητήν. ὁμοίως δὲ κἂν εἴ τις ἅπαντα τὰ μέτρα μιγνύων ποιοῖτο τὴν μίμησιν καθάπερ Χαιρήμων ἐποίησε Κένταυρον μικτὴν ῥαψῳδίαν ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν μέτρων, καὶ ποιητὴν προσαγορευτέον. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων διωρίσθω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. εἰσὶ δέ τινες αἳ πᾶσι χρῶνται τοῖς εἰρημένοις, λέγω δὲ οἷον ῥυθμῷ καὶ μέλει καὶ μέτρῳ, ὥσπερ ἥ τε τῶν διθυραμβικῶν ποίησις καὶ ἡ τῶν νόμων καὶ ἥ τε τραγῳδία καὶ ἡ κωμῳδία· διαφέρουσι δὲ ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἅμα πᾶσιν αἱ δὲ κατὰ μέρος. ταύτας μὲν οὖν λέγω τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν τεχνῶν ἐν οἷς ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν.

28 *ἐποποιία* seclusit Ueberweg (om. Ar.) 1447^{b} 9 *ἀνώνυμος* add. Bernays (confirm. Ar.) *τυγχάνει οὖσα* Suckow: *τυγχάνουσα* A^{c} 15 *κατὰ τὴν* Guelferbytanus: *τὴν κατὰ* A^{c} *κοινὴ* A^{c} 16 *φυσικόν* Heinsius (confirm. Ar.): *μουσικόν* A^{c} 22 *καὶ*] *καὶ τοῦτον* vel *οὐκ ἤδη καὶ* apogr.: *καίτοι* Gomperz, Rassow 24 *αἳ* Aldina 1536: *αἱ* Riccardianus 16: *οἱ* A^{c} 28 *οὖν* apogr. (confirm. Ar.): *οὐ* A^{c} 29 *οἷς* Victorius: *αἷσ* A^{c}

tions; for even he, by the rhythms of his attitudes, may represent men's characters, as well as what they do and suffer. There is further an art which imitates by language alone, without harmony, in prose or in verse, and if in verse, either in some one or in a plurality of metres. This form of imitation is to this day without a name. We have no common name for a mime of Sophron or Xenarchus and a Socratic Conversation; and we should still be without one even if the imitation in the two instances were in trimeters or elegiacs or some other kind of verse—though it is the way with people to tack on 'poet' to the name of a metre, and talk of elegiac-poets and epic-poets, thinking that they call them poets not by reason of the imitative nature of their work, but indiscriminately by reason of the metre they write in. Even if a theory of medicine or physical philosophy be put forth in a metrical form, it is usual to describe the writer in this way; Homer and Empedocles, however, have really nothing in common apart from their metre; so that, if the one is to be called a poet, the other should be termed a physicist rather than a poet. We should be in the same position also, if the imitation in these instances were in all the metres, like the *Centaur* (a rhapsody in a medley of all metres) of Chaeremon; and Chaeremon one has to recognize as a poet. So much, then, as to these arts. There are, lastly, certain other arts, which combine all the means enumerated, rhythm, melody, and verse, e.g. Dithyrambic and Nomic poetry, Tragedy and Comedy; with this difference, however, that the three kinds of means are in some of them all employed together, and in others brought in separately, one after the other. These elements of difference in the above arts I term the means of their imitation.

1448^a Ἐπεὶ δὲ μιμοῦνται οἱ μιμούμενοι πράττοντας, ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτους ἢ σπουδαίους ἢ φαύλους εἶναι (τὰ γὰρ ἤθη σχεδὸν ἀεὶ τούτοις ἀκολουθεῖ μόνοις, κακίᾳ γὰρ καὶ ἀρετῇ τὰ ἤθη διαφέρουσι πάντες), ἤτοι βελτίονας ἢ καθ' ἡμᾶς ἢ χείρονας ἢ καὶ τοιούτους, ὥσπερ οἱ γραφεῖς· Πολύγνωτος μὲν γὰρ κρείττους, Παύσων δὲ χείρους, Διονύσιος δὲ ὁμοίους εἴκαζεν. δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ τῶν λεχθεισῶν ἑκάστη μιμήσεων ἕξει ταύτας τὰς διαφορὰς καὶ ἔσται ἑτέρα τῷ ἕτερα μιμεῖσθαι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ὀρχήσει καὶ αὐλήσει καὶ κιθαρίσει ἔστι γενέσθαι ταύτας τὰς ἀνομοιότητας, καὶ τῷ περὶ τοὺς λόγους δὲ καὶ τὴν ψιλομετρίαν, οἷον Ὅμηρος μὲν βελτίους, Κλεοφῶν δὲ ὁμοίους, Ἡγήμων δὲ ὁ Θάσιος ⟨ὁ⟩ τὰς παρῳδίας ποιήσας πρῶτος καὶ Νικοχάρης ὁ τὴν Δειλιάδα χείρους· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοὺς διθυράμβους καὶ περὶ τοὺς νόμους, ὥσπερ * * γᾶς, Κύκλωπας Τιμόθεος καὶ Φιλόξενος, μιμήσαιτο ἄν τις. ἐν ταύτῃ δὲ τῇ διαφορᾷ καὶ ἡ τραγῳδία πρὸς τὴν κωμῳδίαν διέστηκεν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ χείρους ἡ δὲ βελτίους μιμεῖσθαι βούλεται τῶν νῦν. 2

Ἔτι δὲ τούτων τρίτη διαφορὰ τὸ ὡς ἕκαστα τούτων μιμήσαιτο ἄν τις. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μιμεῖσθαι ἔστιν ὁτὲ μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα † ἢ † ἕτερόν τι γιγνόμενον ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος ποιεῖ, ἢ ὡς τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλοντα, ἢ πάντα ὡς πράττοντας καὶ ἐνεργοῦντας τοὺς 3

1448^a 3 κακία γὰρ καὶ ἀρετὴ A^c 8 τῷ] τὸ A^c 10 ἔστι] -στι in litura A^c τῷ scripsi : τὸ A^c : om. Parisinus 2038 12 ὁ add. Parisinus 2038 13 δειλιάδα A^c (η superscripsit m. rec.) 15 ὥσπερ [in fine versus] γᾶσ κυκλωπᾶσ A^c : ὡς πέργας (καὶ superscr.) κύκλωπας Parisinus 2038 : ὡς πέρσας καὶ κύκλωπας codex Robortelli : ὥσπερ Ἀργᾶς Κύκλωπας Castelvetrus : ὥσπερ θεοὺς Ἀργᾶς, Κύκλωπας Vahlen (1874) : ὥσπερ γὰρ Κύκλωπας Vahlen (1897). plura deesse existimo 16 ταύτῃ Casaubonus : αὐτῇ A^c 21 ⟨ἢ⟩ ὁτὲ Zeller ἢ] ὁτὲ δὲ Reiz 22 τὸν secluseram 23 πάντα Casaubonus : πάντασ A^c

II. The objects the imitator represents are actions, with 2
agents who are necessarily either good men or bad—the diversities of human character being nearly always derivative from this primary distinction, since the line between virtue and vice is one dividing the whole of mankind. It follows therefore, that the agents represented must be either above our own level of goodness, or beneath it, or just such as we are; in the same way as, with the painters, the personages of Polygnotus are better than we are, those of Pauson worse, and those of Dionysius just like ourselves. It is clear that each of the above-mentioned arts will admit of these differences, and that it will become a separate art by representing objects with this point of difference. Even in dancing, flute-playing, and lyre-playing such diversities are possible; and they are also possible in the nameless art that uses language, prose or verse without harmony, as its means; Homer's personages, for instance, are better than we are; Cleophon's are on our own level; and those of Hegemon of Thasos, the first writer of parodies, and Nicochares, the author of the *Diliad*, are beneath it. The same is true of the Dithyramb and the Nome: the personages may be presented in them with the difference exemplified in the . . . of . . . and Argas, and in the Cyclopses of Timotheus and Philoxenus. This difference it is that distinguishes Tragedy and Comedy also; the one would make its personages worse, and the other better, than the men of the present day.

III. A third difference in these arts is in the manner in 3
which each kind of object is represented. Given both the same means and the same kind of object for imitation, one may either (1) speak at one moment in narrative and at another in an assumed character, as Homer does; or (2) one may remain the same throughout, without any such change; or (3) the imitators may represent the whole story dramatically, as though they were actually doing the things described.

μιμουμένους. ἐν τρισὶ δὴ ταύταις διαφοραῖς ἡ μίμησίς ἐστιν, ὡς εἴπομεν κατ' ἀρχάς, ἐν οἷς τε ⟨καὶ ἃ⟩ καὶ ὥς. ὥστε τῇ μὲν ὁ αὐτὸς ἂν εἴη μιμητὴς Ὁμήρῳ Σοφοκλῆς, μιμοῦνται γὰρ ἄμφω σπουδαίους, τῇ δὲ Ἀριστοφάνει, πράττοντας γὰρ μιμοῦνται καὶ δρῶντας ἄμφω. ὅθεν καὶ δράματα καλεῖσθαί τινες αὐτά φασιν, ὅτι μιμοῦνται δρῶντας. διὸ καὶ ἀντιποιοῦνται τῆς τε τραγῳδίας καὶ τῆς κωμῳδίας οἱ Δωριεῖς (τῆς μὲν γὰρ κωμῳδίας οἱ Μεγαρεῖς οἵ τε ἐνταῦθα ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς παρ' αὐτοῖς δημοκρατίας γενομένης καὶ οἱ ἐκ Σικελίας, ἐκεῖθεν γὰρ ἦν Ἐπίχαρμος ὁ ποιητὴς πολλῷ πρότερος ὢν Χιωνίδου καὶ Μάγνητος· καὶ τῆς τραγῳδίας ἔνιοι τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ) ποιούμενοι τὰ ὀνόματα σημεῖον· αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ κώμας τὰς περιοικίδας καλεῖν φασιν, Ἀθηναίους δὲ δήμους, ὡς κωμῳδοὺς οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ κωμάζειν λεχθέντας ἀλλὰ τῇ κατὰ κώμας πλάνῃ ἀτιμαζομένους ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεως·
1448b καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν αὐτοὶ μὲν δρᾶν, Ἀθηναίους δὲ πράττειν προσαγορεύειν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν διαφορῶν καὶ πόσαι καὶ τίνες τῆς μιμήσεως εἰρήσθω ταῦτα.

Ἐοίκασι δὲ γεννῆσαι μὲν ὅλως τὴν ποιητικὴν αἰτίαι 4
δύο τινὲς καὶ αὗται φυσικαί· τό τε γὰρ μιμεῖσθαι σύμφυτον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παίδων ἐστὶ καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ὅτι μιμητικώτατόν ἐστι καὶ τὰς μαθήσεις ποιεῖται διὰ μιμήσεως τὰς πρώτας, καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι πάντας. σημεῖον δὲ τούτου τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων· ἃ γὰρ αὐτὰ λυπηρῶς ὁρῶμεν, τούτων τὰς εἰκόνας τὰς μάλιστα ἠκριβωμένας χαίρομεν θεωροῦντες, οἷον

25 καὶ ἃ add. apogr. 32 δημοκρατείας A^c 34 Χιωνίδου Robortellus (confirm. Ar.) : χωνίδου A^c fort. τραγῳδίας ⟨δ'⟩ 35 αὐτοὶ Spengel : οὗτοι A^c 36 Ἀθηναίους Spengel (occupavit Anonymus in minore ed. Oxon. a. 1760) : ἀθηναῖοι A^c 1448b 5 αὗται Parisinus 2038 : αὐταὶ A^c 6 τούτω* A^c

As we said at the beginning, therefore, the differences in the imitation of these arts come under three heads, their means, their objects, and their manner.

So that as an imitator Sophocles will be on one side akin to Homer, both portraying good men; and on another to Aristophanes, since both present their personages as acting and doing. This in fact, according to some, is the reason for plays being termed dramas, because in a play the personages act the story. Hence too both Tragedy and Comedy are claimed by the Dorians as their discoveries; Comedy by the Megarians—by those in Greece as having arisen when Megara became a democracy, and by the Sicilian Megarians on the ground that the poet Epicharmus was of their country, and a good deal earlier than Chionides and Magnes; even Tragedy also is claimed by certain of the Peloponnesian Dorians. In support of this claim they point to the words 'comedy' and 'drama.' Their word for the outlying hamlets, they say, is *comae*, whereas Athenians call them *demes*—thus assuming that comedians got the name not from their *comoe* or revels, but from their strolling from hamlet to hamlet, lack of appreciation keeping them out of the city. Their word also for 'to act,' they say, is *dran*, whereas Athenians use *prattein*.

So much, then, as to the number and nature of the points of difference in the imitation of these arts.

It is clear that the general origin of poetry was due to 4 two causes, each of them part of human nature. Imitation is natural to man from childhood, one of his advantages over the lower animals being this, that he is the most imitative creature in the world, and learns at first by imitation. And it is also natural for all to delight in works of imitation. The truth of this second point is shown by experience: though the objects themselves may be painful to see, we delight to view the most realistic representations of them in art, the

θηρίων τε μορφὰς τῶν ἀτιμοτάτων καὶ νεκρῶν. αἴτιον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, ὅτι μανθάνειν οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἥδιστον ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ βραχὺ κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτοῦ. διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο χαίρουσι τὰς εἰκόνας ὁρῶντες, ὅτι συμβαίνει θεωροῦντας μανθάνειν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι τί ἕκαστον, οἷον ὅτι οὗτος ἐκεῖνος· ἐπεὶ ἐὰν μὴ τύχῃ προεωρακώς, οὐχ ᾗ μίμημα ποιήσει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἀπεργασίαν ἢ τὴν χροιὰν ἢ διὰ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἄλλην αἰτίαν. κατὰ φύσιν δὲ ὄντος ἡμῖν τοῦ μιμεῖσθαι καὶ τῆς ἁρμονίας καὶ τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ (τὰ γὰρ μέτρα ὅτι μόρια τῶν ῥυθμῶν ἐστι φανερὸν) ἐξ ἀρχῆς πεφυκότες καὶ αὐτὰ μάλιστα κατὰ μικρὸν προάγοντες ἐγέννησαν τὴν ποίησιν ἐκ τῶν αὐτοσχεδιασμάτων. διεσπάσθη δὲ κατὰ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἤθη ἡ ποίησις· οἱ μὲν γὰρ σεμνότεροι τὰς καλὰς ἐμιμοῦντο πράξεις καὶ τὰς τῶν τοιούτων, οἱ δὲ εὐτελέστεροι τὰς τῶν φαύλων, πρῶτον ψόγους ποιοῦντες, ὥσπερ ἕτεροι ὕμνους καὶ ἐγκώμια. τῶν μὲν οὖν πρὸ Ὁμήρου οὐδενὸς ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν τοιοῦτον ποίημα, εἰκὸς δὲ εἶναι πολλούς, ἀπὸ δὲ Ὁμήρου ἀρξαμένοις ἔστιν, οἷον ἐκείνου ὁ Μαργίτης καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. ἐν οἷς κατὰ τὸ ἁρμόττον ἰαμβεῖον ἦλθε μέτρον—διὸ καὶ ἰαμβεῖον καλεῖται νῦν, ὅτι ἐν τῷ μέτρῳ τούτῳ ἰάμβιζον ἀλλήλους. καὶ ἐγένοντο τῶν παλαιῶν οἱ μὲν ἡρωικῶν οἱ δὲ ἰάμβων ποιηταί. ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ σπουδαῖα μάλιστα ποιητὴς Ὅμηρος ἦν (μόνος γὰρ οὐχ ὅτι εὖ ἀλλὰ καὶ μιμήσεις δραματικὰς ἐποίησεν), οὕτως καὶ τὰ τῆς κωμῳδίας σχήματα πρῶτος ὑπέδειξεν οὐ ψόγον ἀλλὰ τὸ γελοῖον δραματοποιήσας· ὁ γὰρ Μαργίτης ἀνάλογον ἔχει, ὥσπερ Ἰλιὰς

12 ἀτιμωτάτων A^c 13 τούτου vel τούτων apogr. 18 οὐχ ᾗ Hermann: οὐχὶ A^c 27 ἅτεροι Spengel 30 μαργείτησ A^c 31 ἰαμβίον (bis) A^c 35 ἀλλὰ Riccardianus 46, Bonitz (confirm. Ar.): ἀλλ' ὅτι A^c 36 οὕτω apogr. 38 ὁ] τὸ A^c fort. ⟨ἡ⟩ Ἰλιὰς

forms for example of the lowest animals and of dead bodies. The explanation is to be found in a further fact: to be learning something is the greatest of pleasures not only to the philosopher but also to the rest of mankind, however small their capacity for it; the reason of the delight in seeing the picture is that one is at the same time learning—gathering the meaning of things, e.g. that the man there is so-and-so; for if one has not seen the thing before, one's pleasure will not be in the picture as an imitation of it, but will be due to the execution or colouring or some similar cause. Imitation, then, being natural to us—as also the sense of harmony and rhythm, the metres being obviously species of rhythms—it was through their original aptitude, and by a series of improvements for the most part gradual on their first efforts, that they created poetry out of their improvisations.

Poetry, however, soon broke up into two kinds according to the differences of character in the individual poets; for the graver among them would represent noble actions, and those of noble personages; and the meaner sort the actions of the ignoble. The latter class produced invectives at first, just as others did hymns and panegyrics. We know of no such poem by any of the pre-Homeric poets, though there were probably many such writers among them; instances, however, may be found from Homer downwards, e.g. his *Margites*, and the similar poems of others. In this poetry of invective its natural fitness brought an iambic metre into use; hence our present term 'iambic,' because it was the metre of their 'iambs' or invectives against one another. The result was that the old poets became some of them writers of heroic and others of iambic verse. Homer's position, however, is peculiar: just as he was in the serious style the poet of poets, standing alone not only through the literary excellence, but also through the dramatic character of his imitations, so too he was the first to outline for us the general forms of Comedy by producing not a dramatic invective, but a dramatic picture of the Ridiculous; his *Margites*

1449a καὶ ἡ Ὀδύσσεια πρὸς τὰς τραγῳδίας, οὕτω καὶ οὗτος πρὸς τὰς κωμῳδίας. παραφανείσης δὲ τῆς τραγῳδίας καὶ κωμῳδίας οἱ ἐφ᾽ ἑκατέραν τὴν ποίησιν ὁρμῶντες κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν οἱ μὲν ἀντὶ τῶν ἰάμβων κωμῳδοποιοὶ ἐγένοντο, οἱ δὲ ἀντὶ τῶν ἐπῶν τραγῳδοδιδάσκαλοι, διὰ τὸ μείζονα καὶ ἐντιμότερα τὰ σχήματα εἶναι ταῦτα ἐκείνων. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐπισκοπεῖν ἆρ᾽ ἔχει ἤδη ἡ τραγῳδία τοῖς εἴδεσιν ἱκανῶς ἢ οὔ, αὐτό τε καθ᾽ αὑτὸ κρῖναι καὶ πρὸς τὰ θέατρα, ἄλλος λόγος. γενομένης ⟨δ᾽⟩ οὖν ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς αὐτοσχεδιαστικῆς—καὶ αὐτὴ καὶ ἡ κωμῳδία καὶ ἡ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐξαρχόντων τὸν διθύραμβον, ἡ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν τὰ φαλλικὰ ἃ ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐν πολλαῖς τῶν πόλεων διαμένει νομιζόμενα—κατὰ μικρὸν ηὐξήθη προαγόντων ὅσον ἐγίγνετο φανερὸν αὐτῆς· καὶ πολλὰς μεταβολὰς μεταβαλοῦσα ἡ τραγῳδία ἐπαύσατο, ἐπεὶ ἔσχε τὴν αὑτῆς φύσιν. καὶ τό τε τῶν ὑποκριτῶν πλῆθος ἐξ ἑνὸς εἰς δύο πρῶτος Αἰσχύλος ἤγαγε καὶ τὰ τοῦ χοροῦ ἠλάττωσε καὶ τὸν λόγον πρωταγωνιστὴν παρεσκεύασεν· τρεῖς δὲ καὶ σκηνογραφίαν Σοφοκλῆς. ἔτι δὲ τὸ μέγεθος· ἐκ μικρῶν μύθων καὶ λέξεως γελοίας διὰ τὸ ἐκ σατυρικοῦ μεταβαλεῖν ὀψὲ ἀπεσεμνύνθη, τό τε μέτρον ἐκ τετραμέτρου ἰαμβεῖον ἐγένετο. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον τετραμέτρῳ ἐχρῶντο διὰ τὸ σατυρικὴν καὶ ὀρχηστικωτέραν εἶναι τὴν ποίησιν, λέξεως δὲ γενομένης αὐτὴ ἡ φύσις τὸ οἰκεῖον μέτρον εὗρε· μάλιστα γὰρ λεκτικὸν τῶν μέτρων τὸ ἰαμβεῖόν ἐστιν· σημεῖον δὲ τούτου, πλεῖστα γὰρ ἰαμβεῖα λέγομεν ἐν τῇ διαλέκτῳ τῇ πρὸς

1449a 6 μείζονα apogr.: μεῖζον A^c 7 ἆρ᾽ ἔχει Vahlen: παρέχει A^c: εἰ ἄρα ἔχει Parisinus 2038: ἄρα ἔχει Riccardianus 46 8 κρῖναι Forchhammer: κρίνεται ἢ ναί A^c 9 γενομένη apogr. δ᾽ add. Riccardianus 46, Bekker αὐτοσχεδιαστικὴ apogr. 11 φαῦλλικὰ A^c: φαῦλα (ut videtur) Ar. 12 διαμένειν A^c 15 ἑαυτῆς apogr.: αὐτῆσ A^c 20 σατυριακοῦ A^c 21 et 25 ἰαμβίον A^c 26 ἰαμβία A^c

in fact stands in the same relation to our comedies as the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* to our tragedies. As soon, however, as Tragedy and Comedy appeared in the field, those naturally drawn to the one line of poetry became writers of comedies instead of iambs, and those naturally drawn to the other, writers of tragedies instead of epics, because these new modes of art were grander and of more esteem than the old.

If it be asked whether Tragedy is now all that it need be in its formative elements, to consider that, and decide it theoretically and in relation to the theatres, is a matter for another inquiry.

It certainly began in improvisations—as did also Comedy; the one originating with the authors of the Dithyramb, the other with those of the phallic songs, which still survive as institutions in many of our cities. And its advance after that was little by little, through their improving on whatever they had before them at each stage. It was in fact only after a long series of changes that the movement of Tragedy stopped on its attaining to its natural form. (1) The number of actors was first increased to two by Aeschylus, who curtailed the business of the Chorus, and made the dialogue, or spoken portion, take the leading part in the play. (2) A third actor and scenery were due to Sophocles. (3) Tragedy acquired also its magnitude. Discarding short stories and a ludicrous diction, through its passing out of its satyric stage, it assumed, though only at a late point in its progress, a tone of dignity; and its metre changed then from trochaic to iambic. The reason for their original use of the trochaic tetrameter was that their poetry was satyric and more connected with dancing than it now is. As soon, however, as a spoken part came in, nature herself found the appropriate metre. The iambic, we know, is the most speakable of metres, as is shown by the fact that we very often fall into it

ἀλλήλους, ἑξάμετρα δὲ ὀλιγάκις καὶ ἐκβαίνοντες τῆς λεκτικῆς ἁρμονίας. ἔτι δὲ ἐπεισοδίων πλήθη. καὶ τὰ ἄλλ' ὡς ἕκαστα κοσμηθῆναι λέγεται ἔστω ἡμῖν εἰρημένα· πολὺ γὰρ ἂν ἴσως ἔργον εἴη διεξιέναι καθ' ἕκαστον.

Ἡ δὲ κωμῳδία ἐστὶν ὥσπερ εἴπομεν μίμησις φαυ- 5
λοτέρων μέν, οὐ μέντοι κατὰ πᾶσαν κακίαν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ ἐστι τὸ γελοῖον μόριον. τὸ γὰρ γελοῖόν ἐστιν ἁμάρτημά τι καὶ αἶσχος ἀνώδυνον καὶ οὐ φθαρτικόν, οἷον εὐθὺς τὸ γελοῖον πρόσωπον αἰσχρόν τι καὶ διεστραμμένον ἄνευ ὀδύνης. αἱ μὲν οὖν τῆς τραγῳδίας μεταβάσεις καὶ δι' ὧν ἐγένοντο οὐ λελήθασιν, ἡ δὲ κωμῳδία διὰ τὸ μὴ
1449^{b} σπουδάζεσθαι ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλαθεν· καὶ γὰρ χορὸν κωμῳδῶν ὀψέ ποτε ὁ ἄρχων ἔδωκεν, ἀλλ' ἐθελονταὶ ἦσαν. ἤδη δὲ σχήματά τινα αὐτῆς ἐχούσης οἱ λεγόμενοι αὐτῆς ποιηταὶ μνημονεύονται. τίς δὲ πρόσωπα ἀπέδωκεν ἢ προλόγους ἢ πλήθη ὑποκριτῶν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἠγνόηται. τὸ δὲ μύθους ποιεῖν [Ἐπίχαρμος καὶ Φόρμις] τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκ Σικελίας ἦλθε * *, τῶν δὲ Ἀθήνησιν Κράτης πρῶτος ἦρξεν ἀφέμενος τῆς ἰαμβικῆς ἰδέας καθόλου ποιεῖν λόγους καὶ μύθους. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐποποιία τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ μέχρι μὲν τοῦ ⟨διὰ⟩ μέτρου μεγάλου μίμησις εἶναι σπουδαίων ἠκολούθησεν· τῷ δὲ τὸ μέτρον ἁπλοῦν ἔχειν καὶ ἀπαγγελίαν εἶναι, ταύτῃ διαφέρουσιν· ἔτι δὲ τῷ μήκει—ἡ μὲν ὅτι μάλιστα πειρᾶται ὑπὸ μίαν περίοδον ἡλίου εἶναι ἢ μικρὸν ἐξαλλάττειν, ἡ δὲ ἐποποιία ἀόριστος τῷ χρόνῳ—καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρει, καίτοι

28 ἄλλα ὡς apogr. (confirm. Ar.): ἄλλωσ A^c 34 γέλοιον (bis) A^c 1449^{b} 1 κωμῳδῷ scripseram: κωμῳδοῖς coni. Bernhardy 6 Ἐπίχαρμος καὶ Φόρμις seclusit Susemihl 7 lacunam indicavi; intercidisse videntur ἦσαν γὰρ Ἐπίχαρμος καὶ Φόρμις ἐκεῖθεν 8 εἰδέασ A^c 9 μὲν τοῦ Tyrwhitt: μόνου A^c 10 διὰ add. Ueberweg 11 τῷ] τὸ A^c 12 μὲν] μὲν γὰρ apogr. 14 τοῦτο pr. A^c

in conversation, whereas we rarely talk hexameters, and only when we depart from the speaking tone of voice. (4) Another change was a plurality of episodes or acts. As for the remaining matters, the superadded embellishments and the account of their introduction, these must be taken as said, as it would probably be a long piece of work to go through the details.

As for Comedy, it is (as has been observed) an imitation of men worse than the average; worse, however, not as regards any and every sort of fault, but only as regards one particular kind, the Ridiculous, which is a species of the Ugly. The Ridiculous may be defined as a mistake or deformity not productive of pain or harm to others; the mask, for instance, that excites laughter, is something ugly and distorted without causing pain.

Though the successive changes in Tragedy and their authors are not unknown, we cannot say the same of Comedy; its early stages passed unnoticed, because it was not as yet taken up in a serious way. It was only at a late point in its progress that a chorus of comedians was officially granted by the archon; they used to be mere volunteers. It had also already certain definite forms at the time when the record of those termed comic poets begins. Who it was who supplied it with masks, or prologues, or a plurality of actors and the like, has remained unknown. The invented Fable, or Plot, however, originated in Sicily, with Epicharmus and Phormis; of Athenian poets Crates was the first to drop the Comedy of invective and frame stories of a general and non-personal nature, in other words, Fables or Plots.

Epic poetry, then, has been seen to agree with Tragedy to this extent, that of being an imitation of serious subjects in a grand kind of verse. It differs from it, however, (1) in that it is in one kind of verse and in narrative form; and (2) in its length—which is due to its action having no fixed limit of time, whereas Tragedy endeavours to keep as far as possible within a single circuit of the sun, or something near that. This, I say, is another point of difference between them, though at first the practice in this respect was just the

τὸ πρῶτον ὁμοίως ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις τοῦτο ἐποίουν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔπεσιν. μέρη δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν ταὐτά, τὰ δὲ ἴδια τῆς τραγῳδίας—διόπερ ὅστις περὶ τραγῳδίας οἶδε σπουδαίας καὶ φαύλης, οἶδε καὶ περὶ ἐπῶν. ἃ μὲν γὰρ ἐποποιία ἔχει, ὑπάρχει τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ, ἃ δὲ αὐτῇ, οὐ πάντα ἐν τῇ ἐποποιίᾳ.

Περὶ ⟨μὲν⟩ οὖν τῆς ἐν ἑξαμέτροις μιμητικῆς καὶ περὶ 6
κωμῳδίας ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν· περὶ δὲ τραγῳδίας λέγωμεν ἀναλαβόντες αὐτῆς ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων τὸν γινόμενον ὅρον τῆς οὐσίας. ἔστιν οὖν τραγῳδία μίμησις πράξεως σπουδαίας καὶ τελείας μέγεθος ἐχούσης, ἡδυσμένῳ λόγῳ χωρὶς ἑκάστῳ τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοῖς μορίοις, δρώντων καὶ οὐ δι' ἀπαγγελίας, δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν. λέγω δὲ ἡδυσμένον μὲν λόγον τὸν ἔχοντα ῥυθμὸν καὶ ἁρμονίαν καὶ μέλος, τὸ δὲ χωρὶς τοῖς εἴδεσι τὸ διὰ μέτρων ἔνια μόνον περαίνεσθαι καὶ πάλιν ἕτερα διὰ μέλους. ἐπεὶ δὲ πράττοντες ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν, πρῶτον μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἂν εἴη τι μόριον τραγῳδίας ὁ τῆς ὄψεως κόσμος, εἶτα μελοποιία καὶ λέξις· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν. λέγω δὲ λέξιν μὲν ταύτην, τὴν τῶν μέτρων σύνθεσιν, μελοποιίαν δὲ ὃ τὴν δύναμιν φανερὰν ἔχει πᾶσαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πράξεώς ἐστι μίμησις, πράττεται δὲ ὑπὸ τινῶν πραττόντων, οὓς ἀνάγκη ποιούς τινας εἶναι κατά τε τὸ ἦθος καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, διὰ γὰρ τούτων καὶ τὰς
1450a πράξεις εἶναί φαμεν ποιάς τινας, πέφυκεν αἴτια δύο τῶν πράξεων εἶναι, διάνοιαν καὶ ἦθος, καὶ κατὰ ταύτας καὶ

16 ταῦτα A^c 21 μὲν add. apogr. 23 ἀναλαβόντες Bernays: ἀπολαβόντεσ A^c 25 ἑκάστῳ Reiz (occupavit versio Paccii): ἑκάστου A^c 28 παθημάτων corr. apogr. (*perturbationum* Paccius; confirm. Syriaca interpretatio ap. Margoliouth A. O. p. 55): μαθημάτων A^c 34 ταύτην scripsi: αὐτὴν A^c 36 πᾶσιν Madius
1450a 1 πέφυκε δὲ αἴτια Parisinus 2938 2 ταῦτα Reiz

same in tragedies as in epic poems. They differ also (3) in their constituents, some being common to both and others peculiar to Tragedy—hence a judge of good and bad in Tragedy is a judge of that in epic poetry also. All the parts of an epic are included in Tragedy; but those of Tragedy are not all of them to be found in the Epic.

Reserving hexameter poetry and Comedy for consideration 6 hereafter, let us proceed now to the discussion of Tragedy; before doing so, however, we must gather up the definition resulting from what has been said. A tragedy, then, is the imitation of an action that is serious and also, as having magnitude, complete in itself; in language with pleasurable accessories, each kind brought in separately in the parts of the work; in a dramatic, not in a narrative form; with incidents arousing pity and fear, wherewith to accomplish its catharsis of such emotions. Here by 'language with pleasurable accessories' I mean that with rhythm and harmony or song superadded; and by 'the kinds separately' I mean that some portions are worked out with verse only, and others in turn with song.

I. As they act the stories, it follows that in the first place the Spectacle (or stage-appearance of the actors) must be some part of the whole; and in the second Melody and Diction, these two being the means of their imitation. Here by 'Diction' I mean merely this, the composition of the verses; and by 'Melody,' what is too completely understood to require explanation. But further: the subject represented also is an action; and the action involves agents, who must necessarily have their distinctive qualities both of character and thought, since it is from these that we ascribe certain qualities to their actions. There are in the natural order of things, therefore, two causes, Character and

τυγχάνουσι καὶ ἀποτυγχάνουσι πάντες. ἔστιν δὲ τῆς μὲν πράξεως ὁ μῦθος ἡ μίμησις· λέγω γὰρ μῦθον τοῦτον, τὴν σύνθεσιν τῶν πραγμάτων, τὰ δὲ ἤθη, καθ' ὃ ποιούς τινας εἶναί φαμεν τοὺς πράττοντας, διάνοιαν δέ, ἐν ὅσοις λέγοντες ἀποδεικνύασίν τι ἢ καὶ ἀποφαίνονται γνώμην. ἀνάγκη οὖν πάσης τραγῳδίας μέρη εἶναι ἕξ, καθ' ὃ ποιά τις ἐστὶν ἡ τραγῳδία· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ μῦθος καὶ ἤθη καὶ λέξις καὶ διάνοια καὶ ὄψις καὶ μελοποιία. οἷς μὲν γὰρ μιμοῦνται, δύο μέρη ἐστίν, ὡς δὲ μιμοῦνται, ἕν, ἃ δὲ μιμοῦνται, τρία, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδέν. τούτοις μὲν οὖν οὐκ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν ὡς εἰπεῖν κέχρηνται τοῖς εἴδεσιν· καὶ γὰρ ὄψεις ἔχει πᾶν καὶ ἦθος καὶ μῦθον καὶ λέξιν καὶ μέλος καὶ διάνοιαν ὡσαύτως. μέγιστον δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν πραγμάτων σύστασις· ἡ γὰρ τραγῳδία μίμησίς ἐστιν οὐκ ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ πράξεως καὶ βίου καὶ εὐδαιμονίας * * καὶ ἡ κακοδαιμονία ἐν πράξει ἐστίν, καὶ τὸ τέλος πρᾶξίς τις ἐστίν, οὐ ποιότης· εἰσὶν δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὰ ἤθη ποιοί τινες, κατὰ δὲ τὰς πράξεις εὐδαίμονες ἢ τοὐναντίον. οὔκουν ὅπως τὰ ἤθη μιμήσωνται πράττουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἤθη συμπεριλαμβάνουσιν διὰ τὰς πράξεις· ὥστε τὰ πράγματα καὶ ὁ μῦθος τέλος τῆς τραγῳδίας, τὸ δὲ τέλος μέγιστον ἁπάντων. ἔτι ἄνευ μὲν πράξεως οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο τραγῳδία, ἄνευ δὲ ἠθῶν γένοιτ' ἄν. αἱ γὰρ τῶν νέων τῶν πλείστων ἀήθεις τραγῳδίαι εἰσίν, καὶ ὅλως ποιηταὶ πολλοὶ τοιοῦτοι, οἷον καὶ τῶν γραφέων Ζεῦξις πρὸς Πολύγνωτον πέπονθεν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Πολύγνωτος ἀγαθὸς ἠθογράφος, ἡ δὲ Ζεύξιδος γραφὴ οὐδὲν

3 ἔστιν δὴ conieceram 12 ὡς εἰπεῖν fortasse post ὄψεις ἔχει πᾶν collocandum 13 ὄψισ A^c 17 intercidisse καὶ κακοδαιμονίας, ἡ δὲ εὐδαιμονία coni. Vahlen 21 συμπαραλαμβάνουσι Guelferbytanus (m. 1), Spengel 27 πολύγνωστον et πολύγνωστοσ A^c

Thought, of their actions, and consequently of their success or failure in their lives. Now the action (that which was done) is represented in the play by the Fable or Plot. The Fable, in our present sense of the term, is simply this, the combination of the incidents, or things done in the story; whereas Character is what makes us ascribe certain moral qualities to the agents; and Thought is shown in all they say when proving a particular point or, it may be, enunciating a general truth. There are six parts consequently of every tragedy, as a whole, that is, of such or such quality, viz. a Fable or Plot, Characters, Diction, Thought, Spectacle and Melody; two of them arising from the means, one from the manner, and three from the objects of the dramatic imitation; and there is nothing else besides these six. Of these, its formative elements, then, not a few of the dramatists have made due use, as every play, one may say, admits of Spectacle, Character, Fable, Diction, Melody, and Thought.

II. The most important of the six is the combination of the incidents of the story. Tragedy is essentially an imitation not of persons but of action and life, of happiness and misery. All human happiness or misery takes the form of action; the end for which we live is a certain kind of activity, not a quality. Character gives us qualities, but it is in our actions—what we do—that we are happy or the reverse. In a play accordingly they do not act in order to portray the Characters; they include the Characters for the sake of the action. So that it is the action in it, i. e. its Fable or Plot, that is the end and purpose of the tragedy; and the end is everywhere the chief thing. Besides this, a tragedy is impossible without action, but there may be one without Character. The tragedies of most of the moderns are characterless—a defect common among poets of all kinds, and with its counterpart in painting in Zeuxis as compared with Polygnotus; for whereas the latter is strong in character, the work of Zeuxis is devoid of it. And

ἔχει ἦθος. ἔτι ἐάν τις ἐφεξῆς θῇ ῥήσεις ἠθικὰς καὶ λέξει καὶ διανοίᾳ εὖ πεποιημένας, ⟨οὔπω⟩ ποιήσει ὃ ἦν τῆς τραγῳδίας ἔργον, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἡ καταδεεστέροις τούτοις κεχρημένη τραγῳδία, ἔχουσα δὲ μῦθον καὶ σύστασιν πραγμάτων. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὰ μέγιστα οἷς ψυχαγωγεῖ ἡ τραγῳδία τοῦ μύθου μέρη ἐστίν, αἵ τε περιπέτειαι καὶ ἀναγνωρίσεις. ἔτι σημεῖον ὅτι καὶ οἱ ἐγχειροῦντες ποιεῖν πρότερον δύνανται τῇ λέξει καὶ τοῖς ἤθεσιν ἀκριβοῦν ἢ τὰ πράγματα συνίστασθαι, οἷον καὶ οἱ πρῶτοι ποιηταὶ σχεδὸν ἅπαντες. ἀρχὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ οἷον ψυχὴ ὁ μῦθος τῆς τραγῳδίας, δεύτερον δὲ τὰ ἤθη (παραπλήσιον γάρ ἐστιν καὶ
1450b ἐπὶ τῆς γραφικῆς· εἰ γάρ τις ἐναλείψειε τοῖς καλλίστοις φαρμάκοις χύδην, οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως εὐφράνειεν καὶ λευκογραφήσας εἰκόνα)· ἔστιν τε μίμησις πράξεως καὶ διὰ ταύτην μάλιστα τῶν πραττόντων. τρίτον δὲ ἡ διάνοια· τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν τὸ λέγειν δύνασθαι τὰ ἐνόντα καὶ τὰ ἁρμόττοντα, ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ ῥητορικῆς ἔργον ἐστίν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαῖοι πολιτικῶς ἐποίουν λέγοντας, οἱ δὲ νῦν ῥητορικῶς. ἔστιν δὲ ἦθος μὲν τὸ τοιοῦτον ὃ δηλοῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν, ὁποῖά τις ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἔστι δῆλον ἢ προαιρεῖται ἢ φεύγει—διόπερ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἦθος τῶν λόγων ἐν οἷς μηδ᾿ ὅλως ἔστιν ὅ τι προαιρεῖται ἢ φεύγει ὁ λέγων—διάνοια δὲ ἐν οἷς ἀποδεικνύουσί τι ὡς ἔστιν ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ καθόλου τι ἀποφαίνονται. τέταρτον δὲ τῶν ἐν λόγῳ ἡ λέξις· λέγω δέ, ὥσπερ πρότερον εἴρηται, λέξιν εἶναι τὴν διὰ τῆς ὀνομασίας ἑρμηνείαν, ὃ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμμέτρων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ἔχει τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν

29 λέξει καὶ διανοίᾳ Vahlen: λέξεισ καὶ διανοίασ A^c 30 οὔπω (ni fallor) add. Ar.: οὐ add. apogr. 31 ἡ] ἢ A^c 1450b 10 τι] τισ A^c 12 ἐν λόγῳ scripsi: μὲν λόγων A^c

again: one may string together a series of characteristic speeches of the utmost finish as regards Diction and Thought, and yet fail to produce the true tragic effect; but one will have much better success with a tragedy which, however inferior in these respects, has a Plot, a combination of incidents, in it. And again: the most powerful elements of attraction in Tragedy, the Peripeties and Discoveries, are parts of the Plot. A further proof is in the fact that beginners succeed earlier with the Diction and Characters than with the construction of a story; and the same may be said of nearly all the early dramatists. We maintain, therefore, that the first essential, the life and soul, so to speak, of Tragedy is the Plot; and that the Characters come second—compare the parallel in painting, where the most beautiful colours laid on without order will not give one the same pleasure as a simple black-and-white sketch of a portrait. We maintain that Tragedy is primarily an imitation of action, and that it is mainly for the sake of the action that it imitates the personal agents. Third comes the element of Thought, i. e. the power of saying whatever can be said, or what is appropriate to the occasion. This is what, in the speeches in Tragedy, falls under the arts of Politics and Rhetoric; for the older poets make their personages discourse like statesmen, and the moderns like rhetoricians. One must not confuse it with Character. Character in a play is that which reveals the moral purpose of the agents, i. e. the sort of thing they seek or avoid, where that is not obvious—hence there is no room for Character in a speech on a purely indifferent subject. Thought, on the other hand, is shown in all they say when proving or disproving some particular point, or enunciating some universal proposition. Fourth among the literary elements is the Diction of the personages, i.e. as before explained, the expression of their thoughts in words, which is practically the same thing with verse as with prose. As for the two remaining parts, the Melody

[πέντε] ἡ μελοποιία μέγιστον τῶν ἡδυσμάτων, ἡ δὲ ὄψις ψυχαγωγικὸν μέν, ἀτεχνότατον δὲ καὶ ἥκιστα οἰκεῖον τῆς ποιητικῆς· ἡ γὰρ τῆς τραγῳδίας δύναμις καὶ ἄνευ ἀγῶνος καὶ ὑποκριτῶν ἔστιν, ἔτι δὲ κυριωτέρα περὶ τὴν ἀπεργασίαν τῶν ὄψεων ἡ τοῦ σκευοποιοῦ τέχνη τῆς τῶν ποιητῶν ἐστιν.

Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων, λέγωμεν μετὰ ταῦτα ποίαν 7
τινὰ δεῖ τὴν σύστασιν εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μέγιστον τῆς τραγῳδίας ἐστίν. κεῖται δὴ ἡμῖν τὴν τραγῳδίαν τελείας καὶ ὅλης πράξεως εἶναι μίμησιν ἐχούσης τι μέγεθος· ἔστιν γὰρ ὅλον καὶ μηδὲν ἔχον μέγεθος. ὅλον δέ ἐστιν τὸ ἔχον ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσον καὶ τελευτήν. ἀρχὴ δέ ἐστιν ὃ αὐτὸ μὲν μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μετ' ἄλλο ἐστίν, μετ' ἐκεῖνο δ' ἕτερον πέφυκεν εἶναι ἢ γίνεσθαι· τελευτὴ δὲ τοὐναντίον ὃ αὐτὸ μετ' ἄλλο πέφυκεν εἶναι ἢ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἄλλο οὐδέν· μέσον δὲ ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ μετ' ἄλλο καὶ μετ' ἐκεῖνο ἕτερον. δεῖ ἄρα τοὺς συνεστῶτας εὖ μύθους μήθ' ὁπόθεν ἔτυχεν ἄρχεσθαι μήθ' ὅπου ἔτυχε τελευτᾶν, ἀλλὰ κεχρῆσθαι ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἰδέαις. ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ζῷον καὶ ἅπαν πρᾶγμα ὃ συνέστηκεν ἐκ τινῶν οὐ μόνον ταῦτα τεταγμένα δεῖ ἔχειν ἀλλὰ καὶ μέγεθος ὑπάρχειν μὴ τὸ τυχόν· τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἐστίν, διὸ οὔτε πάμμικρον ἄν τι γένοιτο καλὸν ζῷον (συγχεῖται γὰρ ἡ θεωρία ἐγγὺς τοῦ ἀναισθήτου χρόνου γινομένη) οὔτε παμμέγεθες (οὐ γὰρ
1451a ἅμα ἡ θεωρία γίνεται ἀλλ' οἴχεται τοῖς θεωροῦσι τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῆς θεωρίας) οἷον εἰ μυρίων σταδίων εἴη

16 πέντε induxit Spengel (om. Ar.) : πέμπτον apogr. 17 ἀπεχνώτατον A^c 18 ἡ apogr. : ὡσ A^c : ἴσως Meiser 23 δὴ scripsi : δ' A^c 34 εἰδέαισ A^c 37 πάμμικρον Riccardianus 16 (*perexiguum* Averroes) : πᾶν μικρὸν A^c 39 παμμέγεθες Riccardianus 16: πᾶν μέγεθοσ A^c

is the greatest of the pleasurable accessories of Tragedy. The Spectacle, though an attraction, is the least artistic of all the parts, and has least to do with the art of poetry. The tragic effect is quite possible without a public performance and actors; and besides, the getting-up of the Spectacle is more a matter for the costumier than the poet.

Having thus distinguished the parts, let us now consider 7 the proper construction of the Fable or Plot, as that is at once the first and the most important thing in Tragedy. We have laid it down that a tragedy is an imitation of an action that is complete in itself, as a whole of some magnitude; for a whole may be of no magnitude to speak of. Now a whole is that which has beginning, middle, and end. A beginning is that which is not itself necessarily after anything else, and which has naturally something else after it; an end is that which is naturally after something itself, either as its necessary or usual consequent, and with nothing else after it; and a middle, that which is by nature after one thing and has also another after it. A well-constructed Plot, therefore, cannot either begin or end at any point one likes; beginning and end in it must be of the forms just described. Again: to be beautiful, a living creature, and every whole made up of parts, must not only present a certain order in its arrangement of parts, but also be of a certain definite magnitude. Beauty is a matter of size and order, and therefore impossible either (1) in a very minute creature, since our perception becomes indistinct as it approaches instantaneity; or (2) in a creature of vast size—one, say, 1000 miles long—as in that case, instead of

ζῷον· ὥστε δεῖ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν συστημάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζῴων ἔχειν μὲν μέγεθος, τοῦτο δὲ εὐσύνοπτον εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μύθων ἔχειν μὲν μῆκος, τοῦτο δὲ εὐμνημόνευτον εἶναι. τοῦ μήκους ὅρος ⟨ὁ⟩ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν οὐ τῆς τέχνης ἐστίν· εἰ γὰρ ἔδει ἑκατὸν τραγῳδίας ἀγωνίζεσθαι, πρὸς κλεψύδρας ἂν ἠγωνίζοντο, ὥσπερ ποτὲ καὶ ἄλλοτέ †φασιν†. ὁ δὲ κατ᾽ αὐτὴν τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος ὅρος, ἀεὶ μὲν ὁ μείζων μέχρι τοῦ σύνδηλος εἶναι καλλίων ἐστὶ κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος· ὡς δὲ ἁπλῶς διορίσαντας εἰπεῖν, ἐν ὅσῳ μεγέθει κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἐφεξῆς γιγνομένων συμβαίνει εἰς εὐτυχίαν ἐκ δυστυχίας ἢ ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν μεταβάλλειν, ἱκανὸς ὅρος ἐστὶν τοῦ μεγέθους.

Μῦθος δ᾽ ἐστὶν εἷς οὐχ ὥσπερ τινὲς οἴονται ἐὰν 8
περὶ ἕνα ᾖ· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ ἄπειρα τῷ ἑνὶ συμβαίνει, ἐξ ὧν ἐνίων οὐδέν ἐστιν ἕν· οὕτως δὲ καὶ πράξεις ἑνὸς πολλαί εἰσιν, ἐξ ὧν μία οὐδεμία γίνεται πρᾶξις. διὸ πάντες ἐοίκασιν ἁμαρτάνειν ὅσοι τῶν ποιητῶν Ἡρακληίδα Θησηίδα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιήματα πεποιήκασιν· οἴονται γάρ, ἐπεὶ εἷς ἦν ὁ Ἡρακλῆς, ἕνα καὶ τὸν μῦθον εἶναι προσήκειν. ὁ δ᾽ Ὅμηρος ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα διαφέρει καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἔοικεν καλῶς ἰδεῖν, ἤτοι διὰ τέχνην ἢ διὰ φύσιν· Ὀδύσσειαν γὰρ ποιῶν οὐκ ἐποίησεν ἅπαντα ὅσα αὐτῷ συνέβη, οἷον πληγῆναι μὲν ἐν τῷ Παρνασσῷ, μανῆναι δὲ προσποιήσασθαι ἐν τῷ ἀγερμῷ, ὧν οὐδὲ θατέρου γενομένου ἀναγκαῖον ἢ εἰκὸς θάτερον γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ περὶ μίαν πρᾶξιν οἵαν λέγομεν τὴν Ὀδύσσειαν συνέστησεν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν Ἰλιά-

1451a 3 συστημάτων scripsi: σωμάτων A^c 6 ὁ add. Bursian 9 ἄλλοτε φασίν A^c: ἄλλοτ᾽ εἰώθασιν M. Schmidt 17 ἑνὶ apogr. (confirm. Ar.): γένει A^c 18 οὕτω apogr. 27 οὐδὲ scripsi: οὐδὲν A^c 28 ἢ Spengel: ἦν A^c: ἦν ἢ apogr. 29 λέγοιμεν A^c

the object being seen all at once, the unity and wholeness of it is lost to the beholder. Just in the same way, then, as a beautiful whole made up of parts, or a beautiful living creature, must be of some size, a size to be taken in by the eye, so a story or Plot must be of some length, but of a length to be taken in by the memory. As for the limit of its length, so far as that is relative to public performances and spectators, it does not fall within the theory of poetry. If they had to perform a hundred tragedies, they would be timed by water-clocks, † as they are said to have been at one period †. The limit, however, set by the actual nature of the thing is this: the longer the story, consistently with its being comprehensible as a whole, the finer it is by reason of its magnitude. As a rough general formula, 'a length which allows of the hero passing by a series of probable or necessary stages from misfortune to happiness, or from happiness to misfortune,' may suffice as a limit for the magnitude of the story.

The Unity of a Plot does not consist, as some suppose, 8
in its having one man as its subject. An infinity of things befall that one man, some of which it is impossible to reduce to unity; and in like manner there are many actions of one man which cannot be made to form one action. One sees, therefore, the mistake of all the poets who have written a *Heracleid*, a *Theseid*, or similar poems; they suppose that, because Heracles was one man, the story also of Heracles must be one story. Homer, however, evidently understood this point quite well, whether by art or instinct, just in the same way as he excels the rest in every other respect. In writing an *Odyssey*, he did not make the poem cover all that ever befell his hero—it befell him, for instance, to get wounded on Parnassus and also to feign madness at the time of the call to arms, but the two incidents had no probable or necessary connexion with one another—instead of doing that, he took an action with a Unity of the kind we are describing as the subject of the *Odyssey*, as also of the *Iliad*. The truth is

δα. χρὴ οὖν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις μιμητικαῖς ἡ μία μίμησις ἑνός ἐστιν, οὕτω καὶ τὸν μῦθον, ἐπεὶ πράξεως μίμησίς ἐστι, μιᾶς τε εἶναι ταύτης καὶ ὅλης, καὶ τὰ μέρη συνεστάναι τῶν πραγμάτων οὕτως ὥστε μετατιθεμένου τινὸς μέρους ἢ ἀφαιρουμένου διαφέρεσθαι καὶ κινεῖσθαι τὸ ὅλον· ὃ γὰρ προσὸν ἢ μὴ προσὸν μηδὲν ποιεῖ ἐπίδηλον, οὐδὲν μόριον τοῦ ὅλου ἐστίν.

9 Φανερὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ τὰ γενόμενα λέγειν, τοῦτο ποιητοῦ ἔργον ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οἷα ἂν γένοιτο καὶ τὰ δυνατὰ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον. ὁ γὰρ 1451b ἱστορικὸς καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς οὐ τῷ ἢ ἔμμετρα λέγειν ἢ ἄμετρα διαφέρουσιν (εἴη γὰρ ἂν τὰ Ἡροδότου εἰς μέτρα τεθῆναι καὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἂν εἴη ἱστορία τις μετὰ μέτρου ἢ ἄνευ μέτρων)· ἀλλὰ τούτῳ διαφέρει, τῷ τὸν μὲν τὰ γενόμενα λέγειν, τὸν δὲ οἷα ἂν γένοιτο. διὸ καὶ φιλοσοφώτερον καὶ σπουδαιότερον ποίησις ἱστορίας ἐστίν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ποίησις μᾶλλον τὰ καθόλου, ἡ δ' ἱστορία τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον λέγει. ἔστιν δὲ καθόλου μέν, τῷ ποίῳ τὰ ποῖα ἄττα συμβαίνει λέγειν ἢ πράττειν κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, οὗ στοχάζεται ἡ ποίησις ὀνόματα ἐπιτιθεμένη· τὸ δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον, τί Ἀλκιβιάδης ἔπραξεν ἢ τί ἔπαθεν. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς κωμῳδίας ἤδη τοῦτο δῆλον γέγονεν· συστήσαντες γὰρ τὸν μῦθον διὰ τῶν εἰκότων οὕτω τὰ τυχόντα ὀνόματα ὑποτιθέασιν, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ ἰαμβοποιοὶ περὶ τὸν καθ' ἕκαστον ποιοῦσιν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς τραγῳδίας τῶν γενομένων ὀνομάτων ἀντέχονται. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι πιθανόν ἐστι τὸ δυνατόν· τὰ μὲν οὖν μὴ γενόμενα οὔπω πιστεύομεν εἶναι δυνατά, τὰ δὲ γε-

32 ταύτης καὶ Susemihl (ed. 1) : καὶ ταύτησ A^c 36 οὐ τὸ apogr. (confirm. Ar.) : οὕτω A^c γενόμενα Riccardianus 16 : γινόμενα A^c 1451b 4 τοῦτο A^c, Spengel τῷ] τὸ Spengel 10 τὸ] τὸν A^c 13 οὕτω] οὔπω (ni fallor) Ar. 14 περὶ τῶν apogr. 16 πειθανόν A^c

that, just as in the other imitative arts one imitation is always of one thing, so in poetry the story, as an imitation of action, must represent one action, a complete whole, with its several incidents so closely connected that the transposal or withdrawal of any one of them will disjoin and dislocate the whole. For that which makes no perceptible difference by its presence or absence is no real part of the whole.

9 From what we have said it will be seen that the poet's function is to describe, not the thing that has happened, but, a kind of thing that might happen, i. e. what is possible as being probable or necessary. The distinction between historian and poet is not in the one writing prose and the other verse—you might put the work of Herodotus into verse, and it would still be a species of history; it consists really in this, that the one describes the thing that has been, and the other a kind of thing that might be. Hence poetry is something more philosophic and of graver import than history, since its statements are of the nature rather of universals, whereas those of history are singulars. By a universal statement I mean one as to what such or such a kind of man will probably or necessarily say or do—which is the aim of poetry, though it affixes proper names to the characters; by a singular statement, one as to what, say, Alcibiades did or had done to him. In Comedy this has become clear by this time; it is only when their plot is already made up of probable incidents that they give it a basis of proper names, choosing for the purpose any names that may occur to them, instead of writing like the old iambic poets about particular persons. In Tragedy, however, they still adhere to the historic names; and for this reason: what convinces is the possible; now whereas we are not yet sure as to the possibility of that which has not hap-

νόμενα φανερὸν ὅτι δυνατά· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐγένετο, εἰ ἦν ἀδύνατα. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις ἐνίαις μὲν ἓν ἢ δύο τῶν γνωρίμων ἐστὶν ὀνομάτων, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πεποιημένα, ἐν ἐνίαις δὲ οὐθέν, οἷον ἐν τῷ Ἀγάθωνος Ἀνθεῖ· ὁμοίως γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ τά τε πράγματα καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα πεποίηται, καὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον εὐφραίνει. ὥστ' οὐ πάντως ἂν εἴη ζητητέον τῶν παραδεδομένων μύθων, περὶ οὓς αἱ τραγῳδίαι εἰσίν, ἀντέχεσθαι. καὶ γὰρ γελοῖον τοῦτο ζητεῖν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ γνώριμα ὀλίγοις γνώριμά ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὅμως εὐφραίνει πάντας. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι τὸν ποιητὴν μᾶλλον τῶν μύθων εἶναι δεῖ ποιητὴν ἢ τῶν μέτρων, ὅσῳ ποιητὴς κατὰ τὴν μίμησίν ἐστιν, μιμεῖται δὲ τὰς πράξεις. κἂν ἄρα συμβῇ γενόμενα ποιεῖν, οὐθὲν ἧττον ποιητής ἐστι· τῶν γὰρ γενομένων ἔνια οὐδὲν κωλύει τοιαῦτα εἶναι οἷα ἂν εἰκὸς γενέσθαι καὶ δυνατὰ γενέσθαι, καθ' ὃ ἐκεῖνος αὐτῶν ποιητής ἐστιν.

τῶν δὲ ἁπλῶν μύθων καὶ πράξεων αἱ ἐπεισοδιώδεις εἰσὶν χείρισται· λέγω δ' ἐπεισοδιώδη μῦθον ἐν ᾧ τὰ ἐπεισόδια μετ' ἄλληλα οὔτ' εἰκὸς οὔτ' ἀνάγκη εἶναι. τοιαῦται δὲ ποιοῦνται ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν φαύλων ποιητῶν δι' αὐτούς, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν διὰ τοὺς ὑποκριτάς· ἀγωνίσματα γὰρ ποιοῦντες καὶ παρὰ τὴν δύναμιν παρατείναντες μῦθον πολ-
1452a *λάκις διαστρέφειν ἀναγκάζονται τὸ ἐφεξῆς. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ μόνον τελείας ἐστὶ πράξεως ἡ μίμησις ἀλλὰ καὶ φοβερῶν καὶ ἐλεεινῶν, ταῦτα δὲ γίνεται καὶ μάλιστα [καὶ μᾶλλον] ὅταν γένηται παρὰ τὴν δόξαν δι' ἄλληλα· τὸ γὰρ θαυμαστὸν οὕτως ἕξει μᾶλλον ἢ εἰ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου καὶ τῆς τύχης, ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης ταῦτα θαυμασιώτατα*

19 *ἐνίαις*] *ἐν ἐνίαις* apogr. 21 *οὐθ' ἓν* A^c *Ἀνθεῖ* Welcker : *ἄνθει* A^c 23 *ὥστ' οὐ*] *ὡσ τοῦ* A^c *ἂν εἴη* M. Schmidt : *εἶναι* A^c 33 *ἁπλῶν*] *ἄλλων* Tyrwhitt 37 *κριτάς* apogr. 38 *παρατείνοντες* apogr. 1452a 3 *καὶ μᾶλλον* induxit Spenge

pened, that which has happened is manifestly possible, else it would not have come to pass. Nevertheless even in Tragedy there are some plays with but one or two known names in them, the rest being inventions; and there are some without a single known name, e. g. Agathon's *Antheus*, in which both incidents and names are of the poet's invention; and it is no less delightful on that account. So that one must not aim at a rigid adherence to the traditional stories on which tragedies are based. It would be absurd, in fact, to do so, as even the known stories are only known to a few, though they are a delight none the less to all.

It is evident from the above that the poet must be more the poet of his stories or Plots than of his verses, inasmuch as he is a poet by virtue of the imitative element in his work, and it is actions that he imitates. And if he should come to take a subject from actual history, he is none the less a poet for that; since some historic occurrences may very well be in the probable and possible order of things; and it is in that aspect of them that he is their poet.

Of simple Plots and actions the episodic are the worst. I call a Plot episodic when there is neither probability nor necessity in the sequence of its episodes. Actions of this sort bad poets construct through their own fault, and good ones on account of the players. His work being for public performance, a good poet often stretches out a Plot beyond its capabilities, and is thus obliged to twist the sequence of incident.

Tragedy, however, is an imitation not only of a complete action, but also of incidents arousing pity and fear. Such incidents have the very greatest effect on the mind when they occur unexpectedly and at the same time in consequence of one another; there is more of the marvellous in them then than if they happened of themselves or by mere chance. Even matters of chance seem most marvellous if there is

δοκεῖ ὅσα ὥσπερ ἐπίτηδες φαίνεται γεγονέναι, οἷον ὡς ὁ ἀνδριὰς ὁ τοῦ Μίτυος ἐν Ἄργει ἀπέκτεινεν τὸν αἴτιον τοῦ θανάτου τῷ Μίτυι, θεωροῦντι ἐμπεσών· ἔοικε γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐκ εἰκῇ γενέσθαι· ὥστε ἀνάγκη τοὺς τοιούτους εἶναι καλλίους μύθους.

Εἰσὶ δὲ τῶν μύθων οἱ μὲν ἁπλοῖ οἱ δὲ πεπλεγμένοι· 10
καὶ γὰρ αἱ πράξεις ὧν μιμήσεις οἱ μῦθοί εἰσιν ὑπάρχουσιν εὐθὺς οὖσαι τοιαῦται. λέγω δὲ ἁπλῆν μὲν πρᾶξιν ἧς γινομένης ὥσπερ ὥρισται συνεχοῦς καὶ μιᾶς ἄνευ περιπετείας ἢ ἀναγνωρισμοῦ ἡ μετάβασις γίνεται, πεπλεγμένη δὲ †λέξις† μετὰ ἀναγνωρισμοῦ ἢ περιπετείας ἢ ἀμφοῖν ἡ μετάβασίς ἐστιν. ταῦτα δὲ δεῖ γίνεσθαι ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς συστάσεως τοῦ μύθου, ὥστε ἐκ τῶν προγεγενημένων συμβαίνειν ἢ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς γίγνεσθαι ταῦτα· διαφέρει γὰρ πολὺ τὸ γίγνεσθαι τάδε διὰ τάδε ἢ μετὰ τάδε.

Ἔστι δὲ περιπέτεια μὲν ἡ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν πρατ- 11
τομένων μεταβολὴ καθάπερ εἴρηται, καὶ τοῦτο δὲ ὥσπερ λέγομεν κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ ἀναγκαῖον, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Οἰδίποδι ἐλθὼν ὡς εὐφρανῶν τὸν Οἰδίπουν καὶ ἀπαλλάξων τοῦ πρὸς τὴν μητέρα φόβου, δηλώσας ὃς ἦν, τοὐναντίον ἐποίησεν· καὶ ἐν τῷ Λυγκεῖ ὁ μὲν ἀγόμενος ὡς ἀποθανούμενος, ὁ δὲ Δαναὸς ἀκολουθῶν ὡς ἀποκτενῶν, τὸν μὲν συνέβη ἐκ τῶν πεπραγμένων ἀποθανεῖν, τὸν δὲ σωθῆναι. ἀναγνώρισις δέ, ὥσπερ καὶ τοὔνομα σημαίνει, ἐξ ἀγνοίας εἰς γνῶσιν μεταβολή, ἢ εἰς φιλίαν ἢ εἰς ἔχθραν, τῶν πρὸς εὐτυχίαν ἢ δυστυχίαν ὡρισμένων· καλλίστη δὲ ἀναγνώρισις, ὅταν ἅμα περιπέτειαι γίνωνται, οἵαν ἔχει ἡ ἐν τῷ Οἰδίποδι. εἰσὶν

9 *μήτυϊ* A^{c} 13 *ὑπάρχουσι* A^{c} 17 *δὲ λέξις*] *δὲ ἐξ ἧς* Riccardianus 16 : *δέ ἐστιν ἐξ ἧς* Vahlen : *δ' ἐστὶν ἧς* Susemihl : fortasse reponendum *πεπλεγμένην δὲ λέγω ἧς* 20 *ταῦτα*] *τἀναντία* Bonitz 33 *γίνονται* A^{c} *οἵαν* scripsi : *οἷον* A^{c}

an appearance of design as it were in them; as for instance the statue of Mitys at Argos killed the author of Mitys' death by falling down on him when a looker-on at a public spectacle; for incidents like that we think to be not without a meaning. A Plot, therefore, of this sort is necessarily finer than others.

Plots are either simple or complex, since the actions they 10
represent are naturally of this twofold description. The action, proceeding in the way defined, as one continuous whole, I call simple, when the change in the hero's fortunes takes place without Peripety or Discovery; and complex, when it involves one or the other, or both. These should each of them arise out of the structure of the Plot itself, so as to be the consequence, necessary or probable, of the antecedents. There is a great difference between a thing happening *propter hoc* and *post hoc*.

A Peripety is the change from one state of things within 11
the play to its opposite of the kind described, and that too in the way we are saying, in the probable or necessary sequence of events; as it is for instance in *Oedipus*: here the opposite state of things is produced by the Messenger, who, coming to gladden Oedipus and to remove his fears as to his mother, reveals the secret of his birth. And in *Lynceus*: just as he is being led off for execution, with Danaus at his side to put him to death, the incidents preceding this bring it about that he is saved and Danaus put to death. A Discovery is, as the very word implies, a change from ignorance to knowledge, and thus to either love or hate, in the personages marked for good or evil fortune. The finest form of Discovery is one attended by Peripeties, like that which goes with the Discovery in *Oedipus*. There are

μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλαι ἀναγνωρίσεις· καὶ γὰρ πρὸς ἄψυχα καὶ τὰ τυχόντα ἔστιν ὡς ὅπερ εἴρηται συμβαίνει, καὶ εἰ πέπραγέ τις ἢ μὴ πέπραγεν ἔστιν ἀναγνωρίσαι. ἀλλ' ἡ μάλιστα τοῦ μύθου καὶ ἡ μάλιστα τῆς πράξεως ἡ εἰρημένη ἐστίν· ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη ἀναγνώρισις καὶ περιπέτεια ἢ ἔλεον
1452ᵇ *ἕξει ἢ φόβον, οἵων πράξεων ἡ τραγῳδία μίμησις ὑπόκειται· ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀτυχεῖν καὶ τὸ εὐτυχεῖν ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων συμβήσεται. ἐπεὶ δὴ ἡ ἀναγνώρισις τινῶν ἐστιν ἀναγνώρισις, αἱ μὲν θατέρου πρὸς τὸν ἕτερον μόνον, ὅταν ᾖ δῆλος ἅτερος τίς ἐστιν, ὁτὲ δὲ ἀμφοτέρους δεῖ ἀναγνωρίσαι, οἷον ἡ μὲν Ἰφιγένεια τῷ Ὀρέστῃ ἀνεγνωρίσθη ἐκ τῆς πέμψεως τῆς ἐπιστολῆς, ἐκείνου δὲ πρὸς τὴν Ἰφιγένειαν ἄλλης ἔδει ἀναγνωρίσεως.*

δύο μὲν οὖν τοῦ μύθου μέρη περὶ ταῦτ' ἐστί, περιπέτεια καὶ ἀναγνώρισις· τρίτον δὲ πάθος. τούτων δὲ περιπέτεια μὲν καὶ ἀναγνώρισις εἴρηται, πάθος δέ ἐστι πρᾶξις φθαρτικὴ ἢ ὀδυνηρά, οἷον οἵ τε ἐν τῷ φανερῷ θάνατοι καὶ αἱ περιωδυνίαι καὶ τρώσεις καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα.

Μέρη δὲ τραγῳδίας οἷς μὲν ὡς εἴδεσι δεῖ χρῆσθαι 12
πρότερον εἴπομεν, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ποσὸν καὶ εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται κεχωρισμένα τάδε ἐστίν, πρόλογος ἐπεισόδιον ἔξοδος χορικόν, καὶ τούτου τὸ μὲν πάροδος τὸ δὲ στάσιμον, κοινὰ μὲν ἁπάντων ταῦτα, ἴδια δὲ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνῆς καὶ κόμμοι. ἔστιν δὲ πρόλογος μὲν μέρος ὅλον τραγῳδίας τὸ πρὸ χοροῦ παρόδου, ἐπεισόδιον δὲ μέρος ὅλον τραγῳδίας τὸ μεταξὺ ὅλων χορικῶν μελῶν, ἔξοδος δὲ μέρος ὅλον τραγῳδίας μεθ' ὃ οὐκ ἔστι χοροῦ μέλος· χορικοῦ δὲ πάροδος μὲν ἡ

35 *ὡς ὅπερ* Spengel : *ὥσπερ* Aᶜ 36 *ἢ*] *εἰ* Aᶜ 1452ᵇ 1 *οἷον* Aᶜ 3 *ἐπεὶ δὴ* Parisinus 2038 : *ἐπειδὴ* Aᶜ 4 *ἅτερος* apogr. : *ἕτεροσ* Aᶜ 7 *ἐκείνου* scripsi : *ἐκείνῳ* Aᶜ 9 *περὶ* om. Riccardianus 46 12 *οἵ τε*] *ὅτε* Aᶜ 19 *προχωροῦ* Aᶜ

no doubt other forms of it; what we have said may happen in a way in reference to inanimate things, even things of a very casual kind; and it is also possible to discover whether some one has done or not done something. But the form most directly connected with the Plot and the action of the piece is the first-mentioned. This, with a Peripety, will arouse either pity or fear—actions of that nature being what Tragedy is assumed to represent; and it will also serve to bring about the happy or unhappy ending. The Discovery, then, being of persons, it may be that of one party only to the other, the latter being already known; or both the parties may have to discover themselves. Iphigenia, for instance, was discovered to Orestes by sending the letter; and another Discovery was required to reveal him to Iphigenia.

Two parts of the Plot, then, Peripety and Discovery, are on matters of this sort. A third part is Suffering; which we may define as an action of a destructive or painful nature, such as murders on the stage, tortures, woundings, and the like. The other two have been already explained.

The parts of Tragedy to be treated as formative elements in 12 the whole were mentioned in a previous Chapter. From the point of view, however, of its quantity, i.e. the separate sections into which it is divided, a tragedy has the following parts: Prologue, Episode, Exode, and a choral portion, distinguished into Parode and Stasimon; these two are common to all tragedies, whereas songs from the stage and *Commoe* are only found in some. The Prologue is all that precedes the Parode of the chorus; an Episode all that comes in between two whole choral songs; the Exode all that follows after the last choral song. In the choral portion the Parode is the whole first statement of the chorus; a Stasimon,

πρώτη λέξις ὅλη χοροῦ, στάσιμον δὲ μέλος χοροῦ τὸ ἄνευ ἀναπαίστου καὶ τροχαίου, κόμμος δὲ θρῆνος κοινὸς χοροῦ καὶ ἀπὸ σκηνῆς. μέρη δὲ τραγῳδίας οἷς μὲν ⟨ὡς εἴδεσι⟩ δεῖ χρῆσθαι πρότερον εἴπαμεν, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ποσὸν καὶ εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται κεχωρισμένα ταῦτ' ἐστίν.

Ὧν δὲ δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι καὶ ἃ δεῖ εὐλαβεῖσθαι συνι- 13
στάντας τοὺς μύθους καὶ πόθεν ἔσται τὸ τῆς τραγῳδίας ἔργον, ἐφεξῆς ἂν εἴη λεκτέον τοῖς νῦν εἰρημένοις. ἐπειδὴ οὖν δεῖ τὴν σύνθεσιν εἶναι τῆς καλλίστης τραγῳδίας μὴ ἁπλῆν ἀλλὰ πεπλεγμένην καὶ ταύτην φοβερῶν καὶ ἐλεεινῶν εἶναι μιμητικήν (τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον τῆς τοιαύτης μιμήσεώς ἐστιν), πρῶτον μὲν δῆλον ὅτι οὔτε τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ἄνδρας δεῖ μεταβάλλοντας φαίνεσθαι ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν, οὐ γὰρ φοβερὸν οὐδὲ ἐλεεινὸν τοῦτο ἀλλὰ μιαρόν ἐστιν· οὔτε τοὺς μοχθηροὺς ἐξ ἀτυχίας εἰς εὐτυχίαν, ἀτραγῳδότατον γὰρ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ πάντων, οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔχει ὧν δεῖ, οὔτε γὰρ φιλάνθρωπον
1453ᵃ οὔτε ἐλεεινὸν οὔτε φοβερόν ἐστιν· οὐδ' αὖ τὸν σφόδρα πονηρὸν ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν μεταπίπτειν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλάνθρωπον ἔχοι ἂν ἡ τοιαύτη σύστασις ἀλλ' οὔτε ἔλεον οὔτε φόβον, ὁ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιόν ἐστιν δυστυχοῦντα, ὁ δὲ περὶ τὸν ὅμοιον, ἔλεος μὲν περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον, φόβος δὲ περὶ τὸν ὅμοιον, ὥστε οὔτε ἐλεεινὸν οὔτε φοβερὸν ἔσται τὸ συμβαῖνον. ὁ μεταξὺ ἄρα τούτων λοιπός. ἔστι δὲ τοιοῦτος ὁ μήτε ἀρετῇ διαφέρων καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ μήτε διὰ κακίαν καὶ μοχθηρίαν μεταβάλλων εἰς τὴν δυστυχίαν ἀλλὰ δι' ἁμαρτίαν τινὰ τῶν ἐν μεγάλῃ δόξῃ ὄντων καὶ εὐτυχίᾳ, οἷον Οἰδίπους καὶ Θυέστης καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων γενῶν

23 ὅλη Susemihl, Westphal: ὅλου Aᶜ 25 ὡς εἴδεσι add. apogr. 28 ὧν Parisinus 2038: ὠσ Aᶜ δεῖ] -εῖ in litura Aᶜ 1453ᵃ 1 αὖ τὸν Parisinus 2038: αὐτὸ Aᶜ 11 οἰδίπους apogr. (confirm. Ar.): δίπουσ Aᶜ

a song of the chorus without anapaests or trochees; a *Commos*, a lamentation sung by chorus and actor in concert. The parts of Tragedy to be used as formative elements in the whole we have already mentioned; the above are its parts from the point of view of its quantity, or the separate sections into which it is divided.

The next points after what we have said above will be 13
these: (1) What is the poet to aim at, and what is he to avoid, in constructing his Plots? and (2) What are the conditions on which the tragic effect depends?

We assume that, for the finest form of Tragedy, the Plot must be not simple but complex; and further, that it must imitate actions arousing pity and fear, since that is the distinctive function of this kind of imitation. It follows, therefore, that there are three forms of Plot to be avoided. (1) A good man must not be seen passing from happiness to misery, or (2) a bad man from misery to happiness. The first situation is not fear-inspiring or piteous, but simply odious to us. The second is the most untragic that can be; it has no one of the requisites of Tragedy; it does not appeal either to the human feeling in us, or to our pity, or to our fears. Nor on the other hand should (3) an extremely bad man be seen falling from happiness into misery. Such a story may arouse the human feeling in us, but it will not move us to either pity or fear; pity is occasioned by undeserved misfortune, and fear by that of one like ourselves; so that there will be nothing either piteous or fear-inspiring in the situation. There remains, then, the intermediate kind of personage, a man not pre-eminently virtuous and just, whose misfortune, however, is brought upon him not by vice and depravity but by some error of judgement, of the number of those in the enjoyment of great reputation and prosperity; e. g. Oedipus, Thyestes, and the men of note of similar families. The perfect Plot, accordingly,

ἐπιφανεῖς ἄνδρες. ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸν καλῶς ἔχοντα μῦθον ἁπλοῦν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ διπλοῦν, ὥσπερ τινές φασι, καὶ μεταβάλλειν οὐκ εἰς εὐτυχίαν ἐκ δυστυχίας ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν μὴ διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἀλλὰ δι' ἁμαρτίαν μεγάλην ἢ οἵου εἴρηται ἢ βελτίονος μᾶλλον ἢ χείρονος. σημεῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον· πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οἱ ποιηταὶ τοὺς τυχόντας μύθους ἀπηρίθμουν, νῦν δὲ περὶ ὀλίγας οἰκίας αἱ κάλλισται τραγῳδίαι συντίθενται, οἷον περὶ Ἀλκμέωνα καὶ Οἰδίπουν καὶ Ὀρέστην καὶ Μελέαγρον καὶ Θυέστην καὶ Τήλεφον καὶ ὅσοις ἄλλοις συμβέβηκεν ἢ παθεῖν δεινὰ ἢ ποιῆσαι. ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν τέχνην καλλίστη τραγῳδία ἐκ ταύτης τῆς συστάσεώς ἐστι. διὸ καὶ οἱ Εὐριπίδῃ ἐγκαλοῦντες [τὸ] αὐτὸ ἁμαρτάνουσιν ὅτι τοῦτο δρᾷ ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις καὶ πολλαὶ αὐτοῦ εἰς δυστυχίαν τελευτῶσιν. τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ὥσπερ εἴρηται ὀρθόν· σημεῖον δὲ μέγιστον· ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν σκηνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγώνων τραγικώταται αἱ τοιαῦται φαίνονται, ἂν κατορθωθῶσιν, καὶ ὁ Εὐριπίδης, εἰ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα μὴ εὖ οἰκονομεῖ, ἀλλὰ τραγικώτατός γε τῶν ποιητῶν φαίνεται. δευτέρα δ' ἡ πρώτη λεγομένη ὑπὸ τινῶν ἐστιν σύστασις, ἡ διπλῆν τε τὴν σύστασιν ἔχουσα καθάπερ ἡ Ὀδύσσεια καὶ τελευτῶσα ἐξ ἐναντίας τοῖς βελτίοσι καὶ χείροσιν. δοκεῖ δὲ εἶναι πρώτη διὰ τὴν τῶν θεάτρων ἀσθένειαν· ἀκολουθοῦσι γὰρ οἱ ποιηταὶ κατ' εὐχὴν ποιοῦντες τοῖς θεαταῖς. ἔστιν δὲ οὐχ αὕτη ἀπὸ τραγῳδίας ἡδονὴ ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῆς κωμῳδίας οἰκεία· ἐκεῖ γὰρ οἳ ἂν ἔχθιστοι ὦσιν ἐν τῷ μύθῳ, οἷον Ὀρέστης καὶ Αἴγισθος, φίλοι γενόμενοι ἐπὶ τελευτῆς ἐξέρχονται, καὶ ἀποθνήσκει οὐδεὶς ὑπ' οὐδενός.

20 Ἀλκμέωνα scripsi: ἀλκμαίωνα A^c 24 τὸ seclusi 31 ἢ A^c 33 βελτίωσι καὶ χείρο*σιν A^c 34 θεατῶν Riccardianus 16 35 ἔστι^ν A^c 37 οἱ ἂν Bonitz: ἂν οἱ A^c 39 ἀποθνήσκει A^c

must have a single, and not (as some tell us) a double issue; the change in the hero's fortunes must be not from misery to happiness, but on the contrary from happiness to misery; and the cause of it must lie not in any depravity, but in some great error on his part; the man himself being either such as we have described, or better, not worse, than that. Fact also confirms our theory. Though the poets began by accepting any tragic story that came to hand, in these days the finest tragedies are always on the story of some few houses, on that of Alcmeon, Oedipus, Orestes, Meleager, Thyestes, Telephus, or any others that may have been involved, as either agents or sufferers, in some deed of horror. The theoretically best tragedy, then, has a Plot of this description. The critics, therefore, are wrong, who blame Euripides for taking this line in his tragedies, and giving many of them an unhappy ending. It is, as we have said, the right line to take. The best proof is this: on the stage, and in the public performances, such plays, properly worked out, are seen to be the most truly tragic; and Euripides, even if his execution be faulty in every other point, is seen to be nevertheless the most tragic certainly of the dramatists. After this comes the construction of Plot which some rank first, one with a double story (like the *Odyssey*) and an opposite issue for the good and the bad personages. It is ranked as first only through the weakness of the audiences; the poets merely follow their public, writing as its wishes dictate. But the pleasure here is not that of Tragedy. It belongs rather to Comedy, where the bitterest enemies in the piece (e.g. Orestes and Aegisthus) walk off good friends at the end, with no slaying of any one by any one.

1453^{b} Ἔστιν μὲν οὖν τὸ φοβερὸν καὶ ἐλεεινὸν ἐκ τῆς ὄψεως 14 γίγνεσθαι, ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς συστάσεως τῶν πραγμάτων, ὅπερ ἐστὶ πρότερον καὶ ποιητοῦ ἀμείνονος. δεῖ γὰρ καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ὁρᾶν οὕτω συνεστάναι τὸν μῦθον ὥστε τὸν ἀκούοντα τὰ πράγματα γινόμενα καὶ φρίττειν καὶ ἐλεεῖν ἐκ τῶν συμβαινόντων· ἅπερ ἂν πάθοι τις ἀκούων τὸν τοῦ Οἰδίπου μῦθον. τὸ δὲ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως τοῦτο παρασκευάζειν ἀτεχνότερον καὶ χορηγίας δεόμενόν ἐστιν. οἱ δὲ μὴ τὸ φοβερὸν διὰ τῆς ὄψεως ἀλλὰ τὸ τερατῶδες μόνον παρασκευάζοντες οὐδὲν τραγῳδίᾳ κοινωνοῦσιν· οὐ γὰρ πᾶσαν δεῖ ζητεῖν ἡδονὴν ἀπὸ τραγῳδίας ἀλλὰ τὴν οἰκείαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ ἐλέου καὶ φόβου διὰ μιμήσεως δεῖ ἡδονὴν παρασκευάζειν τὸν ποιητήν, φανερὸν ὡς τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐμποιητέον. ποῖα οὖν δεινὰ ἢ ποῖα οἰκτρὰ φαίνεται τῶν συμπιπτόντων, λάβωμεν. ἀνάγκη δὴ ἢ φίλων εἶναι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὰς τοιαύτας πράξεις ἢ ἐχθρῶν ἢ μηδετέρων. ἂν μὲν οὖν ἐχθρὸς ἐχθρόν, οὐδὲν ἐλεεινὸν οὔτε ποιῶν οὔτε μέλλων, πλὴν κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος· οὐδ' ἂν μηδετέρως ἔχοντες· ὅταν δ' ἐν ταῖς φιλίαις ἐγγένηται τὰ πάθη, οἷον ἢ ἀδελφὸς ἀδελφὸν ἢ υἱὸς πατέρα ἢ μήτηρ υἱὸν ἢ υἱὸς μητέρα ἀποκτείνῃ ἢ μέλλῃ ἤ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον δρᾷ, ταῦτα ζητητέον. τοὺς μὲν οὖν παρειλημμένους μύθους λύειν οὐκ ἔστιν, λέγω δὲ οἷον τὴν Κλυταιμνήστραν ἀποθανοῦσαν ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀρέστου καὶ τὴν Ἐριφύλην ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀλκμέωνος, αὐτὸν δὲ εὑρίσκειν δεῖ καὶ τοῖς παραδεδομένοις χρῆσθαι καλῶς. τὸ δὲ καλῶς τί λέγομεν, εἴπωμεν σαφέστερον. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὕτω γίνεσθαι τὴν πρᾶξιν, ὥσπερ οἱ παλαιοὶ

1453^{b} 8 ἀτεχνώτερον A^{c} 15 δὴ Spengel: δὲ A^{c} 20 οἷον εἰ Sylburgius 21 ἀποκτείνει ἢ μέλλει A^{c} 22 δρᾶν A^{c} 23 Κλυταιμήστραν Ar. 24 ἀλκμαίωνα A^{c} 26 εἴπομεν A^{c}

The tragic fear and pity may be aroused by the Spectacle; 14 but they may also be aroused by the very structure and incidents of the play—which is the better way and shows the better poet. The Plot in fact should be so framed that, even without seeing the things take place, he who simply hears the account of them shall be filled with horror and pity at the incidents; which is just the effect that the mere recital of the story in *Oedipus* would have on one. To produce this same effect by means of the Spectacle is less artistic, and requires extraneous aid. Those, however, who make use of the Spectacle to put before us that which is merely monstrous and not productive of fear, are wholly out of touch with Tragedy; not every kind of pleasure should be required of a tragedy, but only its own proper pleasure.

The tragic pleasure is that of pity and fear, and the poet has to produce it by a work of imitation; it is clear, therefore, that the causes should be included in the incidents of his story. Let us see, then, what kinds of incident strike one as horrible, or rather as piteous. In a deed of this description the parties must necessarily be either friends, or enemies, or indifferent to one another. Now when enemy does it on enemy, there is nothing to move us to pity either in his doing or in his meditating the deed, except so far as the actual pain of the sufferer is concerned; and the same is true when the parties are indifferent to one another. Whenever the tragic deed, however, is done within the family—when murder or the like is done or meditated by brother on brother, by son on father, by mother on son, or son on mother—these are the situations the poet should seek after. The traditional stories, accordingly, must be kept as they are, e.g. the murder of Clytaemnestra by Orestes and of Eriphyle by Alcmeon. At the same time even with these there is something left to the poet himself; it is for him to devise the right way of treating them. Let us explain more clearly what we mean by 'the right way.' The deed of horror may be done by the doer knowingly and consciously, as in the old poets, and in Medea's murder

ἐποίουν εἰδότας καὶ γιγνώσκοντας, καθάπερ καὶ Εὐριπίδης ἐποίησεν ἀποκτείνουσαν τοὺς παῖδας τὴν Μήδειαν· ἔστιν δὲ πρᾶξαι μέν, ἀγνοοῦντας δὲ πρᾶξαι τὸ δεινόν, εἶθ' ὕστερον ἀναγνωρίσαι τὴν φιλίαν, ὥσπερ ὁ Σοφοκλέους Οἰδίπους· τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἔξω τοῦ δράματος, ἐν δ' αὐτῇ τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ οἷον ὁ Ἀλκμέων ὁ Ἀστυδάμαντος ἢ ὁ Τηλέγονος ὁ ἐν τῷ τραυματίᾳ Ὀδυσσεῖ. ἔτι δὲ τρίτον παρὰ ταῦτα τὸ μέλλοντα ποιεῖν τι τῶν ἀνηκέστων δι' ἄγνοιαν ἀναγνωρίσαι πρὶν ποιῆσαι. καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλως. ἢ γὰρ πρᾶξαι ἀνάγκη ἢ μὴ καὶ εἰδότας ἢ μὴ εἰδότας. τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν γινώσκοντα μελλῆσαι καὶ μὴ πρᾶξαι χείριστον· τό τε γὰρ μιαρὸν ἔχει, καὶ οὐ τραγικόν· ἀπαθὲς γάρ. διόπερ οὐδεὶς
1454^a ποιεῖ ὁμοίως, εἰ μὴ ὀλιγάκις, οἷον ἐν Ἀντιγόνῃ τὸν Κρέοντα ὁ Αἵμων. τὸ δὲ πρᾶξαι δεύτερον. βέλτιον δὲ τὸ ἀγνοοῦντα μὲν πρᾶξαι, πράξαντα δὲ ἀναγνωρίσαι· τό τε γὰρ μιαρὸν οὐ πρόσεστιν καὶ ἡ ἀναγνώρισις ἐκπληκτικόν. κράτιστον δὲ τὸ τελευταῖον, λέγω δὲ οἷον ἐν τῷ Κρεσφόντῃ ἡ Μερόπη μέλλει τὸν υἱὸν ἀποκτείνειν, ἀποκτείνει δὲ οὔ, ἀλλ' ἀνεγνώρισε, καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἰφιγενείᾳ ἡ ἀδελφὴ τὸν ἀδελφόν, καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἕλλῃ ὁ υἱὸς τὴν μητέρα ἐκδιδόναι μέλλων ἀνεγνώρισεν. διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο, ὅπερ πάλαι εἴρηται, οὐ περὶ πολλὰ γένη αἱ τραγῳδίαι εἰσίν. ζητοῦντες γὰρ οὐκ ἀπὸ τέχνης ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τύχης εὗρον τὸ τοιοῦτον παρασκευάζειν ἐν τοῖς μύθοις· ἀναγκάζονται οὖν ἐπὶ ταύτας τὰς οἰκίας ἀπαντᾶν ὅσαις τὰ τοιαῦτα συμβέβηκε πάθη. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων συστάσεως καὶ ποίους τινὰς εἶναι δεῖ τοὺς μύθους εἴρηται ἱκανῶς.

Περὶ δὲ τὰ ἤθη τέτταρά ἐστιν ὧν δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι, ἐν 1

33 Ἀλκμαίων ὁ Victorius : ἀλκμαίωνοσ A^c 34 τὸ Bonitz : τὸν A^c
1454^a 6 ἀνεγνωρισε* A^c

of her children in Euripides. Or he may do it, but in ignorance of his relationship, and discover that afterwards, as does the Oedipus in Sophocles. Here the deed is outside the play; but it may be within it, like the act of the Alcmeon in Astydamas, or that of the Telegonus in *Ulysses Wounded.* A third possibility is for one meditating some deadly injury to another, in ignorance of his relationship, to make the discovery in time to draw back. These exhaust the possibilities, since the deed must necessarily be either done or not done, and either knowingly or unknowingly.

The worst situation is when the personage is with full knowledge on the point of doing the deed, and leaves it undone. It is odious and also (through the absence of suffering) untragic; hence it is that no one is made to act thus except in some few instances, e.g. Haemon and Creon in *Antigone*. Next after this comes the actual perpetration of the deed meditated. A better situation than that, however, is for the deed to be done in ignorance, and the relationship discovered afterwards, since there is nothing odious in it, and the Discovery will serve to astound us. But the best of all is the last; what we have in *Cresphontes*, for example, where Merope, on the point of slaying her son, recognizes him in time; in *Iphigenia*, where sister and brother are in a like position; and in *Helle*, where the son recognizes his mother, when on the point of giving her up to her enemy.

This will explain why our tragedies are restricted (as we said just now) to such a small number of families. It was accident rather than art that led the poets in quest of subjects to embody this kind of incident in their Plots. They are still obliged, accordingly, to have recourse to the families in which such horrors have occurred.

On the construction of the Plot, and the kind of Plot required for Tragedy, enough has now been said.

μὲν καὶ πρῶτον, ὅπως χρηστὰ ᾖ. ἕξει δὲ ἦθος μὲν ἐὰν ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη ποιῇ φανερὸν ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ πρᾶξις προαίρεσίν τινα [ᾗ], χρηστὸν δὲ ἐὰν χρηστήν. ἔστιν δὲ ἐν ἑκάστῳ γένει· καὶ γὰρ γυνή ἐστιν χρηστὴ καὶ δοῦλος, καίτοι γε ἴσως τούτων τὸ μὲν χεῖρον, τὸ δὲ ὅλως φαῦλόν ἐστιν. δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ἁρμόττοντα· ἔστιν γὰρ ἀνδρεῖον μὲν τὸ ἦθος, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἁρμόττον γυναικείῳ τὸ ἀνδρείαν ἢ δεινὴν εἶναι. τρίτον δὲ τὸ ὅμοιον. τοῦτο γὰρ ἕτερον τοῦ χρηστὸν τὸ ἦθος καὶ ἁρμόττον ποιῆσαι ὥσπερ εἴρηται. τέταρτον δὲ τὸ ὁμαλόν. κἂν γὰρ ἀνώμαλός τις ᾖ ὁ τὴν μίμησιν παρέχων καὶ τοιοῦτον ἦθος ὑποτιθείς, ὅμως ὁμαλῶς ἀνώμαλον δεῖ εἶναι. ἔστιν δὲ παράδειγμα πονηρίας μὲν ἤθους μὴ ἀναγκαίου οἷον ὁ Μενέλαος ὁ ἐν τῷ Ὀρέστῃ, τοῦ δὲ ἀπρεποῦς καὶ μὴ ἁρμόττοντος ὅ τε θρῆνος ⟨ὁ τοῦ⟩ Ὀδυσσέως ἐν τῇ Σκύλλῃ καὶ ἡ τῆς Μελανίππης ῥῆσις, τοῦ δὲ ἀνωμάλου ἡ ἐν Αὐλίδι Ἰφιγένεια· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ ἱκετεύουσα τῇ ὑστέρᾳ. χρὴ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἤθεσιν ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ τῶν πραγμάτων συστάσει ἀεὶ ζητεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τὸ εἰκός, ὥστε τὸν τοιοῦτον τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγειν ἢ πράττειν ἢ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ εἰκὸς καὶ τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο γίνεσθαι ἢ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ εἰκός. φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι καὶ τὰς λύσεις τῶν μύθων ἐξ αὐτοῦ δεῖ τοῦ
1454b μύθου συμβαίνειν, καὶ μὴ ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ Μηδείᾳ ἀπὸ μηχανῆς καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἰλιάδι τὰ περὶ τὸν ἀπόπλουν. ἀλλὰ μηχανῇ χρηστέον ἐπὶ τὰ ἔξω τοῦ δράματος, ἢ ὅσα πρὸ τοῦ γέγονεν ἃ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄνθρωπον εἰδέναι, ἢ ὅσα ὕστερον ἃ

18 ποιῇ] -ῆι in litura A^c 19 ᾗ om. Parisinus 2038 22 τὸ Riccardianus 46, Vahlen (ed. 1): τὰ A^c 23 γυναικείῳ τὸ scripsi: γυναικί**τῶι A^c: γυναικὶ τὸ apogr. 29 ἀναγκαίου Marcianus 215: ἀναγκαῖον A^c μὲν ἔλεος (i.e. Μενέλεως) Ar. 30 ὁ τοῦ addidi 35 et 36 ᾗ ἀναγκαῖον Hermann 1454b 2 ἀπόπλουν Riccardianus 16: ἀνάπλουν Parisinus 2038 (Ar. *de conversione navium*): ἁπλοῦν A^c 3 ἐπὶ τὰ apogr. (confirm. Ar.): ἔπειτα A^c 4 οἴονται A^c

In the Characters there are four points to aim at. First 15
and foremost, that they shall be good. There will be an element of character in the play, if (as has been observed) what a personage says or does reveals a certain moral purpose; and a good element of character, if the purpose so revealed is good. Such goodness is possible in every type of personage, even in a woman or a slave, though the one is perhaps an inferior, and the other a wholly worthless being. The second point is to make them appropriate. The Character before us may be, say, manly; but it is not appropriate in a female Character to be manly, or clever. The third is to make them like the reality, which is not the same as their being good and appropriate, in our sense of the term. The fourth is to make them consistent and the same throughout; even if inconsistency be part of the man before one for imitation as presenting that form of character, he should still be consistently inconsistent. We have an instance of baseness of character, not required for the story, in the Menelaus in *Orestes*; of the incongruous and unbefitting in the lamentation of Ulysses in *Scylla*, and in the (clever) speech of Melanippe; and of inconsistency in *Iphigenia at Aulis*, where Iphigenia the suppliant is utterly unlike the later Iphigenia. The right thing, however, is in the Characters just as in the incidents of the play to endeavour always after the necessary or the probable; so that whenever such-and-such a personage says or does such-and-such a thing, it shall be the probable or necessary outcome of his character; and whenever this incident follows on that, it shall be either the necessary or the probable consequence of it. From this one sees (to digress for a moment) that the Dénouement also should arise out of the plot itself, and not depend on a stage-artifice, as in *Medea*, or in the story of the (arrested) departure of the Greeks in the *Iliad*. The artifice must be reserved for matters outside the play—for past events beyond human knowledge, or events yet to come, which require to be

δεῖται προαγορεύσεως καὶ ἀγγελίας· ἅπαντα γὰρ ἀποδίδομεν τοῖς θεοῖς ὁρᾶν. ἄλογον δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔξω τῆς τραγῳδίας, οἷον τὸ ἐν τῷ Οἰδίποδι τῷ Σοφοκλέους. ἐπεὶ δὲ μίμησίς ἐστιν ἡ τραγῳδία βελτιόνων, ἡμᾶς δεῖ μιμεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἰκονογράφους· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ἀποδιδόντες τὴν ἰδίαν μορφὴν [ὁμοίους ποιοῦντες] καλλίους γράφουσιν· οὕτω καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν μιμούμενον καὶ ὀργίλους καὶ ῥᾳθύμους καὶ [τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντας ἐπὶ τῶν ἠθῶν] |τοιούτους ὄντας| ἐπιεικεῖς ποιεῖν [παράδειγμα σκληρότητος], οἷον τὸν Ἀχιλλέα Ἀγάθων καὶ Ὅμηρος. ταῦτα δὴ διατηρεῖν, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τὰ παρὰ τὰς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀκολουθούσας αἰσθήσεις τῇ ποιητικῇ· καὶ γὰρ κατ' αὐτὰς ἔστιν ἁμαρτάνειν πολλάκις· εἴρηται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐκδεδομένοις λόγοις ἱκανῶς.

Ἀναγνώρισις δὲ τί μέν ἐστιν, εἴρηται πρότερον· εἴδη 16
δὲ ἀναγνωρίσεως, πρώτη μὲν ἡ ἀτεχνοτάτη καὶ ᾗ πλείστῃ χρῶνται δι' ἀπορίαν, ἡ διὰ τῶν σημείων. τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν σύμφυτα, οἷον "λόγχην ἣν φοροῦσι Γηγενεῖς" ἢ ἀστέρας οἵους ἐν τῷ Θυέστῃ Καρκίνος, τὰ δὲ ἐπίκτητα, καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν ἐν τῷ σώματι, οἷον οὐλαί, τὰ δὲ ἐκτός, τὰ περιδέραια καὶ οἷον ἐν τῇ Τυροῖ διὰ τῆς σκάφης. ἔστιν δὲ καὶ τούτοις χρῆσθαι ἢ βέλτιον ἢ χεῖρον, οἷον ⟨ὁ⟩ Ὀδυσσεὺς διὰ τῆς οὐλῆς ἄλλως ἀνεγνωρίσθη ὑπὸ τῆς τροφοῦ καὶ ἄλλως ὑπὸ τῶν συβοτῶν· εἰσὶ γὰρ αἱ μὲν πίστεως ἕνεκα ἀτεχνότεραι, καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται πᾶσαι, αἱ δὲ ἐκ περιπετείας, ὥσπερ ἡ ἐν τοῖς Νίπτροις, βελτίους. δεύτεραι δὲ αἱ πεποι-

7 τὸ] τω pr. A^c 14 *παράδειγμα σκληρότητος* seclusit Ritter *Ἀγάθων* apogr.: *ἀγαθῶν* A^c 15 *δὴ* A^c: *δεῖ* vel *δὴ δεῖ* apogr. *τὰ παρὰ τὰς* vel *τὰς παρὰ τὰ* apogr.: *τὰσ παρὰ τὰσ* A^c 20 *ᾗ πλείστῃ* A^c 22 *φοροῦσιν* A^c 24 *περιδέραια* Parisinus 2038: *περιδέρρεα* A^c 25 *οἷον* apogr. (confirm. Ar.): *οἷ* A^c 26 *ὁ* addidi

foretold or announced; since it is the privilege of the Gods to know everything. There should be nothing improbable among the actual incidents. If it be unavoidable, however, it should be outside the tragedy, like the improbability in the *Oedipus* of Sophocles. But to return to the Characters. As Tragedy is an imitation of personages better than the ordinary man, we in our way should follow the example of good portrait-painters, who reproduce the distinctive features of a man, and at the same time, without losing the likeness, make him handsomer than he is. The poet in like manner, in portraying men quick or slow to anger, or with similar infirmities of character, must know how to represent them as such, and at the same time as good men, as Agathon and Homer have represented Achilles.

All these rules one must keep in mind throughout, and further, those also for such points of stage-effect as directly depend on the art of the poet, since in these too one may often make mistakes. Enough, however, has been said on the subject in one of our published writings.

Discovery in general has been explained already. As 16
for the species of Discovery, the first to be noted is (1) the least artistic form of it, of which the poets make most use through mere lack of invention, Discovery by signs or marks. Of these signs some are congenital, like the 'lance-head which the Earth-born have on them,' or 'stars,' such as Carcinus brings in in his *Thyestes*; others acquired after birth —these latter being either marks on the body, e.g. scars, or external tokens, like necklaces, or to take another sort of instance, the ark in the Discovery in *Tyro*. Even these, however, admit of two uses, a better and a worse; the scar of Ulysses is an instance; the Discovery of him through it is made in one way by the nurse and in another by the swineherds. A Discovery using signs as a means of assurance is less artistic, as indeed are all such as imply reflexion; whereas one bringing them in all of a sudden, as in the *Bath-story*, is of a better order. Next after these are (2)

ημέναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ, διὸ ἄτεχνοι. οἷον ⟨ὁ⟩ Ὀρέστης ἐν τῇ Ἰφιγενείᾳ ἀνεγνώρισεν ὅτι Ὀρέστης· ἐκείνη μὲν γὰρ διὰ τῆς ἐπιστολῆς, ἐκεῖνος δὲ αὐτὸς λέγει ἃ βούλεται ὁ ποιητὴς ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ μῦθος· διό τι ἐγγὺς τῆς εἰρημένης ἁμαρτίας ἐστίν, ἐξῆν γὰρ ἂν ἔνια καὶ ἐνεγκεῖν. καὶ ἐν τῷ Σοφοκλέους Τηρεῖ ἡ τῆς κερκίδος φωνή. ἡ τρίτη διὰ μνήμης, τῷ αἰσθέσθαι
1455^{a} τι ἰδόντα, ὥσπερ ἡ ἐν Κυπρίοις τοῖς Δικαιογένους, ἰδὼν γὰρ τὴν γραφὴν ἔκλαυσεν, καὶ ἡ ἐν Ἀλκίνου ἀπολόγῳ, ἀκούων γὰρ τοῦ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ μνησθεὶς ἐδάκρυσεν, ὅθεν ἀνεγνωρίσθησαν. τετάρτη δὲ ἡ ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ, οἷον ἐν Χοηφόροις, ὅτι ὅμοιός τις ἐλήλυθεν, ὅμοιος δὲ οὐθεὶς ἀλλ' ἢ ὁ Ὀρέστης, οὗτος ἄρα ἐλήλυθεν. καὶ ἡ Πολυίδου τοῦ σοφιστοῦ περὶ τῆς Ἰφιγενείας· εἰκὸς γὰρ τὸν Ὀρέστην συλλογίσασθαι ὅτι ἥ τ' ἀδελφὴ ἐτύθη καὶ αὐτῷ συμβαίνει θύεσθαι. καὶ ἐν τῷ Θεοδέκτου Τυδεῖ, ὅτι ἐλθὼν ὡς εὑρήσων υἱὸν αὐτὸς ἀπόλλυται. καὶ ἡ ἐν τοῖς Φινείδαις· ἰδοῦσαι γὰρ τὸν τόπον συνελογίσαντο τὴν εἱμαρμένην ὅτι ἐν τούτῳ εἵμαρτο ἀποθανεῖν αὐταῖς, καὶ γὰρ ἐξετέθησαν ἐνταῦθα. ἔστιν δέ τις καὶ συνθετὴ ἐκ παραλογισμοῦ τοῦ θατέρου, οἷον ἐν τῷ Ὀδυσσεῖ τῷ ψευδαγγέλῳ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ [τὸ] τόξον ἔφη γνώσεσθαι ὃ οὐχ ἑωράκει, τὸ δὲ ὡς δὴ ἐκείνου ἀναγνωριοῦντος διὰ τούτου ποιῆσαι παραλογισμός. πασῶν δὲ βελτίστη ἀναγνώρισις ἡ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων τῆς ἐκπλήξεως γιγνομένης δι' εἰκό-

31 ὁ addidi 35 διό τι ἐγγὺς scripsi : δι' ὅτι ἐγγὺσ A^c : διὸ ἐγγύς τι Vahlen 37 ἡ τρίτη Spengel : ἤτοι τῆι A^c αἴσθεσθαί A^c
1455^{a} 1 τοῖς Marcianus 200 : τῆσ A^c 2 ἀπολόγῳ Parisinus 2038 : ἀπὸ λόγων A^c 4 Χοηφόροις Victorius : χλοηφόροισ A^c 6 Πολυίδου Tyrwhitt : πολυείδουσ A^c : πολυείδου apogr. 10 Φινείδαις Reiz : φινίδαισ A^c 13 θατέρου Bursian (praeeunte Hermanno) : θεάτρου A^c 14 τὸ μὲν] ὁ μὲν apogr. τὸ alterum om. apogr.
15 δὴ Tyrwhitt : δι' A^c 16 παραλογισμός Riccardianus 46, Vahlen (confirm. Ar.) : παραλογισμόν A^c 17 ἐκπλήξεως Parisinus 2038 : πλήξεωσ A^c εἰκόντων A^c

Discoveries made directly by the poet; which are inartistic for that very reason; e.g. Orestes' Discovery of himself in *Iphigenia*: whereas his sister reveals who she is by the letter, Orestes is made to say himself what the poet rather than the story demands. This, therefore, is not far removed from the first-mentioned fault, since he might have presented certain tokens as well. Another instance is the 'shuttle's voice' in the *Tereus* of Sophocles. (3) A third species is Discovery through memory, from a man's consciousness being awakened by something seen or heard. Thus in *The Cyprioe* of Dicaeogenes, the sight of the picture makes the man burst into tears; and in the *Tale of Alcinous*, hearing the harper Ulysses is reminded of the past and weeps; the Discovery of them being the result. (4) A fourth kind is Discovery through reasoning; e.g. in *The Choephoroe*: 'One like me is here; there is no one like me but Orestes; he, therefore, must be here.' Or that which Polyidus the Sophist suggested for *Iphigenia*; since it was natural for Orestes to reflect: 'My sister was sacrificed, and I am to be sacrificed like her.' Or that in the *Tydeus* of Theodectes: 'I came to find a son, and am to die myself.' Or that in *The Phinidae*: on seeing the place the women inferred their fate, that they were to die there, since they had also been exposed there. (5) There is, too, a composite Discovery arising from bad reasoning on the side of the other party. An instance of it is in *Ulysses the False Messenger*: he said he should know the bow—which he had not seen; but to suppose from that that he would know it again (as though he had once seen it) was bad reasoning. (6) The best of all Discoveries, however, is that arising from the

των, οἷον τὸ ἐν τῷ Σοφοκλέους Οἰδίποδι καὶ τῇ Ἰφιγενείᾳ· εἰκὸς γὰρ βούλεσθαι ἐπιθεῖναι γράμματα. αἱ γὰρ τοιαῦται μόναι ἄνευ τῶν πεποιημένων σημείων καὶ δεραίων. δεύτεραι δὲ αἱ ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ.

Δεῖ δὲ τοὺς μύθους συνιστάναι καὶ τῇ λέξει συναπερ- 17
γάζεσθαι ὅτι μάλιστα πρὸ ὀμμάτων τιθέμενον· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἐναργέστατα [ὁ] ὁρῶν ὥσπερ παρ' αὐτοῖς γιγνόμενος τοῖς πραττομένοις εὑρίσκοι τὸ πρέπον καὶ ἥκιστα ἂν λανθάνοι [τὸ] τὰ ὑπεναντία. σημεῖον δὲ τούτου ὃ ἐπετιμᾶτο Καρκίνῳ. ὁ γὰρ Ἀμφιάραος ἐξ ἱεροῦ ἀνῄει, ὃ μὴ ὁρῶντ' ἂν τὸν θεατὴν ἐλάνθανεν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς σκηνῆς ἐξέπεσεν δυσχερανάντων τοῦτο τῶν θεατῶν. ὅσα δὲ δυνατὸν καὶ τοῖς σχήμασιν συναπεργαζόμενον· πιθανώτατοι γὰρ ⌐ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσίν εἰσιν, καὶ χειμαίνει ὁ χειμαζόμενος καὶ χαλεπαίνει ὁ ὀργιζόμενος ἀληθινώτατα. διὸ εὐφυοῦς ἡ ποιητική ἐστιν ἢ μανικοῦ· τούτων γὰρ οἱ μὲν εὔπλαστοι οἱ δὲ ἐκστατικοί εἰσιν. τούς τε λόγους καὶ τοὺς πεποιημένους
1455^{b} *δεῖ καὶ αὐτὸν ποιοῦντα ἐκτίθεσθαι καθόλου, εἶθ' οὕτως ἐπεισοδιοῦν καὶ παρατείνειν. λέγω δὲ οὕτως ἂν θεωρεῖσθαι τὸ καθόλου, οἷον τῆς Ἰφιγενείας· τυθείσης τινὸς κόρης καὶ ἀφανισθείσης ἀδήλως τοῖς θύσασιν, ἱδρυνθείσης δὲ εἰς ἄλλην χώραν, ἐν ᾗ νόμος ἦν τοὺς ξένους θύειν τῇ θεῷ, ταύτην ἔσχε τὴν ἱερωσύνην· χρόνῳ δὲ ὕστερον τῷ ἀδελφῷ συνέβη ἐλθεῖν*

18 *τὸ* scripsi : *ὁ* A^{c} 20 *δέρεων* A^{c} : *περιδεραίων* apogr. 24 *ἐνεργέστατα* A^{c} *ὁ* om. Parisinus 2038 25 *λανθάνοι τὸ* A^{c} : *λανθάνοιτο* apographa plura (*τὸ* Vahleno teste deletum est in nonnullis) 26 *ἐπετιμᾶτο* marg. Riccardiani 16 (confirm. Ar.) : *ἐπιτιμᾶ τῶι* A^{c} 27 *ἀνῄει* Guelferbytanus (confirm. Ar.) : *ἂν εἴη* A^{c} *ὁρῶντ' ἂν* Vahlen : *ὁρῶντα* A^{c} 31 *χιμαζόμενοσ* A^{c} 34 *ἐκστατικοί* Riccardianus 46 (et Paccius in versione ; confirmare videtur Ar.) : *ἐξεταστικοί* A^{c} *τούς τε* Parisinus 2038 : *τούτουσ τε* A^{c} 1455^{b} 1 *ἐπεισοδίου* A^{c} 2 *παρατείνειν* Riccardianus 46 : *περιτείνειν* A^{c}

incidents themselves, when the great surprise comes about through a probable incident, like that in the *Oedipus* of Sophocles; and also in *Iphigenia*; for it was not improbable that she should wish to have a letter taken home. These last are the only Discoveries independent of the artifice of signs and necklaces. Next after them come Discoveries through reasoning.

At the time when he is constructing his Plots, and en- 17
gaged on the Diction in which they are worked out, the poet should remember (1) to put the actual scenes as far as possible before his eyes. In this way, seeing everything with the vividness of an eye-witness as it were, he will devise what is appropriate, and be least likely to overlook incongruities. This is shown by what was censured in Carcinus, the return of Amphiaraus from the sanctuary; it would have passed unnoticed, if it had not been actually seen by the audience; but on the stage his play failed, the incongruity of the incident offending the spectators. (2) As far as may be, too, the poet should even act his story with the very gestures of his personages. Given the same natural qualifications, he who feels the emotions to be described will be the most convincing; distress and anger, for instance, are portrayed most truthfully by one who is feeling them at the moment. Hence it is that poetry demands a man with a special gift for it, or else one with a touch of madness in him; the former can easily assume the required mood, and the latter may be actually beside himself with emotion. (3) His story, again, whether already made or of his own making, he should first simplify and reduce to a universal form, before proceeding to lengthen it out by the insertion of episodes. The following will show how the universal element in *Iphigenia*, for instance, may be viewed: A certain maiden having been offered in sacrifice, and spirited away from her sacrificers into another land, where the custom was to sacrifice all strangers to the Goddess, she was made there the priestess of this rite. Long after that the brother

τῆς ἱερείας, τὸ δὲ ὅτι ἀνεῖλεν ὁ θεὸς διά τινα αἰτίαν [ἔξω τοῦ καθόλου] ἐλθεῖν ἐκεῖ καὶ ἐφ᾽ ὅ τι δὲ ἔξω τοῦ μύθου· ἐλθὼν δὲ καὶ ληφθεὶς θύεσθαι μέλλων ἀνεγνώρισεν, εἴθ᾽ ὡς Εὐριπίδης εἴθ᾽ ὡς Πολύιδος ἐποίησεν, κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς εἰπὼν ὅτι οὐκ ἄρα μόνον τὴν ἀδελφὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸν ἔδει τυθῆναι, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἡ σωτηρία. μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ ἤδη ὑποθέντα τὰ ὀνόματα ἐπεισοδιοῦν· ὅπως δὲ ἔσται οἰκεῖα τὰ ἐπεισόδια, οἷον ἐν τῷ Ὀρέστῃ ἡ μανία δι᾽ ἧς ἐλήφθη καὶ ἡ σωτηρία διὰ τῆς καθάρσεως. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς δράμασιν τὰ ἐπεισόδια σύντομα, ἡ δ᾽ ἐποποιία τούτοις μηκύνεται. τῆς γὰρ Ὀδυσσείας ⟨οὐ⟩ μακρὸς ὁ λόγος ἐστίν· ἀποδημοῦντός τινος ἔτη πολλὰ καὶ παραφυλαττομένου ὑπὸ τοῦ Ποσειδῶνος καὶ μόνου ὄντος, ἔτι δὲ τῶν οἴκοι οὕτως ἐχόντων ὥστε τὰ χρήματα ὑπὸ μνηστήρων ἀναλίσκεσθαι καὶ τὸν υἱὸν ἐπιβουλεύεσθαι, αὐτὸς δὲ ἀφικνεῖται χειμασθείς, καὶ ἀναγνωρίσας †τινὰς† αὐτὸς ἐπιθέμενος αὐτὸς μὲν ἐσώθη τοὺς δ᾽ ἐχθροὺς διέφθειρε. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἴδιον τοῦτο, τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα ἐπεισόδια.

*Ἔστι δὲ πάσης τραγῳδίας τὸ μὲν δέσις τὸ δὲ λύσις, τὰ μὲν ἔξωθεν καὶ ἔνια τῶν ἔσωθεν πολλάκις ἡ δέσις, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἡ λύσις—λέγω δὲ δέσιν μὲν εἶναι τὴν ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς μέχρι τούτου τοῦ μέρους ὃ ἔσχατόν ἐστιν ἐξ οὗ μεταβαίνειν εἰς εὐτυχίαν * *, λύσιν δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς μεταβάσεως μέχρι τέλους—ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Λυγκεῖ τῷ Θεοδέκτου δέσις μὲν τά τε προπεπραγμένα καὶ ἡ τοῦ παιδίου λῆψις καὶ*

7 *ἔξω τοῦ καθόλου* seclusit Duentzer 10 *πολύειδοσ* A^c 15 *δράμασι* apogr. : *ἅρμασιν* A^c 17 *οὐ* add. Vulcanius (confirm. Ar.) *μικρὸς* apogr. 19 *ἔτι* Riccardianus 16 (confirm. Ar.) : *ἐπεὶ* A^c 22 *τινὰς*] fort. *ὅτι* 28 *εἰς εὐτυχίαν ⟨συμβαίνει ἢ εἰς δυστυχίαν⟩* (ut videtur) Ar.: *εἰς εὐτυχίαν ⟨ἐκ δυστυχίας συμβαίνει ἢ ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν⟩* coni. Vahlen *⟨εἰς δυστυχίαν συμβαίνει ἢ⟩ εἰς εὐτυχίαν* Gomperz 29 *λυγκεῖ* apogr. (confirm. Ar.) : *λυκεῖ* A^c

of the priestess happened to come; the fact, however, of the oracle having for a certain reason bidden him go thither, and his object in going, are outside the Plot of the play. On his coming he was arrested, and about to be sacrificed, when he revealed who he was—either as Euripides puts it, or (as suggested by Polyidus) by the not improbable exclamation, 'So I too am doomed to be sacrificed, as my sister was'; and the disclosure led to his salvation. This done, the next thing, after the proper names have been fixed as a basis for the story, is to work in episodes or accessory incidents. One must mind, however, that the episodes are appropriate, like the fit of madness in Orestes, which led to his arrest, and the purifying, which brought about his salvation. In plays, then, the episodes are short; in epic poetry they serve to lengthen out the poem. The argument of the *Odyssey* is not a long one. A certain man has been abroad many years; Poseidon is ever on the watch for him, and he is all alone. Matters at home too have come to this, that his substance is being wasted and his son's death plotted by suitors to his wife. Then he arrives there himself after his grievous sufferings; reveals himself, and falls on his enemies; and the end is his salvation and their death. This being all that is proper to the *Odyssey*, everything else in it is episode. (4) There is a further point 18 to be borne in mind. Every tragedy is in part Complication and in part Dénouement; the incidents before the opening scene, and often certain also of those within the play, forming the Complication; and the rest the Dénouement. By Complication I mean all from the beginning of the story to the point just before the change in the hero's fortunes; by Dénouement, all from the beginning of the change to the end. In the *Lynceus* of Theodectes, for instance, the Complication includes, together with the presupposed inci-

πάλιν ἢ αὐτῶν, ⟨λύσις⟩ δ' ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς αἰτιάσεως τοῦ θανάτου μέχρι τοῦ τέλους. * * τραγῳδίας δὲ εἴδη εἰσὶ τέσσαρα (τοσαῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ μέρη ἐλέχθη), ἡ μὲν πεπλεγμένη, ἧς τὸ ὅλον ἐστὶν περιπέτεια καὶ ἀναγνώρισις, ἡ δὲ παθητική, οἷον οἵ τε
1456^{a} Αἴαντες καὶ οἱ Ἰξίονες, ἡ δὲ ἠθική, οἷον αἱ Φθιώτιδες καὶ ὁ Πηλεύς· τὸ δὲ τέταρτον ὄψις, οἷον αἵ τε Φορκίδες καὶ Προμηθεὺς καὶ ὅσα ἐν ᾅδου. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἅπαντα δεῖ πειρᾶσθαι ἔχειν, εἰ δὲ μή, τὰ μέγιστα καὶ πλεῖστα, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὡς νῦν συκοφαντοῦσιν τοὺς ποιητάς· γεγονότων γὰρ καθ' ἕκαστον μέρος ἀγαθῶν ποιητῶν, ἑκάστου τοῦ ἰδίου ἀγαθοῦ ἀξιοῦσι τὸν ἕνα ὑπερβάλλειν. [δίκαιον δὲ καὶ τραγῳδίαν ἄλλην καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν λέγειν οὐδενὶ ἴσως τῷ μύθῳ· τοῦτο δέ, ὧν ἡ αὐτὴ πλοκὴ καὶ λύσις. πολλοὶ δὲ πλέξαντες εὖ λύουσι κακῶς· δεῖ δὲ ἄμφω ἀεὶ κρατεῖσθαι.] χρὴ δὲ ὅπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις μεμνῆσθαι καὶ μὴ ποιεῖν ἐποποιικὸν σύστημα τραγῳδίαν—ἐποποιικὸν δὲ λέγω [δὲ] τὸ πολύμυθον—οἷον εἴ τις τὸν τῆς Ἰλιάδος ὅλον ποιοῖ μῦθον. ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὸ μῆκος λαμβάνει τὰ μέρη τὸ πρέπον μέγεθος, ἐν δὲ τοῖς δράμασι πολὺ παρὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν ἀποβαίνει. σημεῖον δέ, ὅσοι πέρσιν Ἰλίου ὅλην ἐποίησαν καὶ μὴ κατὰ μέρος ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης, ⟨ἢ⟩ Νιόβην καὶ μὴ ὥσπερ Αἰσχύλος, ἢ ἐκπίπτουσιν ἢ κακῶς ἀγωνίζονται, ἐπεὶ καὶ Ἀγάθων ἐξέπεσεν ἐν τούτῳ μόνῳ· ἐν δὲ ταῖς περιπετείαις καὶ ἐν τοῖς

31 *πάλιν* obelo notat M. Schmidt   *λύσις δὲ ἡ* Parisinus 2038 : *δὴ* A^{c} : *δὴ ⟨ἀπαγωγή, λύσις δ' ἡ⟩* coni. Vahlen : *δή⟨λωσις, λύσις δ' ἡ⟩* Christ   32 excidisse 1456^{a} 7–10 (*δίκαιον—κρατεῖσθαι*) vidit Susemihl   33 *καὶ τὰ*] *κατὰ* Tucker   1456^{a} 2 *τέταρτον ὄψις* scripsi (cf. ad 1458^{a} 5) : *τέταρτον οησ* A^{c} : *τερατῶδες* Schrader   4 *ἄλλως τε* apcgr. (confirm. Ar.) : *ἀλλ' ὥσ γε* A^{c} 6 *ἑκάστου* Parisinus 2038 : *ἕκαστον* A^{c} 7 v. ad 1455^{b} 32   8 *οὐδενὶ* Tyrwhitt (in versione) : *οὐδὲν* A^{c} 10 *κρατεῖσθαι* Vahlen (confirm. Ar.) : *κροτεῖσθαι* A^{c} 12 *δὲ* alterum om. apogr.   17 *ἢ* add. Vahlen   18 *ἀγαθῶν* pr. A^{c} (et Ar.)

dents, the seizure of the child and that in turn of the parents; and the Dénouement all from the indictment for the murder to the end. Now it is right, when one speaks of a tragedy as the same or not the same as another, to do so on the ground before all else of their Plot, i. e. as having the same or not the same Complication and Dénouement. Yet there are many dramatists who, after a good Complication, fail in the Dénouement. But it is necessary for both points of construction to be always duly mastered. (5) There are four distinct species of Tragedy—that being the number of the constituents also that have been mentioned: first, the complex Tragedy, which is all Peripety and Discovery; second, the Tragedy of suffering, e. g. the *Ajaxes* and *Ixions*; third, the Tragedy of character, e. g. *The Phthiotides* and *Peleus*. The fourth constituent is that of 'Spectacle,' exemplified in *The Phorcides*, in *Prometheus*, and in all plays with the scene laid in the nether world. The poet's aim, then, should be to combine every element of interest, if possible, or else the more important and the major part of them. This is now especially necessary owing to the unfair criticism to which the poet is subjected in these days. Just because there have been poets before him strong in the several species of tragedy, the critics now expect the one man to surpass that which was the strong point of each one of his predecessors. (6) One should also remember what has been said more than once, and not write a tragedy on an epic body of incident (i.e. one with a plurality of stories in it), by attempting to dramatize, for instance, the entire story of the *Iliad*. In the epic owing to its scale every part is treated at proper length; with a drama, however, on the same story the result is very disappointing. This is shown by the fact that all who have dramatized the fall of Ilium in its entirety, and not part by part, like Euripides, or the whole of the Niobe story, instead of a portion, like Aeschylus, either fail utterly or have but ill success on the stage; for that and that alone was enough

ἁπλοῖς πράγμασι στοχάζονται ὧν βούλονται θαυμαστῶς· τραγικὸν γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ φιλάνθρωπον. ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο, ὅταν ὁ σοφὸς μὲν μετὰ πονηρίας ⟨δ'⟩ ἐξαπατηθῇ, ὥσπερ Σίσυφος, καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος μὲν ἄδικος δὲ ἡττηθῇ· ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο εἰκὸς ὥσπερ Ἀγάθων λέγει, εἰκὸς γὰρ γίνεσθαι πολλὰ καὶ παρὰ τὸ εἰκός. καὶ τὸν χορὸν δὲ ἕνα δεῖ ὑπολαβεῖν τῶν ὑποκριτῶν, καὶ μόριον εἶναι τοῦ ὅλου καὶ συναγωνίζεσθαι μὴ ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδῃ ἀλλ' ὥσπερ Σοφοκλεῖ. τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς τὰ ᾀδόμενα ⟨οὐδὲν⟩ μᾶλλον τοῦ μύθου ἢ ἄλλης τραγῳδίας ἐστίν· διὸ ἐμβόλιμα ᾄδουσιν πρώτου ἄρξαντος Ἀγάθωνος τοῦ τοιούτου. καίτοι τί διαφέρει ἢ ἐμβόλιμα ᾄδειν ἢ εἰ ῥῆσιν ἐξ ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλο ἁρμόττοι ἢ ἐπεισόδιον ὅλον;

19

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἤδη εἴρηται, λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ λέξεως καὶ διανοίας εἰπεῖν. τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐν τοῖς περὶ ῥητορικῆς κείσθω· τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον μᾶλλον ἐκείνης τῆς μεθόδου. ἔστι δὲ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν ταῦτα, ὅσα ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου δεῖ παρασκευασθῆναι. μέρη δὲ τούτων τό τε ἀποδεικνύναι καὶ τὸ λύειν καὶ τὸ πάθη παρασκευάζειν (οἷον 1456ᵇ ἔλεον ἢ φόβον ἢ ὀργὴν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα) καὶ ἔτι μέγεθος καὶ μικρότητα. δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἰδεῶν δεῖ χρῆσθαι ὅταν ἢ ἐλεεινὰ ἢ δεινὰ ἢ μεγάλα ἢ εἰκότα δέῃ παρασκευάζειν· πλὴν τοσοῦτον διαφέρει, ὅτι τὰ μὲν δεῖ φαίνεσθαι ἄνευ διδασκαλίας, τὰ δὲ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ λέγοντος παρασκευάζεσθαι καὶ παρὰ

22 δὲ add. Riccardianus 16 23 ἡττήθη Aᶜ 24 ⟨καὶ⟩ εἰκὸς ὥσπερ Riccardianus 46 et (ut videtur) Ar. 28 ᾀδόμενα Madius (confirm. Ar.): διδόμενα Aᶜ οὐδὲν add. Vahlen (confirm. Ar.) 33 ἤδη] ἤδ' Aᶜ: εἰδῶν (ut videtur) Ar. 34 καὶ Hermann (confirm. Ar.): ἢ Aᶜ 1456ᵇ 2 σμικρότητα Parisinus 2038 (et fort. Ar.): μικρότητασ Aᶜ 3 εἰδεῶν Aᶜ 4 δέῃ Parisinus 2038: δ' ἢ Aᶜ

to ruin even a play by Agathon. Yet in their Peripeties, as also in their simple plots, the poets I mean show wonderful skill in aiming at the kind of effect they desire—a tragic situation that arouses the human feeling in one, like the clever villain (e. g. Sisyphus) deceived, or the brave wrong-doer worsted. This is probable, however, only in Agathon's sense, when he speaks of the probability of even improbabilities coming to pass. (7) The Chorus too should be regarded as one of the actors; it should be an integral part of the whole, and take a share in the action—that which it has in Sophocles rather than in Euripides. With the later poets, however, the songs in a play of theirs have no more to do with the Plot of that than of any other tragedy. Hence it is that they are now singing intercalary pieces, a practice first introduced by Agathon. And yet what real difference is there between singing such intercalary pieces, and attempting to fit in a speech, or even a whole act, from one play into another?

The Plot and Characters having been discussed, it remains 19
to consider the Diction and Thought. As for the Thought, we may assume what is said of it in our Art of Rhetoric, as it belongs more properly to that department of inquiry. The Thought of the personages is shown in everything to be effected by their language—in every effort to prove or disprove, to arouse emotion (pity, fear, anger, and the like), or to maximize or minimize things. It is clear, also, that their mental procedure must be on the same lines in their actions likewise, whenever they wish them to arouse pity or horror, or have a look of importance or probability. The only difference is that with the act the impression has to be made without explanation; whereas with the spoken word it has to be produced by the speaker, and result from his language. What, indeed would be the good of the speaker,

τὸν λόγον γίγνεσθαι. τί γὰρ ἂν εἴη τοῦ λέγοντος ἔργον, εἰ φαίνοιτο ᾗ δέοι καὶ μὴ διὰ τὸν λόγον; τῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν λέξιν ἓν μέν ἐστιν εἶδος θεωρίας τὰ σχήματα τῆς λέξεως, ἅ ἐστιν εἰδέναι τῆς ὑποκριτικῆς καὶ τοῦ τὴν τοιαύτην ἔχοντος ἀρχιτεκτονικήν, οἷον τί ἐντολὴ καὶ τί εὐχὴ καὶ διήγησις καὶ ἀπειλὴ καὶ ἐρώτησις καὶ ἀπόκρισις καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον. παρὰ γὰρ τὴν τούτων γνῶσιν ἢ ἄγνοιαν οὐδὲν εἰς τὴν ποιητικὴν ἐπιτίμημα φέρεται ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον σπουδῆς. τί γὰρ ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι ἡμαρτῆσθαι ἃ Πρωταγόρας ἐπιτιμᾷ, ὅτι εὔχεσθαι οἰόμενος ἐπιτάττει εἰπὼν "μῆνιν ἄειδε θεά"; τὸ γὰρ κελεῦσαι, φησίν, ποιεῖν τι ἢ μὴ ἐπίταξίς ἐστιν. διὸ παρείσθω ὡς ἄλλης καὶ οὐ τῆς ποιητικῆς ὂν θεώρημα.

Τῆς δὲ λέξεως ἁπάσης τάδ᾽ ἐστὶ τὰ μέρη, στοιχεῖον **20**
συλλαβὴ σύνδεσμος ἄρθρον ὄνομα ῥῆμα πτῶσις λόγος. στοιχεῖον μὲν οὖν ἐστιν φωνὴ ἀδιαίρετος, οὐ πᾶσα δὲ ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἧς πέφυκε συνετὴ γίγνεσθαι φωνή· καὶ γὰρ τῶν θηρίων εἰσὶν ἀδιαίρετοι φωναί, ὧν οὐδεμίαν λέγω στοιχεῖον. ταύτης δὲ μέρη τό τε φωνῆεν καὶ τὸ ἡμίφωνον καὶ ἄφωνον. ἔστιν δὲ φωνῆεν μὲν ⟨τὸ⟩ ἄνευ προσβολῆς ἔχον φωνὴν ἀκουστήν, ἡμίφωνον δὲ τὸ μετὰ προσβολῆς ἔχον φωνὴν ἀκουστήν, οἷον τὸ Σ καὶ τὸ Ρ, ἄφωνον δὲ τὸ μετὰ προσβολῆς καθ᾽ αὑτὸ μὲν οὐδεμίαν ἔχον φωνήν, μετὰ δὲ τῶν ἐχόντων τινὰ φωνὴν γινόμενον ἀκουστόν, οἷον τὸ Γ καὶ τὸ Δ. ταῦτα δὲ διαφέρει σχήμασίν τε τοῦ στόματος καὶ τόποις καὶ δασύτητι καὶ ψιλότητι καὶ μήκει καὶ βραχύ-

8 *φαίνοιτο* Carolus Bigg : *φανοῖτο* A^c *ᾗ δέοι* Vahlen (ed. 2) : *ἡδέα* A^c (et Ar.) : *ἤδη* Castelvetrus 21 *ἄθρον* A^c : in codice post *ῥῆμα* positum huc transtulit Spengel (confirm. Ar.) 23 *συνθετὴ* apogr. (et Ar.) 26 *τὸ* add. Reiz

if things appeared in the required light even apart from anything he says?

As regards the Diction, one subject for inquiry under this head is the turns given to the language when spoken; e. g. the difference between command and prayer, simple statement and threat, question and answer, and so forth. The theory of such matters, however, belongs to Elocution and the professors of that art. Whether the poet knows these things or not, his art as a poet is never seriously criticized on that account. What fault can one see in Homer's 'Sing of the wrath, Goddess'?—which Protagoras has criticized as being a command where a prayer was meant, since to bid one do or not do, he tells us, is a command. Let us pass over this, then, as appertaining to another art, and not to that of poetry.

The Diction viewed as a whole is made up of the following parts: the Letter (or ultimate element), the Syllable, the Conjunction, the Article, the Noun, the Verb, the Case, and the Speech. The Letter is an indivisible sound of a particular kind, one that may become a factor in an intelligible sound. Indivisible sounds are uttered by the brutes also, but no one of these is a Letter in our sense of the term. These elementary sounds are either vowels, semivowels, or mutes. A vowel is a Letter having an audible sound without the addition of another Letter. A semivowel, one having an audible sound by the addition of another Letter; e. g. S and R. A mute, one having no sound at all by itself, but becoming audible by an addition, that of one of the Letters which have a sound of some sort of their own; e. g. D and G. The Letters differ in various ways: as produced by different conformations or in different regions of the mouth; as aspirated, not aspirated, or sometimes one

τητι ἔτι δὲ ὀξύτητι καὶ βαρύτητι καὶ τῷ μέσῳ· περὶ ὧν καθ' ἕκαστον [ἐν] τοῖς μετρικοῖς προσήκει θεωρεῖν. συλλαβὴ δέ ἐστιν φωνὴ ἄσημος συνθετὴ ἐξ ἀφώνου καὶ φωνὴν ἔχοντος· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ΓΡ ἄνευ τοῦ Α συλλαβὴ καὶ μετὰ τοῦ Α, οἷον τὸ ΓΡΑ. ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων θεωρῆσαι τὰς διαφορὰς τῆς μετρικῆς ἐστιν. σύνδεσμος δέ ἐστιν φωνὴ ἄσημος ἣ οὔ-
1457^a τε κωλύει οὔτε ποιεῖ φωνὴν μίαν σημαντικὴν ἐκ πλειόνων φωνῶν πεφυκυῖαν συντίθεσθαι [καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου], ἣν μὴ ἁρμόττει ἐν ἀρχῇ λόγου τιθέναι καθ' αὑτόν, οἷον μέν δή τοί δέ· ἢ φωνὴ ἄσημος ἣ ἐκ πλειόνων μὲν φωνῶν μιᾶς σημαντικῶν δὲ ποιεῖν πέφυκεν μίαν σημαντικὴν φωνήν, * * ἄρθρον δ' ἐστὶ φωνὴ ἄσημος ἣ λόγου ἀρχὴν ἢ τέλος ἢ διορισμὸν δηλοῖ [οἷον τὸ ἀμφί καὶ τὸ περί καὶ τὰ ἄλλα. ἢ φωνὴ ἄσημος ἣ οὔτε κωλύει οὔτε ποιεῖ φωνὴν μίαν σημαντικὴν ἐκ πλειόνων φωνῶν] πεφυκυῖα τίθεσθαι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου. ὄνομα δέ ἐστι φωνὴ συνθετὴ σημαντικὴ ἄνευ χρόνου ἧς μέρος οὐδέν ἐστι καθ' αὑτὸ σημαντικόν· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς διπλοῖς οὐ χρώμεθα ὡς καὶ αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ σημαῖνον, οἷον ἐν τῷ Θεοδώρῳ τὸ δῶρον οὐ σημαίνει. ῥῆμα δὲ φωνὴ συνθετὴ σημαντικὴ μετὰ χρόνου ἧς οὐδὲν μέρος σημαίνει καθ' αὑτό, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ἢ λευκόν οὐ σημαίνει τὸ πότε, τὸ δὲ βαδίζει ἢ βεβάδικεν προσσημαίνει τὸ μὲν τὸν παρόντα χρόνον τὸ δὲ τὸν παρεληλυθότα. πτῶσις δ' ἐστὶν

34 ἐν seclusit Spengel 1457^a 2–3 καὶ—μέσου seclusi 4 μέν] μεν. A^c δή τοί scripsi: ητοι. A^c δέ] δε. A^c 5 σημαντικῶν Robortellus: σημαντικὸν A^c 6 lacunam indicavi, huc transferenda esse suspicatus ea quae infra leguntur, οἷον τὸ ἀμφί καὶ τὸ περί καὶ τὰ ἄλλα 7–9 οἷον τὸ ἀμφί—φωνῶν seclusi 7 ἀμφί Hartung: φ. μ. ῑ. A^c περί] π. ε. ρ. ῑ. A^c 17 ποτέ Spengel βαδίζει apogr. (confirm. Ar.): βαδίζειν A^c προσσημαίνει Parisinus 2038: προσημαίνει A^c

and sometimes the other; as long, short, or of variable quantity; and further as having an acute, grave, or intermediate accent. The details of these matters we must leave to the metricians. (2) A Syllable is a non-significant composite sound, made up of a mute and a Letter having a sound (a vowel or semivowel); for GR, without an A, is just as much a Syllable as GRA, with an A. The various forms of the Syllable also belong to the theory of metre. (3) A Conjunction is (*a*) a non-significant sound which, when one significant sound is formable out of several, neither hinders nor aids the union, and which, if the Speech thus formed stands by itself (apart from other Speeches) must not be inserted at the beginning of it; e.g. μέν, δή, τοί, δέ. Or (*b*) a non-significant sound capable of combining two or more significant sounds into one; e.g. ἀμφί, περί, etc. (4) An Article is a non-significant sound marking the beginning, end, or dividing-point of a Speech, its natural place being either at the extremities or in the middle. (5) A Noun or name is a composite significant sound not involving the idea of time, with parts which have no significance by themselves in it. It is to be remembered that in a compound we do not think of the parts as having a significance also by themselves; in the name 'Theodorus,' for instance, the δῶρον means nothing to us. (6) A Verb is a composite significant sound involving the idea of time, with parts which (just as in the Noun) have no significance by themselves in it. Whereas the word 'man' or 'white' does not imply *when*, 'walks' and 'has walked' involve in addition to the idea of walking that of time present or

ὀνόματος ἢ ῥήματος ἡ μὲν κατὰ τὸ τούτου ἢ τούτῳ σημαῖνον καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἡ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἑνὶ ἢ πολλοῖς, οἷον ἄνθρωποι ἢ ἄνθρωπος, ἡ δὲ κατὰ τὰ ὑποκριτικά, οἷον κατ' ἐρώτησιν ἐπίταξιν· τὸ γὰρ ἐβάδισεν; ἢ βάδιζε πτῶσις ῥήματος κατὰ ταῦτα τὰ εἴδη ἐστίν. λόγος δὲ φωνὴ συνθετὴ σημαντικὴ ἧς ἔνια μέρη καθ' αὑτὰ σημαίνει τι (οὐ γὰρ ἅπας λόγος ἐκ ῥημάτων καὶ ὀνομάτων σύγκειται, οἷον ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὁρισμός, ἀλλ' ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ ῥημάτων εἶναι λόγον, μέρος μέντοι ἀεί τι σημαῖνον ἕξει) οἷον ἐν τῷ βαδίζει Κλέων ὁ Κλέων. εἷς δέ ἐστι λόγος διχῶς, ἢ γὰρ ὁ ἓν σημαίνων, ἢ ὁ ἐκ πλειόνων συνδέσμῳ, οἷον ἡ Ἰλιὰς μὲν συνδέσμῳ εἷς, ὁ δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τῷ ἓν σημαίνειν.

Ὀνόματος δὲ εἴδη τὸ μὲν ἁπλοῦν, ἁπλοῦν δὲ λέγω ὃ **21**
μὴ ἐκ σημαινόντων σύγκειται, οἷον γῆ, τὸ δὲ διπλοῦν· τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐκ σημαίνοντος καὶ ἀσήμου, πλὴν οὐκ ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι σημαίνοντος καὶ ἀσήμου, τὸ δὲ ἐκ σημαινόντων σύγκειται. εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ τριπλοῦν καὶ τετραπλοῦν ὄνομα καὶ πολλαπλοῦν, οἷον τὰ πολλὰ τῶν μεγαλειωτῶν, Ἑρμοκαϊ-
1457ᵇ *κόξανθος * *. ἅπαν δὲ ὄνομά ἐστιν ἢ κύριον ἢ γλῶττα ἢ μεταφορὰ ἢ κόσμος ἢ πεποιημένον ἢ ἐπεκτεταμένον ἢ ὑφῃρημένον ἢ ἐξηλλαγμένον. λέγω δὲ κύριον μὲν ᾧ χρῶνται ἕκαστοι, γλῶτταν δὲ ᾧ ἕτεροι· ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ γλῶτ-*

19 *κατὰ τὸ* Reiz: *τὸ κατὰ* A^c   22 *ἐβάδισεν*;] notam interrogationis add. Tyrwhitt   *βάδιζε* Riccardianus 16: *ἐβάδιζεν* A^c   27 *βαδίζει* Parisinus 2038 (confirm. Ar.): *βαδίζειν* A^c   29 *συνδέσμῳ* Riccardianus 16: *συνδέσμων* A^c   30 *τῷ* apogr.: *τὸ* A^c   31 *εἴδη*] *εἴ-* in litura A^c   33 *ὀνόματι* Spengel, Vahlen (confirm. Ar.): *ὀνόματοσ* A^c   35 *μεγαλειωτῶν* scripsi: *μεγαλιωτῶν* A^c: *μεγαλείων ὧν* Vahlen: *Μασσαλιωτῶν* (ex Ar. *de Massiliotis*) Diels   *ἑρμοκαί· κόξανθοσ* A^c   1457ᵇ 1 ubi lacunam indicavi addit Ar. *qui supplicabatur dominum caelorum* (vel *Iovem*), unde *ἐπευξάμενος Διὶ πατρί* restituit Diels; nescio an exemplum lateat nominis quadruplicis   2 *ἀφῃρημένον* Spengel

time past. (7) A Case of a Noun or Verb is when the word means 'of' or 'to' a thing, and so forth, or for one or many (e.g. 'man' and 'men'); or it may consist merely in the mode of utterance, e.g. in question, command, etc. 'Walked?' and 'Walk!' are Cases of the verb 'to walk' of this last kind. (8) A Speech is a composite significant sound, some of the parts of which have a certain significance by themselves. It may be observed that a Speech is not always made up of Noun and Verb; it may be without a Verb, like the definition of man; but it will always have some part with a certain significance by itself. In the Speech 'Cleon walks,' 'Cleon' is an instance of such a part. A Speech is said to be one in two ways, either as signifying one thing, or as a union of several Speeches made into one by conjunction. Thus the *Iliad* is one Speech by conjunction of several; and the definition of man is one through its signifying one thing.

Nouns are of two kinds, either (1) simple, i.e. made up of **21**
non-significant parts, like the word γῆ, or (2) double; in the latter case the word may be made up either of a significant and a non-significant part (a distinction which disappears in the compound), or of two significant parts. It is possible also to have triple, quadruple or higher compounds, like most of our amplified names; e.g. 'Hermocaïcoxanthus' and the like.

Whatever its structure, a Noun must always be either (1) the ordinary word for the thing, or (2) a strange word, or (3) a metaphor, or (4) an ornamental word, or (5) a coined word, or (6) a word lengthened out, or (7) curtailed, or (8) altered in form. By the ordinary word I mean that in general use in a country; and by a strange word, one in use elsewhere. So that the same word may obviously be

ταν καὶ κύριον εἶναι δυνατὸν τὸ αὐτό, μὴ τοῖς αὐτοῖς δέ· τὸ γὰρ σίγυνον Κυπρίοις μὲν κύριον, ἡμῖν δὲ γλῶττα. μεταφορὰ δέ ἐστιν ὀνόματος ἀλλοτρίου ἐπιφορὰ ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους ἐπὶ εἶδος ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδους ἐπὶ τὸ γένος ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδους ἐπὶ εἶδος ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. λέγω δὲ ἀπὸ γένους μὲν ἐπὶ εἶδος οἷον "νηῦς δέ μοι ἥδ' ἕστηκεν·" τὸ γὰρ ὁρμεῖν ἐστιν ἑστάναι τι. ἀπ' εἴδους δὲ ἐπὶ γένος "ἦ δὴ μυρί' Ὀδυσσεὺς ἐσθλὰ ἔοργεν·" τὸ γὰρ μυρίον πολύ ἐστιν, ᾧ νῦν ἀντὶ τοῦ πολλοῦ κέχρηται. ἀπ' εἴδους δὲ ἐπὶ εἶδος οἷον "χαλκῷ ἀπὸ ψυχὴν ἀρύσας" καὶ "τεμὼν ἀτειρέι χαλκῷ·" ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἀρύσαι ταμεῖν, τὸ δὲ ταμεῖν ἀρύσαι εἴρηκεν· ἄμφω γὰρ ἀφελεῖν τί ἐστιν. τῷ δὲ ἀνάλογον λέγω, ὅταν ὁμοίως ἔχῃ τὸ δεύτερον πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ τέταρτον πρὸς τὸ τρίτον· ἐρεῖ γὰρ ἀντὶ τοῦ δευτέρου τὸ τέταρτον ἢ ἀντὶ τοῦ τετάρτου τὸ δεύτερον. καὶ ἐνίοτε προστιθέασιν ἀνθ' οὗ λέγει πρὸς ὅ ἐστι. λέγω δὲ οἷον ὁμοίως ἔχει φιάλη πρὸς Διόνυσον καὶ ἀσπὶς πρὸς Ἄρη· ἐρεῖ τοίνυν τὴν φιάλην ἀσπίδα Διονύσου καὶ τὴν ἀσπίδα φιάλην Ἄρεως. ἢ ὃ γῆρας πρὸς βίον, καὶ ἑσπέρα πρὸς ἡμέραν· ἐρεῖ τοίνυν τὴν ἑσπέραν γῆρας ἡμέρας ἢ ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, καὶ τὸ γῆρας ἑσπέραν βίου ἢ δυσμὰς βίου. ἐνίοις δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ὄνομα κείμενον τῶν ἀνάλογον, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἧττον ὁμοίως λεχθήσεται· οἷον τὸ τὸν καρπὸν μὲν ἀφιέναι σπείρειν, τὸ δὲ τὴν φλόγα ἐπὶ τοῦ ἡλίου ἀνώνυμον· ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἔχει τοῦτο πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὸ σπείρειν πρὸς τὸν καρπόν, διὸ εἴρηται "σπείρων θεοκτίσταν

6 fort. *σίγυνος* 10 *ὁρμῖν* (-*ῖν* in litura) A^{c} 11 *ἤδη μυριόδυσσεὺσ* A^{c} 12 *μύριον* A^{c} 13 fort. *πολλά* 14 *ἀρύσας καὶ* Tyrwhitt (*ἀρύσας* Leidensis et corr. Vaticanus 1400, *καὶ* Laurentianus LX 21): *ἀερύσασκε* A^{c} *τεμῶν* A^{c}: *ταμὼν* Bekker (ed. 3) *ατηρει* A^{c} 16 *τῷ* scripsi: *τὸ* A^{c} 27 *ἐπὶ* M. Schmidt: *ἀπὸ* A^{c} (et Ar.)

at once strange and ordinary, though not in reference to the same people; σίγυνος, for instance, is an ordinary word in Cyprus, and a strange word with us. Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else; the transference being either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or on grounds of analogy. That from genus to species is exemplified in 'Here stands my ship'; for lying at anchor is the 'standing' of a particular kind of thing. That from species to genus in 'Truly ten thousand good deeds has Ulysses wrought,' where 'ten thousand,' which is a particular large number, is put in place of the generic 'a large number.' That from species to species in 'Drawing the life with the bronze,' and in 'Severing with the enduring bronze'; where the poet uses 'draw' in the sense of 'sever' and 'sever' in that of 'draw,' both words meaning to 'take away' something. That from analogy is possible whenever there are four terms so related that the second (B) is to the first (A), as the fourth (D) to the third (C); for one may then metaphorically put B in lieu of D, and D in lieu of B. Now and then, too, they qualify the metaphor by adding on to it that to which the word it supplants is relative. Thus a cup (B) is in relation to Dionysus (A) what a shield (D) is to Ares (C). The cup accordingly will be metaphorically described as the 'shield *of Dionysus*' (D + A), and the shield as the 'cup *of Ares*' (B + C). Or to take another instance: As old age (D) is to life (C), so is evening (B) to day (A). One will accordingly describe evening (B) as the 'old age *of the day*' (D + A)—or by the Empedoclean equivalent; and old age (D) as the 'evening' or 'sunset *of life*' (B + C). It may be that some of the terms thus related have no special name of their own, but for all that they will be metaphorically described in just the same way. Thus to cast forth seed-corn is called 'sowing'; but to cast forth its flame, as said of the sun, has no special name. This nameless act (B), however, stands in just the same relation to its object, sunlight (A), as sowing (D) to the seed-corn (C). Hence the expression in the poet, 'sowing around a god-created

φλόγα.” ἔστι δὲ τῷ τρόπῳ τούτῳ τῆς μεταφορᾶς χρῆσθαι καὶ ἄλλως, προσαγορεύσαντα τὸ ἀλλότριον ἀποφῆσαι τῶν οἰκείων τι, οἷον εἰ τὴν ἀσπίδα εἴποι φιάλην μὴ Ἄρεως ἀλλ' ἄοινον. * * πεποιημένον δ' ἐστὶν ὃ ὅλως μὴ καλούμενον ὑπὸ τινῶν αὐτὸς τίθεται ὁ ποιητής, (δοκεῖ γὰρ ἔνια εἶναι τοιαῦτα) οἷον τὰ κέρατα ἔρνυγας καὶ τὸν ἱερέα ἀρητῆρα. ἐπεκτεταμένον
1458^{a} δέ ἐστιν ἢ ἀφῃρημένον τὸ μὲν ἐὰν φωνήεντι μακροτέρῳ κεχρημένον ᾖ τοῦ οἰκείου ἢ συλλαβῇ ἐμβεβλημένῃ, τὸ δὲ ἂν ἀφῃρημένον τι ᾖ αὐτοῦ, ἐπεκτεταμένον μὲν οἷον τὸ πόλεως πόληος καὶ τὸ Πηλείδου Πηληιάδεω, ἀφῃρημένον δὲ οἷον τὸ κρῖ καὶ τὸ δῶ καὶ “μία γίνεται ἀμφοτέρων ὄψ.” ἐξηλλαγμένον δ' ἐστὶν ὅταν τοῦ ὀνομαζομένου τὸ μὲν καταλείπῃ τὸ δὲ ποιῇ, οἷον τὸ “δεξιτερὸν κατὰ μαζόν” ἀντὶ τοῦ δεξιόν.

αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν ὀνομάτων τὰ μὲν ἄρρενα τὰ δὲ θήλεα τὰ δὲ μεταξύ, ἄρρενα μὲν ὅσα τελευτᾷ εἰς τὸ Ν καὶ Ρ ⟨καὶ Σ⟩ καὶ ὅσα ἐκ τούτου σύγκειται (ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν δύο, Ψ καὶ Ξ), θήλεα δὲ ὅσα ἐκ τῶν φωνηέντων εἴς τε τὰ ἀεὶ μακρά, οἷον εἰς Η καὶ Ω, καὶ τῶν ἐπεκτεινομένων εἰς Α· ὥστε ἴσα συμβαίνει πλήθη εἰς ὅσα τὰ ἄρρενα καὶ τὰ θήλεα· τὸ γὰρ Ψ καὶ τὸ Ξ ⟨τῷ Σ⟩ ταὐτά ἐστιν. εἰς δὲ ἄφωνον οὐδὲν ὄνομα τελευτᾷ, οὐδὲ εἰς φωνῆεν βραχύ. εἰς δὲ τὸ Ι τρία μόνον, μέλι κόμμι πέπερι. εἰς δὲ τὸ Υ πέντε. τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ εἰς ταῦτα καὶ Ν ⟨καὶ Ρ⟩ καὶ Σ.

32 ἀλλ' ἄοινον Victorius : ἀλλὰ οἴνου A^c (et Ar.) 33 definitionem κόσμου hic deesse vidit Madius 35 ἔρνυγας Victorius : ἐρνύτας Aldina 1536 1458^{a} 2 ᾖ] ἢ A^c συλλαβὴ ἐμβεβλημένη A^c 3 ἀφήρη μὲν ὄντι ἢ A^c πόλεοσ A^c 4 πηλείδου Parisinus 2038 : πηλέοσ A^c 5 ὄψ Victorius : ὀησ (i.e. ΟΨΙΣ) A^c ἐξηλαγμένον A^c 9 καὶ Σ add. Riccardianus 16 (confirm. Ar.) 11 αἰεὶ A^c 13 πλήθει apogr. 14 τῷ Σ add. anon. ap. Tyrwhittum : καὶ Σ Reiz 15 κόμμι Riccardianus 16 : κόμι A^c 16 ταῦτα ⟨καὶ Α⟩ καὶ Ν ⟨καὶ Ρ⟩ καὶ Σ coni. Morelius

flame' (D+A). There is also another form of qualified metaphor. Having given the thing the alien name, one may by a negative addition deny of it one of the attributes naturally associated with its new name. An instance of this would be to call the shield not the 'cup *of Ares*,' as in the former case, but a 'cup *that holds no wine*.' * * * A coined word is a name which, being quite unknown among a people, is given by the poet himself; e.g. (for there are some words that seem to be of this origin) ἐρνύγες for horns, and ἀρητήρ for priest. A word is said to be lengthened out, when it has a short vowel made long, or an extra syllable inserted; e.g. πόληος for πόλεως, Πηληιάδεω for Πηλείδου. It is said to be curtailed, when it has lost a part; e.g. κρῖ, δῶ, and ὄψ in μία γίνεται ἀμφοτέρων ὄψ. It is an altered word, when part is left as it was and part is of the poet's making; e.g. δεξιτερόν for δεξιόν, in δεξιτερὸν κατὰ μαζόν.

The Nouns themselves (to whatever class they may belong) are either masculines, feminines, or intermediates (neuter). All ending in N, P, Σ, or in the two compounds of this last, Ψ and Ξ, are masculines. All ending in the invariably long vowels, H and Ω, and in A among the vowels that may be long, are feminines. So that there is an equal number of masculine and feminine terminations, as Ψ and Ξ are the same as Σ, and need not be counted. There is no Noun, however, ending in a mute or in either of the two short vowels, E and O. Only three (μέλι, κόμμι, πέπερι) end in I, and five in Y. The intermediates, or neuters, end in the variable vowels or in N, P, Σ.

22 Λέξεως δὲ ἀρετὴ σαφῆ καὶ μὴ ταπεινὴν εἶναι. σαφεστάτη μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ἐκ τῶν κυρίων ὀνομάτων, ἀλλὰ ταπεινή· παράδειγμα δὲ ἡ Κλεοφῶντος ποίησις καὶ ἡ Σθενέλου. σεμνὴ δὲ καὶ ἐξαλλάττουσα τὸ ἰδιωτικὸν ἡ τοῖς ξενικοῖς κεχρημένη· ξενικὸν δὲ λέγω γλῶτταν καὶ μεταφορὰν καὶ ἐπέκτασιν καὶ πᾶν τὸ παρὰ τὸ κύριον. ἀλλ' ἄν τις [ἂν] ἅπαντα τοιαῦτα ποιήσῃ, ἢ αἴνιγμα ἔσται ἢ βαρβαρισμός· ἂν μὲν οὖν ἐκ μεταφορῶν, αἴνιγμα, ἐὰν δὲ ἐκ γλωττῶν, βαρβαρισμός. αἰνίγματός τε γὰρ ἰδέα αὕτη ἐστί, τὸ λέγοντα ὑπάρχοντα ἀδύνατα συνάψαι—κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὴν τῶν ὀνομάτων σύνθεσιν οὐχ οἷόν τε τοῦτο ποιῆσαι, κατὰ δὲ τὴν μεταφορῶν ἐνδέχεται—οἷον "ἄνδρ' εἶδον πυρὶ χαλκὸν ἐπ' ἀνέρι κολλήσαντα," καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. ἐκ τῶν γλωττῶν βαρβαρισμός. δεῖ ἄρα κεκρᾶσθαί πως τούτοις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ μὴ ἰδιωτικὸν ποιήσει μηδὲ ταπεινόν, οἷον ἡ γλῶττα καὶ ἡ μεταφορὰ καὶ ὁ κόσμος καὶ τἆλλα τὰ εἰρημένα εἴδη, τὸ δὲ κύριον τὴν σαφήνειαν. οὐκ ἐλάχιστον δὲ μέρος 1458b συμβάλλεται εἰς τὸ σαφὲς τῆς λέξεως καὶ μὴ ἰδιωτικὸν αἱ ἐπεκτάσεις καὶ ἀποκοπαὶ καὶ ἐξαλλαγαὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων· διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἄλλως ἔχειν ἢ ὡς τὸ κύριον παρὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς γιγνόμενον τὸ μὴ ἰδιωτικὸν ποιήσει, διὰ δὲ τὸ κοινωνεῖν τοῦ εἰωθότος τὸ σαφὲς ἔσται. ὥστε οὐκ ὀρθῶς ψέγουσιν οἱ ἐπιτιμῶντες τῷ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ τῆς διαλέκτου καὶ διακωμῳδοῦντες τὸν ποιητήν, οἷον Εὐκλείδης ὁ ἀρχαῖος, ὡς ῥᾴδιον ποιεῖν, εἴ τις δώσει ἐκτείνειν ἐφ' ὁπόσον βούλεται

24 ἂν om. apogr. ποιῆσαι A^c 26 γλοττῶν A^c 27 λέγοντα] λέγον τὰ A^c 28 τῶν ⟨ἄλλων⟩ ὀνομάτων (ut videtur) Ar. οὐχοίονται A^c 29 μεταφορῶν scripsi: μεταφορὰν A^c ἴδον A^c πυρὶ χαλκὸν Victorius: πυρίχαλκον A^c 31 κεκρᾶσθαι Riccardianus 46 (confirm. Ar.): κεκρίσθαι A^c 1458b 1 συμβάλεται A^c: συμβάλλονται apogr. 6 ἐπιτιμοῦντεσ A^c

The perfection of Diction is for it to be at once clear **22**
and not mean. The clearest indeed is that made up of the ordinary words for things, but it is mean, as is shown by the poetry of Cleophon and Sthenelus. On the other hand the Diction becomes distinguished and non-prosaic by the use of unfamiliar terms, i. e. strange words, metaphors, lengthened forms, and everything that deviates from the ordinary modes of speech.—But a whole statement in such terms will be either a riddle or a barbarism, a riddle, if made up of metaphors, a barbarism, if made up of strange words. The very nature indeed of a riddle is this, to describe a fact in an impossible combination of words (which cannot be done with the real names for things, but can be with their metaphorical substitutes); e. g. 'I saw a man glue brass on another with fire,' and the like. The corresponding use of strange words results in a barbarism.—A certain admixture, accordingly, of unfamiliar terms is necessary. These, the strange word, the metaphor, the ornamental equivalent, etc., will save the language from seeming mean and prosaic, while the ordinary words in it will secure the requisite clearness. What helps most, however, to render the Diction at once clear and non-prosaic is the use of the lengthened, curtailed, and altered forms of words. Their deviation from the ordinary words will, by making the language unlike that in general use, give it a non-prosaic appearance; and their having much in common with the words in general use will give it the quality of clearness. It is not right, then, to condemn these modes of speech, and ridicule the poet for using them, as some have done; e. g. the elder Euclid, who said it was easy to make poetry if one were to be allowed to lengthen the words in the statement itself as much as one likes—a procedure he

†ἰαμβοποιήσας ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ λέξει† "Ἐπιχάρην εἶδον Μαραθῶνάδε βαδίζοντα," καὶ "οὐκ ἄν γ' ἐράμενος †τὸν ἐκείνου ἐλλέβορον†." τὸ μὲν οὖν φαίνεσθαί πως χρώμενον τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ γελοῖον· τὸ δὲ μέτριον κοινὸν ἁπάντων ἐστὶ τῶν μερῶν· καὶ γὰρ μεταφοραῖς καὶ γλώτταις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις εἴδεσι χρώμενος ἀπρεπῶς καὶ ἐπίτηδες ἐπὶ τὰ γελοῖα τὸ αὐτὸ ἂν ἀπεργάσαιτο. τὸ δὲ ἁρμοττόντως ὅσον διαφέρει ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπῶν θεωρείσθω ἐντιθεμένων τῶν ὀνομάτων εἰς τὸ μέτρον. καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γλώττης δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μεταφορῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἰδεῶν μετατιθεὶς ἄν τις τὰ κύρια ὀνόματα κατίδοι ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγομεν· οἷον τὸ αὐτὸ ποιήσαντος ἰαμβεῖον Αἰσχύλου καὶ Εὐριπίδου, ἓν δὲ μόνον ὄνομα μετατιθέντος, ἀντὶ κυρίου εἰωθότος γλῶτταν, τὸ μὲν φαίνεται καλὸν τὸ δ' εὐτελές. Αἰσχύλος μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ ἐποίησε

φαγέδαινα ἥ μου σάρκας ἐσθίει ποδός,

ὁ δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐσθίει τὸ θοινᾶται μετέθηκεν. καὶ

νῦν δέ μ' ἐὼν ὀλίγος τε καὶ οὐτιδανὸς καὶ ἀεικής,

εἴ τις λέγοι τὰ κύρια μετατιθεὶς

νῦν δέ μ' ἐὼν μικρός τε καὶ ἀσθενικὸς καὶ ἀειδής·

καὶ

δίφρον [τε] ἀεικέλιον καταθεὶς ὀλίγην τε τράπεζαν,
δίφρον μοχθηρὸν καταθεὶς μικράν τε τράπεζαν·

9 fortasse mutato ordine *ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ λέξει, ἰαμβοποιήσας* Ἐπιχάρην Bursian: *ἤτει χάριν* A^{c} *ἴδον* A^{c} *μαραθῶνα δὲ* A^{c} 10 *ἂν γεράμενοσ* A^{c} 12 *μέτριον* Spengel: *μέτρον* A^{c} 14 *ἐπὶ τὰ*] *ἔπειτα* A^{c} fort. *γελοιότερα* 15 *ἁρμοττόντως* Tucker: *ἁρμόττοντοσ* A^{c}: *ἁρμόττον* apogr. 18 *εἰδέων* A^{c} 19 *ἰάμβιον* A^{c} 20 *μεταθέντος* apogr. 23 *φαγέδαινα* apogr.: *φαγάδενα* A^{c}: *φαγέδαιναν* Hermann 25 *δὲ μεὼν* A^{c} *ἀεικής* Riccardianus 46, Morelius (confirmare videtur Ar.): *ἀειδήσ* A^{c} 27 *δὲ μεὼν* A^{c} *μικρός τε* apogr.: *μικρὸσ δὲ* A^{c} 29 *τε* prius om. apogr.: *τε** (nisi forte *ται* fuerat) A^{c}: *τ' αἰκέλιον* reposuit Vahlen

caricatured by reading Ἐπιχάρην εἶδον Μαραθῶνάδε βαδίζοντα, and οὐκ ἄν γ' ἐράμενος τὸν ἐκείνου ἐλλέβορον as verses. A too apparent use of these licences has certainly a ludicrous effect, but they are not alone in that; the rule of moderation applies to all the constituents of the poetic vocabulary; even with metaphors, strange words, and the rest, the effect will be the same, if one uses them improperly and with a view to provoking laughter. The proper use of them is a very different thing. To realize the difference one should take an epic verse and see how it reads when the normal words are introduced. The same should be done too with the strange word, the metaphor, and the rest; for one has only to put the ordinary words in their place to see the truth of what we are saying. The same iambic, for instance, is found in Aeschylus and Euripides, and as it stands in the former it is a poor line; whereas Euripides, by the change of a single word, the substitution of a strange for what is by usage the ordinary word, has made it seem a fine one. Aeschylus having said in his *Philoctetes*:

φαγέδαινα ἥ μου σάρκας ἐσθίει ποδός,

Euripides has merely altered the ἐσθίει here into θοινᾶται. Or suppose

νῦν δέ μ' ἐὼν ὀλίγος τε καὶ οὐτιδανὸς καὶ ἀεικής

to be altered by the substitution of the ordinary words into

νῦν δέ μ' ἐὼν μικρός τε καὶ ἀσθενικὸς καὶ ἀειδής.

Or the line

δίφρον ἀεικέλιον καταθεὶς ὀλίγην τε τράπεζαν

into

δίφρον μοχθηρὸν καταθεὶς μικράν τε τράπεζαν.

καὶ τὸ "ἠιόνες βοόωσιν," ἠιόνες κράζουσιν. ἔτι δὲ Ἀριφράδης τοὺς τραγῳδοὺς ἐκωμῴδει, ὅτι ἃ οὐδεὶς ἂν εἴποι ἐν τῇ διαλέκτῳ τούτοις χρῶνται, οἷον τὸ δωμάτων ἄπο ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀπὸ δωμάτων, καὶ τὸ σέθεν καὶ τὸ ἐγὼ δέ νιν καὶ τὸ 1459^a *Ἀχιλλέως πέρι ἀλλὰ μὴ περὶ Ἀχιλλέως, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἐν τοῖς κυρίοις ποιεῖ τὸ μὴ ἰδιωτικὸν ἐν τῇ λέξει ἅπαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἐκεῖνος δὲ τοῦτο ἠγνόει. ἔστιν δὲ μέγα μὲν τὸ ἑκάστῳ τῶν εἰρημένων πρεπόντως χρῆσθαι, καὶ διπλοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ γλώτταις, πολὺ δὲ μέγιστον τὸ μεταφορικὸν εἶναι. μόνον γὰρ τοῦτο οὔτε παρ' ἄλλου ἔστι λαβεῖν εὐφυίας τε σημεῖόν ἐστι· τὸ γὰρ εὖ μεταφέρειν τὸ τὸ ὅμοιον θεωρεῖν ἐστιν. τῶν δ' ὀνομάτων τὰ μὲν διπλᾶ μάλιστα ἁρμόττει τοῖς διθυράμβοις, αἱ δὲ γλῶτται τοῖς ἡρωικοῖς, αἱ δὲ μεταφοραὶ τοῖς ἰαμβείοις. καὶ ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἡρωικοῖς ἅπαντα χρήσιμα τὰ εἰρημένα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἰαμβείοις διὰ τὸ ὅτι μάλιστα λέξιν μιμεῖσθαι ταῦτα ἁρμόττει τῶν ὀνομάτων ὅσοις κἂν ἐν [ὅσοις] λόγοις τις χρήσαιτο· ἔστι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα τὸ κύριον καὶ μεταφορὰ καὶ κόσμος. περὶ μὲν οὖν τραγῳδίας καὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ πράττειν μιμήσεως ἔστω ἡμῖν ἱκανὰ τὰ εἰρημένα.*

Περὶ δὲ τῆς διηγηματικῆς καὶ ἐν μέτρῳ μιμητικῆς, **23** *ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς μύθους καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις συνιστάναι δραματικοὺς καὶ περὶ μίαν πρᾶξιν ὅλην καὶ τελείαν ἔχουσαν ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσα καὶ τέλος, ἵν' ὥσπερ ζῷον ἓν ὅλον ποιῇ τὴν οἰκείαν ἡδονήν, δῆλον, καὶ μὴ ὁμοίας ἱστορίας τὰς*

31 *τὸ ἴωνεσ βοῶσιν ἢ ἴωνεσ* A^c *ἀρειφράδησ* A^c 32 *εἴπηι* A^c 1459^a 4 *τὸ*] *τῶι* A^c 6 *π,ἄλλου* (ἀρ' suprascr.) A^c 10 et 12 *ἰαμβίοισ* A^c 13 *κἂν* Riccardianus 46, Harles: *καὶ* A^c *ὅσοις* om. apogr. *τις* apogr.: *τί* A^c 20 fort. *ὅλον* ⟨*ὂν*⟩ 21 *ποιεῖ* A^c *ἱστορίαις τὰς συνθήσεις* [sic] Riccardianus 46: *ἱστορίαις τὰς συνθέσεις* Dacier

Or ἠιόνες βοόωσιν into ἠιόνες κράζουσιν. Add to this that Ariphrades used to ridicule the tragedians for introducing expressions unknown in the language of common life, δωμάτων ἄπο (for ἀπὸ δωμάτων), σέθεν, ἐγὼ δέ νιν, Ἀχιλλέως πέρι (for περὶ Ἀχιλλέως), and the like. The mere fact of their not being in ordinary speech gives the Diction a non-prosaic character; but Ariphrades was unaware of that. It is a great thing, indeed, to make a proper use of these poetical forms, as also of compounds and strange words. But the greatest thing by far is to be a master of metaphor. It is the one thing that cannot be learnt from others; and it is also a sign of genius, since a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in dissimilars.

Of the kinds of words we have enumerated it may be observed that compounds are most in place in the dithyramb, strange words in heroic, and metaphors in iambic poetry. Heroic poetry, indeed, may avail itself of them all. But in iambic verse, which models itself as far as possible on the spoken language, only those kinds of words are in place which are allowable also in an oration, i. e. the ordinary word, the metaphor, and the ornamental equivalent.

Let this, then, suffice as an account of Tragedy, the art imitating by means of action on the stage.

As for the poetry which merely narrates, or imitates by 23
means of versified language (without action), it is evident that it has several points in common with Tragedy.

I. The construction of its stories should clearly be like that in a drama; they should be based on a single action, one that is a complete whole in itself, with a beginning, middle, and end, so as to enable the work to produce its own proper pleasure with all the organic unity of a living

συνήθεις θεῖναι, ἐν αἷς ἀνάγκη οὐχὶ μιᾶς πράξεως ποιεῖσθαι δήλωσιν ἀλλ' ἑνὸς χρόνου, ὅσα ἐν τούτῳ συνέβη περὶ ἕνα ἢ πλείους, ὧν ἕκαστον ὡς ἔτυχεν ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα. ὥσπερ γὰρ κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους ἥ τ' ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ἐγένετο ναυμαχία καὶ ἡ ἐν Σικελίᾳ Καρχηδονίων μάχη οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ συντείνουσαι τέλος, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς χρόνοις ἐνίοτε γίνεται θάτερον μετὰ θάτερον, ἐξ ὧν ἓν οὐδὲν γίνεται τέλος. σχεδὸν δὲ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν τοῦτο δρῶσι. διὸ ὥσπερ εἴπομεν ἤδη καὶ ταύτῃ θεσπέσιος ἂν φανείη Ὅμηρος παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους, τῷ μηδὲ τὸν πόλεμον καίπερ ἔχοντα ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος ἐπιχειρῆσαι ποιεῖν ὅλον· λίαν γὰρ ἂν μέγας καὶ οὐκ εὐσύνοπτος ἔμελλεν ἔσεσθαι, ἢ τῷ μεγέθει μετριάζοντα καταπεπλεγμένον τῇ ποικιλίᾳ. νῦν δ' ἓν μέρος ἀπολαβὼν ἐπεισοδίοις κέχρηται αὐτῶν πολλοῖς, οἷον νεῶν καταλόγῳ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐπεισοδίοις [δὶς] διαλαμβάνει τὴν ποίησιν. οἱ δ' ἄλλοι περὶ ἕνα ποιοῦσι
1459b καὶ περὶ ἕνα χρόνον καὶ μίαν πρᾶξιν πολυμερῆ, οἷον ὁ τὰ Κύπρια ποιήσας καὶ τὴν μικρὰν Ἰλιάδα. τοιγαροῦν ἐκ μὲν Ἰλιάδος καὶ Ὀδυσσείας μία τραγῳδία ποιεῖται ἑκατέρας ἢ δύο μόναι, ἐκ δὲ Κυπρίων πολλαὶ καὶ τῆς μικρᾶς Ἰλιάδος πλέον ὀκτώ, οἷον ὅπλων κρίσις, Φιλοκτήτης, Νεοπτόλεμος, Εὐρύπυλος, πτωχεία, Λάκαιναι, Ἰλίου πέρσις καὶ ἀπόπλους, καὶ Σίνων καὶ Τρῳάδες.

ἔτι δὲ [ἔτι δὲ] 24
τὰ εἴδη ταὐτὰ δεῖ ἔχειν τὴν ἐποποιίαν τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ, ἢ γὰρ ἁπλῆν ἢ πεπλεγμένην ἢ ἠθικὴν ἢ παθητικήν· καὶ τὰ μέρη ἔξω μελοποιίας καὶ ὄψεως ταὐτά· καὶ γὰρ περιπετειῶν

22 *θεῖναι* scripsi: *εἶναι* A^c 25 *σαλαμίνη* A^c 26 *ναύμαχοσ* A^c 28 *μετὰ θάτερον* Parisinus 2038: *μετὰ θατέρου* A^c 31 *τῷ* Riccardianus 16: *τὸ* A^c 33 *μέγα* pr. A^c 36 *δὶσ* deletum in A^c: *οἷς* Riccardianus 16 1459b 2 *Κύπρια* Reiz: *κυπρικὰ* A^c 4 *μόνασ* pr. A^c 7 *πρωϊάδεσ* pr. A^c *ἔτι δὲ* bis A^c 8 *δεῖ*] *δὴ* A^c

creature. Nor should one suppose that there is anything like them in our usual histories. A history has to deal not with one action, but with one period and all that happened in that to one or more persons, however disconnected the several events may have been. Just as two events may take place at the same time, e. g. the sea-fight off Salamis and the battle with the Carthaginians in Sicily, without converging to the same end, so too of two consecutive events one may sometimes come after the other with no one end as their common issue. Nevertheless most of our epic poets, one may say, ignore the distinction.

Herein, then, to repeat what we have said before, we have a further proof of Homer's marvellous superiority to the rest. He did not attempt to deal even with the Trojan war in its entirety, though it was a whole with a definite beginning and end—through a feeling apparently that it was too long a story to be taken in in one view, or if not that, too complicated from the variety of incident in it. As it is, he has singled out one section of the whole; many of the other incidents, however, he brings in as episodes, using the Catalogue of the Ships, for instance, and other episodes to relieve the uniformity of his narrative. As for the other epic poets, they treat of one man, or one period; or else of an action which, although one, has a multiplicity of parts in it. This last is what the authors of the *Cypria* and *Little Iliad* have done. And the result is that, whereas the *Iliad* or *Odyssey* supplies materials for only one, or at most two tragedies, the *Cypria* does that for several, and the *Little Iliad* for more than eight: for an *Adjudgment of Arms*, a *Philoctetes*, a *Neoptolemus*, a *Eurypylus*, a *Ulysses as Beggar*, a *Laconian Women*, a *Fall of Ilium*, and a *Departure of the Fleet*; as also a *Sinon*, and a *Women of Troy*.

II. Besides this, Epic poetry must divide into the same **24**
species as Tragedy; it must be either simple or complex, a story of character or one of suffering. Its parts, too,

δεῖ καὶ ἀναγνωρίσεων καὶ παθημάτων· ἔτι τὰς διανοίας καὶ τὴν λέξιν ἔχειν καλῶς. οἷς ἅπασιν Ὅμηρος κέχρηται καὶ πρῶτος καὶ ἱκανῶς. καὶ γὰρ καὶ τῶν ποιημάτων ἑκάτερον συνέστηκεν ἡ μὲν Ἰλιὰς ἁπλοῦν καὶ παθητικόν, ἡ δὲ Ὀδύσσεια πεπλεγμένον (ἀναγνώρισις γὰρ διόλου) καὶ ἠθική· πρὸς γὰρ τούτοις λέξει καὶ διανοίᾳ πάντα ὑπερβέβληκεν.

Διαφέρει δὲ κατά τε τῆς συστάσεως τὸ μῆκος ἡ ἐποποιία καὶ τὸ μέτρον. τοῦ μὲν οὖν μήκους ὅρος ἱκανὸς ὁ εἰρημένος· δύνασθαι γὰρ δεῖ συνορᾶσθαι τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὸ τέλος. εἴη δ' ἂν τοῦτο, εἰ τῶν μὲν ἀρχαίων ἐλάττους αἱ συστάσεις εἶεν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ πλῆθος τραγῳδιῶν τῶν εἰς μίαν ἀκρόασιν τιθεμένων παρήκοιεν. ἔχει δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἐπεκτείνεσθαι τὸ μέγεθος πολύ τι ἡ ἐποποιία ἴδιον διὰ τὸ ἐν μὲν τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἅμα πραττόμενα πολλὰ μέρη μιμεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς καὶ τῶν ὑποκριτῶν μέρος μόνον· ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐποποιίᾳ διὰ τὸ διήγησιν εἶναι ἔστι πολλὰ μέρη ἅμα ποιεῖν περαινόμενα, ὑφ' ὧν οἰκείων ὄντων αὔξεται ὁ τοῦ ποιήματος ὄγκος. ὥστε τοῦτ' ἔχει τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἰς μεγαλοπρέπειαν καὶ τὸ μεταβάλλειν τὸν ἀκούοντα καὶ ἐπεισοδιοῦν ἀνομοίοις ἐπεισοδίοις· τὸ γὰρ ὅμοιον ταχὺ πληροῦν ἐκπίπτειν ποιεῖ τὰς τραγῳδίας. τὸ δὲ μέτρον τὸ ἡρωικὸν ἀπὸ τῆς πείρας ἥρμοκεν. εἰ γάρ τις ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ μέτρῳ διηγητικὴν μίμησιν ποιοῖτο ἢ ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀπρεπὲς ἂν φαίνοιτο· τὸ γὰρ ἡρωικὸν στασιμώτατον καὶ ὀγκωδέστατον τῶν μέτρων ἐστίν—διὸ καὶ γλώττας καὶ με-

13 *ἱκανῶς* apogr. (confirm. Ar.) : *ἱκανὸσ* A^{c} *πονημάτων* A^{c} 15 *ἀναγνωρίσεις* Christ *ἠθικόν* corr. rec. A^{c} 16 *γὰρ* A^{c} : *δὲ* apogr. *πάντας* apogr. 21 *πρὸς δὲ* apogr. (confirm. Ar.) : *προσθε* A^{c} 29 fort. [*τὸ*] *ἀγαθὸν* 32 *ἥρμωκεν* A^{c} 33 *διηγηματικὴν* apogr.

with the exception of Song and Spectacle, must be the same, as it requires Peripeties, Discoveries, and scenes of suffering just like Tragedy. Lastly, the Thought and Diction in it must be good in their way. All these elements appear in Homer first; and he has made due use of them. His two poems are each examples of construction, the *Iliad* simple and a story of suffering, the *Odyssey* complex (there is Discovery throughout it) and a story of character. And they are more than this, since in Diction and Thought too they surpass all other poems.

There is, however, a difference in the Epic as compared with Tragedy, (1) in its length, and (2) in its metre. (1) As to its length, the limit already suggested will suffice: it must be possible for the beginning and end of the work to be taken in in one view—a condition which will be fulfilled if the poem be shorter than the old epics, and about as long as the series of tragedies offered for one hearing. For the extension of its length epic poetry has a special advantage, of which it makes large use. In a play one cannot represent an action with a number of parts going on simultaneously; one is limited to the part on the stage and connected with the actors. Whereas in epic poetry the narrative form makes it possible for one to describe a number of simultaneous incidents; and these, if germane to the subject, increase the body of the poem. This then is a gain to the Epic, tending to give it grandeur, and also variety of interest and room for episodes of diverse kinds. Uniformity of incident by the satiety it soon creates is apt to ruin tragedies on the stage. (2) As for its metre, the heroic has been assigned it from experience; were any one to attempt a narrative poem in some one, or in several, of the other metres, the incongruity of the thing would be apparent. The heroic in fact is the gravest and weightiest

ταφορὰς δέχεται μάλιστα· περιττὴ γὰρ καὶ * * ἡ διηγηματικὴ μίμησις τῶν ἄλλων. τὸ δὲ ἰαμβεῖον καὶ τετράμετρον 1460 a κινητικὰ καὶ τὸ μὲν ὀρχηστικὸν τὸ δὲ πρακτικόν. ἔτι δὲ ἀτοπώτερον εἰ μιγνύοι τις αὐτά, ὥσπερ Χαιρήμων. διὸ οὐδεὶς μακρὰν σύστασιν ἐν ἄλλῳ πεποίηκεν ἢ τῷ ἡρῴῳ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἴπομεν αὐτὴ ἡ φύσις διδάσκει τὸ ἁρμόττον αὐτῇ αἱρεῖσθαι. Ὅμηρος δὲ ἄλλα τε πολλὰ ἄξιος ἐπαινεῖσθαι καὶ δὴ καὶ ὅτι μόνος τῶν ποιητῶν οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ ὃ δεῖ ποιεῖν αὐτόν. αὐτὸν γὰρ δεῖ τὸν ποιητὴν ἐλάχιστα λέγειν· οὐ γάρ ἐστι κατὰ ταῦτα μιμητής. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι αὐτοὶ μὲν δι' ὅλου ἀγωνίζονται, μιμοῦνται δὲ ὀλίγα καὶ ὀλιγάκις· ὁ δὲ ὀλίγα φροιμιασάμενος εὐθὺς εἰσάγει ἄνδρα ἢ γυναῖκα ἢ ἄλλο τι ἦθος, καὶ οὐδέν' ἀήθη ἀλλ' ἔχοντα ἤθη. δεῖ μὲν οὖν ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις ποιεῖν τὸ θαυμαστόν, μᾶλλον δ' ἐνδέχεται ἐν τῇ ἐποποιίᾳ τὸ ἄλογον, δι' ὃ συμβαίνει μάλιστα τὸ θαυμαστόν, διὰ τὸ μὴ ὁρᾶν εἰς τὸν πράττοντα· ἐπεὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Ἕκτορος δίωξιν ἐπὶ σκηνῆς ὄντα γελοῖα ἂν φανείη, οἱ μὲν ἑστῶτες καὶ οὐ διώκοντες, ὁ δὲ ἀνανεύων, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἔπεσιν λανθάνει. τὸ δὲ θαυμαστὸν ἡδύ· σημεῖον δέ, πάντες γὰρ προστιθέντες ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ὡς χαριζόμενοι. δεδίδαχεν δὲ μάλιστα Ὅμηρος καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ψευδῆ λέγειν ὡς δεῖ. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο παραλογισμός. οἴονται γὰρ ἄνθρωποι, ὅταν

36 excidisse videtur ταύταις vel ταύτῃ (cf. Twining ad loc.) 37 μίμησις apogr. : κίνησισ A^c ἰαμβίον A^c 1460 a 1 κινητικὰ καὶ corr. Riccardianus 46, Vahlen : κινητικαὶ A^c 2 μιγνύοι Parisinus 2038 : μιγνύει apographa pleraque : μηγνύη (fuit μὴ γνύη ; -η fin. in litura) A^c : μὴ γνοίη Ar. 3 τῷ] τὸ A^c 4 αὐτῇ] αὐτὴ A^c 5 αἱρεῖσθαι Bonitz (confirm. Ar.) : διαιρεῖσθαι A^c 11. οὐδέν' ἀήθη Victorius : οὐδένα ἀήθη Riccardianus 46 : οὐδένα ἤθη A^c 13 ἄλογον Victorius : ἀνάλογον A^c (et Ar.) δι' ὃ Parisinus 2038 : διὸ A^c 14 ἐπεὶ apogr. : ἔπειτα A^c (et Ar.) 20 fort. ἅνθρωποι

of metres—which is what makes it more tolerant than the rest of strange words and metaphors, that also being a point in which the narrative form of poetry goes beyond all others. The iambic and trochaic, on the other hand, are metres of movement, the one representing that of life and action, the other that of the dance. Still more unnatural would it appear, if one were to write an epic in a medley of metres, as Chaeremon did. Hence it is that no one has ever written a long story in any but heroic verse; nature herself, as we have said, teaches us to select the metre appropriate to such a story.

Homer, admirable as he is in every other respect, is especially so in this, that he alone among epic poets is not unaware of the part to be played by the poet himself in the poem. The poet should say very little *in propria persona*, as he is no imitator when doing that. Whereas the other poets are perpetually coming forward in person, and say but little, and that only here and there, as imitators, Homer after a brief preface brings in forthwith a man, a woman, or some other Character—no one of them characterless, but each with distinctive characteristics.

The marvellous is certainly required in Tragedy. The Epic, however, affords more opening for the improbable, the chief factor in the marvellous, because in it the agents are not visibly before one. The scene of the pursuit of Hector would be ridiculous on the stage—the Greeks halting instead of pursuing him, and Achilles shaking his head to stop them; but in the poem the absurdity is overlooked. The marvellous, however, is a cause of pleasure, as is shown by the fact that we all tell a story with additions, in the belief that we are doing our hearers a pleasure.

Homer more than any other has taught the rest of us the art of framing lies in the right way. I mean the use of

τουδὶ ὄντος τοδὶ ᾖ ἢ γινομένου γίνηται, εἰ τὸ ὕστερον ἔστιν, καὶ τὸ πρότερον εἶναι ἢ γίνεσθαι· τοῦτο δέ ἐστι ψεῦδος. διὸ δεῖ, ἂν τὸ πρῶτον ψεῦδος, ἄλλο δὲ τούτου ὄντος ἀνάγκη εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι ᾖ, προσθεῖναι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ τοῦτο εἰδέναι ἀληθὲς ὂν παραλογίζεται ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ὡς ὄν. παράδειγμα δὲ τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν Νίπτρων. προαιρεῖσθαί τε δεῖ ἀδύνατα εἰκότα μᾶλλον ἢ δυνατὰ ἀπίθανα· τούς τε λόγους μὴ συνίστασθαι ἐκ μερῶν ἀλόγων, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μὲν μηδὲν ἔχειν ἄλογον, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔξω τοῦ μυθεύματος, ὥσπερ Οἰδίπους τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι πῶς ὁ Λάιος ἀπέθανεν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν τῷ δράματι, ὥσπερ ἐν Ἠλέκτρᾳ οἱ τὰ Πύθια ἀπαγγέλλοντες ἢ ἐν Μυσοῖς ὁ ἄφωνος ἐκ Τεγέας εἰς τὴν Μυσίαν ἥκων. ὥστε τὸ λέγειν ὅτι ἀνῄρητο ἂν ὁ μῦθος γελοῖον· ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ οὐ δεῖ συνίστασθαι τοιούτους, ἂν δὲ θῇ καὶ φαίνηται εὐλογωτέρως ἐνδέχεσθαι, καὶ ἄτοπον· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ ἐν Ὀδυσσείᾳ ἄλογα τὰ περὶ τὴν ἔκθεσιν ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἦν ἀνεκτὰ δῆλον
1460b ἂν γένοιτο, εἰ αὐτὰ φαῦλος ποιητὴς ποιήσειε· νῦν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀγαθοῖς ὁ ποιητὴς ἀφανίζει ἡδύνων τὸ ἄτοπον. τῇ δὲ λέξει δεῖ διαπονεῖν ἐν τοῖς ἀργοῖς μέρεσιν καὶ μήτε ἠθικοῖς μήτε διανοητικοῖς· ἀποκρύπτει γὰρ πάλιν ἡ λίαν λαμπρὰ λέξις τά τε ἤθη καὶ τὰς διανοίας.

Περὶ δὲ προβλημάτων καὶ λύσεων, ἐκ πόσων τε καὶ 25
ποίων [ἂν] εἰδῶν ἐστιν, ὧδ' ἂν θεωροῦσιν γένοιτ' ἂν φανερόν.

21 τοῦ διόντοσ pr. A^c τοδὶ ᾖ ἢ apogr.: τὸ δι' ἣν pr. A^c (corr. τὸ δὶ ἤ, vel ἧι) εἰ] ἡ in textu A^c 23 δεῖ Riccardianus 46, Bonitz: δὴ A^c ἄλλο codices Robortelli: ἄλλου A^c (ἀλλ' οὐ- corr.) 24 ᾖ Jortin: ἡ A^c 25 ὂν m. rec. in litura A^c 26 τούτου codex Robortelli νίπτρω A^c 27 ἀπείθανα A^c 30 fort. ⟨ὁ⟩ Οἰδίπους Λάιος Riccardianus 16: ἰόλαοσ A^c 33 οστε pr. A^c ἀνήρειτο A^c γέλοιον A^c 1460b 1 ποιήσειε Riccardianus 46, Heinsius: ποιήσει A^c 5 τά τε] τὰ δὲ A^c 7 ἂν ante εἰδῶν om. apogr.

paralogism. Whenever, if A is or happens, a consequent, B, is or happens, men's notion is that, if the B is, the A also is —but that is a false conclusion. Accordingly, if A is untrue, but there is something else, B, that on the assumption of its truth follows as its consequent, the right thing then is to add on the B. Just because we know the truth of the consequent, we are in our own minds led on to the erroneous inference of the truth of the antecedent. Here is an instance, from the *Bath-story* in the *Odyssey.*

A likely impossibility is always preferable to an unconvincing possibility. The story should never be made up of improbable incidents; there should be nothing of the sort in it. If, however, such incidents are unavoidable, they should be outside the piece, like the hero's ignorance in *Oedipus* of the circumstances of Laius' death; not within it, like the report of the Pythian games in *Electra*, or the man's having come to Mysia from Tegea without uttering a word on the way, in *The Mysians.* So that it is ridiculous to say that one's Plot would have been spoilt without them, since it is fundamentally wrong to make up such Plots. If the poet has taken such a Plot, however, and one sees that he might have put it in a more probable form, he is guilty of absurdity as well as a fault of art. Even in the *Odyssey* the improbabilities in the setting-ashore of Ulysses would be clearly intolerable in the hands of an inferior poet. As it is, the poet conceals them, his other excellences veiling their absurdity. Elaborate Diction, however, is required only in places where there is no action, and no Character or Thought to be revealed. Where there is Character or Thought, on the other hand, an over-ornate Diction tends to obscure them.

As regards Problems and their Solutions, one may see 25
the number and nature of the assumptions on which they

ἐπεὶ γάρ ἐστι μιμητὴς ὁ ποιητὴς ὡσπερανεὶ ζωγράφος ἤ τις ἄλλος εἰκονοποιός, ἀνάγκη μιμεῖσθαι τριῶν ὄντων τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἕν τι ἀεί, ἢ γὰρ οἷα ἦν ἢ ἔστιν, ἢ οἷά φασιν καὶ δοκεῖ, ⟨ἢ⟩ οἷα εἶναι δεῖ. ταῦτα δ' ἐξαγγέλλεται λέξει ἢ καὶ γλώτταις καὶ μεταφοραῖς· καὶ πολλὰ πάθη τῆς λέξεώς ἐστι, δίδομεν γὰρ ταῦτα τοῖς ποιηταῖς. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ ὀρθότης ἐστὶν τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς οὐδὲ ἄλλης τέχνης καὶ ποιητικῆς. αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς ποιητικῆς διττὴ ἁμαρτία, ἡ μὲν γὰρ καθ' αὐτήν, ἡ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. εἰ μὲν γὰρ προείλετο μιμήσασθαι * * ἀδυναμίαν, αὐτῆς ἡ ἁμαρτία· εἰ δὲ τῷ προελέσθαι μὴ ὀρθῶς, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἵππον ἄμφω τὰ δεξιὰ προβεβληκότα, ἢ τὸ καθ' ἑκάστην τέχνην ἁμάρτημα (οἷον τὸ κατ' ἰατρικὴν ἢ ἄλλην τέχνην) ἢ ἀδύνατα πεποίηται ὁποῖ' ἂν οὖν, οὐ καθ' ἑαυτήν. ὥστε δεῖ τὰ ἐπιτιμήματα ἐν τοῖς προβλήμασιν ἐκ τούτων ἐπισκοποῦντα λύειν. πρῶτον μὲν τὰ πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην· ⟨εἰ⟩ ἀδύνατα πεποίηται, ἡμάρτηται· ἀλλ' ὀρθῶς ἔχει, εἰ τυγχάνει τοῦ τέλους τοῦ αὐτῆς, (τὸ γὰρ τέλος εἴρηται) εἰ οὕτως ἐκπληκτικώτερον ἢ αὐτὸ ἢ ἄλλο ποιεῖ μέρος. παράδειγμα ἡ τοῦ Ἕκτορος δίωξις. εἰ μέντοι τὸ τέλος ἢ μᾶλλον ⟨ἢ μὴ⟩ ἧττον ἐνεδέχετο ὑπάρχειν καὶ κατὰ τὴν περὶ τούτων τέχνην, [ἡμαρτῆσθαι] οὐκ ὀρθῶς· δεῖ γὰρ εἰ ἐνδέχεται ὅλως μηδαμῇ ἡμαρτῆσθαι. ἔτι ποτέρων ἐστὶ τὸ ἁμάρτημα, τῶν κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἢ κατ' ἄλλο συμβεβη-

8 ἤ] εἴ pr. A^c 9 τὸν ἀριθμὸν apogr.: τῶν ἀριθμῶν A^c 11 ἢ add. apogr. 16 εἰ] ἡ pr. A^c 17 exciderunt fort. ἥμαρτε δὲ δι' εἰ Riccardianus 16, corr. Parisinus 2038: ἡ A^c 18 τῷ corr. Parisinus 2038: τὸ A^c 20 ἢ ἀδύνατα πεποίηται induxit Duentzer 21 ὁποῖ' ἂν οὖν scripsi: ὁποίαν ὀῦν A^c: ὁποιανοῦν vulg.: ὁποιαοῦν Winstanley fort. ἐπιτιμήματα ⟨τὰ⟩ 22 τὰ] τὰ (εἰ superscr. m. rec.) A^c 23 εἰ add. Parisinus 2038, Vahlen 24 αὐτῆς apogr.: αὐτῆσ A^c 27 ἢ μὴ add. Ueberweg: ἢ add. corr. A^c, apogr. 28 ἡμαρτῆσθαι (μαρτῆσθαι pr. A^c) seclusi

proceed by viewing the matter in the following way. (1) The poet being an imitator just like the painter or other maker of likenesses, he must necessarily in all instances represent things in one or other of three aspects, either as they were or are, or as they are said or thought to be or to have been, or as they ought to be. (2) All this he does in language, with an admixture, it may be, of strange words and metaphors, as also of the various modified forms of words, since the use of these is conceded in poetry. (3) It is to be remembered, too, that there is not the same kind of correctness in poetry as in politics, or indeed any other art. There is, however, within the limits of poetry itself a possibility of two kinds of error, the one directly, the other only accidentally connected with the art. If the poet meant to describe the thing correctly, and failed through lack of power of expression, his art itself is at fault. But if it was through his having meant to describe it in some incorrect way (e.g. to make the horse in movement have both right legs thrown forward) that the technical error (one in a matter of, say, medicine or some other special science), or impossibilities of whatever kind they may be, have got into his description, his error in that case is not in the essentials of the poetic art. These, therefore, must be the premisses of the Solutions in answer to the criticisms involved in the Problems.

I. As to the criticisms relating to the poet's art itself. Any impossibilities there may be in his descriptions of things are faults. But from another point of view they are justifiable, if they serve the end of poetry itself—if (to assume what we have said of that end) they make the effect of some portion of the work more astounding. The Pursuit of Hector is an instance in point. If, however, the poetic end might have been as well or better attained without sacrifice of technical correctness in such matters, the impossibility is not to be justified, since the description should be, if it can, entirely free from error. One may ask, too, whether the error is in a matter directly or only accidentally connected

κός; ἔλαττον γὰρ εἰ μὴ ᾔδει ὅτι ἔλαφος θήλεια κέρατα οὐκ ἔχει ἢ εἰ ἀμιμήτως ἔγραψεν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐὰν ἐπιτιμᾶται ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ, ἀλλ' ἴσως δεῖ, οἷον καὶ Σοφοκλῆς ἔφη αὐτὸς μὲν οἵους δεῖ ποιεῖν, Εὐριπίδην δὲ οἷοι εἰσίν, ταύτῃ λυτέον. εἰ δὲ μηδετέρως, ὅτι οὕτω φασίν, οἷον τὰ περὶ θεῶν· ἴσως γὰρ οὔτε βέλτιον [οὔτε] λέγειν οὔτ' ἀληθῆ, ἀλλ' ἔτυχεν
1461a ὥσπερ Ξενοφάνει· ἀλλ' οὖν φασι. τὰ δὲ ἴσως οὐ βέλτιον μέν, ἀλλ' οὕτως εἶχεν, οἷον τὰ περὶ τῶν ὅπλων, "ἔγχεα δέ σφιν ὄρθ' ἐπὶ σαυρωτῆρος·" οὕτω γὰρ τότ' ἐνόμιζον, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν Ἰλλυριοί. περὶ δὲ τοῦ καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς ἢ εἴρηταί τινι ἢ πέπρακται, οὐ μόνον σκεπτέον εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πεπραγμένον ἢ εἰρημένον βλέποντα εἰ σπουδαῖον ἢ φαῦλον, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὸν πράττοντα ἢ λέγοντα πρὸς ὃν ἢ ὅτε ἢ ὅτῳ ἢ οὗ ἕνεκεν, οἷον ἢ μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ, ἵνα γένηται, ⟨ἢ⟩ μείζονος κακοῦ, ἵνα ἀπογένηται. τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν ὁρῶντα δεῖ διαλύειν, οἷον γλώττῃ "οὐρῆας μὲν πρῶτον·" ἴσως γὰρ οὐ τοὺς ἡμιόνους λέγει ἀλλὰ τοὺς φύλακας· καὶ τὸν Δόλωνα, "ὅς ῥ' ἦ τοι εἶδος μὲν ἔην κακός," οὐ τὸ σῶμα ἀσύμμετρον ἀλλὰ τὸ πρόσωπον αἰσχρόν, τὸ γὰρ εὐειδὲς οἱ Κρῆτες ⟨τὸ⟩ εὐπρόσωπον καλοῦσι· καὶ τὸ "ζωρότερον δὲ κέραιε" οὐ τὸ ἄκρατον ὡς οἰνόφλυξιν ἀλλὰ τὸ θᾶττον. τὰ δὲ κατὰ μεταφορὰν εἴρηται, οἷον "ἄλλοι μέν

31 εἴδει pr. A^c 32 ἢ] η pr. A^c εἰ ἀμιμήτως] η ἀμιμητωσ (corr. κἀμιμήτωσ) A^c 33 ἴσως] οἵους m. rec. in marg. A^c 34 Εὐριπίδην Heinsius: εὐριπίδησ A^c 36 οὔτε alterum om. Parisinus 2038: οὕτω Riccardianus 16 1461a 1 ξενοφάνει vel ξενοφάνης apogr.: ξενοφάνη A^c οὖν Tyrwhitt: οὐ A^c φασί. τὰ δὲ Spengel: φασι τάδε. A^c 2 ἔνχεα A^c 3 τότε νομίζον pr. A^c 6 εἰ] ἢ A^c 8 οὗ ἕνεκεν] ὂυν ἕκεν A^c ἢ] εἰ apogr. 9 ἢ add. corr. A^c, apogr. 12 ὅς ῥ' ἦ τοι Vahlen: ὡσ ῥῆτοι (corr. rec. ῥ') A^c ἔην] εἰ ἦν A^c 14 τὸ addidi 15 κεραι έου pr. A^c 16 τὰ Spengel: τὸ A^c

with the poetic art; since it is a lesser error in an artist not to know, for instance, that the hind has no horns, than to produce an unrecognizable picture of one.

II. If the poet's description be criticized as not true to fact, one may urge perhaps that the object ought to be as described—an answer like that of Sophocles, who said that he drew men as they ought to be, and Euripides as they were. If the description, however, be neither true nor of the thing as it ought to be, the answer must be then, that it is in accordance with opinion. The tales about Gods, for instance, may be as wrong as Xenophanes thinks, neither true nor the better thing to say; but they are certainly in accordance with opinion. Of other statements in poetry one may perhaps say, not that they are better than the truth, but that the fact was so at the time; e. g. the description of the arms: 'their spears stood upright, butt-end upon the ground'; for that was the usual way of fixing them then, as it is still with the Illyrians. As for the question whether something said or done in a poem is morally right or not, in dealing with that one should consider not only the intrinsic quality of the actual word or deed, but also the person who says or does it, the person to whom he says or does it, the time, the means, and the motive of the agent—whether he does it to attain a greater good, or to avoid a greater evil.

III. Other criticisms one must meet by considering the language of the poet: (1) by the assumption of a strange word in a passage like *οὐρῆας μὲν πρῶτον*, where by *οὐρῆας* Homer may perhaps mean not mules but sentinels. And in saying of Dolon, *ὅς ῥ' ἦ τοι εἶδος μὲν ἔην κακός*, his meaning may perhaps be, not that Dolon's body was deformed, but that his face was ugly, as *εὐειδής* is the Cretan word for handsome-faced. So, too, *ζωρότερον δὲ κέραιε* may mean not 'mix the wine stronger,' as though for topers, but 'mix it quicker.' (2) Other expressions in Homer may be explained as metaphorical; e. g. in *ἄλλοι μέν ῥα θεοί τε καὶ ἀνέρες εὗδον*

ῥα θεοί τε καὶ ἀνέρες εὗδον * * παννύχιοι·" ἅμα δέ φησιν "ἦ τοι ὅτ' ἐς πεδίον τὸ Τρωικὸν ἀθρήσειεν, αὐλῶν συρίγγων †τε ὁμαδόν†·" τὸ γὰρ πάντες ἀντὶ ⟨τοῦ⟩ πολλοί κατὰ μεταφορὰν εἴρηται, τὸ γὰρ πᾶν πολύ τι. καὶ τὸ "οἴη δ' ἄμμορος" κατὰ μεταφοράν, τὸ γὰρ γνωριμώτατον μόνον. κατὰ δὲ προσῳδίαν, ὥσπερ Ἱππίας ἔλυεν ὁ Θάσιος, τὸ "δίδομεν δέ οἱ" καὶ "τὸ μὲν οὗ καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ." τὰ δὲ διαιρέσει, οἷον Ἐμπεδοκλῆς "αἶψα δὲ θνήτ' ἐφύοντο, τὰ πρὶν μάθον ἀθάνατα ζωρά τε πρὶν κέκρητο." τὰ δὲ ἀμφιβολίᾳ, "παρῴχηκεν δὲ πλέω νύξ·" τὸ γὰρ πλείω ἀμφίβολόν ἐστιν. τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως. τὸν κεκραμένον οἶνόν φασιν εἶναι, ὅθεν πεποίηται "κνημὶς νεοτεύκτου κασσιτέροιο·" καὶ χαλκέας τοὺς τὸν σίδηρον ἐργαζομένους, ὅθεν εἴρηται ὁ Γανυμήδης Διὶ οἰνοχοεύειν, οὐ πινόντων οἶνον. εἴη δ' ἂν τοῦτό γε κατὰ μεταφοράν. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὅταν ὄνομά τι ὑπεναντίωμά τι δοκῇ σημαίνειν, ἐπισκοπεῖν ποσαχῶς ἂν σημαίνοι τοῦτο ἐν τῷ εἰρημένῳ, οἷον τῷ "τῇ ῥ' ἔσχετο χάλκεον ἔγχος" τὸ ταύτῃ κωλυθῆναι ποσαχῶς ἐνδέχεται—ὡδὶ ἢ ⟨ὡδὶ⟩ ὡς μάλιστ' ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι κατὰ τὴν καταντικρὺ ἢ
1461^b ὡς Γλαύκων λέγει, ὅτι ἔνια ἀλόγως προυπολαμβάνουσιν καὶ αὐτοὶ καταψηφισάμενοι συλλογίζονται, καὶ ὡς εἰρηκότος ὅ

17 post εὗδον intercidisse suspicor ἅπαντες   πανύχιοι pr. A^c 19 τε ὁμαδόν] θ' ὅμαδον Sylburgius; haud scio an integer versus (Il. 10. 13), αὐλῶν συρίγγων τ' ἐνοπὴν ὅμαδόν τ' ἀνθρώπων, sit restituendus   τοῦ add. apogr.   20 όιη pr. A^c (οἴη m. rec.)   24 θνήτ' Morelius : θνητὰ A^c 25 ἀθάνατ' ⟨εἶναι⟩ Riccardianus 46   ζωρά Victorius : ζῶά A^c κέκρητο (ι superscr. m. rec.) A^c ἀμφιβόλια pr. A^c 27 τὸν κεκραμένον apogr. : τῶν κεκραμένων A^c 30 οἰνοχοεύει A^c πεινόντων pr. A^c 31 ὀνόματι ὑπεναντιώματι (fuit -ίω-) δοκεῖ A^c 33 σημαίνοι Vahlen (ed. 1) : σημαίνοιε A^c : σημήνειεν apogr.   οἷον τῷ scripsi : οἷον τὸ A^c 35 ὡδὶ add. Riccardianus 46, Vahlen 1461^b 1 ὅτι] τί A^c (marg. m. rec. ὅτι)   2 εἰρηκότος Riccardianus 46 : εἰρηκότεσ A^c

⟨ἅπαντες⟩ παννύχιοι, as compared with what he tells us at the same time, ἦ τοι ὅτ' ἐς πεδίον τὸ Τρωικὸν ἀθρήσειεν, αὐλῶν συρίγγων †τε ὁμαδόν†, the word ἅπαντες, 'all,' is metaphorically put for 'many,' since 'all' is a species of 'many.' So also his οἴη δ' ἄμμορος is metaphorical, the best known standing 'alone.' (3) A change, as Hippias suggested, in the mode of reading a word will solve the difficulty in δίδομεν δέ οἱ, and τὸ μὲν οὗ καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ. (4) Other difficulties may be solved by another punctuation; e. g. in Empedocles, αἶψα δὲ θνήτ' ἐφύοντο, τὰ πρὶν μάθον ἀθάνατα ζωρά τε πρὶν κέκρητο. Or (5) by the assumption of an equivocal term, as in παρῴχηκεν δὲ πλέω νύξ, where πλέω is equivocal. Or (6) by an appeal to the custom of language. Wine-and-water we call 'wine'; and it is on the same principle that Homer speaks of a κνημὶς νεοτεύκτου κασσιτέροιο, a 'greave of new-wrought *tin*.' A worker in iron we call a 'brazier'; and it is on the same principle that Ganymede is described as the '*wine*-server' of Zeus, though the Gods do not drink wine. This latter, however, may be an instance of metaphor. But whenever also a word seems to imply some contradiction, it is necessary to reflect how many ways there may be of understanding it in the passage in question; e. g. in Homer's τῇ ῥ' ἔσχετο χάλκεον ἔγχος one should consider the possible senses of 'was stopped there'—whether by taking it in this sense or in that one will best avoid the fault of which Glaucon speaks: 'They start with some improbable presumption; and having so decreed it themselves, proceed

τι δοκεῖ ἐπιτιμῶσιν, ἂν ὑπεναντίον ᾖ τῇ αὑτῶν οἰήσει. τοῦτο δὲ πέπονθε τὰ περὶ Ἰκάριον. οἴονται γὰρ αὐτὸν Λάκωνα εἶναι· ἄτοπον οὖν τὸ μὴ ἐντυχεῖν τὸν Τηλέμαχον αὐτῷ εἰς Λακεδαίμονα ἐλθόντα. τὸ δ' ἴσως ἔχει ὥσπερ οἱ Κεφαλλῆνές φασι· παρ' αὐτῶν γὰρ γῆμαι λέγουσι τὸν Ὀδυσσέα καὶ εἶναι Ἰκάδιον ἀλλ' οὐκ Ἰκάριον· δι' ὁμάρτημα δὲ τὸ πρόβλημα εἰκός ἐστιν. ὅλως δὲ τὸ ἀδύνατον μὲν πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν ἢ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἢ πρὸς τὴν δόξαν δεῖ ἀνάγειν. πρός τε γὰρ τὴν ποίησιν αἱρετώτερον πιθανὸν ἀδύνατον ἢ ἀπίθανον καὶ δυνατόν· * * τοιούτους εἶναι οἵους Ζεῦξις ἔγραφεν, ἀλλὰ βέλτιον· τὸ γὰρ παράδειγμα δεῖ ὑπερέχειν. πρὸς ἅ φασιν τἄλογα· οὕτω τε καὶ ὅτι ποτὲ οὐκ ἄλογόν ἐστιν· εἰκὸς γὰρ καὶ παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς γίνεσθαι. τὰ δ' ὑπεναντίως εἰρημένα οὕτω σκοπεῖν ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔλεγχοι εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως, ⟨ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸν⟩ ἢ πρὸς ἃ αὐτὸς λέγει ἢ ὃ ἂν φρόνιμος ὑποθῆται. ὀρθὴ δ' ἐπιτίμησις καὶ ἀλογίᾳ καὶ μοχθηρίᾳ, ὅταν μὴ ἀνάγκης οὔσης μηθὲν χρήσηται τῷ ἀλόγῳ, ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης τῷ Αἰγεῖ, ἢ τῇ πονηρίᾳ, ὥσπερ ἐν Ὀρέστῃ ⟨τῇ⟩ τοῦ Μενελάου. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐπιτιμήματα ἐκ πέντε εἰδῶν φέρουσιν· ἢ γὰρ ὡς ἀδύνατα ἢ ὡς ἄλογα ἢ ὡς βλαβερὰ ἢ ὡς ὑπεναντία ἢ ὡς

3 ἐπειτιμῶσιν pr. A^c αὐτῶν Parisinus 2038 : αὐτῶν A^c 4 πέπονθε* A^c περ ἰκάριον A^c 5 τιλέμαχον A^c 6 Κεφαλλῆνες Tyrwhitt : κεφαλῆνεσ A^c 7 αὐτῶν pr. Vaticanus 1400 : αὐτῶν A^c 8 δι' ἁμάρτημα Madius (*errore* Valla) : διαμάρτημα A^c 9 ⟨εἶναι⟩ εἰκός Hermann 11 πειθανὸν A^c 12 ἀπείθανον A^c καὶ εἰ ἀδύνατον intercidisse coni. Vahlen (confirm. Ar.) οἵους Parisinus 2038 : οἷον A^c 15 ὑπεναντίως Twining : ὑπεναντία ὡσ A^c 18 φρόνιμος apogr. : φρόνημον (corr. φρόνιμον) A^c 19 ἀλογίᾳ καὶ μοχθηρίᾳ Vahlen : ἀλογία καὶ μοχθηρία A^c 21 Αἰγεῖ ἢ τῇ margo Riccardiani 16 : αἰγειήτῃ A^c τῇ addendum coni. Vahlen

to draw inferences, and censure the poet as though he had actually said whatever they happen to believe, if his statement conflicts with their own notion of things.' This is how Homer's silence about Icarius has been treated. Starting with the notion of his having been a Lacedaemonian, the critics think it strange for Telemachus not to have met him when he went to Lacedaemon. Whereas the fact may have been as the Cephallenians say, that the wife of Ulysses was of a Cephallenian family, and that her father's name was Icadius, not Icarius. So that it is probably a mistake of the critics that has given rise to the Problem.

Speaking generally, one has to justify (1) the Impossible by reference to the requirements of poetry, or to the better, or to opinion. For the purposes of poetry a convincing impossibility is preferable to an unconvincing possibility; and if men such as Zeuxis depicted be impossible, the answer is that it is better they should be like that, as the artist ought to improve on his model. (2) The Improbable one has to justify either by showing it to be in accordance with opinion, or by urging that at times it is not improbable; for there is a probability of things happening also against probability. (3) The contradictions found in the poet's language one should first test as one does an opponent's confutation in a dialectical argument, so as to see whether he means the same thing, in the same relation, and in the same sense, before admitting that he has contradicted either something he has said himself or what a man of sound sense assumes as true. But there is no possible apology for improbability of Plot or depravity of character, when they are not necessary and no use is made of them, like the improbability in the appearance of Aegeus in *Medea* and the baseness of Menelaus in *Orestes*.

The objections, then, of critics start with faults of five

παρὰ τὴν ὀρθότητα τὴν κατὰ τέχνην. αἱ δὲ λύσεις ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀριθμῶν σκεπτέαι, εἰσὶν δὲ δώδεκα.

Πότερον δὲ βελτίων ἡ ἐποποιικὴ μίμησις ἢ ἡ τραγική, 26
διαπορήσειεν ἄν τις. εἰ γὰρ ἡ ἧττον φορτικὴ βελτίων, τοιαύτη δ᾽ ἡ πρὸς βελτίους θεατάς ἐστιν ἀεί, λίαν δῆλον ὅτι ἡ ⟨πρὸς⟩ ἅπαντα μιμουμένη φορτική· ὡς γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθανομένων ἂν μὴ αὐτὸς προσθῇ, πολλὴν κίνησιν κινοῦνται, οἷον οἱ φαῦλοι αὐληταὶ κυλιόμενοι ἂν δίσκον δέῃ μιμεῖσθαι, καὶ ἕλκοντες τὸν κορυφαῖον ἂν Σκύλλαν αὐλῶσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν τραγῳδία τοιαύτη ἐστίν, ὡς καὶ οἱ πρότερον τοὺς ὑστέρους αὐτῶν ᾤοντο ὑποκριτάς· ὡς λίαν γὰρ ὑπερβάλλοντα πίθηκον ὁ Μυννίσκος τὸν Καλλιππίδην ἐκάλει, τοιαύτη δὲ δόξα καὶ περὶ Πιν-
1462a δάρου ἦν· ὡς δ᾽ οὗτοι [δ᾽] ἔχουσι πρὸς αὐτούς, ἡ ὅλη τέχνη πρὸς τὴν ἐποποιίαν ἔχει. τὴν μὲν οὖν πρὸς θεατὰς ἐπιεικεῖς φασιν εἶναι ⟨οἳ⟩ οὐδὲν δέονται τῶν σχημάτων, τὴν δὲ τραγικὴν πρὸς φαύλους· εἰ οὖν φορτική, χείρων δῆλον ὅτι ἂν εἴη. πρῶτον μὲν οὐ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἡ κατηγορία ἀλλὰ τῆς ὑποκριτικῆς, ἐπεὶ ἔστι περιεργάζεσθαι τοῖς σημείοις καὶ ῥαψῳδοῦντα, ὅπερ [ἐστὶ] Σωσίστρατος, καὶ διᾴδοντα, ὅπερ ἐποίει Μνασίθεος ὁ Ὀπούντιος. εἶτα οὐδὲ κίνησις ἅπασα ἀποδοκιμαστέα, εἴπερ μηδ᾽ ὄρχησις, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ φαύλων, ὅπερ καὶ Καλλιππίδῃ ἐπετιμᾶτο καὶ νῦν ἄλλοις ὡς οὐκ ἐλευθέρας γυναῖκας μιμουμένων. ἔτι ἡ τραγῳδία καὶ ἄνευ κινήσεως ποιεῖ τὸ αὑτῆς, ὥσπερ ἡ ἐποποιία· διὰ γὰρ τοῦ ἀναγινώσκειν φανερὰ ὁποία

25 σκεπταίαι A^{c} 26 βελτίον A^{c} 28 δ᾽ ἡ apogr. : δὴ A^{c} ἀεί, λίαν Vahlen : δειλίαν A^{c} 29 πρὸς addidi 30 κινοῦνται apogr. : κινοῦντα A^{c} 1462a 1 δ᾽ alterum om. apogr. αὐτούς Hermann : αὐτοὺσ A^{c} 3 οἳ add. Victorius σχημάτων τὴν apogr. : σχημά | τα αὐτὴν (τα αὐ m. rec. in loco macula deformato) A^{c} 4 εἰ] ἡ A^{c} 5 μὲν ⟨οὖν⟩ Parisinus 2038 7 ἐστὶ induxit Duentzer διᾴδοντα apogr. : διαδόντα A^{c} 8 ὁ πούντιοσ A^{c} 10 ἐπιτιμᾶτο pr. A^{c} 11 αὐτῆσ A^{c}

kinds: the allegation is always that something is either (1) impossible, (2) improbable, (3) corrupting, (4) contradictory, or (5) against technical correctness. The answers to these objections must be sought under one or other of the above-mentioned heads, which are twelve in number.

The question may be raised whether the epic or the tragic 26 is the higher form of imitation. It may be argued that, if the less vulgar is the higher, and the less vulgar is always that which addresses the better public, an art addressing any and every one is of a very vulgar order. It is a belief that their public cannot see the meaning, unless they add something themselves, that causes the perpetual movements of the performers—bad flute-players, for instance, rolling about, if quoit-throwing is to be represented, and pulling at the conductor, if Scylla is the subject of the piece. Tragedy, then, is said to be an art of this order—to be in fact just what the later actors were in the eyes of their predecessors; for Mynniscus used to call Callippides 'the ape,' because he thought he so overacted his parts; and a similar view was taken of Pindarus also. All Tragedy, however, is said to stand to the Epic as the newer to the older school of actors. The one, accordingly, is said to address a cultivated audience, which does not need the accompaniment of gesture; the other, an uncultivated one. If, therefore, Tragedy is a vulgar art, it must clearly be lower than the Epic.

The answer to this is twofold. In the first place, one may urge (1) that the censure does not touch the art of the dramatic poet, but only that of his interpreter; for it is quite possible to overdo the gesturing even in an epic recital, as did Sosistratus, and in a singing contest, as did Mnasitheus of Opus. (2) That one should not condemn all movement, unless one means to condemn even the dance, but only that of ignoble people—which is the point of the criticism passed on Callippides and in the present day on others, that their women are not like gentlewomen. (3) That Tragedy may produce its effect even without movement or action in just the same way as Epic poetry; for from

τίς ἐστιν· εἰ οὖν ἐστι τά γ' ἄλλα κρείττων, τοῦτό γε οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῇ ὑπάρχειν. ἔπειτα διότι πάντ' ἔχει ὅσαπερ ἡ ἐποποιία (καὶ γὰρ τῷ μέτρῳ ἔξεστι χρῆσθαι), καὶ ἔτι οὐ μικρὸν μέρος τὴν μουσικὴν καὶ τὰς ὄψεις, δι' ἧς αἱ ἡδοναὶ συνίστανται ἐναργέστατα· εἶτα καὶ τὸ ἐναργὲς ἔχει καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀναγνώσει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων· ἔτι τὸ ἐν ἐλάττονι μήκει τὸ τέλος 1462^b τῆς μιμήσεως εἶναι (τὸ γὰρ ἀθροώτερον ἥδιον ἢ πολλῷ κεκραμένον τῷ χρόνῳ, λέγω δ' οἷον εἴ τις τὸν Οἰδίπουν θείη τὸν Σοφοκλέους ἐν ἔπεσιν ὅσοις ἡ Ἰλιάς)· ἔτι ἧττον μία ἡ μίμησις ἡ τῶν ἐποποιῶν (σημεῖον δέ, ἐκ γὰρ ὁποιασοῦν μιμήσεως πλείους τραγῳδίαι γίνονται), ὥστε ἐὰν μὲν ἕνα μῦθον ποιῶσιν, ἢ βραχέως δεικνύμενον μείουρον φαίνεσθαι, ἢ ἀκολουθοῦντα τῷ τοῦ μέτρου μήκει ὑδαρῆ· λέγω δὲ οἷον ἐὰν ἐκ πλειόνων πράξεων ᾖ συγκειμένη, ὥσπερ ἡ Ἰλιὰς ἔχει πολλὰ τοιαῦτα μέρη καὶ ἡ Ὀδύσσεια, καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἔχει μέγεθος (καίτοι ταῦτα τὰ ποιήματα συνέστηκεν ὡς ἐνδέχεται ἄριστα καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα μιᾶς πράξεως μίμησις) —εἰ οὖν τούτοις τε διαφέρει πᾶσιν καὶ ἔτι τῷ τῆς τέχνης ἔργῳ (δεῖ γὰρ οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν ἡδονὴν ποιεῖν αὐτὰς ἀλλὰ τὴν εἰρημένην), φανερὸν ὅτι κρείττων ἂν εἴη μᾶλλον τοῦ τέλους τυγχάνουσα τῆς ἐποποιίας.

περὶ μὲν οὖν τραγῳδίας καὶ ἐποποιίας, καὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν μερῶν, καὶ πόσα καὶ τί διαφέρει, καὶ τοῦ εὖ ἢ μὴ τίνες αἰτίαι, καὶ περὶ ἐπιτιμήσεων καὶ λύσεων, εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα. * * *

14 αὐτὴ pr. A^c 17 ἀναγνώσει Madius (e codd. quibusdam): ἀναγνωρίσει A^c 18 ἔτι τὸ coni. Jortin, Winstanley: ἔτι τῶι A^c ἐλάττωνι A^c 1462^b 1 ἥδιον ἢ Madius (confirm. Ar.): ἡδονὴ A^c 2 τὸν δίπουν pr. A^c θείη bis A^c 3 τὸν] τὸ pr. A^c ἡ ἰλιάς Riccardianus 16: ἢ ἰλίασ (fuit ἰδίασ) A^c μία ἡ Spengel: ἡ μία A^c 6 μείουρον Parisinus 2038: μύουρον A^c 7 τοῦ μέτρου] συμμέτρῳ Bernays 9 post Ὀδύσσεια add. ἃ apogr. 10 καίτοι ταῦτα τὰ apogr.: καὶ τοιαῦτ' ἄττα A^c 18 ἢ] εἰ A^c

the mere reading of a play its quality may be seen. So that, if it be superior in all other respects, this element of inferiority is no necessary part of it.

In the second place, one must remember (1) that Tragedy has everything that the Epic has (even the epic metre being admissible), together with a not inconsiderable addition in the shape of the Music (a very real factor in the pleasure of the drama) and the Spectacle. (2) That its reality of presentation is felt in the play as read, as well as in the play as acted. (3) That the tragic imitation requires less space for the attainment of its end; which is a great advantage, since the more concentrated effect is more pleasurable than one with a large admixture of time to dilute it—consider the *Oedipus* of Sophocles, for instance, and the effect of expanding it into the number of lines of the *Iliad*. (4) That there is less unity in the imitation of the epic poets, as is proved by the fact that any one work of theirs supplies matter for several tragedies; the result being that, if they take what is really a single story, it seems curt when briefly told, and thin and waterish when on the scale of length usual with their verse. In saying that there is less unity in an epic, I mean an epic made up of a plurality of actions, in the same way as the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* have many such parts, each one of them in itself of some magnitude; yet the structure of the two Homeric poems is as perfect as can be, and the action in them is as nearly as possible one action. If, then, Tragedy is superior in these respects, and also besides these, in its poetic effect (since the two forms of poetry should give us, not any or every pleasure, but the very special kind we have mentioned), it is clear that, as attaining the poetic effect better than the Epic, it will be the higher form of art.

So much for Tragedy and Epic poetry—for these two arts in general and their species; the number and nature of their constituent parts; the causes of success and failure in them; the Objections of the critics, and the Solutions in answer to them.

FRAGMENTA

I.

Aristoteles Rhet. 3. 2, 1404^b 37: *τῶν δ' ὀνομάτων τῷ μὲν σοφιστῇ ὁμωνυμίαι χρήσιμοι (παρὰ ταύτας γὰρ κακουργεῖ), τῷ ποιητῇ δὲ συνωνυμίαι. λέγω δὲ κύριά τε καὶ συνώνυμα οἷον τὸ πορεύεσθαι καὶ τὸ βαδίζειν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἀμφότερα καὶ κύρια καὶ συνώνυμα ἀλλήλοις. τί μὲν οὖν τούτων ἕκαστόν ἐστι καὶ πόσα εἴδη μεταφορᾶς καὶ ὅτι τοῦτο πλεῖστον δύναται καὶ ἐν ποιήσει καὶ ἐν λόγοις, αἱ μεταφοραί, εἴρηται καθάπερ ἐλέγομεν ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.*

Simplicius in Categ. 36. 13 Kalbfleisch: *καὶ γὰρ καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ περὶ ποιητικῆς συνώνυμα εἶπεν εἶναι ὧν πλείω μὲν τὰ ὀνόματα λόγος δὲ ὁ αὐτός, οἷα δή ἐστι τὰ πολυώνυμα, τό τε λώπιον καὶ ἱμάτιον καὶ τὸ φᾶρος.*

II.

Aristoteles Poet. 6, 1449^b 21: *περὶ κωμῳδίας ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν.*

III.

Aristoteles Rhet. 1. 11, 1371^b 33: *ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπεὶ ἡ παιδιὰ τῶν ἡδέων καὶ πᾶσα ἄνεσις καὶ ὁ γέλως τῶν ἡδέων,*

ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ γελοῖα ἡδέα εἶναι, καὶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ λόγους καὶ ἔργα· διώρισται δὲ περὶ γελοίων χωρὶς ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.

Idem Rhet. 3. 18, 1419^{b} 2: περὶ δὲ τῶν γελοίων, ἐπειδή τινα δοκεῖ χρῆσιν ἔχειν ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι, καὶ δεῖν ἔφη Γοργίας τὴν μὲν σπουδὴν διαφθείρειν τῶν ἐναντίων γέλωτι τὸν δὲ γέλωτα σπουδῇ ὀρθῶς λέγων, εἴρηται πόσα εἴδη γελοίων ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἁρμόττει ἐλευθέρῳ τὸ δ' οὔ· ὅπως οὖν τὸ ἁρμόττον αὐτῷ λήψεται. ἔστι δ' ἡ εἰρωνεία τῆς βωμολοχίας ἐλευθεριώτερον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα ποιεῖ τὸ γελοῖον, ὁ δὲ βωμολόχος ἑτέρου.

Conf. Cicero de Oratore 2. 58: *Locus autem et regio quasi ridiculi . . . turpitudine et deformitate quadam continetur; haec enim ridentur vel sola vel maxime, quae notant et designant turpitudinem aliquam non turpiter . . . nec insignis improbitas et scelere iuncta nec rursus miseria insignis agitata ridetur: facinerosos maiore quadam vi quam ridiculi vulnerari volunt; miseros inludi nolunt, nisi se forte iactant; parcendum autem maxime est caritati hominum, ne temere in eos dicas qui diliguntur. haec igitur adhibenda est primum in iocando moderatio; itaque ea facillime luduntur quae neque odio magno neque misericordia maxima digna sunt; quam ob rem materies omnis ridiculorum est in iis vitiis quae sunt in vita hominum neque carorum neque calamitosorum neque eorum qui ob facinus ad supplicium rapiendi videntur; eaque belle agitata ridentur.*

IV.

Antiatticista in Anecdotis Bekkeri 101. 32: κυντότατον: Ἀριστοτέλης περὶ ποιητικῆς τὸ δὲ πάντων κυντότατον.

V.

Aristoteles Pol. 8. 7, 1341^{b} 32: ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν διαίρεσιν ἀποδεχόμεθα τῶν μελῶν ὡς διαιροῦσί τινες τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, τὰ μὲν ἠθικὰ τὰ δὲ πρακτικὰ τὰ δ' ἐνθουσιαστικὰ τιθέντες, καὶ

τῶν ἁρμονιῶν τὴν φύσιν πρὸς ἕκαστα τούτων οἰκείαν ἄλλην πρὸς ἄλλο μέρος τιθέασι, φαμὲν δ' οὐ μιᾶς ἕνεκα ὠφελείας τῇ μουσικῇ χρῆσθαι δεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ πλειόνων χάριν (καὶ γὰρ παιδείας ἕνεκεν καὶ καθάρσεως—τί δὲ λέγομεν τὴν κάθαρσιν, νῦν μὲν ἁπλῶς, πάλιν δ' ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς ἐροῦμεν σαφέστερον—τρίτον δὲ πρὸς διαγωγήν, πρὸς ἄνεσίν τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς συντονίας ἀνάπαυσιν), φανερὸν ὅτι χρηστέον μὲν πάσαις ταῖς ἁρμονίαις, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον πάσαις χρηστέον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν τὴν παιδείαν ταῖς ἠθικωτάταις, πρὸς δὲ ἀκρόασιν ἑτέρων χειρουργούντων καὶ ταῖς πρακτικαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἐνθουσιαστικαῖς. ὃ γὰρ περὶ ἐνίας συμβαίνει πάθος ψυχὰς ἰσχυρῶς τοῦτο ἐν πάσαις ὑπάρχει, τῷ δὲ ἧττον διαφέρει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον, οἷον ἔλεος καὶ φόβος, ἔτι δ' ἐνθουσιασμός· καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς κινήσεως κατοκώχιμοί τινές εἰσιν, ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἱερῶν μελῶν ὁρῶμεν τούτους, ὅταν χρήσωνται τοῖς ἐξοργιάζουσι τὴν ψυχὴν μέλεσι, καθισταμένους ὥσπερ ἰατρείας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως. ταὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο ἀναγκαῖον πάσχειν καὶ τοὺς ἐλεήμονας καὶ τοὺς φοβητικοὺς καὶ τοὺς ὅλως παθητικούς, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει τῶν τοιούτων ἑκάστῳ, καὶ πᾶσι γίγνεσθαί τινα κάθαρσιν καὶ κουφίζεσθαι μεθ' ἡδονῆς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μέλη τὰ καθαρτικὰ παρέχει χαρὰν ἀβλαβῆ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

Conf. Aristoteles Pol. 8. 6, 1341ª 21: *ἔτι δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ αὐλὸς ἠθικὸν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὀργιαστικόν, ὥστε πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους αὐτῷ καιροὺς χρηστέον ἐν οἷς ἡ θεωρία κάθαρσιν μᾶλλον δύναται ἢ μάθησιν.*

Proclus in Plat. Remp. 1 p. 42 Kroll: *εἰπεῖν χρὴ . . . δεύτερον, τί δήποτε μάλιστα τὴν τραγῳδίαν καὶ τὴν κωμικὴν οὐ παραδέχεται* [scil. Plato] *καὶ ταῦτα συντελούσας πρὸς ἀφοσίωσιν τῶν παθῶν, ἃ μήτε παντάπασιν ἀποκλίνειν δυνατὸν μήτε ἐμπιμπλάναι πάλιν ἀσφαλές, δεόμενα δέ τινος ἐν καιρῷ κινήσεως, ἣν ἐν ταῖς τούτων ἀκροάσεσιν ἐκπληρουμένην ἀνενοχλήτους ἡμᾶς ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ λοιπῷ χρόνῳ ποιεῖν . . .* p. 49: *τὸ δὲ δεύτερον* [scil. *πρόβλημα*]*—τοῦτο δ' ἦν τὸ τὴν τραγῳδίαν ἐκβάλλεσθαι καὶ κωμῳδίαν ἀτόπως, εἴπερ διὰ τούτων δυνατὸν ἐμμέτρως ἀποπιμπλάναι τὰ πάθη καὶ ἀποπλήσαντας εὐεργὰ πρὸς τὴν παιδείαν ἔχειν*

τὸ πεπονηκὸς αὐτῶν θεραπεύσαντας—τοῦτο δ' οὖν πολλὴν καὶ τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει παρασχὸν αἰτιάσεως ἀφορμὴν καὶ τοῖς ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιήσεων τούτων ἀγωνισταῖς τῶν πρὸς Πλάτωνα λόγων οὑτωσί πως ἡμεῖς ἑπόμενοι τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν διαλύσομεν ... p. 50: δεῖν μὲν οὖν τὸν πολιτικὸν διαμηχανᾶσθαί τινας τῶν παθῶν τούτων ἀπεράσεις καὶ ἡμεῖς φήσομεν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὥστε τὰς περὶ αὐτὰ προσπαθείας συντείνειν, τοὐναντίον μὲν οὖν ὥστε χαλινοῦν καὶ τὰς κινήσεις αὐτῶν ἐμμελῶς ἀναστέλλειν· ἐκείνας δὲ ἄρα τὰς ποιήσεις πρὸς τῇ ποικιλίᾳ καὶ τὸ ἄμετρον ἐχούσας ἐν ταῖς τῶν παθῶν τούτων προκλήσεσι πολλοῦ δεῖν εἰς ἀφοσίωσιν εἶναι χρησίμους. αἱ γὰρ ἀφοσιώσεις οὐκ ἐν ὑπερβολαῖς εἰσιν ἀλλ' ἐν συνεσταλμέναις ἐνεργείαις, σμικρὰν ὁμοιότητα πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ἐχούσαις ὧν εἰσιν ἀφοσιώσεις.

Iamblichus de Myst. I. 11: αἱ δυνάμεις τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων παθημάτων τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν πάντῃ μὲν εἰργόμεναι καθίστανται σφοδρότεραι, εἰς ἐνέργειαν δὲ βραχεῖαν [ita Bernays; βραχεῖς vulg.] καὶ ἄχρι τοῦ συμμέτρου προαγόμεναι χαίρουσι μετρίως καὶ ἀποπληροῦνται, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἀποκαθαιρόμεναι πειθοῖ καὶ οὐ πρὸς βίαν ἀναπαύονται. διὰ δὴ τοῦτο ἔν τε κωμῳδίᾳ καὶ τραγῳδίᾳ ἀλλότρια πάθη θεωροῦντες ἵσταμεν τὰ οἰκεῖα πάθη καὶ μετριώτερα ἀπεργαζόμεθα καὶ ἀποκαθαίρομεν.

VI.

Philoponus in Aristot. de Anima p. 269, 28 ed. Hayduck: διὰ τοῦτό φησιν ὅτι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, τουτέστι τὸ τέλος, διττόν ἐστι, τὸ μὲν οὗ ἕνεκα, τὸ δὲ ᾧ, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ Ποιητικῇ καὶ ἐν τῇ Περὶ γενέσεως εἶπεν.

COMMENTARY

τῶν εἰδῶν αὐτῆς. The *εἴδη* meant are epic poetry, Tragedy, and Comedy, as is clear from 6, 1449 b 21, where the main subjects for consideration in the Poetics are enumerated. Lyric poetry, apart from an occasional reference to the Dithyramb and Nome, or the chorica in Tragedy, is ignored in the existing Poetics; and there is little or no reason to suppose it to have been discussed in the lost portion of the book. The probability is that, from the importance of its musical element, it belonged in Aristotle's classification of the arts to the theory of *μελοποιία* rather than to that of poetry proper. The work of the two lyric poets Phrynis and Timotheus is put under the head of *μελοποιία* in Metaph. *α* 1, 993 b 15; and in the Problems, where Phrynichus is said to have been a *μελοποιός* rather than a tragedian (Probl. 18. 31, 920 a 11 *Διὰ τί οἱ περὶ Φρύνιχον ἦσαν μᾶλλον μελοποιοί; ἢ διὰ τὸ πολλαπλάσια εἶναι τότε τὰ μέλη ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις τῶν μέτρων;*), the same view is implied of the lyric parts of Tragedy. It is to be remembered too that Aristophanes in Ran. 1250 makes Euripides begin his criticism of the chorica in Aeschylus by calling him a *κακὸς μελοποιός*. 1447 a 8

For the antithesis in the text comp. 26, 1462 b 16 *καὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν*.—Top. 1. 15, 106 b 37 *ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων* [scil. *ὀνομάτων*], *ὅταν αὐτὸ πλεοναχῶς λέγηται, καὶ ἡ πτῶσις ἡ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ πλεοναχῶς ῥηθήσεται, καὶ εἰ ἡ πτῶσις, καὶ αὐτό*.—Eth. E. 7. 15, 1248 b 22 *δικαιοσύνη καὶ αὐτὴ καὶ αἱ πράξεις*.

ἥν τινα δύναμιν ἕκαστον ἔχει = *ὅ τι δύναται ἕκαστον*: comp. Pol. 5. 2, 1302 b 5 *τούτων δὲ ὕβρις μὲν καὶ κέρδος τίνα ἔχουσι δύναμιν καὶ πῶς αἴτια, σχεδόν ἐστι φανερόν . . . δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἡ τιμὴ καὶ τί δύναται καὶ πῶς αἰτία στάσεως*. Each species of poetry has its special capacities, which enable it to do what the rest either cannot do at all or cannot do so well and effectively. Other Aristotelian instances of *δύναμις* with a sense approximating to our 'function' or 'effect' will be found in Bon. Ind. 206 b 29.

συνίστασθαι is a passive in 26, 1462 a 16, and probably also in a 9
24, 1460 a 28. That it is a passive in the present passage is shown

1447 a 9 by the parallels, *τοὺς συνεστῶτας εὖ μύθους* in 7, 1450 b 32, and *οὕτω συνεστάναι τὸν μῦθον* in 14, 1453 b 4.

a 10 **καλῶς ἕξειν**: 13, 1453 a 12 *τὸν καλῶς ἔχοντα μῦθον.*—24, 1459 b 12 *τὰς διανοίας καὶ τὴν λέξιν ἔχειν καλῶς.* As anything good of its kind may be said to be *καλόν*, so anything that is in the condition in which it ought to be is said to *καλῶς ἔχειν* (comp. Bon. Ind. 360 b 38).

ἔτι δὲ ἐκ πόσων καὶ ποίων ἐστὶ μορίων, scil. *ἡ ποίησις.* Many of the translators, however, suppose the subject to be *ἕκαστον εἶδος* ('ex quot et cujusmodi partibus constent singulae species,' Goulston). The question is considered in chap. 6 in reference to Tragedy, and in 24, 1450 b 10 in reference to epic poetry.

a 11 **περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστι μεθόδου**: Soph. el. 33, 183 b 12 *δεδήλωται δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα τῆς αὐτῆς μεθόδου τῶν λόγων ἐστίν.* The meaning of *μέθοδος*, a favourite word with Aristotle, has been discussed by Waitz, Org. 2 p. 297 (comp. Bon. Ind. 449 b 43).

a 12 **λέγωμεν ἀρξάμενοι κτέ.** The language here is very like that in Soph. el. 1, 164 a 20 *περὶ δὲ τῶν σοφιστικῶν ἐλέγχων . . . λέγωμεν ἀρξάμενοι κατὰ φύσιν ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων* (comp. De sensu 1, 436 a 6; De part. an. 1. 5, 646 a 3; 2. 10, 655 b 28; Eth. E. 1. 7, 1217 a 18; Rhet. 1. 13, 1373 b 1). In order to determine the definition of poetry, or rather of Tragedy as the highest form of the art, Aristotle starts with the assumption that Tragedy, together with certain other allied arts, comes under the general head of *μίμησις*, 'imitation,' and then proceeds by successive divisions of this genus to note one by one the various points which differentiate it from the rest. (1) Tragedy has language, metre, and music as its means of imitation; the music in it, however, comes in only from time to time, in the choral parts—which distinguishes it from the Nome and the Dithyramb. (2) It represents noble personages—which distinguishes it from Comedy. (3) It has a dramatic form—which distinguishes it from the Epic. These with other differentiae less clearly accounted for are combined in the definition of Tragedy at the opening of chap. 6. The logical order here exemplified is what Aristotle regards as the natural order of procedure: Phys. 1. 7, 189 b 31 *ἔστι γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν τὰ κοινὰ πρῶτον εἰπόντας οὕτω τὰ περὶ ἕκαστον ἴδια θεωρεῖν.*

a 13 **ἐποποιία κτέ.** This enumeration of imitative arts comprises the four great species of poetry distinguished by Plato in Rep. 394 C, together with two purely musical arts, *αὐλητική* and *κιθαριστική*

These last may be supposed to be added partly on account of the manifest analogy between them and poetry, both being imitative arts appealing to the ear, and partly also on account of the historical connexion of poetry with music (comp. Cicero De Orat. 3, 174 *musici, qui erant quondam idem poetae*). Even Plato occasionally merges the one in the other. In the Republic *μουσική* includes poetry, and in Symp. 205 C poetry includes *τὸ περὶ τὴν μουσικήν*. 1447^{a} 13

ἡ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποίησις: ^{b} 26 *ἡ τῶν διθυραμβικῶν ποίησις.*—Plato Gorg. 501 E *ἡ τῶν διθυράμβων ποίησις.*—502 B *ἡ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποίησις.*

διθυραμβοποιητική. Plato cites the Dithyramb as an instance of the non-imitative type of poetry: Rep. 394 C *τῆς ποιήσεως . . . ἡ μὲν διὰ μιμήσεως ὅλη ἐστίν, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, τραγῳδία τε καὶ κωμῳδία, ἡ δὲ δι' ἀπαγγελίας αὐτοῦ τοῦ ποιητοῦ—εὕροις δ' ἂν αὐτὴν μάλιστά που ἐν διθυράμβοις.* By Aristotle's time, however, the Dithyramb (as also the Nome) had lost its original form, and become 'imitative' or semi-dramatic, a sort of musical counterpart of the Drama, dealing with the same kinds of subject as Tragedy, and with solos by professional singers corresponding to the speeches of the tragic actors. This change in the character of the Dithyramb is noted in Probl. 19. 15, 918^{b} 18 *οἱ διθύραμβοι, ἐπειδὴ μιμητικοὶ ἐγένοντο, οὐκέτι ἔχουσιν ἀντιστρόφους, πρότερον δὲ εἶχον· αἴτιον δὲ ὅτι τὸ παλαιὸν οἱ ἐλεύθεροι ἐχόρευον αὐτοί· πολλοὺς οὖν ἀγωνιστικῶς ᾄδειν χαλεπὸν ἦν, ὥστε ἐναρμόνια μέλη ἐνῆδον· μεταβάλλειν γὰρ πολλὰς μεταβολὰς τῷ ἑνὶ ῥᾷον ἢ τοῖς πολλοῖς, καὶ τῷ ἀγωνιστῇ ἢ τοῖς τὸ ἦθος φυλάττουσιν* (comp. Bergk, Gr. Litt. 2 p. 529, and Wilamowitz, Euripides Herakles[1] 1 p. 79). In this mention of the Dithyramb, therefore, Aristotle does not cite it as a type of lyric poetry in general (as is often supposed), but as representing an imitative or dramatic form of lyric—a lyrical *μίμησις* or picture of life and manners. A certain approximation to this later form of Dithyramb is to be seen in Bacchylides (Comparetti, Mélanges Weil p. 30). ^{a} 14

τῆς αὐλητικῆς ἡ πλείστη: De Caelo 3. 1, 298^{b} 2 *τὴν πλείστην τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίας* (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr.[3] 2. 1 p. 279). The *αὐλός* was the accompaniment of the Dithyramb and the *κιθάρα* of the Nome. That, however, is not the reason for this reference to them, as it is clear from ^{a} 23 that Aristotle is thinking rather of music without words, i.e. of that which was termed in antiquity *ψιλὴ αὔλησις* and *ψιλὴ κιθάρισις*. Plato in the Laws (669 E) sets his face against this purely instrumental music, which had evidently attained ^{a} 15

1447 a 15 to a high degree of perfection in his time, on the ground that it ends in a mere display of technical execution (*θαυματουργία*) and a 'brutish noise' (*φωνῆς θηριώδους σφόδρα φίλον*). Aristotle's language in Pol. 8. 6, 1341 a 11 *τὰ θαυμάσια καὶ περιττὰ τῶν ἔργων ἃ νῦν ἐλήλυθεν εἰς τοὺς ἀγῶνας*, seems to imply that there was in his view some truth in Plato's criticism. In the present passage accordingly, instead of saying *ἡ αὐλητική*, or *ἡ αὐλητικὴ πᾶσα*, he adopts the qualified form of expression, *τῆς αὐλητικῆς ἡ πλείστη*, in order to show that he is not unaware of there being exceptions to the rule.

a 16 *μιμήσεις*. The general meaning of *μιμεῖσθαι* is either 'to do what another has done', or 'to make something like something else', i.e. to represent by means of a copy or counterfeit of some sort. The primitive sense of the word must have been 'to play the *μῖμος*,' to reproduce the language, tones, gestures, etc., of another—a sense which survives in the use of the term for the imitation of persons by actors on the stage. In actual use the word is wide enough to include the counterfeiting of movement and attitude by the dancer, that of voice and sound by the singer and musician, that of the forms and colours of things by the sculptor and painter, and even the representation of things in words, as in speech and literature. A noteworthy variation, however, is to be observed in the application of the word to a work of literature. Owing to the traditional associations connected with it Plato in the Republic opposes *μίμησις* to narrative, restricting it to the dramatic mode of statement, in which the speaker effaces himself, as it were, and identifies himself with his personages: Rep. 393 B *οὐκοῦν διήγησις μέν ἐστι καὶ ὅταν τὰς ῥήσεις ἑκάστοτε λέγῃ* [scil. *Ὅμηρος*] *καὶ ὅταν τὰ μεταξὺ τῶν ῥήσεων; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Ἀλλ' ὅταν γέ τινα λέγῃ ῥῆσιν ὥς τις ἄλλος ὤν, ἆρ' οὐ τότε ὁμοιοῦν αὐτὸν φήσομεν ὅτι μάλιστα τὴν αὑτοῦ λέξιν ἑκάστῳ ὃν ἂν προείπῃ ὡς ἐροῦντα; Φήσομεν· τί γάρ; Οὐκοῦν τό γε ὁμοιοῦν ἑαυτὸν ἄλλῳ ἢ κατὰ φωνὴν ἢ κατὰ σχῆμα μιμεῖσθαί ἐστιν ἐκεῖνον ᾧ ἄν τις ὁμοιοῖ; Τί μήν; Ἐν δὴ τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὗτός τε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταὶ διὰ μιμήσεως τὴν διήγησιν ποιοῦνται. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Εἰ δέ γε μηδαμοῦ ἑαυτὸν ἀποκρύπτοιτο ὁ ποιητής, πᾶσα ἂν αὐτῷ ἄνευ μιμήσεως ἡ ποίησίς τε καὶ διήγησις γεγονυῖα εἴη.*—394 B *τῆς ποιήσεώς τε καὶ μυθολογίας ἡ μὲν διὰ μιμήσεως ὅλη ἐστίν, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, τραγῳδία τε καὶ κωμῳδία, ἡ δὲ δι' ἀπαγγελίας αὐτοῦ τοῦ ποιητοῦ—εὕροις δ' ἂν αὐτὴν μάλιστά που ἐν διθυράμβοις—ἡ δ' αὖ δι' ἀμφοτέρων ἔν τε τῇ τῶν ἐπῶν ποιήσει, πολλαχοῦ δὲ καὶ ἄλλοθι.* In his use of *μιμεῖσθαι* in

the Poetics Aristotle has fallen into a grave inconsistency, as he distinctly makes it in one place (3, 1448 a 21) include narrative, and in another (24, 1460 a 9) exclude it. 1447 a 16

τὸ σύνολον qualifies *πᾶσαι*, what is said of the class as a whole being opposed to the specific differences which reveal themselves in it on closer examination; comp. Plato Soph. 220 B ΞΕ. *Τοῦ δὲ ἐνύδρου* [scil. *γένους ἡ θήρα*] *σχεδὸν τὸ σύνολον ἁλιευτική;* ΘΕΑΙ. *Ναί.* ΞΕ. *Τί δέ; ταύτην αὖ τὴν θήραν ἆρ' οὐκ ἂν κατὰ μέγιστα μέρη δύο διελοίμην;*

τῷ γένει ἑτέροις. Forchhammer's correction *τῷ ἐν ἑτέροις* is supposed to be confirmed by the use of the preposition to denote the means or vehicle of imitation in a 22 and b 29, and also elsewhere (3, 1448 a 20 etc.). The sense, however, is just as well expressed by the simple dative, as it is for instance in the immediate context in a 18 and a 26; and as the means under consideration, *λόγος, ἁρμονία,* and *ῥυθμός*, differ in kind, they are rightly described as *γένει ἕτερα.* There is no need to restore ⟨*τῷ*⟩ *γένει*; Aristotle not unfrequently omits the article in this and cognate formulas, e.g. in Top. I. 7, 103 a 13 *γένει ταὐτά,* in H. A. 2. 1, 497 b 9 and Metaph. I 10, 1059 a 14 *γένει ἕτερα.* In An. post. 2. 15, 98 a 26–28 we find him saying *τῷ γένει* and *γένει*, and in Eth. N. 10. 5, 1175 a 25 *τῷ εἴδει* and *εἴδει* without perceptible difference of meaning. The distinction in fact between *γένει ἕτερα* and *τῷ γένει ἕτερα* is not greater than that between 'different in kind' and 'different in their kind' in English. A confirmation of Forchhammer's reading has been seen in the fact that in 8, 1451 a 17 A^c has *τῷ γένει* instead of the true reading *τῷ ἑνί.* The two cases, however, are not quite parallel. ΤΩΓΕΝΕΙ = ΤΩΙΕΝΙ assumes only a very familiar kind of corruption, whereas ΤΩΓΕΝΕΙ = ΤΩΙΕΝ leaves an important part of the word (the termination) unexplained. It is also to be observed that the comparison in the next line, *ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ χρώμασι κτέ.*, seems to presuppose *γένει ἑτέροις*, as *χρώματα καὶ σχήματα* and *φωνή*, which appeal to different senses, are marked instances of things *γένει ἕτερα* (comp. An. post. 2. 13, 97 b 34). There is no doubt a certain inelegance in *τῷ γένει ἑτέροις μιμεῖσθαι*, but it is not greater than that in Phys. I. 7, 191 a 1 *διὰ τὸ ἕτερον ὑπάρχειν τὸ εἶναι αὐτοῖς,* or that in Plato Rep. 534 B *διαλεκτικὸν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον ἑκάστου λαμβάνοντα τῆς οὐσίας.* a 17

ἢ τῷ ἕτερα ἢ τῷ ἑτέρως. The distinction is already in Plato, Rep. 398 B *ἅ τε γὰρ λεκτέον καὶ ὡς λεκτέον εἴρηται.*

1447 a 18 **καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον.** Other instances of parallelismus antitheticus will be found in 3, 1448 a 22, 6, 1449 b 26, 15, 1454 a 30, 24, 1460 a 16.

ὥσπερ γὰρ κτέ. Aristotle prepares us for the difference of means in these arts by pointing to the difference of means in a larger group of imitative arts. The distinction between the arts that address the eye and those that address the ear is frequently noted by Plato in similar terms, e.g. in Rep. 373 B *οἵ τε μιμηταί, πολλοὶ μὲν οἱ περὶ τὰ σχήματά τε καὶ χρώματα, πολλοὶ δὲ οἱ περὶ μουσικήν, ποιηταί τε καὶ τούτων ὑπηρέται, ῥαψῳδοὶ ὑποκριταὶ χορευταὶ κτέ.* (comp. Rep. 603 B; Crat. 423 D; Gorg. 474 E). It is assumed also in a number of Aristotelian passages (e.g. in An. post. 2. 13, 97 b 35; Eth. N. 3. 13, 1118 a 3; Pol. 8. 5, 1340 a 34). Aristotle has a special reason for saying *ἕτεροι δὲ διὰ τῆς φωνῆς*, because the great imitative capacity of the voice is what renders language and poetry possible, together with many of the arts subsidiary to the latter: Rhet. 3. 1, 1404 a 21 *ὑπῆρξε δὲ καὶ ἡ φωνὴ πάντων μιμητικώτατον τῶν μορίων ἡμῖν· διὸ καὶ αἱ τέχναι συνέστησαν, ἥ τε ῥαψῳδία καὶ ἡ ὑποκριτικὴ καὶ ἄλλαι γε.*

a 19 **πολλὰ** is not otiose. The art of the painter or sculptor has certain limits; it can represent many things; but there are some (e.g. character and feeling) that it can only imperfectly or indirectly express (Pol. 8. 5, 1340 a 32; comp. Xenophon Mem. 3. 10, 1). The theory in Lessing's Laocoon is based on an idea already in Aristotle.

μιμοῦνταί τινες ἀπεικάζοντες: Xenophon Mem. 3. 10, 1 *σώματα διὰ τῶν χρωμάτων ἀπεικάζοντες ἐκμιμεῖσθε.*

οἱ μὲν διὰ τέχνης οἱ δὲ διὰ συνηθείας is thrown in parenthetically, like the very similar remark in 8, 1451 a 24, *ἤτοι διὰ τέχνην ἢ διὰ φύσιν.* As opposed to *τέχνη*, *συνήθεια* means much the same as *ἐμπειρία*, with which it is coupled in Eth. N. 8. 7, 1158 a 14 *δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐμπειρίαν λαβεῖν καὶ ἐν συνηθείᾳ γενέσθαι*, and in 10. 10, 1181 a 9 *οὐ μὴν μικρόν γε ἔοικεν ἡ ἐμπειρία συμβάλλεσθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγίνοντ' ἂν διὰ τῆς πολιτικῆς συνηθείας πολιτικοί.* The contrast is between the skill depending on mere practice or habitude, and that directed by a consciousness of the rules and principles of the art which deals with the particular subject. On this distinction see Metaph. A 1, 980 b 28, and Mill's Logic Bk. II. ch. 3 (1, p. 214, ed. 4).

a 20 **ἕτεροι δὲ** corresponds to a foregoing *τινές* in Eth. N. 1. 1, 1094 b 18 *ἤδη γάρ τινες ἀπώλοντο διὰ πλοῦτον, ἕτεροι δὲ δι' ἀνδρείαν.*

Compare also Plato Rep. 349 D μουσικὸν δέ τινα λέγεις, ἕτερον δὲ ἄμουσον; 1447 a 20

διὰ τῆς φωνῆς = τῇ φωνῇ. Aristotle has allowed himself to repeat the prepositional construction used in the parenthesis. The emendation of Madius, διὰ τῆς φύσεως, besides making too much of a merely incidental remark in a parenthesis, leaves χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι without an antithesis; it ignores in fact the whole point of the analogy to which attention is drawn, the diversity of means. The diversity of means, λόγος, ῥυθμός, and ἁρμονία, in the group of imitative arts under consideration is said to be like the diversity of means, χρώματα καὶ σχήματα and φωνή, observable in a larger group of imitative arts.

ἐν ῥυθμῷ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἁρμονίᾳ. The three terms had already a 22
appeared in the same sense in Plato's analysis of the song or choral in Rep. 398 D τὸ μέλος ἐκ τριῶν ἐστι συγκείμενον, λόγου τε καὶ ἁρμονίας καὶ ῥυθμοῦ (comp. Laws 661 C; 669 D). His terminology, however, is not always quite the same; he sometimes says ῥυθμὸς καὶ μέτρον (Phil. 17 D, Gorg. 502 C) or μέτρον καὶ ῥυθμός (Rep. 601 A) in lieu of ῥυθμός; and μέλος, 'melody' or 'tune', in lieu of ἁρμονία (Rep. 400 A, Gorg. 502 C, Laws 656 C, etc.). Aristotle also, in more than one passage in the Poetics (1, 1447 b 25; 6, 1449 b 31), has put μέλος in place of ἁρμονία; and in one instance (6, 1449 b 29) he combines the two terms as synonyms. It is clear, therefore, that in its present application ἁρμονία means no more than 'melody' or 'tune'. ῥυθμός is properly 'time' or 'pace'. It is a very general word, since it includes the element of rhythm in language and in the movements of the dance, as well as that in music; comp. Plato Laws 665 A τῇ δὴ τῆς κινήσεως τάξει [scil. εἴπομεν ὡς] ῥυθμὸς ὄνομα εἴη, τῇ δ' αὖ τῆς φωνῆς, τοῦ τε ὀξέος ἅμα καὶ βαρέος συγκεραννυμένων, ἁρμονία ὄνομα προσαγορεύοιτο, χορεία δὲ τὸ ξυναμφότερον κληθείη.—672 E Ὅλη μέν που χορεία ὅλη παίδευσις ἦν ἡμῖν, τούτου δ' αὖ τὸ μὲν ῥυθμοί τε καὶ ἁρμονίαι, τὸ κατὰ τὴν φωνήν . . . τὸ δέ γε κατὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος κίνησιν ῥυθμὸν μὲν κοινὸν τῇ τῆς φωνῆς εἶχε κινήσει, σχῆμα δ' ἴδιον. ἐκεῖ δὲ μέλος ἡ τῆς φωνῆς κίνησις (see also Symp. 187 B and Phil. 17 C). The various applications of ῥυθμός are thus summarized in Aristoxenus (p. 411, 8 Marquard): ἔστι δὲ τὰ ῥυθμιζόμενα τρία· λέξις, μέλος, κίνησις σωματική. Plato's view as to the great imitative capacities of rhythm and harmony and music generally may be seen in Rep. 399 A sqq., in Laws 668 A sqq., and more briefly put, in Laws 798 D τὰ περὶ τοὺς

1447 a 22 *ῥυθμοὺς καὶ πᾶσαν μουσικήν ἐστι τρόπων μιμήματα βελτιόνων καὶ χειρόνων ἀνθρώπων.* The point is recognized with equal clearness by Aristotle in Pol. 8. 5, 1340 a 18, *ἔστι δ' ὁμοιώματα μάλιστα παρὰ τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις ἐν τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς καὶ τοῖς μέλεσιν ὀργῆς καὶ πραότητος, ἔτι δ' ἀνδρείας καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἠθικῶν . . .* (a 38) *ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέλεσιν αὐτοῖς ἔστι μιμήματα τῶν ἠθῶν . . .* (b 7) *τὸν αὐτὸν γὰρ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἦθος ἔχουσι στασιμώτερον οἱ δὲ κινητικόν, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν φορτικωτέρας ἔχουσι τὰς κινήσεις οἱ δὲ ἐλευθεριωτέρας.*

a 23 **ἢ χωρὶς ἢ μεμιγμένοις**: a reminiscence of Plato Laws 669 D *διασπῶσιν οἱ ποιηταὶ ῥυθμὸν μὲν καὶ σχήματα μέλους χωρίς, λόγους ψιλοὺς εἰς μέτρα τιθέντες, μέλος δ' αὖ καὶ ῥυθμὸν ἄνευ ῥημάτων, ψιλῇ κιθαρίσει τε καὶ αὐλήσει προσχρώμενοι.*

χρώμεναι, scil. *ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν.*

a 25 **τυγχάνουσιν.** On the construction with *κἂν εἰ* see Vahlen, Beitr. 1, p. 35. Mr. Newman in a note on Pol. 2. 1, 1260 b 31 seems to doubt the necessity of restoring the indicative in this and other similar places in Aristotelian texts.

ἡ τῶν συρίγγων. The word to be supplied is apparently *μίμησις*—not *τέχνη*, as is assumed in HSt. s.v. *σῦριγξ*, and in Bon. Ind. 735 a 39. The Platonic *ἡ τῶν λόγων τέχνη* in Phaedr. 260 D is not a true parallel. For a similar genitive after *μίμησις* comp. Lucian De salt. 64 *ἡ μίμησις τῆς ὀρχήσεως.*

a 26 **αὐτῷ δὲ τῷ ῥυθμῷ κτέ.** is an unnecessary clause, as *ὀρχηστική* is not one of the arts in the list in a 13; it will be observed too that there is a change in the form of expression, *μιμοῦνται*, instead of *χρώμεναι* with *ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν* understood. The clause would seem to have been originally an afterthought, worked in by Aristotle as soon as he saw that there was an art that used rhythm alone. His giving a reason for this mention of *ὀρχηστική* may be supposed to imply a consciousness of its being a new point, and one requiring demonstration.

αἱ τῶν ὀρχηστῶν. The traditional reading *οἱ τῶν ὀρχηστῶν* has been corrected into *ἔνιοι τῶν ὀρχηστῶν* by Twining; into *οἱ* ⟨*πολλοὶ*⟩ *τῶν ὀρχηστῶν* by Heinsius; and into *οἱ* ⟨*χαρίεντες*⟩ *τῶν ὀρχηστῶν* by Zeller. It is assumed that Aristotle may have wished to recognize the fact, of which Plato had spoken in Laws 795 E, that dancing is sometimes a mere exercise of the body and without dramatic meaning. A much simpler correction, however, is *αἱ τῶν ὀρχηστῶν*, with *μιμήσεις* (rather than *τέχναι*) understood from the context.

Aristotle is thinking of the professional dancers, who told a story in **1447^{a} 26**
pantomime, by the mere movements and attitudes of their bodies (comp. Sittl, Die Gebärden der Gr. u. Röm. p. 244).

σχηματιζομένων ῥυθμῶν: the rhythms in their movements, in the **^{a} 27**
succession of their *σχήματα*, their gestures or attitudes (see on 26, 1462^{a} 3). The emphasis is on *ῥυθμῶν*; that the attitudes of the dancer might be dramatic, and represent 'what men do or have done to them', was too obvious to require saying. Aristotle is insisting on the 'ethical' significance which rhythm imparts to the dance. On rhythm as expressive of character and temperament see Pol. 8. 5, 1340^{a} 18 and the Platonic passages referred to on ^{a} 22.

ἤθη: the character and temperament of the personages repre- **^{a} 28**
sented, as distinct from their *πάθη καὶ πράξεις*, 'what they do or have done to them'. The meaning of **πάθη καὶ πράξεις** is sufficiently shown by 9, 1451^{b} 11 *τί Ἀλκιβιάδης ἔπραξεν ἢ τί ἔπαθεν*, and 13, 1453^{a} 22 *παθεῖν δεινὰ ἢ ποιῆσαι* (see also on 11, 1452^{b} 11). *πάθη* is generally assumed (e. g. in Bon. Ind. 557^{a} 49) to denote in this passage 'feelings' or 'emotions'. The words *πάθη καὶ πράξεις* cover the whole ground of the story in the dance; so that Aristotle, if he had cared to anticipate the term used later on in 6, 1450^{a} 4, might have said here, without difference of meaning, *ἤθη καὶ μύθους*.

ἡ δὲ [ἐποποιία] κτέ. Suckow's correction, *τυγχάνει οὖσα*, is to be found in his Form der Platonischen Schriften p. 53. With it, and the readings implied in the Arabic Version, the whole passage becomes intelligible and in harmony with the context. We were told at the outset in ^{a} 22 that the three means of imitation, *ῥυθμός*, *λόγος*, and *ἁρμονία*, may be employed either singly or in certain combinations. Having just spoken (1) of imitation *ἐν ἁρμονίᾳ καὶ ῥυθμῷ*, and (2) of imitation *ἐν ῥυθμῷ* alone, Aristotle passes on (3) to imitation *ἐν λόγῳ*—whether alone, or in combination with rhythm or metre, and finally (4) to imitation *ἐν ἁρμονίᾳ καὶ ῥυθμῷ καὶ λόγῳ*. This exhausts the possibilities, since it is evident that *ἁρμονία* alone, and the combination *ἁρμονία* + *λόγος*, need not be taken into account. The third of his four heads Aristotle divides, and recognizes three possible forms of means, (1) *λόγος* alone, (2) *λόγος* + some one kind of metre, and (3) *λόγος* + a plurality of metres. In other words he distinguishes between (1) imitations in prose, (2) imitations in some one metre (hexameters, trimeters, etc.), and (3) imitations in a plurality of metres. Of this large and well-

1447 a 28 marked class of imitative literature, which includes the Mime, the 'imaginary conversations' of Socrates, the Epic, and Chaeremon's *Centaur*, Aristotle observes that it has 'remained to this day without a distinctive name'. The common fact here is *μίμησις ἐν λόγῳ*, but there is, he says, no one common name connoting the common fact and equally applicable to all the kinds within the class.

Those who retain *ἐποποιία*, with the addition of *ἀνώνυμος* at the end of the sentence, suppose it to mean 'word-poetry' (*Wortdichtung*, Bernays, Zwei Abhandl. p. 81). Such a special and unique sense, however, for a term like *ἐποποιία* is highly improbable, and also against the analogy of all the similar compounds (e.g. *λογοποιία, μελοποιία, μυθοποιία, ὀνοματοποιία*), in which the *-ποιία* means simply the making of something, just as much as in *ἀρτοποιία, ὁδοποιία, παιδοποιία* and the like. And even if the word could bear its new meaning, it would be inappropriate here, as the Mime and the 'Socratic Conversation' were prose imitations—not poems. To a Greek of Aristotle's time the idea of a prose poem would have seemed a contradiction in terms.

a 29 **τοῖς λόγοις ψιλοῖς ἢ τοῖς μέτροις** = *τοῖς λόγοις ψιλοῖς ἢ τοῖς μέτροις ψιλοῖς*: comp. 2, 1448 a 11 *τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὴν ψιλομετρίαν*. *ψιλοῖς*, which in this connexion means *χωρὶς ἁρμονίας*, 'without melody' (v. Tyrwhitt ad loc. and Bon. Ind. 433 b 29), differentiates this group of imitative arts from the semi-musical arts considered later on, at the end of the chapter; comp. Plato Phaedr. 278 c *ποίησιν ψιλὴν ἢ ἐν ᾠδῇ συντέθηκε*, and Laws 669 D (quoted on a 23). *λόγοις ψιλοῖς* has been taken by several (including Bon. Ind. 862 b 31) to mean 'prose' in the present passage—a sense which *ψιλὸς λόγος* has no doubt in a good many instances, e.g. in Rhet. 3. 2, 1404 b 14, 33. But there is nothing in the general meaning of the word to necessitate this interpretation here. *ψιλός* means simply 'by itself', without some accessory, whatever the accessory thus excluded may happen to be (v. HSt. s. v.).

ἢ τοῖς μέτροις. *μέτρα* has to be understood in the concrete sense of 'kinds of verse', i. e. as equivalent to *λόγοι ἔμμετροι* or *λόγοι* + *ῥυθμός*. Aristotle remembers that the literary form of imitation is generally in verse, and accordingly adds *ἢ τοῖς μέτροις*. The addition, however, has a sort of reflex influence on the general term *λόγοις* which precedes it, and by the contrast it suggests gives the word for the moment the special sense of 'prose', as distinct from verse. Other instances of a general term with its meaning

modified by what follows will be found in 22, 1458 a 28 and 25, 1460 b 11. The logical scheme of the statement in a 29–b 23 may be thus exhibited:— 1447 a 29

Language without music	prose	
	verse	in some one kind of metre
		in a plurality of metres

Plato has the same division in Laws 810 B, where he is protesting against the divorce of poetry and literature from music: *πρὸς δὲ δὴ μαθήματα ἄλυρα ποιητῶν κείμενα ἐν γράμμασι, τοῖς μὲν μετὰ μέτρων τοῖς δ' ἄνευ [ῥυθμῶν τμημάτων*[1]*], ἃ δὴ συγγράμματα κατὰ λόγον εἰρημένα μόνον, τητώμενα ῥυθμοῦ τε καὶ ἁρμονίας, σφαλερὰ γράμμαθ' ἡμῖν ἐστι παρά τινων . . . καταλελειμμένα.* Here *ἄλυρα* corresponds to Aristotle's *ψιλοῖς, τοῖς μὲν μετὰ μέτρων τοῖς δ' ἄνευ* to his *τοῖς λόγοις ἢ τοῖς μέτροις*, and *κατὰ λόγον εἰρημένα μόνον τητώμενα ῥυθμοῦ τε καὶ ἁρμονίας* to his *μόνον τοῖς λόγοις ψιλοῖς.*

ἀνώνυμος: Phys. 5. 2, 226 a 26 *ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν κίνησις* b 9
ἀλλοίωσις ἔστω· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐπέζευκται κοινὸν ὄνομα . . . ἡ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν τὸ μὲν κοινὸν ἀνώνυμον, καθ' ἑκάτερον δ' αὔξησις καὶ φθίσις.—De anima 2. 7, 418 a 26 *ὁρατὸν δ' ἔστιν χρῶμά τε, καὶ ὃ λόγῳ μὲν ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, ἀνώνυμον δὲ τυγχάνει ὄν.*—H. A. 10. 40, 623 b 5 *ἔστι δέ τι γένος τῶν ἐντόμων, ὃ ἑνὶ μὲν ὀνόματι ἀνώνυμόν ἐστιν.*—Pol. 3. 1, 1275 a 30 *ἀνώνυμον τὸ κοινὸν ἐπὶ δικαστοῦ καὶ ἐκκλησιαστοῦ.* For other instances see Bon. Ind. 69 b 2. Aristotle has often to speak of a class as being still without a name, because its existence has not yet been recognized by ordinary thought (comp. Bernays, Zwei Abhandl. p. 81).

τυγχάνει οὖσα. Similarly in De sensu 5, 447 b 7 Thurot would restore *ὑπάρχει οὖσα* for *ὑπάρχουσα.*

ὀνομάσαι κοινὸν: scil. *ὄνομα*; comp. Meteor. 4. 9, 387 b 2 *οὐ γὰρ* b 10
κεῖται ὄνομα κοινόν.—H. A. 4. 7, 531 b 22 *οὐκ ἐπέζευκται κοινὸν ὄνομα οὐδέν.*

τοὺς Σώφρονος καὶ Ξενάρχου μίμους. The surviving fragments (Kaibel, CGF. 1 pp. 152 and 182) show that the mimes of Sophron and Xenarchus were in prose (comp. Bernhardy, Gr. Litt.[3] 2. 2 p. 533). And as their very name is suggestive of *μίμησις*, Aristotle points to them as an indisputable example of prose-imitation, *μίμησις ἐν λόγῳ χωρὶς ἁρμονίας καὶ ῥυθμοῦ.* A very similar view of them is implied in a fr. of the dialogue *περὶ ποιητῶν* (72 Teubn.): *οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ἐμμέτρους τοὺς καλουμένους*

[1] These two words seem to represent a gloss, *ῥυθμῶν τητώμενα.*

1447 b 10 Σώφρονος μίμους μὴ φῶμεν εἶναι λόγους καὶ μιμήσεις, ἢ τοὺς Ἀλεξαμενοῦ τοῦ Τηίου τοὺς πρώτους γραφέντας τῶν Σωκρατικῶν διαλόγων (v. Bernays, Zwei Abhandl. p. 82; Kaibel l. c., p. 152). The fr. makes it clear that Aristotle saw a certain affinity between the Mime and the 'Socratic Conversations' of Alexamenus; and with it before us, it is not difficult to divine the reason for the juxtaposition of the Mime and the Σωκρατικὸς λόγος in the present passage of the Poetics; the two things differed in name, but at the same time they had an essential element in common, that of being prose-imitations, μιμήσεις ἐν λόγῳ, and not (like poetry) ἐν μέτρῳ.

b 11 **τοὺς Σωκρατικοὺς λόγους.** As used here and in Rhet. 3. 16, 1417 a 20, the term Σωκρατικοὶ λόγοι must be taken to cover the ground of the whole of this species of literature, the 'Socratic Conversations' not only of Alexamenus, but also of Plato, Aeschines and the rest (comp. Joel, Archiv f. Gesch. der Phil. 8, 468). A certain resemblance between the Platonic Dialogue and the Mime is presupposed in the story (Duris fr. 45 in Müller, FHG. 2 p. 480) of Plato having been a zealous student and imitator of Sophron. It is difficult, therefore, to agree with Teichmüller's view, that Aristotle's intention was to contrast the Mime and the Dialogue, and insist on the difference between them.

οὐδὲ εἰ: De interpr. 11, 20 b 25 οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ ἐρώτησις μία οὐδ' ἐὰν ᾖ ἀληθής.—14, 24 a 3 οὐδὲν διοίσει οὐδ' ἂν καθόλου τιθῶμεν τὴν κατάφασιν.—Soph. el. 11, 171 b 12 τὰ γὰρ ψευδογραφήματα οὐκ ἐριστικά . . . οὐδέ γ' εἴ τί ἐστι ψευδογράφημα περὶ ἀληθές.

At this point Aristotle runs off into a digression (comp. 9, 1451 b 1) in order to minimize the importance of the element of metre in the imitative forms of literature. Even if a mime and a dialogue were both written in verse, either in some one (b 11–12) or in several kinds of metre (b 20), they would still be without a common name connoting the μίμησις in them, which is their essential point of agreement. The writer of such a versified mime or dialogue might no doubt be described in ordinary parlance as an ἐποποιός or ἐλεγειοποιός, or by some similar name indicating the kind of verse in which his work happens to be written. Names of this kind, however, are misleading, since they imply that the verse rather than the μίμησις embodied in it is the essence of the literary form of imitation. Metre, in Aristotle's view, is only one of the accidents of poetry; and the use of it does not make a writer like Empedocles a poet in any true sense of the word.

ἐλεγειοποιοὺς τοὺς δὲ ἐποποιούς. There is no need to understand, still less insert, *τοὺς μὲν* before *ἐλεγειοποιοὺς* (v. Kühner, Gr. Gr.^{3} 2. 2 p. 265); comp. the instances cited by Vahlen (ad loc.); to which may be added Soph. el. 21, 178^{a} 3, Metaph. Δ 28, 1024^{a} 33. 1447^{b} 14

οὐχ ὡς κατὰ τὴν μίμησιν = *ὡς οὐ κατὰ τὴν μίμησιν.* For the position of the negative comp. Plato Phaed. 77 E *ὡς δεδιότων . . . πειρῶ ἀναπείθειν, μᾶλλον δὲ μὴ ὡς ἡμῶν δεδιότων, ἀλλ' ἴσως ἔνι τις καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν παῖς, ὅστις τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβεῖται.*

Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ. In a fragment (fr. 70 Teubn.) of the dialogue ^{b} 18 *περὶ ποιητῶν* he is declared to have been a master of all the resources of epic language: *Ὁμηρικὸς ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ δεινὸς περὶ τὴν φράσιν γέγονε, μεταφορικός τ' ὢν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς περὶ ποιητικὴν ἐπιτεύγμασι χρώμενος.* This is not inconsistent with the present passage; Aristotle's meaning is that, though Empedocles may be a poet in his form, he is not a poet in his matter. A philosophic poem comes under the head of what the ancients termed *didascalice,* its purpose being to teach or instruct, rather than to interest us in a *μίμησις,* a picture of life and manners. That Empedocles was not in any real sense a poet is implied in Plato Theaet. 152 E *καὶ περὶ τούτου πάντες ἑξῆς οἱ σοφοὶ πλὴν Παρμενίδου ξυμφερέσθων, Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἑκατέρας, κωμῳδίας μὲν Ἐπίχαρμος, τραγῳδίας δὲ Ὅμηρος*—where Empedocles, it will be observed, is put into distinct contrast with Homer. This view of him is more clearly stated in later writers, e.g. in Plutarch, De aud. poet. 16 C *τὰ δ' Ἐμπεδοκλέους ἔπη καὶ Παρμενίδου καὶ θηριακὰ Νικάνδρου καὶ γνωμολογίαι Θεόγνιδος λόγοι εἰσὶ κεχρημένοι παρὰ ποιητικῆς ὥσπερ ὄχημα τὸ μέτρον καὶ τὸν ὄγκον, ἵνα τὸ πεζὸν διαφύγωσιν.*—Schol. Dionys. Thr. p. 166. 13 Hilgard *οὐκ ἔστι ποιητὴς ὁ μέτρῳ μόνῳ χρώμενος· οὐδὲ γὰρ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ὁ τὰ φυσικὰ γράψας, οὐδὲ οἱ περὶ ἀστρολογίας εἰπόντες, οὐδὲ ὁ Πύθιος ἐμμέτρως χρησμῳδῶν.*

ποιητήν. The poet is tacitly assumed to be a *μιμητὴς ἐν μέτροις* ^{b} 19 (comp. 24, 1460^{a} 7; 25, 1460^{b} 8).

ὁμοίως recalls the idea of the original assertion in ^{b} 9, *οὐδὲν ἂν* ^{b} 20 *ἔχοιμεν ὀνομάσαι κοινὸν τοὺς Σώφρονος καὶ Ξενάρχου μίμους καὶ τοὺς Σωκρατικοὺς λόγους.* Vahlen quotes Eth. N. I. 12, 1101^{b} 21 *δῆλον ὅτι τῶν ἀρίστων οὐκ ἔστιν ἔπαινος . . . ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν*—where *οὐκ ἔστιν ἔπαινος* is to be understood. *ὁμοίως* often represents the apodosis of a conditional sentence (v. An. pr. I. 9, 30^{b} 1; I. 14, 33^{a} 12; I. 38, 49^{a} 22; De caelo I. 4, 271^{a} 13; 2. 4, 287^{a} 19; De anima I. 1, 402^{b} 8). The equivalent *τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον*

1447 b 20 is used in just the same way in An. pr. 2. 24, 69 a 11 *τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον κἂν εἰ διὰ πλειόνων τῶν ὁμοίων ἡ πίστις γίνοιτο.*

b 21 **Χαιρήμων.** For the little that remains of his Κένταυρος see Nauck, TGF.[2] p. 784. Aristotle terms it a *ῥαψῳδία* as though it were a sort of epic; and it is clear that in 24, 1460 a 2 he still regards it as coming under that head. If Athenaeus 608 E speaks of it as a *δρᾶμα πολύμετρον*, the explanation is that such a bizarre experiment in literature might very well be placed in more than one class. The title was no doubt taken from its subject; not from its monstrous combination of metres, as Welcker imagines (Nachtrag zu der Schrift über die Aeschylische Trilogie p. 71). There were several comedies (Kock, CAF. 3 p. 698) and also an ode (by Lasus of Hermione) with this or a very similar title.

b 22 **ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν μέτρων**: to be taken with *μικτὴν* (comp. Vahlen, Aristotelische Aufsätze 2 p. 42). *ἁπάντων* must be an exaggeration, since it is inconceivable that every kind of metre was represented in Chaeremon's poem. Similar instances of overstatement are to be found in b 28 (*πᾶσιν*), in 18, 1455 b 33 (*τὸ ὅλον*), in 22, 1458 a 24 (*ἅπαντα*), and in De anima 2. 6, 418 a 11, 19 (v. Rodier ad loc.).

καὶ ποιητὴν προσαγορευτέον has been altered in some apographs into *⟨οὐκ ἤδη⟩ καὶ ποιητὴν προσαγορευτέον* and in others into *καὶ ⟨τοῦτον⟩ ποιητὴν προσαγορευτέον.* Various other corrections have been recently suggested, e. g. *κατὰ ⟨τοῦτο⟩ ποιητὴν προσαγορευτέον* (M. Schmidt), *δικαίως ποιητὴν προσαγορευτέον* (Ueberweg), *καίτοι ποιητὴν προσαγορευτέον* (Rassow and Gomperz). Susemihl omits the clause (with Vahlen, Beitr. 1 p. 38), but finds a place for *προσαγορευτέον* by inserting it after *ποιητήν* in b 20.

The clause (if we retain the reading of the MS.) seems to come in in much the same way as that in b 18, *διὸ τὸν μὲν ποιητὴν δίκαιον καλεῖν, τὸν δὲ φυσιολόγον μᾶλλον ἢ ποιητήν.* As an illustration of the third of his three possibilities (comp. Vahlen, Beitr. 1 p. 4) Aristotle cites Chaeremon's *Centaur*; and his assumption is that, as a work of this description is a *μίμησις* (comp. b 21 *ποιοῖτο τὴν μίμησιν*) and also in verse (b 22 *ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν μέτρων*), the author is a *μιμητὴς ἐν μέτροις*, and therefore rightly regarded as a poet, though popular language does not give him a special name of the type of those considered in the preceding section (b 13–19). The argument, therefore, will come to this: If a mime and a dialogue were written in a medley of metres, the writers would have to be recognized as poets; but we should have no common

name for the two works themselves, notwithstanding their similarity in form as well as nature. Some such meaning seems to be demanded by the general logic of the argument, which is directed to show that not only the prose forms of the literary 'imitation', but also the various poetic forms of it are 'to this day' without a general name (b 9 ἀνώνυμος τυγχάνει οὖσα μέχρι τοῦ νῦν). The only difficulty is to see how the clause καὶ ποιητὴν προσαγορευτέον is brought in. Vahlen (ad loc.) takes it as following after the apodosis implied in ὁμοίως—'adnecti non positae sed cogitatae apodosi sententiam (καὶ ποιητὴν προσαγορευτέον)'. I suspect that it was primarily meant to apply to Chaeremon, and that it is loosely subjoined to what is said of him in the context, as an assertion of his claim to be ranked among the poets in spite of his metrical absurdities. 1447 b 22

The question may perhaps be asked: If it was possible to give ποιητής the sense assumed for it in this chapter and elsewhere, why did not Aristotle recognize the word ποίημα as an equally legitimate 'common name' for all the various species of verse-imitation? The answer may perhaps be this, that he thought it to be (like ἐποποιός, ἐλεγειοποιός, etc.) too directly suggestive of the metrical form (comp. Rhet. 3. 8, 1408 b 30), which he puts aside as only one of the accidents even of the poetical 'imitation'.

The term 'Poet', as used by most of the ancients, is the subject of a valuable inquiry by H. Weil (Études sur l'antiquité grecque, p. 237), who shows that the nearest modern representative of it is 'author' or 'composer'. Its primary meaning is the man who writes the words, or composes the music, in contradistinction to the rhapsodists, actors, singers or musicians, who present the work to the public (comp. Plato Rep. 373 B ποιηταί τε καὶ τούτων ὑπηρέται, ῥαψῳδοί, ὑποκριταί, χορευταί, κτἑ.). But as the literary work which had to be thus recited or sung was by custom in verse, the 'poet' was also a writer of verses. The idea of verse in fact became part of the conventional meaning of the word—as also of the verb ποιεῖν, which often means to write or say in verse; the compounds, likewise, ἐποποιός, ἐλεγειοποιός, etc., all denote writers of some kind of verse. ποιεῖν is thus opposed to λέγειν, to speak in prose, and the ποιητής either to the συγγραφεύς, who writes prose, or to the ἰδιώτης, the ordinary man who speaks in prose. Another association attaching to the word had its origin in the matter with which early Greek poetry was connected. The poet was distinguished from the historian or chronicler by the fact

1447 b 22 that he was so constantly dealing with a remote or legendary past, in the treatment of which there was ample room for play of imagination. All the great poetical subjects are classed by Plato under the general head of 'myths' or fictions (Rep. 377 A and 382 D; comp. Xenophanes fr. 1, 21 Diels); and it was an understood thing that a free use of fiction was one of the privileges of the poet: Solon fr. 29 Bergk *πολλὰ ψεύδονται ἀοιδοί*.—Isocrates 195 D *τῶν γε παλαιῶν καθόδων αὗται μάλιστ' εὐδοκιμοῦσιν, ἃς παρὰ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀκούομεν· οὗτοι γὰρ οὐ μόνον τῶν γεγενημένων τὰς καλλίστας ἡμῖν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρ' αὑτῶν καινὰς συντιθέασιν* (also Horace A. P. 9). This recognition of an element of fiction in poetry is perhaps the nearest approach the ancients make to our idea of 'poetic creation'. The ordinary conception in antiquity of the poet was that he was, just like the painter (v. Poet. 15, 1454 b 9, and 25, 1460 b 8), an imitator, and that his work was not so much a creation as a copy, more or less faithful, of something already existing in legend or life.

b 25 **μέλει** = *ἁρμονίᾳ* in the scheme in a 22.

μέτρῳ, which now takes the place of the original term *λόγῳ* in a 22, has the concrete sense of 'verse' or versified language, i. e. as equivalent to *λόγος ἔμμετρος* or *λόγος + ῥυθμός* (comp. 4, 1448 b 21). It is an ill-chosen word, therefore, as it says too much, and, if understood strictly, would make the *ῥυθμῷ*, with which the enumeration begins, a superfluity.

b 28 **αἱ μὲν ἅμα πᾶσιν αἱ δὲ κατὰ μέρος.** As Teichmüller points out, *πᾶσιν* repeats the *πᾶσι* in b 24, *χρῶνται* having to be supplied. The antithesis is between *ἅμα* and *κατὰ μέρος*; so that in lieu of the latter Aristotle might have said *οὐχ ἅμα ἀλλὰ κατὰ μέρος*. Comp. Meteor. 1. 14, 351 a 28 *ἐκείνοις μὲν οὐ κατὰ μέρος ταῦτα συμβαίνει πάσχειν, ἀλλ' ἅμα πᾶν ἀκμάζειν καὶ φθίνειν ἀναγκαῖον*.—Plato Theaet. 189 E *ἤτοι ἅμα γε ἢ ἐν μέρει* (also Bon. Ind. 455 b 14 and 571 b 47). Aristotle's language would naturally imply that, whereas the three means of expression, language, metre, and music, are inseparable in the Dithyramb and Nome, they appear separately and by turns in the Drama. This, however, is an overstatement (see on *ἁπάντων* in b 22), as it is only the musical element that comes in intermittently, in the choral parts of the play (6, 1449 b 30).

1448 a 1 **μιμοῦνται οἱ μιμούμενοι πράττοντας**: comp. 1, 1447 a 28; 3, 1448 a 27; 6, 1449 b 36; 1450 b 3, 9; 1451 b 29. This is to all appearance another reminiscence of Plato: Rep. 396 C *μιμού-*

μενος τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀσφαλῶς τε καὶ ἐμφρόνως πράττοντα.—603 C 1448 a 1 *πράττοντας, φαμέν, ἀνθρώπους μιμεῖται ἡ μιμητικὴ βιαίους ἢ ἑκουσίας πράξεις.*

ἢ σπουδαίους ἢ φαύλους is explained by what follows, *κακίᾳ γὰρ* a 2 *καὶ ἀρετῇ τὰ ἤθη διαφέρουσι πάντες* (comp. 5, 1449 a 32). This, Aristotle adds, is the primary and most universal distinction between man and man; nearly all other distinctions of character may be classed under this one common head.

ἀκολουθεῖ: De part. an. 2. 1, 646 a 17 *αἱ δ' ἄλλαι διαφοραὶ ταύταις* a 3 *ἀκολουθοῦσιν.*

κακίᾳ γὰρ καὶ ἀρετῇ *κτέ.* Pol. 5. 2, 1303 b 15 *μεγίστη μὲν οὖν ἴσως διάστασις ἀρετὴ καὶ μοχθηρία.*

ἤτοι βελτίονας . . . τοιούτους, scil. *μιμοῦνται οἱ μιμούμενοι.* We a 4 have been prepared for this distinction by the preceding *ἐπεὶ μιμοῦνται οἱ μιμούμενοι πράττοντας, ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτους ἢ σπουδαίους ἢ φαύλους εἶναι*; but the third possibility, that the personages represented may be on the same level as ourselves (*ἢ καὶ τοιούτους*), is a new point, which is felt to require a word of proof. Aristotle accordingly reminds us of a similar fact in painting (a 5): the personages in the works of Dionysius are just like ourselves (*ὁμοίους*). The three possibilities being thus generally established, Aristotle proceeds to say, by way of corollary (*δῆλον δὲ* a 7), that the same distinction is to be seen in the poetical arts, in epic, lyric, and dramatic poetry (a 11), and that it constitutes also the essential point of difference between Tragedy and Comedy (a 16). That *μιμοῦνται* may be supplied from the protasis (a 1) after *ἢ καὶ τοιούτους* in a 5 is assumed by all the older translators. Vahlen illustrates the construction from Metaph. Δ 7, 1017 a 13 *τὸν γὰρ ἄνθρωπον ὅταν μουσικὸν λέγωμεν καὶ τὸν μουσικὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἢ τὸν λευκὸν μουσικὸν ἢ τοῦτον λευκόν, τὸ μὲν* (scil. *λέγομεν*) *ὅτι ἄμφω τῷ αὐτῷ συμβεβήκασι κτέ.* Other instances of a verb having to be understood in the principal from a subordinate clause will be found in Kühner, Gr. Gr.[3] 2. 2, p. 574; an exact parallel, however, to the construction in the present passage is still wanting. The only alternative is to suppose the apodosis to begin at *δῆλον δὲ* (a 7)—in which case it will be necessary to restore *δῆλον δή*, and to take the words *ἤτοι βελτίονας κτέ.* as appositional to the *ἢ σπουδαίους ἢ φαύλους εἶναι* in a 2. The clause, however, that follows, *ὥσπερ οἱ γραφεῖς* (scil. *μιμοῦνται*), seems to show that *ἤτοι βελτίονας κτέ.* = *ἤτοι βελτίονας . . . μιμοῦνται.*

ὥσπερ οἱ γραφεῖς. Plutarch, who defines poetry as a *μιμητικὴ* a 5

1448^{a} 5 *τέχνη καὶ δύναμις ἀντίστροφος τῇ ζωγραφίᾳ*, quotes a saying, commonly attributed to Simonides, *ζωγραφίαν μὲν εἶναι φθεγγομένην τὴν ποίησιν, ποίησιν δὲ σιγῶσαν τὴν ζωγραφίαν* (De aud. poet. 17 F, with Wyttenbach's note). The comparison, which reappears in Poet. 6, 1450^{a} 26, ^{b} 1; 15, 1454^{b} 9; 25, 1460^{b} 8, and indirectly elsewhere, is of very frequent occurrence in Plato (v. Rep. 377 E, 597 E, 603 B, 605 A etc.).

γραφεῖς. The Attic form *γραφῆς* has survived in the text of Meteor. 3. 2, 372^{a} 7, and De sensu 3, 440^{a} 8.

Πολύγνωτος: comp. 6, 1450^{a} 27.

^{a} 6 **Παύσων**: Pol. 8. 5, 1340^{a} 36 *δεῖ μὴ τὰ Παύσωνος θεωρεῖν τοὺς νέους, ἀλλὰ τὰ Πολυγνώτου κἂν εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν γραφέων ἢ τῶν ἀγαλματοποιῶν ἐστιν ἠθικός.* If he was the same as the Pauson of Aristoph. Ach. 854, he must have had a certain sort of affinity to our modern caricaturists (comp. Hor. Ep. 2. 1, 264; Aelian V. H. 4. 4); it will be seen also that Aristotle regards his work as the analogue of that of the parodists and comic poets in literature.

Διονύσιος δὲ ὁμοίους εἴκαζεν. *ὁμοίους*, as the context shows (comp. *τοιούτους* in ^{a} 5), means 'like ourselves', neither better nor worse than the average man. *εἰκάζειν* (=to produce an *εἰκών* or portrait) is practically synonymous with *μιμεῖσθαι*, the word ordinarily used by Aristotle even of a painter. In 1, 1447^{a} 19 he has the more precise expression, *μιμοῦνται ἀπεικάζοντες*. The Dionysius meant is Dionysius of Colophon. It is a disputed point (Overbeck, Schriftquellen 1136) whether he is to be identified with the painter of whom Pliny N. H. 35. 113 says: *Contra Dionysius nihil aliud quam homines pinxit, ob id anthropographos cognominatus.* The epithet *ἀνθρωπογράφος* would certainly seem peculiarly applicable to Aristotle's Dionysius, as a realistic painter, whose gods and heroes were too like ordinary men.

^{a} 8 **ἕτερα** is qualified and explained by the *τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον* that follows. The personages represented differ in the way just described, i.e. as being either better or worse than, or on the same level as, the ordinary man. For the neuter *ἕτερα* see on ^{a} 19.

^{a} 9 **ὀρχήσει**: Plato Laws 814 E *δύο μὲν αὐτῆς* (scil. *ὀρχήσεως*) *εἴδη χρὴ νομίζειν εἶναι, τὴν μὲν τῶν καλλιόνων σωμάτων ἐπὶ τὸ σεμνὸν μιμουμένην, τὴν δὲ τῶν αἰσχιόνων ἐπὶ τὸ φαῦλον* (comp. also 655 C; 798 D). For the kind of dancing Aristotle has in mind here see on 1, 1447^{a} 27.

αὐλήσει καὶ κιθαρίσει: see on 1, 1447^{a} 15.

τῷ περὶ τοὺς λόγους δὲ καὶ τὴν ψιλομετρίαν is a general expression 1448 a 10
for the group of purely literary imitative arts, which were described in 1, 1447 a 29 as using *τοῖς λόγοις ψιλοῖς ἢ τοῖς μέτροις*. *Ψιλομετρία*—a term misunderstood by later writers (v. Bernays, Heraklit. Briefe p. 116)—means verse without music (*χωρὶς ἁρμονίας*; see on 1, 1447 a 29). The qualifying addition 'without music' might no doubt have been appended to *τοὺς λόγους* also; but it is more wanted where it is, so as to distinguish the verse that was simply recited from the verse that was sung. From this point onward Aristotle ignores the prose imitations (the Mime and the Dialogue), and deals only with 'poetry', the versified forms of imitative literature (*μίμησις ἐν μέτροις*; see on 1, 1447 a 23).

τῷ περὶ τοὺς λόγους = *ἐν τῷ περὶ τοὺς λόγους*, the preposition being understood from the preceding context (comp. Bon. Ind. 630 a 40). The restoration of *τῷ* for *τὸ* in 25, 1461 a 33 admits of the same explanation. For *τὸ περί τι* in the sense of 'the class comprising' see Plato Soph. 221 B (with Campbell's note), Symp. 205 C, Rep. 394 B.

Κλεοφῶν. In 22, 1458 a 20 his diction is said to be *ταπεινή*. a 12
Aristotle notes elsewhere the ludicrous effect his occasional attempts at fine language produced owing to the incongruity between the expression and the matter he dealt with: Rhet. 3. 7, 1408 a 10 *τὸ δὲ πρέπον ἕξει ἡ λέξις, ἐὰν ᾖ . . . τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις πράγμασιν ἀνάλογον. τὸ δ' ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν ἐὰν μήτε περὶ εὐόγκων αὐτοκαβδάλως λέγηται μήτε περὶ εὐτελῶν σεμνῶς, μηδ' ἐπὶ τῷ εὐτελεῖ ὀνόματι ἐπῇ κόσμος. εἰ δὲ μή, κωμῳδία* ['a comic joke', Casaubon on Ath. 3. 12] *φαίνεται, οἷον ποιεῖ* Κλεοφῶν· *ὁμοίως γὰρ ἔνια ἔλεγε καὶ εἰ εἴπειεν ἂν πότνια συκῆ*. In the present passage we are told that his personages were 'like ourselves' (*ὁμοίους*), neither better than the ordinary man, like those in Homer, nor worse, like those in a parody. From the context as well as the company in which he is placed it is plain that he is to be regarded as a sort of epic poet. He is taken as the representative of the prosaic Epic—the Epic of the commonplace, as distinct from the noble Epic of Homer and the debased Epic known as parody. His work being put under the head of *ψιλομετρία*, 'verse without the accompaniment of song,' he cannot have been in Aristotle's view either a lyric or a dramatic poet (comp. Tyrwhitt ad loc.). The notion that he was the writer of a dialogue entitled the 'Mandrobulus' is based on an erroneous interpretation of Soph. el. 15, 174 b 19 (see J. of Phil. 12 p. 17).

Ἡγήμων: see Brandt, Parodorum epicorum reliq., p. 37, and

1448 a 12 Kock, CAF. 1, p. 700. Parody was an element in the humour of the Old Comedy, as also of Epicharmus; and there were certainly others before Hegemon who travestied Homer. What Aristotle means, however, is that Hegemon was the first to take up parody as a special form of poetical literature (Schrader, Rh. Mus. N. F. 20, p. 186). According to Athenaeus 699 A (comp. 407 A) he was the first to present a parody in the poetical contests in the theatre: *πρῶτος εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τοὺς ἀγῶνας τοὺς θυμελικοὺς Ἡγήμων, καὶ παρ' Ἀθηναίοις ἐνίκησεν ἄλλαις τε παρῳδίαις καὶ τῇ Γιγαντομαχίᾳ.*

a 13 **παρῳδίας.** A *παρῳδία*, in Aristotle's sense of the word, is a mock epic, a poem on an ignoble theme in epic language and metre.

Νικοχάρης: he may perhaps be the same as the comic poet of the same name (Kock, CAF. 1 p. 770). We know nothing more of his work, and there is some uncertainty even as to its title. *Δειλιάς* (which is assonant to *Ἰλιάς*) would mean, as Twining says, the 'Poltroniad'; *Δηλιάς*, either the 'Tale of Delos', or the 'Tale of Delium'; it is practically impossible to say which.

a 15 **ὥσπερ * * γᾶς** *κτέ.* It is important to bear in mind that in A^c the *ὥσπερ* here ends a line, and that the *γᾶς* stands at the beginning of another. The better apographs have either *ὡς περγᾶς* or *ὡς πέργας*. The reading *ὡς Πέρσας καὶ Κύκλωπας* was probably due to a corrector who knew of the *Πέρσαι* as a nome of Timotheus; it may be seen in the process of genesis in the text of Parisinus 2038. In his latest edition (comp. Hermes 12, p. 192) Vahlen puts a colon after *νόμους*, and suggests that *ὥσπερ γὰρ Κύκλωπας* should be restored—on the supposition (1) that Timotheus and Philoxenus may represent the ignoble Nome and Dithyramb, and (2) that instances of the opposite were not wanted, as the Nome and Dithyramb were so generally associated with noble subjects. However attractive this explanation may be, Vahlen's reading fails to account for the accent in the traditional *ὥσπερ γᾶς* of the Paris MS. Castelvetro was probably right in recognizing in *γᾶς* the second half of *Ἀργᾶς*, the name of one notorious in antiquity as the writer of a debased kind of nome (Meineke, FCG. 3, p. 388). If we accept Castelvetro's suggestion, a question naturally arises as to the extent of the lacuna before the *γᾶς* of the MS. The original statement may have been something like what Vahlen formerly supposed, *ὥσπερ* ⟨*θεοὺς Ἀρ-*⟩*γᾶς*; but it is quite as likely that more than this has been lost, and that the text, when entire, gave the name of another writer of nomes, who

was put in contrast with Argas, and also the name of a common subject differently treated by the two poets (ὥσπερ ⟨-- καὶ Ἀρ-⟩ γᾶς); so that this clause may have said of the Nome what the next (Κύκλωπας Τιμόθεος καὶ Φιλόξενος) says of the Dithyramb. If it be objected that, on this hypothesis, Aristotle ought to have considered also, as a third possibility, the 'realistic' or intermediate type of Nome and Dithyramb, the reply is that, if it ever existed, it was of no real importance for his purpose. He is simply preparing us for the distinction in the Drama between Tragedy and Comedy; and when he comes to the subject of the Drama in a 16, we see that he omits to recognize an intermediate or 'realistic' drama, in which the chief personages were *ὅμοιοι*, like the ordinary man. 1448 a 15

Κύκλωπας. Polyphemus must have been a stock-subject in literature, as there were dramas with the title Κύκλωψ, dealing with him and his story, by Epicharmus, Aristias, and Antiphanes, as well as the existing play of Euripides. The plural here, as Düntzer points out, denotes not several Cyclopses, but Polyphemus as treated in different poems. For the Κύκλωψ ἢ Γαλάτεια of Philoxenus see Bergk, LG.[4] 3 p. 609, and Schmidt's Diatribe in dithyrambum, p. 54. It seems to have been a covert satire on the elder Dionysius, who had offended the poet; we may suppose, then, that Philoxenus made his Cyclops an ignoble personage, *χείρων ἢ καθ' ἡμᾶς*. We have no evidence even of this indirect kind as to the Polyphemus of Timotheus (see Bergk l. c. p. 620; Schmidt l. c. p. 102), but it is a natural inference from what Aristotle implies in the context, that he was not like the Cyclops of Philoxenus.

ἐν ταύτῃ δὲ τῇ διαφορᾷ. Vahlen retains the traditional *ἐν αὐτῇ δὲ τῇ διαφορᾷ*, taking it to mean 'in ipsa quam dico differentia'. a 15

βούλεται: this is their general tendency and intention, though there may be exceptions to the rule (comp. Bon. Ind. 140 b 41). a 18

τῶν νῦν replaces the *ἢ καθ' ἡμᾶς* in a 4. Aristotle is thinking more especially of the chief personages in Tragedy, who belong in most instances to the heroic age; comp. 13, 1453 a 20 and Probl. 19. 48, 922 b 17 *ἐκεῖνοι* [i. e. the tragic actors as distinct from the chorus] *μὲν γὰρ ἡρώων μιμηταί, οἱ δὲ ἡγεμόνες τῶν ἀρχαίων μόνοι ἦσαν ἥρωες· οἱ δὲ λαοὶ ἄνθρωποι, ὧν ἐστιν ὁ χορός.*

τούτων τρίτη διαφορά. *τούτων = τῶν λεχθεισῶν μιμήσεων* in a 7; comp. 1, 1447 b 29 *τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν τεχνῶν*. Vahlen supposes the words to mean 'harum quas recenseo differentiarum tertia'. a 19

1448 a 19 **ἕκαστα τούτων**: the objects with the possibilities of difference described in chap. 2. Though the objects of the poetic imitations are properly persons, the neuter is used as a more general way of designating them; it reappears in the context in *τὰ αὐτά* (a 20) and *ἕτερόν τι* (a 21), as well as in the formula (repeated from 1, 1447 a 17) *ἐν οἷς τε καὶ ἃ καὶ ὥς* in a 25.

a 20 **τὰ αὐτὰ μιμεῖσθαι.** The subject understood with *μιμεῖσθαι* is *τὸν μιμούμενον*; and the participles which follow in a 21–22, to describe the differences of manner, are in apposition to that. In a 23, however, where Aristotle is dealing with the Drama, in which there is a plurality of imitators, he has to put the participles in the plural (*ὡς πράττοντας*), and the subject, instead of being left to be supplied, is definitely mentioned, and in the plural (*τοὺς μιμουμένους*, a 24).

a 21 **ὁτὲ μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα κτέ.** The amended reading of this passage *⟨ἢ⟩ ὁτὲ μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα ὁτὲ δὲ ἕτερόν τι γιγνόμενον* is anticipated in Goulston's paraphrase, 'aut ut interdum eas exponat poeta, et interdum ipse aliud quid, i. alia persona, fiat.' The *ἢ* which the MS. has before *ἕτερον* may very well be supposed to have been omitted (comp. 25, 1461 a 9), and then re-inserted in the wrong place, as a correction of *ὁτὲ δὲ* (comp. my 'Textual Criticism of the Nic. Ethics', p. 18).

ἕτερόν τι. Ulrici's correction *ἕτερόν τινα* (suggested by Plato's *ὥς τις ἄλλος ὤν* in Rep. 393 c) is the result of a curious oversight. As Aristotle began by speaking of the objects imitated in the neuter (*τὰ αὐτὰ μιμεῖσθαι*: see on *ἕκαστα τούτων* in a 19), he was bound to describe the imitator as identifying himself, not with 'some one else', but with 'something else' (*ἕτερόν τι*).

The statement in the text in a 21–24 is on the same lines as that in Plato Rep. 392 D–394 D; its very terminology is a reminiscence of Plato's; and it would be a mere enigma to us, if we had not the key to it in the Republic. Plato distinguishes between three forms of *διήγησις*: (1) simple narration, in which the poet speaks throughout *in propria persona*; (2) imitative or dramatic narration, in which he effaces himself as it were, and speaks in the person of another; and (3) the mixed manner, narrative and dramatic by turns, which we see in Homer. Aristotle's *ἀπαγγέλλοντα* recalls Plato's *δι' ἀπαγγελίας αὐτοῦ τοῦ ποιητοῦ* (Rep. 394 c); and his *ἕτερόν τι γιγνόμενον* the Platonic *ὥς τις ἄλλος ὤν* (Rep. 393 c). The combination also of the two manners in Homer (*ὁτὲ μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα ὁτὲ δὲ ἕτερόν τι γιγνόμενον*) is a point

which Plato works out and explains at some length: *μέχρι μὲν τούτων τῶν ἐπῶν, 'καὶ ἐλίσσετο πάντας Ἀχαιούς, Ἀτρείδα δὲ μάλιστα δύω, κοσμήτορε λαῶν,' λέγει τε αὐτὸς ὁ ποιητὴς καὶ οὐδ' ἐπιχειρεῖ ἡμῶν τὴν διάνοιαν ἄλλοσε τρέπειν, ὡς ἄλλος τις ὁ λέγων ἢ αὐτός· τὰ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ὢν ὁ Χρύσης λέγει καὶ πειρᾶται ἡμᾶς ὅ τι μάλιστα ποιῆσαι μὴ Ὅμηρον δοκεῖν εἶναι τὸν λέγοντα ἀλλὰ τὸν ἱερέα, πρεσβύτην ὄντα* (Rep. 393 A). Plato's concluding formula for the Homeric or mixed mode of representation, *τὰς διηγήσεις ποιεῖσθαι . . . τὰ μὲν μιμουμένους τὰ δὲ μή* (Rep. 394 D), is the all but exact equivalent of Aristotle's *μιμεῖσθαι . . . ὁτὲ μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα ὁτὲ δὲ ἕτερόν τι γιγνόμενον*. At the same time it must be admitted that there are certain noteworthy points of differences between the two statements. (1) With Plato the term *μιμεῖσθαι* is restricted to the dramatic mode of representation; whereas Aristotle uses it in a much wider sense (see on 1, 1447^{a} 16). (2) The order also, in which the three possibilities are arranged, is different, since Aristotle takes them, not in the order of logic, but in that of time; and begins with Homer and the Homeric manner. And (3) when he comes (in ^{a} 23) to the third possibility, the purely dramatic form of expression, he is apparently thinking more of the actors than of the dramatic author himself (v. on ^{a} 23). Aristotle's general view in fact of the Epic is that it comes under the head of narrative, as distinct from dramatic, imitation (5, 1449^{b} 11 *τῷ . . . ἀπαγγελίαν εἶναι*; comp. 6, 1449^{b} 26 *δρώντων καὶ οὐ δι' ἀπαγγελίας*); and in his two chapters (23 and 24) specially dealing with epic poetry the Epic in *ἡ διηγηματικὴ μίμησις* (23, 1459^{a} 17; 24, 1459^{b} 36)—the Drama being *ἡ ἐν τῷ πράττειν μίμησις* (22, 1459^{a} 15). This, however, does not prevent him from recognizing the Epic (as Plato had done before him) as a quasi-dramatic form of poetry. Every epic is said to have a quasi-dramatic element in it to some extent (*μιμοῦνται δὲ ὀλίγα*, 24, 1460^{a} 9), and the Homeric Epic has it in a very marked degree. Homer is said to reduce the element of narrative to a minimum (*ὀλίγα φροιμιασάμενος*, 24, 1460^{a} 9; comp. *ἐλάχιστα λέγειν*, ^{a} 7), taking every opportunity of making his personages come forward and speak for themselves, just as though they were characters in a play and on the stage (*εὐθὺς εἰσάγει ἄνδρα ἢ ἄλλο τι ἦθος*, 24, 1460^{a} 10). The 'mixed manner' of Homer, therefore, is acknowledged in chap. 24, as clearly and in much the same way as it seems to be in the words of the present passage (as amended), *ὁτὲ μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα ὁτὲ δὲ ἕτερόν τι γιγνόμενον*.

1448^{a} 21

1448 a 21 If the traditional text be retained (with Ritter, Vahlen, and others), it has to be read thus: *καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μιμεῖσθαι ἔστιν ὁτὲ μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα—ἢ ἕτερόν τι γιγνόμενον ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος ποιεῖ, ἢ ὡς τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλοντα—ἢ πάντας ὡς πράττοντας καὶ ἐνεργοῦντας τοὺς μιμουμένους.* According to this view the words *ὁτὲ μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα* have to be taken as a general description of the narrative as opposed to the purely dramatic manner (*πάντας ὡς πράττοντας κτέ.*), the parenthesis recognizing the two possibilities within the sphere of narrative poetry. This interpretation of the passage (1) implies, to my mind, too wide a divergence from the scheme in the Republic; and (2) it practically assumes that *ὁτὲ μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα* means no more than *ἀπαγγέλλοντα* or *ἢ ἀπαγγέλλοντα*; it also involves (3) what seems to me a hardly tenable interpretation of the concluding clause (see on a 23).

a 22 **ὡς τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλοντα**: another instance of parallelismus antitheticus (see on 1, 1447 a 18); it is the converse in sense of that in De caelo 2. 6, 288 a 31 *εἴτε . . . ἀλλοιοῖτο καὶ μὴ διαμένοι τὸ αὐτό.* It is not necessary to bracket the article before *αὐτὸν*, though the omission would certainly bring the present statement into closer conformity with that in Plato Rep. 393 A–D, and make the antithesis to be between what the poet says *in propria persona* (comp. 24, 1460 a 6, 11) and what he says in an assumed character.

a 23 **ἢ πάντα ὡς πράττοντας καὶ ἐνεργοῦντας τοὺς μιμουμένους.** *πάντα*, the correction of Casaubon (De Sat. Poesi p. 82 Rambach), was tacitly adopted by Goulston. It is in apposition to the *τὰ αὐτά* in a 20, and serves to distinguish the Drama from the Epic, which is at best only partially dramatic. If *πάντας* be retained, it has to be taken with *τοὺς μιμουμένους* as the object after *μιμεῖσθαι* understood from a 21. *μιμεῖσθαι*, however, is already provided with an object, viz. *τὰ αὐτά* (a 20); and *τὰ αὐτά* is much too important logically to be ignored through a change of construction. In chap. 2 Aristotle has shown how the subjects of the representation may differ. He tells us now that there are possibilities of difference also in the mode or manner of the representation, even when the subjects are the same (*τὰ αὐτά*); these differences of manner are indicated by the circumstantial participles in the clauses which follow *τὰ αὐτὰ μιμεῖσθαι ἔστιν.* It will be observed that in this third participial clause the participles are in the plural, and that the grammatical subject, instead of being understood, as it was in a 20, is expressed, and also in the plural, *τοὺς μιμου-*

μένους. The explanation of the change of number is probably 1448 a 23
this, that Aristotle is thinking for the moment of the actors rather than of the poet himself. There are certainly several passages in the Poetics, very closely resembling that before us, in which the reference must be to the actors, a play being conceived to be something which 'they act', i.e. with a plurality of imitators concerned in it: comp. 6, 1449 b 26 δρώντων; b 31 πράττοντες ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν; 1450 a 21 πράττουσιν. The suggestion that τοὺς μιμουμένους refers to the actors is due to E. Müller, Theorie der Kunst bei den Alten 2 p. 18. The clause, with the reading πάντας, is generally supposed to mean 'aut omnes qui imitatione exprimuntur quasi agentes et operantes imitari' (Tyrwhitt), τοὺς μιμουμένους being taken as a passive in the sense of the 'personages imitated'. The use of the present of μιμεῖσθαι as a passive is not impossible, but there is, as far as I am aware, no clear instance of it[1]; it may be observed too that in 15, 1454 a 26, where Aristotle wants a present passive of μιμεῖσθαι, he does not say ὁ μιμούμενος, but has recourse to a periphrasis, ὁ τὴν μίμησιν παρέχων.

ἐν τρισὶ δὴ ταύταις κτέ. Comp. 1, 1447 a 16 διαφέρουσι δὲ ἀλλή- a 24
λων τρισίν κτέ. The preposition here (unlike that in the following ἐν οἷς) denotes the sphere within which the poetic imitation works. ταύταις is the real subject of the proposition (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr.[3] 2. 1 p. 628), and preparative to the enumeration that follows, ἐν οἷς τε καὶ ἃ καὶ ὥς (comp. De caelo 2. 2, 285 a 11). The whole statement, therefore, is practically the same thing as ταῦτα δή, τὰ ἐν οἷς τε καὶ ἃ καὶ ὥς, τρεῖς διαφοραί εἰσιν ἐν αἷς ἡ μίμησίς ἐστιν, or as Bon. Ind. 546 a 57 puts it, ἐν αἷς δὴ διαφοραῖς ἡ μίμησις γίγνεται, αὗται τρεῖς εἰσιν, ἐν οἷς τε καὶ ἃ καὶ ὥς.

ὥστε τῇ μὲν κτέ. is a sort of corollary to what was said in chap. 2 a 25
and the opening section of chap. 3. Aristotle is now once more viewing plays in their relation to the authors, and the actors are ignored. In chap. 6 there are several instances of his passing unconsciously from the one point of view to the other. Thus in 6, 1449 b 26, 31, 1450 a 10, 21, b 11 the reference is to the play as acted; whereas in 6, 1449 b 34, 1450 a 25–37, b 7 it is to the play as a literary production, the work of the poet.

πράττοντας γὰρ μιμοῦνται. The dramatic poet, instead of giving a 27
us a merely verbal description of the incidents, makes his person-

[1] The passage in Plato Rep. 604 E (if μιμούμενον be retained) admits of another interpretation.

1448 a 27 ages appear on the stage, and go through a semblance of action. The difference between Aristotle's language here and in a 23 is to be noted: the dramatic poet *μιμεῖται πράττοντας*; the actor *μιμεῖται ὡς πράττων*.

a 28 **δρῶντας.** This reminds Aristotle of a current explanation of the word *drama*, *ὅτι μιμοῦνται δρῶντας*, and leads him off into a digression on the claim of the Dorians to the discovery of the Drama. This claim, he says, they support by an appeal to language; they maintain that not only *κωμῳδία* but also the general term *δρᾶμα* are words of Dorian origin. The statement here being quite sufficient for its purpose, it is not necessary to suppose (with Egger) a lacuna in the text, on the assumption that a Dorian etymology of *τραγῳδία* also must have been mentioned. The present passage is clearly the ultimate source of the corresponding statements in the grammarians: Anon. De Comoedia (Kaibel, CGF. 1 p. 6) *τὴν κωμῳδίαν ηὑρῆσθαί φασιν ὑπὸ Σουσαρίωνος· τὴν δὲ ὀνομασίαν ἔχειν οἱ μὲν ὅτι περὶ τὰς κώμας περιιόντες ᾖδον καὶ ἐπεδείκνυντο, μήπω πόλεων οὐσῶν ἀλλ' ἐν κώμαις οἰκούντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, οἱ δὲ ἀντιλέγοντές φασι μὴ κώμας καλεῖσθαι παρ' Ἀθηναίοις ἀλλὰ δήμους, καὶ κωμῳδίαν αὐτὴν καλοῦσιν ἐπεὶ ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς ἐκώμαζον.* —Diomedes 486 P. (=Kaibel, l. c. p. 57) *Comoedia dicta ἀπὸ τῶν κωμῶν; κῶμαι enim appellantur pagi, id est conventicula rusticorum . . . vel ἀπὸ τοῦ κώμου, id est comisatione, quia olim in eiusmodi fabulis amantium iuvenum κῶμοι canebantur* (v. Reifferscheid, Suetonii Reliq. p. 7).

a 31 **οἱ Μεγαρεῖς.** On the Megarian Comedy see Meineke, FCG. 1 p. 18. The doubts about it raised by Wilamowitz (Herm. 9 p. 319) have been examined by Gomperz (Vienna Academy, Sitzungsb. 1888 p. 12) and Zielinski (Gliederung der altattischen Komödie p. 243). The Megarian claim to Comedy is noted by the anonymous commentator on Eth. N. 4. 6, 1123 a 24 (p. 186 Heylb.): *διασύρονται γὰρ οἱ Μεγαρεῖς ἐν κωμῳδίᾳ (ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀντιποιοῦνται αὐτῆς ὡς παρ' αὐτοῖς πρῶτον εὑρεθείσης, εἴ γε καὶ Σουσαρίων ὁ κατάρξας κωμῳδίας Μεγαρεὺς ἦν) κτέ.*; his parenthetical recognition of it, however, has no independent value, as it is obviously only an amplification of the words in the text. It will be observed that Aristotle says nothing about Susarion either here or in chap. 5—where he expressly tells us that the earlier history of Comedy is not known.

a 32 **τῆς παρ' αὐτοῖς δημοκρατίας.** Megara is said to have expelled the tyrant Theagenes about B. C. 600.

οἱ ἐκ Σικελίας, the Megarians of Megara Hyblaea—literally, the 1448^{a} 32
Megarians 'on the Sicilian side'. For this use of the preposition comp. Pol. 8. 7, 1341^{b} 28 *οἱ ἐκ φιλοσοφίας*, 'those on the philosophic side'.

Ἐπίχαρμος. In 5, 1449^{b} 6 he and Phormis are said to have ^{a} 33
been the first to discard the Comedy of personalities; so that from this point of view he was the forerunner of the New Comedy, i. e. of what Aristotle regards as Comedy proper. Plato had already given him the premier place in Comedy: Theaet. 152 E *τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἑκατέρας, κωμῳδίας μὲν Ἐπίχαρμος, τραγῳδίας δὲ Ὅμηρος.* The Sicilian origin of Comedy is often asserted by post-Aristotelian writers: Theocritus Ep. 17. 1 *ὁ τὰν κωμῳδίαν εὑρὼν Ἐπίχαρμος.*—Solinus 5. 13 *Hic* [scil. *in Sicilia*] *primum inventa comoedia.*—Themistius Or. 27, 406 Dind. *καὶ κωμῳδία τὸ παλαιὸν ἤρξατο μὲν ἀπὸ Σικελίας· ἐκεῖθεν γὰρ ἤστην Ἐπίχαρμός τε καὶ Φόρμις* [see on 5, 1449^{b} 6]· *κάλλιον δὲ Ἀθήναζε συνηυξήθη.*—Prol. de Comoedia 3 = Kaibel CGF. 1 p. 7 *Ἐπίχαρμος· οὗτος πρῶτος τὴν κωμῳδίαν διερριμμένην ἀνεκτήσατο πολλὰ προσφιλοτεχνήσας.*—Suidas *Ἐπίχαρμος*: *εὗρε τὴν κωμῳδίαν ἐν Συρακούσαις ἅμα Φόρμῳ.* The whole question has been discussed by Bentley, Wks. 1 p. 251 Dyce, and by Welcker, Kl. Schr. 1 p. 273.

Χιωνίδου καὶ Μάγνητος. From this mention of them here, as ^{a} 34
also from the allusion to them further on, in 5, 1449^{b} 3, it is clear that Aristotle knows of no Attic writers of Comedy earlier than Chionides and Magnes; and even these apparently are mere names to him (see on 5, 1449^{b} 4). The comedies usually ascribed to them (Kock, CAF. 1 pp. 4–9) were no doubt the work of a much later age (comp. Wilamowitz, l. c. p. 335). As regards Chionides, his appearance as a comic poet has been placed as early as B.C. 487 on the strength of the statement in Suidas: *Χιωνίδης, Ἀθηναῖος, κωμικὸς τῆς ἀρχαίας κωμῳδίας· ὃν καὶ λέγουσι πρωταγωνιστὴν γενέσθαι τῆς ἀρχαίας κωμῳδίας, διδάσκειν δὲ ἔτεσιν ὀκτὼ πρὸ τῶν Περσικῶν.* Magnes, who is known from an inscription (694 Dittenberger^{2}) to have been exhibiting a play at the city Dionysia in or shortly after B.C. 464 (v. Bergk, Kl. Schr. 2 p. 475), is expressly described by Suidas as a much younger man than Epicharmus: *ἐπιβάλλει δ' Ἐπιχάρμῳ νέος πρεσβύτῃ.* The chronology of the life of Epicharmus is beset with difficulties. He is said to have lived to a very great age (90, or even 97), and to have 'flourished' at the time of Gelo and Hiero, the tyrants of Syracuse (B.C. 485–467); we may very well suppose him, however,

1448 a 34 to have written comedies before this period, as also to have lived beyond its limits. Suidas' statement that he was producing comedies at Syracuse six years before the Persian war (i. e. in B. C. 485: comp. Clinton FH. 2^3 p. 31), when 'Euetes, Euxenides, and Myllus were performing at Athens' (*ἦν δὲ πρὸ τῶν Περσικῶν ἔτη ἓξ διδάσκων ἐν Συρακούσαις· ἐν δὲ Ἀθήναις Εὐέτης καὶ Εὐξενίδης καὶ Μύλλος ἐπεδείκνυντο*), is of some importance, as showing that Epicharmus was conceived to be coeval with a generation at Athens anterior to Chionides and the regular drama which began with him (comp. Usener, Rh. Mus. 28 p. 423). There is no very serious difference, therefore, between Suidas and Aristotle as to the priority of Epicharmus.

καὶ τῆς τραγῳδίας = *τῆς δὲ τραγῳδίας*. Vahlen illustrates the change of construction by Soph. el. 11, 171 b 8 *συλλογισμὸς ἐριστικὸς καὶ σοφιστικός ἐστιν εἷς μὲν ὁ φαινόμενος συλλογισμός . . . καὶ ὅσοι μὴ ὄντες κτέ.*—where *καὶ ὅσοι* seems to stand for *ἕτεροι δὲ ὅσοι*; comp. also Hartung, Lehre v. d. Partikeln 2 p. 410. It would be a very simple alteration, and an improvement to the sense, to read *καὶ τῆς τραγῳδίας* ⟨*δ'*⟩ *ἔνιοι* (J. of Phil. 10 p. 67).

ἔνιοι, i.e. the Sicyonians: Herod. 5. 67 *τά τε δὴ ἄλλα οἱ Σικυώνιοι ἐτίμων τὸν Ἄδρηστον καὶ δὴ πρὸς τὰ πάθεα αὐτοῦ τραγικοῖσι χοροῖσι ἐγέραιρον, τὸν μὲν Διόνυσον οὐ τιμῶντες, τὸν δὲ Ἄδρηστον.*—Themistius Or. 27, 406 Dind. *καὶ τραγῳδίας εὑρεταὶ μὲν Σικυώνιοι, τελεσιουργοὶ δὲ Ἀττικοὶ ποιηταί.*—Suidas: *Θέσπις, Ἰκαρίου πόλεως Ἀττικῆς, τραγικὸς ἑκκαιδέκατος ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου γενομένου τραγῳδιοποιοῦ Ἐπιγένους τοῦ Σικυωνίου τιθέμενος, ὡς δέ τινες, δεύτερος μετὰ Ἐπιγένην· ἄλλοι δὲ αὐτὸν πρῶτον τραγικὸν γενέσθαι φασίν* (comp. also Suid. s.v. *Οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν Διόνυσον*). On Epigenes see Bentley, Wks. 1 p. 286 Dyce, and Bernhardy, Gr. Litt. 1^5 p. 430.

a 36 **περιοικίδας**: Pol. 6. 5, 1320 b 6 *ἀεὶ γάρ τινας ἐκπέμποντες τοῦ δήμου πρὸς τὰς περιοικίδας ποιοῦσιν εὐπόρους.* As understood at Athens the term *κώμη* meant a quarter of the city, as distinct from the outlying townships (*δῆμοι*): Plato Laws 746 D *φρατρίας καὶ δήμους καὶ κώμας.*—Isocrates 149 A *διελόμενοι τὴν μὲν πόλιν κατὰ κώμας τὴν δὲ χώραν κατὰ δήμους* (v. also Photius Lex. s. v. *κώμην*, and Suidas s. v. with the commentators).

a 37 **κωμῳδοὺς . . . ἀπὸ τοῦ κωμάζειν.** The connexion is indirectly implied in the juxtaposition of the two words in the law cited (or interpolated) in Demosthenes 21. 10 *ἡ πομπὴ καὶ οἱ παῖδες καὶ ὁ κῶμος καὶ οἱ κωμῳδοὶ καὶ οἱ τραγῳδοί.*

b 1 **καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν κτέ.** The argument comes practically to this:

'Plays confessedly represent *actions*: now if they had been originally 1448 b 1
an Athenian invention, one would expect them to have been called *πράγματα* rather than *δράματα*; *πράττειν* being the ordinary Athenian word for *to act.*' That Aristotle does not accept this view of *δρᾶν* and *πράττειν* is indirectly shown by his own use of the words. He has just said (a 27) *πράττοντας καὶ δρῶντας*, and in his definition of Tragedy (6, 1449 b 26) his word is *δρώντων*, though he might easily have said *πραττόντων*.

τῆς μιμήσεως is the genitive after *τῶν διαφορῶν*. Vahlen illus- b 3
trates the order by Plato, Phil. 17 C *ἐπειδὰν λάβῃς τὰ διαστήματα ὁπόσα ἐστὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῆς φωνῆς*.

ἐοίκασι. Setting aside the antiquarian questions raised in b 4
chap. 3, Aristotle asserts that the birth of poetry was due to large natural causes. The origin of poetry generally (*γεννῆσαι μὲν ὅλως*) is attributable to the imitative instinct in all men. The origin of the two great kinds of poetry (*διεσπάσθη δὲ* b 24), of which Tragedy and Comedy were the ultimate developments, is attributable to the personal tendencies and differences of character in the individual poets (*τὰ οἰκεῖα ἤθη* b 24).

αἰτίαι δύο. The two causes are those mentioned in the immediate context, *τὸ μιμεῖσθαι* (a 5) and *τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι* (a 8). These Aristotle regards as two distinguishable facts in human nature; it will be observed too that he proves the second point by a formal argument, which he has not thought necessary to do in the case of the first. *τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι*, instead of coming in as a mere afterthought after *τὸ μιμεῖσθαι*, involves a different idea, and relates to a different class of persons—the public interested in works of art, as distinct from the artists who produce them. Aristotle is perfectly aware that the cultivation of an art implies not only artists but also a public to accept and reward their work (comp. Teichmüller, Aristot. Forsch. 2 p. 203).

μιμητικώτατον: Probl. 30. 6, 956 a 14 *Διὰ τί ἀνθρώπῳ πειστέον* b 7
μᾶλλον ἢ ἄλλῳ ζῴῳ; . . . ἢ ὅτι μιμητικώτατον; μανθάνειν γὰρ δύναται διὰ τοῦτο. Vahlen illustrates this use of the neuter singular by De somn. 3, 457 b 24 *καταπίπτουσι . . . οἱ ἄνθρωποι, μόνον γὰρ ὀρθὸν τῶν ζῴων*, and Pol. 1. 2, 1253 a 16 *τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς τἆλλα ζῷα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἴδιον, τὸ μόνον ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ . . . αἴσθησιν ἔχειν*.

μαθήσεις: Quintilian 10. 2, 1 *Neque enim dubitari potest quin artis pars magna contineatur imitatione. nam ut invenire primum fuit estque praecipuum, sic ea quae bene inventa sunt utile sequi. atque omnis vitae ratio sic constat, ut quae probamus in aliis facere*

1448 b 7 *ipsi velimus. sic litterarum ductus, ut scribendi fiat usus, pueri sequuntur; sic musici vocem docentium, pictores opera priorum, rustici probatam experimento culturam in exemplum intuentur; omnis denique disciplinae initia ad propositum sibi praescriptum formari videmus.*

b 9 **σημεῖον.** A *σημεῖον* is that which proves or confirms a proposition; an *αἴτιον*, something that explains or gives a reason for it. Aristotle defines a *σημεῖον* in An. pr. 2. 27, 70 a 7 *σημεῖον δὲ βούλεται εἶναι πρότασις ἀποδεικτικὴ ἀναγκαία ἢ ἔνδοξος· οὗ γὰρ ὄντος ἔστιν ἢ οὗ γενομένου πρότερον ἢ ὕστερον γέγονε τὸ πρᾶγμα, τοῦτο σημεῖόν ἐστι τοῦ γεγονέναι ἢ εἶναι* (comp. Bon. Ind. 677 b 1).

b 10 **ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων**: 're ipsa' (Tyrwhitt; v. Bon. Ind. 286 a 43 and Schwegler on Metaph. A 3, 984 a 12). *τῶν ἔργων* here is often rendered by 'works of art' ('in operibus opificum', Victorius).

ἃ γὰρ αὐτὰ λυπηρῶς ὁρῶμεν: Rhet. 1. 11, 1371 b 4 *ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ μανθάνειν τε ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ θαυμάζειν, καὶ τὰ τοιάδε ἀνάγκη ἡδέα εἶναι οἷον τό τε μεμιμημένον* [*μιμητικόν* Vet. Vers.], *ὥσπερ γραφικὴ καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιία καὶ ποιητική, καὶ πᾶν ὃ ἂν εὖ μεμιμημένον ᾖ, κἂν ᾖ μὴ ἡδὺ αὐτὸ τὸ μεμιμημένον· οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ χαίρει, ἀλλὰ συλλογισμός ἐστιν ὅτι τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο, ὥστε μανθάνειν τι συμβαίνει.*—De part. an. 1. 5, 645 a 11 *καὶ γὰρ ἂν εἴη παράλογον καὶ ἄτοπον, εἰ τὰς μὲν εἰκόνας αὐτῶν* [i.e. *τῶν ζῴων τῶν μὴ κεχαρισμένων*] *θεωροῦντες χαίρομεν ὅτι τὴν δημιουργήσασαν τέχνην συνθεωροῦμεν, οἷον τὴν γραφικὴν ἢ τὴν πλαστικήν, αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν φύσει συνεστώτων μὴ μᾶλλον ἀγαπῷμεν τὴν θεωρίαν, δυνάμενοί γε τὰς αἰτίας καθορᾶν. διὸ δεῖ μὴ δυσχεραίνειν παιδικῶς τὴν περὶ τῶν ἀτιμοτέρων ζῴων ἐπίσκεψιν.* Plutarch also (De aud. poet. 18 A; Qu. conv. 5. 1, 674 A) has a good deal to say on this point.

b 12 **ἀτιμοτάτων**: De anima 1. 2, 404 b 3 *ἐν ἅπασι γὰρ ὑπάρχειν αὐτὸν* [i.e. *νοῦν*] *τοῖς ζῴοις, καὶ μεγάλοις καὶ μικροῖς καὶ τιμίοις καὶ ἀτιμοτέροις.*—De part. an. 1. 5, 645 a 15 (see on b 10).

b 13 **καὶ τοῦτο.** For the conjunction comp. 13, 1453 a 17 *σημεῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ γιγόμενον.*—De somno 3, 456 b 28 *σημεῖον δὲ τούτων καὶ τὰ ὑπνωτικά.*—Meteor. 2. 8, 367 a 11 *τεκμήριον δ' ἐστὶ . . . καὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον.*—Xenoph. An. 1. 9. 29 *τεκμήριον δὲ τούτου καὶ τόδε.*

b 16 **θεωροῦντας μανθάνειν**: comp. Rhet. l. c., and Plato Rep. 475 D *οἱ . . . φιλοθεάμονες πάντες ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσι τῷ καταμανθάνειν χαίροντες τοιοῦτοι εἶναι.* Belger (De Aristotele etiam in Arte Poetica componenda Platonis discipulo p. 45) finds some further traces of Plato in this portion of the Poetics. Our pleasure in the contemplation of a picture or other work of imitative art is explained here

to be the natural concomitant of an intellectual act, the discovery or recognition on our part of the meaning of the picture (comp. Probl. 19. 5, 918^a 3). 1448^b 16

οὐχ ᾗ. *οὐχὶ* for *οὐχ ᾗ* is found in K^b in Eth. N. 8. 12, 1161^a 1, and in D (the Marcianus) in An. post. 1. 23, 84^b 8. ^{b} 18

κατὰ φύσιν δὲ ὄντος ἡμῖν τοῦ μιμεῖσθαι. This has been supposed to stand somewhat loosely for the two things previously mentioned, *τὸ μιμεῖσθαι* and *τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι*; but a little reflexion will show that Aristotle has not fallen into any such inexactness of language. What he is now considering is the evolution of the poet; and he tells us that the imitative aptitude of the poet is only a higher and more developed form of that natural aptitude for imitation which is common to all mankind. There is no reason why he should also remind us at this point of the naturalness of the pleasure that we derive from poetry and other kinds of imitation. ^{b} 20

καὶ τῆς ἁρμονίας καὶ τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ seem to be added as an afterthought, in recognition of the historical connexion between music and poetry. Except in its lyric forms, however, poetry was now no longer combined with music; in Aristotle's view, also, even metre is at the most only one of its accidents (1, 1447^b 11). A very different view has been taken of these words by Tyrwhitt and Vahlen—and long before their time by Averroes and Sigonius (Emend. p. 152)—who suppose harmony and rhythm to be the second of the *αἰτίαι δύο φυσικαί* mentioned in the early part of the chapter (^{b} 5). There are two objections to this interpretation: (1) it ignores the significance of the distinction between *τὸ μιμεῖσθαι* and *τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι* (v. on ^{b} 4); and (2) if *τῆς ἁρμονίας καὶ τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ* are to bear this emphasis, one would expect them to be brought in in a less incidental way, and with a reason of some sort to justify the position ascribed to them. As the matter is in Aristotle's opinion of such secondary importance, he does not stop to show that our sense of harmony and rhythm is natural, or to explain how it has come to be natural to us (comp. Probl. 19. 38, 920^b 29). Metre is said to be a mode of rhythm in Rhet. 3. 8, 1408^b 28, *ὁ δὲ τοῦ σχήματος τῆς λέξεως ἀριθμὸς ῥυθμός ἐστιν, οὗ καὶ τὰ μέτρα τμητά* [*? τμήματα*]. On the difference between them see Cicero Orator 67, Quintilian 9. 4, 45, and Schol. Hephaest. p. 144 Gaisf.

ἐξ ἀρχῆς is much the same thing as *ἐν ἀρχῇ* (Eucken, Sprachgebr. p. 10). If it may be taken not with *ἐγέννησαν* but with the ^{b} 22

1448 b 22 participle, the antithesis between ἐξ ἀρχῆς πεφυκότες and προάγοντες will be not unlike that in Metaph. A 2, 982 b 13 ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν τὰ πρόχειρα τῶν ἀπόρων θαυμάσαντες, εἶτα κατὰ μικρὸν οὕτω προϊόντες καὶ περὶ τῶν μειζόνων διαπορήσαντες.

αὐτὰ: loosely used for 'their work' or 'performances'; it anticipates what is termed in the next line 'their improvisations'. προάγειν is here (and again in 4, 1449 a 13) a transitive verb; in the Aristotelian passages in which it seems to be intransitive (= προϊέναι) an object can generally be supplied without difficulty from the context (comp. Bon. Ind. 633 b 10). The meaning of the word in the present context is to 'advance', or 'carry a stage further' (comp. Plato Polit. 262 c), as may be seen from the parallel in Soph. el. 33, 183 b, in which the gradual progress or advance of Rhetoric and other arts is described: οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἀρχὰς εὑρόντες παντελῶς ἐπὶ μικρόν τι προήγαγον· οἱ δὲ νῦν εὐδοκιμοῦντες παραλαβόντες παρὰ πολλῶν οἷον ἐκ διαδοχῆς κατὰ μέρος προαγαγόντων οὕτως ηὐξήκασιν.

b 23 **αὐτοσχεδιασμάτων.** On the verb αὐτοσχεδιάζειν = 'to speak off-hand, without premeditation or previous study' see Ernesti, Lex. techn. gr. s.v. The fact is described in the Homeric Hymn to Hermes 54 θεὸς δ' ὑπὸ καλὸν ἄειδεν, ἐξ αὐτοσχεδίης πειρώμενος, ἠύτε κοῦροι ἡβηταὶ θαλίῃσι παραιβόλα κερτομέουσιν, ἀμφὶ Δία Κρονίδην καὶ Μαιάδα καλλιπέδιλον. A similar view of the origin of poetry is implied in Quintilian 9. 4, 114 *poema nemo dubitaverit imperito quodam initio fusum et aurium mensura et similiter decurrentium spatiorum observatione esse generatum, mox in eo repertos pedes.*—Maximus Tyr. 37. 4 Ἀθηναίοις δὲ ἡ μὲν παλαιὰ μοῦσα χοροὶ παίδων ἦσαν καὶ ἀνδρῶν, γῆς ἐργάται κατὰ δήμους ἱστάμενοι . . . ᾄσματα ᾄδοντες αὐτοσχέδια (comp. on 4, 1449 a 9, and Bentley, Wks. I p. 250 Dyce). The phallic-song, in which Aristotle finds the germ of Comedy, was sometimes described as an ᾠδὴ αὐτοσχέδιος (see on 4, 1449 a 12).

b 24 **διεσπάσθη δὲ** corresponds with the γεννῆσαι μὲν ὅλως in b 4.

κατὰ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἤθη: comp. Plato Rep. 396 c sqq.

b 25 **τὰς καλὰς . . . πράξεις καὶ τὰς τῶν τοιούτων.** As Düntzer (Rettung der aristotelischen Poetik p. 129) and Bernays (Zwei Abh. p. 28) have shown, this is not a tautology, as the actions of those who are καλοὶ (τῶν τοιούτων) are not always καλαὶ πράξεις; comp. Plato Rep. 396 c μάλιστα μὲν μιμούμενος τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀσφαλῶς τε καὶ ἐμφρόνως πράττοντα, ἐλάττω δὲ καὶ ἧττον ἢ ὑπὸ νόσων ἢ ὑπὸ ἐρώτων ἐσφαλμένον ἢ καὶ ὑπὸ μέθης ἤ τινος ἄλλης ξυμφορᾶς.

ψόγους has the same concrete sense of 'invectives' in Plato Laws 829 C *ἐγκώμιά τε καὶ ψόγους ποιεῖν.* The earliest, as well as the most eminent representative of this kind of literature, was Archilochus, the *ψογερὸς Ἀρχίλοχος βαρυλόγοις ἔχθεσιν πιαινόμενος* of Pindar (Pyth. 2. 100). 1448^{b} 27

ὕμνους καὶ ἐγκώμια: Plato Rep. 607 A *ὕμνους θεοῖς καὶ ἐγκώμια τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς.*—Etym. Gud. s. v. *ὕμνος*: *Ὕμνος ἐγκωμίου διαφέρει καθὸ ὁ μὲν ὕμνος ἐπὶ θεοῦ λέγεται τὸ δὲ ἐγκώμιον ἐπὶ ἀνθρώπου.* On hymns and encomia as very primitive forms of Greek poetry see Bergk, Gr. Litt. 1 p. 423.

εἰκὸς δὲ εἶναι πολλούς, scil. *τοιούτους*; comp. Goulston's version, 'verisimile autem est, qui talia condiderint, extitisse multos.' Aristotle says this because he thinks that even in those days the baser sort (*οἱ εὐτελέστεροι* ^{b}26) were probably in a majority; he has no romantic illusions as to the superiority of the men of an earlier age (Pol. 2. 8, 1269^{a} 5). On the pre-Homeric poets, to whom Aristotle refers, comp. Sextus Emp. Adv. math. 1. 204 *οὐχ ὑπὸ πάντων ὁμολογεῖται ποιητὴς ἀρχαιότατος εἶναι Ὅμηρος· ἔνιοι γὰρ Ἡσίοδον προήκειν τοῖς χρόνοις λέγουσιν, Λίνον τε καὶ Ὀρφέα καὶ Μουσαῖον καὶ ἄλλους παμπληθεῖς*: see also Bernhardy Gr. Litt. 1^{5} p. 308. Aristotle, however, was quite aware that the writings which bore the names of these legendary poets were not really by them (H. A. 6. 6, 563^{a} 18; see Bernays, Dialoge d. Aristot. p. 95). ^{b}29

ἐκείνου ὁ Μαργίτης: Eustratius on Eth. N. 6. 7, 1141^{a} 14 (p. 320 Heylb.) *παράγει . . . καί τινα ποίησιν Μαργίτην ὀνομαζομένην Ὁμήρου. μνημονεύει δ' αὐτῆς οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ ποιητικῆς ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἀρχίλοχος καὶ Κρατῖνος καὶ Καλλίμαχος ἐν τῷ ἐπιγράμματι καὶ μαρτυροῦσιν εἶναι Ὁμήρου τὸ ποίημα.* On the Margites, which Aristotle thus attributes to Homer, see Kinkel, EGF. p. 64. This statement in the Poetics does not throw any light on the question of the original form of the Margites, whether the iambic lines in it were a primitive part of the poem, or subsequently added by Pigres (see Goettling, Op. Acad. p. 167, and Hiller, N. Jahrb. f. Phil. 1887 p. 13 for a discussion of it); it stands in a parenthesis, and must not be taken in any direct connexion with the *ἐν οἷς . . . ἰαμβεῖον ἦλθε μέτρον* that follows. ^{b}30

καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα refers to writings more or less like the Margites by post-Homeric poets—not to other minor poems of a light order attributable to Homer himself, as Bergk (Gr. Litt. 1 p. 775) suggests.

1448 b 30 **ἐν οἷς** = ἐν δὲ τούτοις, scil. τοῖς ψόγοις, the relative beginning a new sentence, as in 24, 1459 b 12 οἷς ἅπασιν.—Phys. 8. 3, 253 b 12 πρὸς οὓς . . . οὐ χαλεπὸν ἀπαντῆσαι.—Metaph. Θ 3, 1046 b 33 οἷς τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἄτοπα οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν.—Λ 8, 1074 b 8 ὧν εἴ τις χωρίσας αὐτὸ λάβοι μόνον τὸ πρῶτον.

κατὰ τὸ ἁρμόττον: 17, 1455 b 10 κατὰ τὸ εἰκός.—Rhet. 1. 1, 1355 a 22 and 9, 1367 b 12 κατὰ τὸ προσῆκον (opposed to παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον).—Eth. N. 4. 6, 1123 a 20 παρὰ τὸ δέον. The reading of the Aldine (and of Parisinus 2038), καὶ τὸ ἁρμόττον, has been accepted by Bon. Ind. 357 b 48.

b 31 **ἦλθε**: the verb has the same sense in Eth. N. 5. 8, 1133 a 20 ἐφ' ὃ τὸ νόμισμα ἐλήλυθε.—Pol. 1. 9, 1258 a 6 τὸ ἕτερον εἶδος τῆς χρηματιστικῆς διὰ τοῦτ' ἐλήλυθεν.

ἰαμβεῖον καλεῖται: Strabo 422 Cas. ὁ μὲν (scil. ὁ δάκτυλος) ὕμνοις ἐστὶν οἰκεῖος ὁ δ' ἴαμβος κακισμοῖς.—Proclus Chrestom. 7, p. 346 Gaisf. τὸν ἴαμβον τάττεσθαι μὲν ἐπὶ λοιδορίας τὸ παλαιόν· καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἰαμβίζειν κατά τινα γλῶσσαν λοιδορεῖν ἔλεγον . . . ἔοικε δὲ ὁ ἴαμβος τὸ μὲν παλαιὸν ἐπὶ τῶν εἰς ψόγον καὶ ἔπαινον γραφομένων ὁμοίως λέγεσθαι· ἐπεὶ δέ τινες ἐπλεόνασαν ἐν ταῖς κακολογίαις τὸ μέτρον, ἐκεῖθεν τὸ ἰαμβίζειν εἰς τὸ ὑβρίζειν ὑπὸ τῆς συνηθείας ἐκπεσεῖν.—Schol. Hephaest. 6, p. 182 Gaisf. ἐκλήθη δὲ ἴαμβος, ἀφ' οὗ τὸ μέτρον παρονομάζεται ἰαμβικόν, ἐπείπερ οἱ ὑβρίζειν καὶ λοιδορεῖν τινὰς βουλόμενοι τούτῳ ἐχρῶντο τῷ μέτρῳ· ἰαμβίζειν γὰρ ἔλεγον οἱ παλαιοὶ τὸ ὑβρίζειν.—Suetonii Reliq. p. 19 Reiff. *Iambus est carmen maledicum . . . appellatum est autem* π α ρ ὰ τ ὸ ἰ α μ β ί ζ ε ι ν, *quod est maledicere.*

b 33 **τῶν παλαιῶν**. The reference is apparently to Homer and Archilochus, as the first and greatest representatives of the two great directions in poetry; comp. Velleius Paterc. 1. 5 *Neque quenquam alium, cuius operis primus auctor fuerit, in eo perfectissimum praeter Homerum et Archilochum reperiemus.*—Dio Chrysost. Or. 33, p. 5 R. δύο γὰρ ποιητῶν γεγονότων ἐξ ἅπαντος τοῦ αἰῶνος, οἷς οὐδένα τῶν ἄλλων συμβάλλειν ἄξιον, Ὁμήρου τε καὶ Ἀρχιλόχου, τούτων Ὅμηρος μὲν σχεδὸν πάντα ἐνεκωμίασε . . . Ἀρχίλοχος δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν ἐναντίαν ἧκε [fort. ᾖξε], τὸ ψέγειν. Their pre-eminence is implied in the juxtaposition of the two names in Heraclitus fr. 119 (42 Diels), τόν τε Ὅμηρον ἔφασκεν ἄξιον ἐκ τῶν ἀγώνων ἐκβάλλεσθαι καὶ ῥαπίζεσθαι καὶ Ἀρχίλοχον ὁμοίως.

b 34 **τὰ σπουδαῖα . . . ποιητής**: comp. Plato Apol. 18 B τὰ μετέωρα φροντιστής.

b 35 **οὐχ ὅτι εὖ**, scil. ἐποίησεν. Homer 'wrote well', as a master of

the art of poetic expression (comp. 24, 1459 b 16; 1460 b 1); his poems are 'imitations', or pictures of human life, which distinguishes them from those of Empedocles and others (comp. 1, 1447 b 15); and they are moreover 'dramatic imitations', i.e. not unlike those in the Drama (comp. 24, 1460 a 5). In this way, then, Aristotle intimates that Homer not only dealt with the same kind of subject as Tragedy (*τὰ σπουδαῖα*), but also anticipated the dramatic manner. 1448 b 35

σχήματα . . . ὑπέδειξεν, 'marked out for us the great outlines of Comedy'. *σχῆμα* has the same sense in 5, 1449 b 3, and in Plato Laws 5, 737 D *σχήματος ἕνεκα καὶ ὑπογραφῆς*. For the use of *ὑπέδειξε* comp. Rhet. 3. 2, 1404 b 25 *ὅπερ Εὐριπίδης ποιεῖ καὶ ὑπέδειξε πρῶτος*.—Ath. Pol. 41 *Ἀριστείδης μὲν ὑπέδειξεν, Ἐφιάλτης δ' ἐπετέλεσεν*.—Isocrates 268 A *ταῦτα πράττοντες καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑποδεικνύοντες*. b 36

οὐ ψόγον ἀλλὰ τὸ γελοῖον δραματοποιήσας. The sense is that, when Homer passed from *σπουδαῖα* to *φαῦλα*, his treatment of the latter was more akin to that in the comic poets than to that in the *ἰαμβοποιοί*; Margites with him was only ridiculous—not vicious or held up to obloquy as vicious, as a writer of *ψόγοι* would have made him. A *ψόγος* dwells on some serious vice of character; whereas Comedy, as Aristotle conceives it, deals only with those lesser faults which we are able to laugh at (see on 5, 1449 a 33). This view of the Margites is not quite in harmony with that in 4, 1448 b 30, where it is regarded as a *ψόγος*, the first known instance of the kind. b 37

With *οὐ ψόγον* Vahlen supplies *ποιήσας* from the *δραματοποιήσας* that follows. This is legitimate enough, but hardly necessary, as *δραματοποιεῖν*, 'to write, or describe, as a dramatist would' (see on 22, 1458 b 9) is just as applicable to *ψόγον* as it is to *τὸ γελοῖον* (comp. Tyrwhitt's rendering 'non vituperium sed ridiculum dramatice exprimens'). The meaning Aristotle attaches to it may be seen from *μιμήσεις δραματικὰς ἐποίησεν* in b 35 (v. ad loc.).

ὥσπερ Ἰλιὰς καὶ ἡ Ὀδύσσεια. Vahlen illustrates this insertion of the article before *Ὀδύσσεια* by De resp. 17, 478 b 28 *ἔστι δὲ θάνατος καὶ ἡ φθορὰ πᾶσιν ὁμοίως τοῖς μὴ ἀτελέσιν*, and Rhet. 3. 13, 1414 b 13 *ἔσται οὖν . . . διήγησις ἕτερον καὶ ἡ ἐπιδιήγησις καὶ προδιήγησις*, and a number of other passages in Aristotle (comp. also Riddell, Digest of Idioms § 240 G). On the other hand Spengel would restore the article before *Ἰλιὰς* on account of its appearance in the parallel in 26, 1462 b 8 *ὥσπερ ἡ Ἰλιὰς ἔχει πολλὰ τοιαῦτα* b 38

1448 b 38 *μέρη καὶ ἡ Ὀδύσσεια* (comp. also 24, 1459 b 14 *ἡ μὲν Ἰλιὰς . . . ἡ δὲ Ὀδύσσεια*). There is as a rule nothing exceptional or anomalous in Aristotle's usage in reference to the article with the titles of books. He is apt to omit it, just as Athenaeus does, when the title is given in the actual form which it would have as the heading of a MS. (comp. Apollonius Synt. 1, 26), after the preposition *ἐν*. The Poetics supply a number of examples of this usage, e.g. 16, 1455 a 2 *ἐν Ἀλκίνου ἀπολόγῳ*.—24, 1460 a 35 *τὰ ἐν Ὀδυσσείᾳ ἄλογα*.—14, 1454 a 1 *ἐν Ἀντιγόνῃ*.—16, 1455 a 4 *ἐν Χοηφόροις*.—24, 1460 a 31 *ἐν Ἠλέκτρᾳ*.—a 32 *ἐν Μυσοῖς*.—25, 1461 b 21 *ἐν Ὀρέστῃ*. In 24, 1460 a 30, however, the traditional text omits the article with a title in the nominative; for it is clear that *Οἰδίπους* in this place means the Oedipus Tyrannus, in the same way as with us 'Hamlet' may mean the play, not the person. In many places in which the article is omitted, the title is used in a general sense as a common noun; thus in Soph. el. 24, 180 a 21 *δός μοι Ἰλιάδα* means 'give me an Iliad' (i.e. a copy of the Iliad). Instances of this in the Poetics are 8, 1451 a 20 *Ἡρακληίδα Θησηίδα*, 'a Heracleid, a Theseid'.—a 24 *Ὀδύσσειαν*, 'an Odyssey'.—23, 1459 b 3 *Ἰλιάδος καὶ Ὀδυσσείας*, 'a poem like the Iliad or Odyssey'.—b 4 *Κυπρίων*, 'a poem like the *Κύπρια*'. I am inclined to think, therefore, that Spengel was right in suggesting *ὥσπερ ⟨ἡ⟩ Ἰλιάς* in the present passage; and also that in 24, 1460 a 30 the true reading must be *ὥσπερ ⟨ὁ⟩ Οἰδίπους*.

1449 a 3 **ἑκατέραν τὴν ποίησιν** recalls the distinction drawn in 4, 1448 b 24 between the two great forms of poetry, the higher and the lower.

κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν: 4, 1448 b 24 *κατὰ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἤθη*.

a 4 **ἀντὶ τῶν ἰάμβων κωμῳδοποιοὶ ἐγένοντο**. Vahlen compares De part. an. 2. 13, 657 b 34 *ἀντὶ ταύτης τῆς φυλακῆς πάντα σκληρόφθαλμά ἐστιν*, and Herod. 7. 62 *ἀντὶ τῶν πίλων μιτρηφόροι ἦσαν*.

a 7 **ἔχει . . . τοῖς εἴδεσιν ἱκανῶς**. For the dative comp. Meteor. 1. 3, 339 b 5 *πῶς ἔχει τάξει πρὸς τἆλλα*.—De anima 2. 3, 414 b 33 *τῷ ἐφεξῆς οὕτως ἔχουσι*.

For the sense of *εἴδεσιν* in this passage, Vahlen (Beitr. 1 p. 22) compares that of *σχήματα* in the account of Comedy in 4, 1448 b 36 and 5, 1449 b 3. *εἴδη* seems to mean the formative constituents of Tragedy, the forms it must embody in order to realize its nature in its completeness. Aristotle assumes that Tragedy has by this time attained to its natural form (a 15 *ἔσχε τὴν αὑτῆς φύσιν*); but he declines to consider the question whether there is still a possibility

of improvement in the treatment of its various formative constituents. 1449 a 7
The suggestion that the εἴδη here meant are the same as the μέρη distinguished in chap. 6, from another point of view, is due to Madius. εἶδος in the sense of a formative constituent is perhaps unique in Aristotle, but there are certainly a few instances of it in Plato Rep. iv (comp. Campbell, 2 p. 298), where the three faculties in the soul are sometimes described as εἴδη (434 D, 439 E, 440 B) and sometimes as μέρη (442 B, C). The alternative interpretation is to take εἴδη in the logical sense of 'species'. This view, though not improbable in itself (comp. 18, 1455 b 32), is hardly reconcileable with the use of εἴδη in 6, 1450 a 13 as a designation for the μέρη with which the chapter is dealing.

αὐτό τε καθ' αὑτὸ κρῖναι. On the reading here see J. of Phil. 5 a 8
p. 117. The conjunction serves to connect κρῖναι with ἐπισκοπεῖν, the second clause being complementary to the first (comp. 6, 1450 b 3). Similarly in De anima 3. 3, 427 b 15 *φαντασία γὰρ ἕτερον καὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ διανοίας· αὐτή τε οὐ γίγνεται ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ἄνευ ταύτης οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπόληψις*, the second clause (*αὐτή τε κτέ.*) is explanatory of the first. κρῖναι has been taken as an infinitive of limitation by Vahlen, who quotes H. A. 9. 38, 622 b 20 *τῶν δ' ἐντόμων ἐργατικώτατον ζῴων ἐστί, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ πρὸς τἆλλα συγκρίνεσθαι πάντα, τό τε τῶν μυρμήκων γένος καὶ τὸ τῶν μελιττῶν.* As far as I can see, an infinitive of limitation would not be quite in place in a passage like the present.

For the antithesis between καθ' αὑτὸ and πρὸς τὰ θέατρα comp. Top. 5. 1, 128 b 16 *ἀποδίδοται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον ἢ καθ' αὑτὰ καὶ ἀεὶ ἢ πρὸς ἕτερον καὶ ποτέ.*—Cat. 6, 5 b 16 *οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ μέγα λέγεται ἢ μικρόν, ἀλλὰ τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον ἀναφέρεσθαι* (comp. Bon. Ind. 212 a 2). κρίνειν has an indirect question after it in Metaph. A 4, 984 b 31 *τούτους μὲν οὖν πῶς χρὴ διανεῖμαι . . . ἐξέστω κρίνειν ὕστερον.*

γενομένης δ' οὖν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς αὐτοσχεδιαστικῆς = *γενομένη δ' οὖν ἀπ'* a 9
ἀρχῆς αὐτοσχεδιαστική. Having begun with *γενομένης . . . αὐτοσχεδιαστικῆς*, scil. *τῆς τραγῳδίας*, Aristotle sees that the same is true of Comedy, and adds a parenthesis to show that; after which he says in a 13 *ηὐξήθη*, just as though *γενομένη . . . αὐτοσχεδιαστική* had begun the clause. For another instance of a gen. abs. in lieu of a nominative see 17, 1455 b 3 (comp. Bon. Ind. 149 b 26 and Kühner, Gr. Gr.[3] 2. 2 p. 110). A parenthetical addition of very similar form is found in 5, 1449 b 12, and also (with Christ's punctuation) in Metaph. Θ 10, 1051 b 11. ἀπ' ἀρχῆς is used adverbially (comp. Pol. 7. 16, 1334 b 29, and Plato Criti. 112 E) in the same

1449 a 9 sense as ἐξ ἀρχῆς. Several of the recent editors and translators, however, accepting the reading γενομένη of certain apographs, take ἀρχῆς and αὐτοσχεδιαστικῆς together as meaning an 'improvisational beginning'. This certainly simplifies matters, but it may be doubted whether ἀρχὴ αὐτοσχεδιαστική would naturally bear that meaning.

a 11 **τῶν ἐξαρχόντων.** 'ἐξάρχειν τὸν διθύραμβον, ἢ τὰ φαλλικά, ii dicebantur qui choro utrivis canendo praeiverunt; qui, ut verisimile est, ab initio poetae ipsi fuerunt', says Tyrwhitt, quoting Archilochus (fr. 77 Bergk) ὡς Διωνύσοι' ἄνακτος καλὸν ἐξάρξαι μέλος οἶδα διθύραμβον. By the ἐξάρχων here Aristotle means the poet-composer, who supplied both words and air, and taught them to the chorus—not as is sometimes supposed, the κορυφαῖος, who was only one of the chorus (comp. Hiller, Rh. Mus. 39 p. 325). ἐξάρχειν διθύραμβον is practically a synonym for διδάσκειν διθύραμβον, the expression in Herodotus i. 23.

It is clear that Aristotle has in his own mind a general view of the historical development of early Greek poetry, but he tells us as little as possible about it—in fact no more than is absolutely necessary for present purposes. The intention of the Poetics is to give us a theory of the Epic and of the Drama (see on 1, 1447 a 8), not a treatise on the history and archaeology of the Drama. The Epic having been traced to its origin (4, 1448 b 23–33), Aristotle turns to the question of the rise and progress of the Drama. Both forms of Drama, he thinks, arose out of lyric or choral poetry. Tragedy began when the author of the dithyramb came forward with an 'improvisation', i. e. with a ῥῆσις or spoken statement, which he improvised in the interval between the two halves of the song of the chorus—that being the origin of the two great constituents of a Greek drama, a spoken part and a sung part, an actor and a chorus. This is a sufficient account of the facts; and there was no need for Aristotle to go off into a multiplicity of historical or antiquarian details. His silence on such points is no proof of his ignorance of the legendary history of Attic Tragedy. The allusion in τῶν ἐξαρχόντων in the text is probably to Thespis, whom he is known to have mentioned, in a fragment (probably of the dialogue περὶ ποιητῶν) preserved by Themistius Or. 26, 382 Dind.: οὐ προσέχομεν Ἀριστοτέλει ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὁ χορὸς εἰσιὼν ᾖδεν εἰς τοὺς θεούς, Θέσπις δὲ πρόλογόν τε καὶ ῥῆσιν ἐξεῦρεν; (comp. Heitz, Fr. Arist. 19 and Bernays, Dial. d. Aristot. p. 139). Here the 'hymn to the gods' corresponds with

the Dithyramb; and the 'prologue and speech' introduced by Thespis may be identified with the improvisations of the actor-poet, which transformed the Dithyramb into Tragedy. It is clear from Aristotle's confession of ignorance as to Comedy in 5, 1449 a 37 that he knows more of the history of Tragedy than he actually tells us, and that he is not aware of there being any serious lacuna in it (comp. Hiller, Rh. Mus. 39 p. 320). 1449 a 11

φαλλικά: Photius Lex. *Φαλλικόν· ποίημα αὐτοσχέδιον ἐπὶ τῷ φαλλῷ ᾀδόμενον.*—Hesychius *Φαλλικόν· ὄρχημά τι· οἱ δὲ μέλος· ἄλλοι ᾠδὴν αὐτοσχέδιον ἐπὶ τῷ φαλλῷ ᾀδομένην.* In these phallus-songs, which were a widespread institution in Greece (comp. Heraclitus fr. 127, and Herodotus 2, 48), Aristotle sees the origin of Comedy; it arose, he thinks, through the author of the song 'improvising' some scurrilous tale—no doubt in the interval between the parts of the song—and becoming in this way the forerunner of the single actor of the earliest form of Comedy. It will be observed that he supposes Tragedy and Comedy to have developed on exactly the same lines. A coarse and irregular Comedy, not unlike what Aristotle seems to be assuming, is known to have survived in certain parts of Greece even in post-Aristotelian times (Athenaeus 621 E sqq.).

προαγόντων: see on 4, 1448 b 22. a 13

μεταβολάς: 5, 1449 a 37 *αἱ τῆς τραγῳδίας μεταβάσεις.* a 14

ἡ τραγῳδία. The word is repeated, because Comedy is in a somewhat different position (5, 1449 a 38).

ἐπαύσατο. For the tense of the participle (misunderstood by Elmsley on Eurip. Heracl. 721) comp. An. post. 2. 1, 89 b 27 *εὑρόντες γὰρ ὅτι ἐκλείπει πεπαύμεθα.*—Meteor. 1. 3, 339 b 32 *θεωρήσαντες ἂν τὰ νῦν δεικνύμενα . . . ἴσως ἂν ἐπαύσαντο ταύτης τῆς παιδικῆς δόξης.*—De mem. 2, 453 a 24 *οὐ γὰρ ῥᾳδίως παύεται κινηθεῖσα.* a 15

φύσιν: Pol. 1. 2, 1252 b 32 *ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος ἐστίν· οἷον γὰρ ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθείσης, ταύτην φαμὲν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἑκάστου, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου ἵππου οἰκίας.* On *φύσις* in the sense of the natural form of a thing see Bon. Ind. 838 a 41.

καὶ τό τε τῶν ὑποκριτῶν πλῆθος. There is no need to assume a lacuna here (with Ueberweg). Having shown how Tragedy began with a single actor (a 11), Aristotle proceeds to note the introduction of a second, and after that, of a third actor. The increasing prominence of the actor is in his view the most significant fact in the evolution of the Drama; the other points

1449 a 15 mentioned are either of minor importance or the direct consequence of the change in the number of actors. A difficulty may perhaps be found in the language in the text, as the *καί*, with which the statement begins, cannot be taken as connecting *ἤγαγε* etc. with the *ἐπαύσατο* or the *ἔσχε τὴν αὑτῆς φύσιν* in the preceding sentence. The difficulty disappears if one observes that the emphasis there is on the participial *πολλὰς μεταβολὰς μεταβαλοῦσα* (comp. 5, 1449 b 2 *ἤδη δὲ σχήματά τινα αὐτῆς ἐχούσης*), which repeats the idea of the *κατὰ μικρὸν ηὐξήθη* in a 13. The *καί* in fact is explanatory, introducing a series of statements in support of the original assertion that Tragedy underwent many changes before attaining to its ultimate form.

ὑποκριτῶν. The actor is called a *ὑποκριτής* not (as is so often said) because he answered the chorus, but because he was the poet's spokesman, who interpreted his text to the public (see Heimsoeth, De voce *ὑποκριτής*, and Sommerbrodt, Scaenica p. 259, 289). The term must have acquired this sense at the time when, by a division of labour, the poet left the acting to others, instead of being himself the performer of his pieces, as he originally was according to Rhet. 3. 1, 1403 b 23 *ὑπεκρίνοντο γὰρ αὐτοὶ τὰς τραγῳδίας οἱ ποιηταὶ τὸ πρῶτον.* The position of the *ὑποκριτής* in fact was analogous to that of the *ῥαψῳδός*; they were both of them intermediaries, who interpreted the words of a poet to the public. It is to be noted that in describing the rhapsodist in the Ion Plato in one place terms him a *ἑρμηνεύς* and in another a *ὑποκριτής*, apparently without any difference of meaning: Ion 530 C *τὸν γὰρ ῥαψῳδὸν ἑρμηνέα δεῖ τοῦ ποιητοῦ τῆς διανοίας γίγνεσθαι τοῖς ἀκούουσι,* and 535 E *οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ θεατὴς τῶν δακτυλίων ὁ ἔσχατος . . . ὁ δὲ μέσος σὺ ὁ ῥαψῳδὸς καὶ ὑποκριτής, ὁ δὲ πρῶτος αὐτὸς ὁ ποιητής.* For the sense of the derivative *ὑποκριτική* see on 19, 1456 b 10.

a 16 **Αἰσχύλος**: comp. the Aristotelian survey of the progress of the Drama in Themistius Or. 26 p. 382 Dind. (v. on a 11): *οὐ προσέχομεν Ἀριστοτέλει ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὁ χορὸς εἰσιὼν ᾖδεν εἰς τοὺς θεούς, Θέσπις δὲ πρόλογόν τε καὶ ῥῆσιν ἐξεῦρεν, Αἰσχύλος δὲ τρίτον ὑποκριτὴν καὶ ὀκρίβαντας, τὰ δὲ πλείω τούτων Σοφοκλέους ἀπελαύσαμεν καὶ Εὐριπίδου;* There is no doubt a discrepancy between this and the statement in the text about Aeschylus, but it need not disturb us, unless we assume Aristotle to have been incapable of a change of opinion even on a small matter of learned research. Ancient opinion was divided on the point: Vita Aeschyli

(Dindorf, Poet. scen.[5] prol. p. 3): ἐχρήσατο δ' ὑποκριτῇ πρώτῳ μὲν 1449 a 16
Κλεάνδρῳ, ἔπειτα καὶ τὸν δεύτερον αὐτῷ προσῆψε Μυννίσκον τὸν Χαλκιδέα· τὸν δὲ τρίτον ὑποκριτὴν αὐτὸς ἐξεῦρεν, ὡς δὲ Δικαίαρχος ὁ Μεσσήνιος, Σοφοκλῆς·

τὸν λόγον: the portion recited or spoken, as opposed to τὰ a 17
τοῦ χοροῦ, the portion sung (τὰ ᾀδόμενα in 18, 1456 a 28); comp. the use of λόγοι in 6, 1450 b 6, 9 in the sense of the speeches or ῥήσεις in a play. Λόγος is a word with a Protean variety of meanings even in the Poetics. In 1, 1447 a 22 (etc.) it means 'language', as opposed to metre and music; in 6, 1450 b 15 'prose', as distinct from verse; in 22, 1459 a 13 an 'oration', as opposed to a poem; in 15, 1454 a 18 (comp. 19, 1456 a 37, b 6), the 'language', as distinct from the action, of the personages; in 17, 1455 b 17 (comp. a 34; 5, 1449 b 8; 24, 1460 a 27), the 'story', as distinct from its setting in the actual poem. And in 20, 1457 a 23 it is one of the technical terms of Aristotelian logic or grammar.

πρωταγωνιστὴν παρεσκεύασεν, 'made it assume the leading part a 18
in the play'. For this metaphorical use of πρωταγωνιστής comp. that of the derivative πρωταγωνιστεῖν in Pol. 8. 4, 1338 b 29 ὥστε τὸ καλὸν ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ θηριῶδες δεῖ πρωταγωνιστεῖν· οὐ γὰρ λύκος οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων θηρίων τι ἀγωνίσαιτο ἂν οὐθένα καλὸν κίνδυνον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός. Instances of this extension of meaning (which is common enough in later Greek) will be found in HSt. s.v. πρωταγωνιστής and πρωταγωνιστέω. Aristotle is apt to use technical terms of theatrical origin in their popular sense (see on 14, 1453 b 8 χορηγίας) even in a book like the Poetics.

σκηνογραφίαν: i. e. Sophocles was the first to have the screen behind the actors painted to represent the façade of a palace or a temple, or whatever else the play required as its background. The improvement here ascribed to Sophocles was sometimes attributed to Aeschylus (Sommerbrodt, Scaenica p. 142; Haigh, Attic Th.[3] p. 181).

ἔτι δὲ τὸ μέγεθος: comp. a 28 ἔτι δὲ ἐπεισοδίων πλήθη. τὸ μέγεθος a 19
is apparently a nominative *extra structuram*, like an item in an inventory. There are some fairly well-established instances of this anomalous use of the nominative (Bon. Ind. 46 b 41; Meisterhans, Gr.[3] p. 203; Kühner, Gr. Gr.[3] 2. 1 p. 45). τὸ μέγεθος = its magnitude, or extent, i. e. the length now usual in Tragedy. The word, however, is not always a purely neutral term; as the opposite of μικρότης (comp. the ἐκ μικρῶν μύθων in the context), it may very well mean a 'considerable length' (or 'size'), so as to suggest an

1449^{a} 19 idea of the importance or dignity of the object; comp. Eth. N. 4. 4, 1122^{b} 32 *μέγεθος ἔχει καὶ ἀξίωμα.*—Pol. 5, 10, 1313^{a} 7 *τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ ἀξίωμα τῆς ἀρχῆς.* The *ἀπεσεμνύνθη* in the next line shows this to be at any rate by implication the sense of *μέγεθος* in the present passage.

Aristotle evidently had in his own mind a clear and precise conception of the origin of Tragedy, though it is difficult for us to recover more than fragments of it from a statement so brief and allusive as that in the text. He merely tells us (1) that the most primitive tragedies dealt with short stories; (2) that the language of the primitive actor, instead of being serious and solemn, was sportive or jocose, and (3) in trochaics, not in iambics. By way of explanation of this last point, he adds that, as Tragedy was originally akin to the satyric drama, the language of the primitive tragic actor had still something of the rhythm of the dance about it. Aristotle's idea of the original tragic actor may possibly have been that he also was made up as a satyr (comp. Wilamowitz, Eurip. Herakles[1] 1. p. 87). He certainly mentions one characteristic of the stage-satyr, his jesting language, and seems to imply another, viz. his dance-like movements (comp. Welcker, Nachtrag zu der Schrift ü. d. Aesch. Tril. p. 337).

ἐκ μικρῶν μύθων: such as might be told, for instance, in a single act. For the asyndeton comp. 5, 1449^{b} 12; De anima 3. 2, 426^{b} 24; De sensu 3, 440^{a} 8 (*οἷον ἐνίοτε οἱ γραφῆς ποιοῦσιν· ἑτέραν χρόαν ἐφ' ἑτέραν ἐναργεστέραν ἐπαλείφουσιν*); Metaph. Θ 10, 1051^{b} 11 (ed. Christ).

^{a} 20 **ὀψὲ ἀπεσεμνύνθη**. The time meant is presumably the age of Phrynichus.

^{a} 21 **ἐκ τετραμέτρου ἰαμβεῖον ἐγένετο**: Rhet. 3. 1, 1404^{a} 30 *οἱ τὰς τραγῳδίας ποιοῦντες . . . ἐκ τῶν τετραμέτρων εἰς τὸ ἰαμβεῖον μετέβησαν διὰ τὸ τῷ λόγῳ τοῦτο τῶν μέτρων ὁμοιότατον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων.*

^{a} 23 **ὀρχηστικωτέραν**: 24, 1459^{b} 37 *τὸ δὲ ἰαμβεῖον καὶ τετράμετρον κινητικὰ καὶ τὸ μὲν ὀρχηστικὸν τὸ δὲ πρακτικόν.*—Rhet. 3. 8, 1408^{b} 32 *τῶν δὲ ῥυθμῶν ὁ μὲν ἡρῷος σεμνὸς καὶ λεκτικῆς ἁρμονίας δεόμενος, ὁ δ' ἴαμβος αὐτή ἐστιν ἡ λέξις ἡ τῶν πολλῶν· διὸ μάλιστα πάντων τῶν μέτρων ἰαμβεῖα φθέγγονται λέγοντες. δεῖ δὲ σεμνότητα γενέσθαι καὶ ἐκστῆσαι. ὁ δὲ τροχαῖος κορδακικώτερος· δηλοῖ δὲ τὰ τετράμετρα· ἔστι γὰρ ῥυθμὸς τροχαῖος τὰ τετράμετρα.*—Longinus 41. 1 *μικροποιοῦν δ' οὐδὲν οὕτως ἐν τοῖς ὑψηλοῖς ὡς ῥυθμὸς κεκλασμένος λόγου καὶ σεσοβημένος, οἷον δὴ πυρρίχιοι καὶ τροχαῖοι καὶ διχόρειοι, τέλεον εἰς ὀρχηστικὸν συνεκπίπτοντες.* *ὀρχηστικός* in this

connexion means practically μιμητικὸς ὀρχήσεως, just as ἠθικός in 1449 a 23
the Poetics (see on 6, 1450 a 29) means μιμητικὸς ἤθους. Similarly λεκτικός = μιμητικὸς λέξεως (comp. 21, 1459 a 12), πρακτικός = μιμητικὸς πράξεως, and παθητικός = μιμητικὸς πάθους.

λέξεως, 'speech' as opposed to song (comp. on 21, 1459 a 12).

αὐτὴ ἡ φύσις: 24, 1460 a 4 *αὐτὴ ἡ φύσις διδάσκει τὸ ἁρμόττον* a 24
αὐτῇ αἱρεῖσθαι.—De caelo 3. 8, 306 b 15 *ἔοικεν ἡ φύσις αὐτὴ τοῦτο σημαίνειν ἡμῖν*.—Hippocrates 3 p. 606 K. *ἀνευρίσκει ἡ φύσις αὐτὴ ἑωυτῇ τὰς ἐφόδους οὐκ ἐκ διανοίας, οἷον τὸ σκαρδαμύσσειν καὶ ἡ γλῶσσα ὑπουργέει καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· ἀπαίδευτος ἡ φύσις ἐοῦσα καὶ οὐ μαθοῦσα τὰ δέοντα ποιέει.*

λεκτικὸν: 21, 1459 a 11 *ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἰαμβείοις διὰ τὸ ὅτι μάλιστα λέξιν μιμεῖσθαι ταῦτα ἁρμόττει ὅσοις κἂν ἐν λόγοις τις χρήσαιτο.* Comp. also Rhet. 3. 1, 1404 a 30, 3. 8, 1408 b 32 (quoted on a 21 and a 23). The term is sufficiently explained by a 26 *πλεῖστα γὰρ ἰαμβεῖα λέγομεν ἐν τῇ διαλέκτῳ τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους.*

διαλέκτῳ, 'talk', 'converse', as in Plato Symp. 203 A *διὰ τούτου* a 26
πᾶσά ἐστιν ἡ ὁμιλία καὶ ἡ διάλεκτος θεοῖς πρὸς ἀνθρώπους: comp. Rhet. 3. 8, 1408 b 34 *μάλιστα πάντων τῶν μέτρων ἰαμβεῖα φθέγγονται λέγοντες*, and 3. 2, 1404 b 34 *πάντες γὰρ μεταφοραῖς διαλέγονται.* For the general meaning of διάλεκτος see on 22, 1458 b 32. Horace's *alternis aptus sermonibus* (A. P. 81) is a distant echo of this statement of Aristotle's. Cicero also observes that ordinary speech constantly falls into iambics: Orator 189 *senarios vero et Hipponacteos effugere vix possumus; magnam enim partem ex iambis nostra constat oratio.*

λεκτικῆς ἁρμονίας. ἁρμονία here seems to mean 'pitch' (τόνος) a 27
as in Rhet. 3. 1, 1403 b 31 (v. Monro, Modes of ancient Greek music p. 15). Aristoxenus recognizes a similar distinction between the musical and the conversational μέλος: *λέγεται γὰρ δὴ καὶ λογῶδές τι μέλος, τὸ συγκείμενον ἐκ τῶν προσῳδιῶν τῶν ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασιν· φυσικὸν γὰρ τὸ ἐπιτείνειν καὶ ἀνιέναι ἐν τῷ διαλέγεσθαι* (p. 24 Marquard).

ἐπεισοδίων: see on 12, 1452 b 20. a 28

ὡς ἕκαστα κοσμηθῆναι λέγεται is added to explain the main a 30
statement, *τὰ ἄλλα . . . ἔστω εἰρημένα* (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr.[3] 2. 2 p. 495). For the general form of the sentence Vahlen compares Metaph. Γ 3, 1005 b 19 *τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἅμα ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀδύνατον τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτό· καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προσδιορισαίμεθ' ἄν, ἔστω προσδιωρισμένα.*

κοσμηθῆναι = *ἐπικοσμηθῆναι.* Certain elements in a play Aris-

1449 a 30 totle dismisses as *κόσμοι*, decorative accessories rather than structural parts of the work. With this use of *κοσμεῖν* we may compare that of *ἡδύνειν* in 6, 1449 b 28 and 24, 1460 b 2, to denote the addition of accessories designed to make the work agreeable to us.

a 32 **ἡ δὲ κωμῳδία** *κτέ.* The progress of Tragedy having been sketched, the next point to be considered is the progress of Comedy (a 37–b 8). The statement is introduced by a definition (a 32–37) based on hints already given in preceding chapters as to the nature of Comedy. In 2, 1448 a 16 Comedy was said to deal with personages worse than the average man (*χείρους*, = *φαυλότεροι* in the present passage); and in 4, 1448 b 36 its subject was assumed to be *τὸ γελοῖον*. These two points Aristotle reconciles and combines in a rough provisional definition (comp. Tyrwhitt ad loc.), before proceeding to the question more immediately before him, that of the *μεταβάσεις* of Comedy. It is not necessary, therefore, to suppose this defining clause to be out of place. If we try the experiment of transferring it to another place, by putting it for instance after *λόγους καὶ μύθους* in b 8 (with Thurot), or after *ἐποποιίᾳ* in b 20 (with Vahlen, Beitr. 1 p. 48), it will be found that little or nothing is gained by this disturbance of the traditional order (comp. Teichmüller, Aristot. Forsch. 1 p. 34).

ὥσπερ εἴπομεν: in 2, 1448 a 17 and 4, 1448 b 37.

a 33 **πᾶσαν κακίαν**: Plato Rep. 490 D *ὁρᾶν αὐτῶν τοὺς μὲν ἀχρήστους, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς κακοὺς πᾶσαν κακίαν.*—Demosthenes 18, 279 *τὸ δὲ δὴ καὶ τοὺς πρὸς ἔμ᾽ αὐτὸν ἀγῶνας ἐάσαντα νῦν ἐπὶ τόνδ᾽ ἥκειν καὶ πᾶσαν ἔχει κακίαν.*

ἀλλὰ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ ἐστι τὸ γελοῖον μόριον: a compressed statement, practically equivalent to *οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ ἕν τι εἶδος κακίας· τοῦ γὰρ αἰσχροῦ ἐστι τὸ γελοῖον μόριον.* The personages in Comedy are worse than most men, but only in one particular respect, as presenting a certain harmless deformity or ugliness of character, which makes them ridiculous only—not objects for blame or aversion. It is, in Aristotle's view, the harmlessness of the evil in them that makes them fit objects of laughter.

a 34 **τὸ γὰρ γελοῖον** *κτέ.* Two kinds of possible objects of laughter are implied in the text. (1) An act is *γελοῖον* when it is of the nature of a harmless mistake or blunder (*ἁμάρτημα ἀνώδυνον*); and (2) a person is *γελοῖος* when he presents some moral or physical deformity of the same harmless kind (*αἶσχος ἀνώδυνον*). The negative element here is a very essential part of the definition. Plato also, who thinks that the spectacle of human ignorance is the

true object of laughter in Comedy, explains that, to be laughable, 1449 a 34
the ignorance must be harmless (*ἀβλαβὴς τοῖς ἄλλοις* Phil. 49 E).

As *γελοῖα* are the basis of all Comedy, Aristotle must be assumed to have devoted a section of his theory of Comedy (in the lost Second Book) to the causes and conditions of laughter, in the same way as we find him analysing *τὸ φοβερὸν καὶ ἐλεεινόν* in chaps. 13–14 of the existing Poetics. It is not impossible that several traces of his theory survive in Cicero's discussion of the 'Ridiculous' in De Oratore 2, 58–59, which seems to be on distinctly Aristotelian lines. Part of it has been quoted under Fr. III.

ἁμάρτημα: see on 13, 1453 a 16.

αἶσχος (like the adj. *αἰσχρός*) includes moral as well as physical a 35
deformity. Though the illustration in a 36 relates to physical ugliness, Aristotle is really thinking of the ugliness of character in the personages of Comedy, who have been described as being *χείρους τῶν νῦν* (2, 1448 a 17). Their visible ugliness is part of their *ὄψις* (see on 6, 1449 b 33), which lies outside the limits of the art of the poet himself.

ἀνώδυνον: comp. a 37 *ἄνευ ὀδύνης*. *ὀδύνη* is a pain that one feels strongly: Plato Crat. 419 C *ὀδύνη δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐνδύσεως τῆς λύπης κεκλημένη ἔοικεν.* The Stoic definition (Diog. Laert. 7. 112) was *ὀδύνη λύπη ἐπίπονος*, translated by Cicero (Tusc. 4. 8) by *aerumna aegritudo laboriosa.*

εὐθὺς: 'to take the first instance that occurs'; in 10, 1452 a 14 a 36
it means *suapte natura* (Bon. Ind. 296 a 13).

τὸ γελοῖον πρόσωπον. For the masks in Comedy see Pollux 4, 143, and Haigh, Att. Th.[3] p. 242.

αἰσχρόν τι καὶ διεστραμμένον: Plato Rep. 506 C *βούλει οὖν αἰσχρὰ θεάσασθαι, τυφλά τε καὶ σκολιά, ἐξὸν παρ' ἄλλων ἀκούειν φανά τε καὶ καλά;*

κωμῳδῶν. The correction *κωμῳδῷ*, which I have now relegated b 1
to a note, was suggested by Tyrwhitt's interpretation of *ἐθελονταί*, the word being intended to bear the sense of the comic *actor*, i. e. the actor-poet, since Aristotle is referring to the time when the actor was the poet himself (comp. Rhet. 3. 1, 1403 b 23). This sense of the word in the Greek of Aristotle's period has been contested by Mr. H. P. Richards (Class. Rev. 14 p. 201); but I think he has carried his negation too far[1], more especially as we find

[1] Prof. E. Capps also (Trans. of the American Philological Association 31 p. 117) is unable to accept Mr. Richards' view.

1449 b 1 the corresponding word *τραγῳδοί* in the sense of the tragic actors in Poet. 22, 1458 b 32 (v. ad loc.). The traditional doctrine of the grammarians was that *κωμῳδοί* was used for the actors as well as for the members of the chorus in Comedy: Ammonius *π. διαφ. λέξ.* p. 86 Valck. Κωμῳδὸς *καὶ* Τραγῳδὸς *λέγεται ὁ χορευτὴς καὶ ὑποκριτής* (v. also p. 138; comp. Rohde, Kl. Schr. 2 p. 408). That *κωμῳδοί* may refer to the actors even in strict Attic seems to be shown by Plato Phaedr. 236 C *ἵνα μὴ τὸ τῶν κωμῳδῶν φορτικὸν πρᾶγμα ἀναγκαζώμεθα ποιεῖν, ἀνταποδιδόντες ἀλλήλοις*, in illustration of which W. H. Thompson quotes Aristoph. Eq. 286 sqq. and 361 sqq. For Aristotle's time, however, the use seems to be pretty clearly established by the language of his contemporary, Chares of Mytilene (ap. Ath. 538 F): *ὑπεκρίθησαν δὲ τραγῳδοὶ μὲν Θεσσαλὸς καὶ Ἀθηνόδωρος καὶ Ἀριστόκριτος, κωμῳδοὶ δὲ Λύκων καὶ Φορμίων καὶ Ἀρίστων.* And half a century after Aristotle this was the normal sense of the term, as is proved by inscriptions of the period (Dittenberger, Syll.[2] p. 517, 519; Lüders, Die dionysischen Künstler p. 187–97), in which the *κωμῳδοί* or actors are expressly distinguished from the *χορευταὶ κωμικοί*, who had taken the place occupied by the chorus in the older Comedy. The history of the word, therefore, runs parallel with that of the comic chorus. Whether the comic chorus in its original form was actually extinct or only verging on extinction at the time when Aristotle was writing the Poetics, it is impossible to say (comp. E. Capps, American J. of Archaeology x p. 319); but there is evidence that, whatever its form may have been, it was no longer a very important part of a comedy. And if that was the fact, the gradual restriction of the term *κωμῳδός* to the actor would be the natural result of the absence or diminished importance of the chorus in the Comedy of the period.

b 2 **ὀψέ ποτε.** Aristotle seems to have had a definite date in his mind. He conceives the history of Attic Comedy to begin with Chionides, who is said to have exhibited as early as B.C. 487 (see on 4, 1448 a 34); but the formal recognition of it by the state must have come later, probably about B.C. 465 (Wilamowitz, Eurip. Herakles[1] 1 p. 51; comp. Bergk, Kl. Schr. 2 p. 503).

ἐθελονταὶ ἦσαν. 'Intelligi potest de Choro, sed etiam de poetis, secundum illa quae ex Aelio Dionysio [fr. 150 Schwabe] protulit Eustathius ad Il. K v. 230. Ἐθελοντὴς *ὁ αὐθαιρέτως τι ποιῶν· ἐκαλοῦντο δὲ καὶ ἐθελονταὶ διδάσκαλοι, δραμάτων δηλαδή, ὅτε τις μὴ λαβὼν χορὸν μηδὲ χορηγητὴν ἔχων ἑαυτῷ τὰ πάντα παρεῖχε.*

Et sic fortasse rectius. Hinc enim poetarum, nascente Comoedia, conditio difficilis maxime apparet, quod non modo Chorum docere sed etiam conducere, nutrire, vestibus alioque omni apparatu instruere necesse haberent' (Tyrwhitt). A somewhat similar use of the term seems to have survived at Thebes, where *ἐθελοντής* is said to have been the name for the actor in a rude species of burlesque (Sosibius ap. Ath. 621 D)—presumably because the performance was at his own charge and risk. The alternative to Tyrwhitt's interpretation is to suppose the reference to be either to volunteer *χορηγοί* (comp. Demosth. 21. 13 *ὑπεσχόμην ἐγὼ χορηγήσειν ἐθελοντής*, and Hesych. *ἐθελοντάς· τοὺς βουλομένους ἢ χορηγούς*), or as Usener (Rh. Mus. 28 p. 424) has suggested, to volunteer actors and chorus-singers. **1449 b 2**

σχήματα: comp. 4, 1448 b 36 and Bon. Ind. 740 a 24. **b 3**

οἱ λεγόμενοι αὐτῆς, scil. *τῆς κωμῳδίας*. It has been thought that the form of expression here may imply some slowness to grant the name *ποιητής* to a comedian (Neil on Aristoph. Eq. 507).

μνημονεύονται. As soon as Comedy became a state institution, an official record of the successful poets must have been kept in the public archives; the successful *χορηγοί* also sometimes set up a similar record on their own account in temples (Pol. 8. 6, 1341 a 35; comp. Bernhardy, Gr. Litt.[3] 2. 2 p. 152). **b 4**

ἀπέδωκεν: De sensu 2, 438 b 17 *ἀποδιδόναι καὶ προσάπτειν ἕκαστον τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἑνὶ τῶν στοιχείων*. In Plato Laws 2, 669 C *ἀποδοῦναι* and *προσαρμόττειν* are treated as synonyms.

προλόγους. The term is defined in 12, 1452 b 19. The introduction of a 'prologue' in Tragedy was sometimes said to have been due to Thespis: Themist. Or. 26 p. 382 Dind. *Θέσπις δὲ πρόλογον καὶ ῥῆσιν ἐξεῦρεν.* It was obviously a significant moment in the history of the Drama when the play, instead of beginning with a choral song, opened with a statement spoken by an actor.

πλήθη: comp. the use of *πλήθη* in 4, 1449 a 28 and 21, 1458 a 13. The plural is in keeping with that in *προλόγους* and *μύθους* in the context. **b 5**

μύθους: see on b 9.

Ἐπίχαρμος καὶ Φόρμις. These words, which were first bracketed by Susemihl (Rh. Mus. 18 p. 376), cannot be retained where they stand. No appropriate verb can be supplied with them; for though Aristotle might have said *μύθους ἀπέδωκε*, he could hardly have meant to say *μύθους ποιεῖν ἀπέδωκε*. And even if *ἀπέδωκε* is to be understood, there is an awkward asyndeton in *τὸ μὲν ἐξ* **b 6**

1449 b 6 ἀρχῆς, which on this assumption should surely be τὸ μὲν ⟨οὖν⟩ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, as is actually read in certain of the apographs. From the reminiscence of this passage (comp. Welcker, Kl. Scr. 1 p. 330) in Themistius Or. 27 p. 406 Dind. καὶ κωμῳδία τὸ παλαιὸν ἤρξατο μὲν ἐκ Σικελίας (ἐκεῖθεν γὰρ ἤστην Ἐπίχαρμός τε καὶ Φόρμος), κάλλιον δὲ Ἀθήναζε συνηυξήθη, it would seem that the words Ἐπίχαρμος καὶ Φόρμις were originally part of a clause which came in after ἐκ Σικελίας ἦλθεν, and that what Aristotle wrote was something like this: τὸ δὲ μύθους ποιεῖν τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκ Σικελίας ἦλθεν (ἦσαν γὰρ Ἐπίχαρμος καὶ Φόρμις ἐκεῖθεν), τῶν δὲ Ἀθήνησιν Κράτης κτέ. (v. J. of Phil. 5 p. 118).

Φόρμις, sometimes called in later writers Φόρμος. On the two forms of the name see Lobeck Pathol. serm. gr. prolegomena p. 502. All that is known of him will be found in Grysar, De Doriensium comoedia p. 76 (comp. Bernhardy, Gr. Litt.[3] 2. 2 p. 520, and Kaibel, CGF. 1 p. 148).

b 7 **Κράτης**: his 'floruit' may be put about B.C. 450. For the fragments of his comedies see Kock, CAF. 1 p. 130; Meineke, FCG. 1 p. 58.

b 8 **ἀφέμενος τῆς ἰαμβικῆς ἰδέας.** 'Ac mihi quidem hoc Aristoteles significare voluisse videtur, cum Cratinus ceterique antiquiores comici certos quosdam homines in fabulis suis exagitassent populoque ridendos propinassent, Cratetem primum apud Athenienses extitisse qui Epicharmi exemplo comicae poesios materiam a singulorum hominum irrisione ad generales morum notationes rerumque descriptiones traduceret. . . Quod autem lacessendi consuetudinem omisisse Crates ab Aristotele dicitur, id plane fragmenta fabularum confirmant, in quibus nihil prorsus reperias ex quo certos quosdam homines eum carpsisse intellegatur' (Meineke l. c. p. 59). The 'iambic form' of Comedy is the Old Comedy, which, from the personal nature of its satire, was only one remove from the 'invective' of Archilochus and the Iambographers (4, 1449 a 4). It is thus characterized in Horace Sat. 1. 4. 1: *Eupolis atque Cratinus Aristophanesque poetae Atque alii, quorum comoedia prisca virorum est, Si quis erat dignus describi, quod malus aut fur, Quod moechus foret aut sicarius aut alioqui Famosus, multa cum libertate notabant.*

καθόλου ποιεῖν λόγους is the opposite of περὶ τὸν καθ' ἕκαστον ποιεῖν (see 9, 1451 b 14). The implied antithesis is between a story about some particular person, e.g. Alcibiades, and one about (for instance) 'a man', or 'a man of such and such a type'

(ὁ τοιόσδε, Rhet. I. 2, 1356 b 30), i.e. as we should say, 'a character', the representative of a possible class. A 'character' is a coherent group of qualities disengaged from the various accidents which coexist with it in the concrete individual; it is therefore in the nature of things something general and attributable to several, whereas the individual as such is unique. Aristotle's view is that the personages in Crates, as in all the higher forms of poetry, are 'characters', i.e. more or less idealized personages, not real men as in History, the Ψόγος, and the Old Comedy. How these abstracts of human personality come to get proper names attached to them in the Drama is a point which Aristotle considers at some length in 9, 1451 b 13–22 (comp. 17, 1455 b 12). 1449 b 8

μύθους: i.e. his stories were as imaginary as his personages. A *μῦθος* according to Plato Rep. 377 A is a *λόγος ψευδής* (either taken from legend or invented by the poet himself), though there may be some element of truth in it. b 9

ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐποποιία κτέ. At this point, the evolution of the Drama having been sketched, Aristotle inserts a provisional note on the points of agreement and difference between Tragedy and epic poetry, which anticipates to a certain extent the longer statement in chaps. 23–24. The two points of agreement had been already intimated, the first in 4, 1448 b 34, and the second in 5, 1449 a 20.

μέχρι μὲν τοῦ . . . εἶναι: 7, 1451 a 10 *μέχρι τοῦ σύνδηλος εἶναι*.—Top. 8. 1, 155 b 7 *μέχρι μὲν οὖν τοῦ εὑρεῖν τὸν τόπον ὁμοίως τοῦ φιλοσόφου καὶ τοῦ διαλεκτικοῦ ἡ σκέψις*. The construction *συνακολουθεῖν μέχρι* occurs in Phys. I. 5, 188 b 26 *μέχρι μὲν οὖν τούτου σχεδὸν συνηκολουθήκασι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ πλεῖστοι*—where also *συνακολουθεῖν*, just like *ἀκολουθεῖν* here, is the opposite of *διαφέρειν* (188 b 30: comp. Bon. Ind. 26 a 23). In these and similar instances the preposition *μέχρι* is to be understood as inclusive of that which is mentioned as the limit (comp. Eucken, Sprachgebr. p. 17). A difficulty has been found in *ἠκολούθησεν* (by Thurot and Spengel), on the ground that it would be more natural to speak of Tragedy following the Epic than of the Epic following Tragedy. This view assumes that *ἀκολουθεῖν* must mean to 'follow after' in order of time, whereas the word may very well mean 'go with' (comp. Rhet. I. 6, 1362 a 29), i.e. 'agree with'. The aorist seems to imply that the fact has been already recognized.

μὲν τοῦ. With the traditional reading *μόνου* (retained by Vahlen) the infinitive *εἶναι* which follows is out of construction.

1449 b 10 **⟨διὰ⟩ μέτρου μεγάλου.** For the preposition comp. 1, 1447 a 27 *διὰ τῶν σχηματιζομένων ῥυθμῶν.*—b 11 *διὰ τριμέτρων.*—b 16 *διὰ τῶν μέτρων.*—6, 1449 b 30 *διὰ μέτρων.* As here used, *μέτρον μέγα* seems to mean a large kind of verse, one fitted for a large subject (comp. 4, 1449 a 6 *μείζονα σχήματα*). The hexameter is a metre of this description (24, 1460 a 3); and Aristotle may be presumed, I think, to have taken the same view of the tragic iambic as corresponding to the *μέγεθος* of the tragic stories, and the gravity of the tragic diction (comp. 4, 1449 a 19). Vahlen, retaining the manuscript reading *μέχρι μόνου μέτρου μεγάλου*, takes *μέτρον μέγα* to mean 'spatium magnum sive fines ampli'; this, however, is hardly probable with *τὸ μέτρον* in the sense of 'metre' in the very next line (comp. Gomperz, Zu Aristoteles' Poetik 1 p. 25).

The following are some of the attempts at emending this passage: *μέχρι μόνου μέτρου μετὰ λόγου* (the Aldine, and corr. Parisinus 2038[1]); *μέχρι μὲν τοῦ μέτρῳ [μετὰ λόγου]* (Tyrwhitt); *μέχρι μόνου τοῦ διὰ λόγου ἐμμέτρου μεγάλου* (Ueberweg); *μέχρι μὲν τοῦ [μέτρου μεγάλου]* (Christ).

μίμησις . . . σπουδαίων: as was said in 4, 1448 b 34. *σπουδαίων* is presumably neuter (comp. 4, 1448 b 34, and the note on 3, 1448 a 19).

b 11 **τῷ δὲ τὸ μέτρον ἁπλοῦν ἔχειν**, scil. *τὴν ἐποποιίαν.* *ἁπλοῦν* is the opposite of *ποικίλον* (comp. Bon. Ind. 76 b 12); the contrast is between the one metre of the Epic (v. 24, 1459 b 32) and the variety of metres in Tragedy.

ταύτῃ. In illustration of the construction Vahlen quotes 23, 1459 a 30 *ταύτῃ θεσπέσιος ἂν φανείη . . . τῷ μηδὲ τὸν πόλεμον . . . ἐπιχειρῆσαι ποιεῖν ὅλον.*—Pol. 7. 15, 1334 a 41 *οὐ ταύτῃ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων, τῷ μὴ νομίζειν.*—Plato Rep. 605 A *τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον τοιοῦτον ὁμιλεῖν . . . ταύτῃ ὡμοίωται.*

b 12 **ἔτι δὲ τῷ μήκει**: scil. *διαφέρει ἡ ἐποποιία.* Having laid this down, however, Aristotle remembers that the difference did not always exist; he accordingly repeats his original proposition by a resumptive *καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρει* (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr.³ 2. 1 p. 660), in order to introduce a qualifying clause, *καίτοι τὸ πρῶτον κτέ.* The clause marked as a parenthesis is equivalent to *ἡ μὲν γὰρ κτέ.* (actually found in some apographs), and is similar in form to that in 4, 1449 a 19 (v. ad loc.).

[1] Perhaps also the Arabic translation (Margoliouth, A. O. p. 54); it is certainly implied in the paraphrase 'metrico sermone' of Averroes (p. 359 Heidenhain).

τῷ μήκει. Aristotle is thinking of a very obvious fact, viz. that an epic (the Iliad or Odyssey, for instance) runs to several thousand lines, whereas a tragedy rarely exceeds some 1,600. This difference he never loses sight of; he notes it in 17, 1455 b 16, and (in a context just like the present) in 24, 1459 b 17 (*διαφέρει δὲ κατά τε τῆς συστάσεως τὸ μῆκος ἡ ἐποποιία καὶ τὸ μέτρον*); and he returns to it in his concluding chapter (26, 1462 a 18), where the comparative merits of the two forms of poetry are under discussion. These parallels, as Teichmüller has seen, are enough to show that *μῆκος* must denote here not the *ambitus actionis*, the imaginary duration of the action of the poem, as is often supposed, but rather the real length of the work itself, a length to be measured by the number of lines the work would take up in a book, or the hours it would need for recitation. It has the same sense in 7, 1451 a 6 and in 24, 1459 b 18. A reason for this difference of length, one quite sufficient for Aristotle's purpose, is given in the parenthesis, *ἡ μὲν ὅτι μάλιστα κτἑ.* He regards it as the natural consequence of another kind of difference, viz. the fact that the action in a Greek tragedy is as a rule kept within a limit of some 24 hours, whereas that in an epic may extend over weeks, or even years. There being this difference, therefore, in the extent of the action, the quantum of matter to be included in the story, it is only natural that there should be a corresponding difference in the length of the literary statement in the two instances, and that an epic poem accordingly should be of greater length than a tragedy. A certain correspondence between the length and the quantum of matter in a poem is recognized in 26, 1462 b 2. Assuming this correspondence, Aristotle explains the great length of an epic, as compared with a tragedy, as due to the great length of time over which the epic action extends. In other words, he passes from the idea of the actual length, the actual time required for the recitation, to that of the imaginary time covered by the action of the poem; and he does this on the tacit assumption that the two things are so closely connected that the one may serve to explain the other (comp. Ueberweg, Aristoteles über Dichtkunst p. 57). Teichmüller's theory, that Aristotle is referring in the parenthesis to the time of the actual recitation or performance [1], and thinking 1449 b 12

[1] The idea of some of the older dramatic critics, that in a perfect drama the actual time of the performance and the supposed time of the action of the piece would coincide, is not unlike that which Teichmüller reads into the text of Aristotle.

1449 b 12 of the series of dramas (a trilogy or tetralogy) presented on the stage in a single day, may be set aside at once, not only on archaeological grounds, but also because it assumes an impossible sense for ὑπὸ μίαν περίοδον ἡλίου.

πειρᾶται means much the same thing as βούλεται in 2, 1448 a 18. The same anxiety to avoid overstatement is to be seen in ὅτι μάλιστα and ἢ μικρὸν ἐξαλλάττειν in the context.

13 **μίαν περίοδον ἡλίου** cannot be, as Teichmüller imagines, a way of describing the natural day of 12 hours or so; the periphrasis is deliberately chosen in order to make it clear that the solar day of 24 hours is meant. A περίοδος of the sun is not its half-circuit, but its circuit, i. e. the time it takes to come round again to an assumed starting-point. For other Aristotelian instances of this sense of the word see Bon. Ind. 582 b 29. The statement in the text was often quoted in former times as evidence for the assertion that the so-called 'Unity of Time' was one of Aristotle's rules for the Drama. 'The stage', says Sydney in his Apology for Poetry (p. 63 Arber), 'should always represent but one place; and the uttermost time presupposed in it should be, both by Aristotle's precept and common sense, but one day.' What Aristotle actually says is not a precept, but only an incidental recognition of a fact in the practice of the theatre in his age. The same is true also of the 'Unity of Place', which was believed to be implied as a rule in 24, 1459 b 25. The 'Unity of Action', however, is very emphatically asserted in chaps. 8–11 and elsewhere.

μικρὸν ἐξαλλάττειν = 'to vary, or depart, from that only a little', i.e. 'to exceed that limit only a little'. The reference is not to variation within the limit, but to variation beyond it.

b 15. **τὸ πρῶτον.** In the earliest drama, says Aristotle, the Unity of Time was not observed with strictness, any more than it is in epic poetry. This passage has been discussed by M. Maurice Croiset (Rev. des Études grecques 1. p. 373; comp. Heimsoeth, De tragoediae graecae trilogiis p. iv), who suggests that Aristotle may be referring to the period anterior to the institution of the trilogy, when a long tragic story, instead of being dealt with in three tragedies, may be supposed to have been told in one. It is clear that the action in such a play would be very like that of an epic, and cover a longer time than 24 hours. One may ask how in the absence of some device like the modern curtain the lapse of time between act and act could be sufficiently indicated; and one may also ask whether there was the same chorus throughout the

performance. These are difficulties which we have now no means of answering. 1449 b 15

ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις. The preposition shows that Aristotle is thinking not of the time of the performance, but of something within the play, the imaginary time of the action in it (Ribbeck, Rh. Mus. 24, 135); comp. 13, 1453 a 25 *τοῦτο δρᾷ ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις*.

μέρη: i.e. the constituents enumerated and distinguished in 6, 1449 b 31 sqq. The parts peculiar to Tragedy are melody and 'spectacle' (24, 1459 b 10). b 16

διόπερ *κτέ*. Similarly in chaps. 23–24, before explaining the differences between epic poetry and Tragedy, Aristotle is at some pains to show that a good epic will have much the same structure as a good tragedy, and that in most respects the same canons of construction are applicable to it (23, 1459 a 17–24, b 17). The corollary ends at *ἐπῶν*; what follows (*ἃ μὲν γὰρ κτέ.*) is a reason in support of the main statement (b 16). b 17

περὶ . . . τῆς ἐν ἑξαμέτροις μιμητικῆς: in chaps. 23–24. b 21

περὶ κωμῳδίας: in the lost Second Book of the Poetics.

ἀναλαβόντες: Top. 6, 14, 151 b 19 *καλῶς εἰρημένον ὅρον ἀναλαβεῖν*.—Meteor. 1. 3, 339 a 33 *ἀναλαβόντες οὖν τὰς ἐξ ἀρχῆς θέσεις . . . λέγωμεν*.—1. 8, 345 b 31 *ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγωμεν ἀναλαβόντες τὴν ὑποκειμένην ἀρχὴν ἡμῖν*.—Rhet. 1. 13, 1373 b 27 *ἀναλαβόντες τί ἐστι τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι λέγωμεν*. b 23

ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων τὸν γινόμενον = *τὸν γινόμενον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων*. For the hyperbaton comp. Metaph. Θ 3, 1047 a 12 *τὸ δ' ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι ὁ λέγων ἢ εἶναι ἢ ἔσεσθαι ψεύσεται*.—Eth. N. 8. 16, 1163 b 18 *εἰς δύναμιν δὲ ὁ θεραπεύων ἐπιεικὴς εἶναι δοκεῖ* (also Kühner, Gr. Gr.[3] 2. 1 p. 616)[1].

ὅρον τῆς οὐσίας: the definition of its essence, or essential nature; comp. Metaph. Z 13, 1039 a 19 *δοκεῖ γε πᾶσι καὶ ἐλέχθη πάλαι ἢ μόνον εἶναι οὐσίας ὅρον ἢ μάλιστα*.—De part. an. 1. 1, 642 a 26 *ὁρίσασθαι τὴν οὐσίαν*.—4. 5, 678 a 34 *τῷ λόγῳ . . . τῷ ὁρίζοντι τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῶν*.

ἔστιν οὖν τραγῳδία *κτέ*. The definition, which is in logical form, *per genus et differentias*, professes to be a summary of points already established; and in its principal elements it is that. b 24

[1] There is no hyperbaton in An. post. 1. 34, 89 b 14 *πάντα γὰρ τὰ αἴτια τὰ μέσα ὁ ἰδὼν τὰ ἄκρα ἐγνώρισεν*, which has been cited as an instance of it. The sense shows that *ὁ ἰδὼν* is to be taken with *τὰ ἄκρα*, and that the accusatives before it are the object of *ἐγνώρισεν*.

1449^{b} 24 (1) That Tragedy is a *μίμησις* was said in 1, 1447^{a} 13; and that it is a *μίμησις πράξεως* is implied in 1, 1447^{a} 28. (2) *σπουδαίας*, which differentiates Tragedy from Comedy, recalls chap. 2 and 4, 1448^{b} 34—*καὶ τελείας μέγεθος ἐχούσης* being added in recognition apparently of the point indicated in 4, 1449^{a} 19. (3) The means in Tragedy were noted in 1, 1447^{b} 24–8; and (4) the dramatic manner of its imitation in 3, 1448^{a} 23–28. But for the concluding clause, on the effect of Tragedy on the emotions, we have not been prepared by anything in the earlier chapters. Aristotle no doubt regarded one part of it, *δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου*, as self-evident, but the rest is presumably an anticipation of a point worked out at length in the lost Second Book of the Poetics. In just the same way we find him using the term *προαιρετική* in the definition of virtue in Eth. N. 2. 6, 1106^{b} 36, and reserving the formal explanation of *προαίρεσις* for 3. 4, 1111^{b} 4. This concluding clause is an integral part of the definition, since the end of the thing to be defined cannot be ignored in any logically complete statement of its nature (De anima 1. 1, 403^{a} 25; Metaph. H 2, 1043^{a} 14).

^{b} 25 **τελείας μέγεθος ἐχούσης.** The point is considered in chap. 7, where 'completeness' is said to imply a whole of some magnitude (7, 1450^{b} 24). We have not yet been told that the action in Tragedy must be a *τελεία πρᾶξις*, but from the explanatory *μέγεθος ἐχούσης* Aristotle would seem to regard the point as the natural consequence of the *μέγεθος* mentioned already in 4, 1449^{a} 19 as one of the characteristics of Tragedy proper. In that case the term distinguishes Tragedy proper with its complete and self-contained stories from the rudimentary Drama of an earlier period.

ἡδυσμένῳ: Plato Rep. 607 A *εἰ δὲ τὴν ἡδυσμένην μοῦσαν παραδέξῃ ἐν μέλεσιν ἢ ἔπεσιν, ἡδονή σοι καὶ λύπη ἐν τῇ πόλει βασιλεύσετον.* The word is taken from cookery (comp. De sensu 4, 442^{a} 10). The nature of the metaphor may be seen, in the case of the substantive *ἥδυσμα*, from Aristotle's criticism of the style of Alcidamas in Rhet. 3. 3, 1406^{a} 19 *οὐ γὰρ ἡδύσματι χρῆται ἀλλ' ὡς ἐδέσματι τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις* ('the sauce with him is the dish'). Said of language *ἡδυσμένος* implies the accession of something (here metre and music) to make it agreeable, just as *κοσμηθῆναι* in 4, 1449^{a} 29 meant the accession of something to make the work beautiful. An echo of this passage (comp. 6, 1450^{b} 11) may perhaps be recognized in Plutarch Erot. 769 C *λόγῳ ποίησις ἡδύσματα ⟨τὰ⟩ μέλη καὶ μέτρα καὶ ῥυθμοὺς ἐφαρμόσασα*, and also in Strabo 818 Cas.

φλυαροῦσιν ὥσπερ μέλος ἢ ῥυθμὸν [ἢ] ἥδυσμά τι τῷ λόγῳ τὴν τερατείαν προσφέροντες. The metaphor reappears in Shakespeare, Hamlet 2. 2 *I remember one said there were no sallets in the lines to make the matter savoury.* 1449 b 25

ἑκάστῳ τῶν εἰδῶν: scil. *τῶν ἡδυσμάτων*, understood from *ἡδυσμένῳ*. Similarly in Isocrates 190 D *περὶ τούτων δηλῶσαι μὴ μόνον τοῖς τεταγμένοις ὀνόμασιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ξένοις τὰ δὲ καινοῖς τὰ δὲ μεταφοραῖς, καὶ μηδὲν παραλιπεῖν ἀλλὰ πᾶσι τοῖς εἴδεσι διαποικῖλαι τὴν ποίησιν* one may supply *τῶν ὀνομάτων* with *εἴδεσι*. For another instance of this allusive use of *εἶδος* see 25, 1461 b 22. In what follows (b 29) *ἑκάστῳ τῶν εἰδῶν* is replaced by *τοῖς εἴδεσι*; the reading of the MS., *ἑκάστου*, seems to have arisen through *χωρίς* having been mistaken for a preposition. The juxtaposition of *χωρίς* and *ἑκάστῳ* is just like that in Pol. 7. 1, 1323 b 41 *καὶ χωρὶς ἑκάστῳ καὶ κοινῇ ταῖς πόλεσιν* (comp. *χωρὶς ἕκαστον* in De caelo 2. 12, 292 a 13, b 27). The implied antithesis in the present passage is between 'each separately' (*χωρίς*), and 'all together, and at once' (*ἅμα*: comp. De gen. et corr. 1. 5, 322 a 13, and Metaph. E 4, 1027 b 23). Tragedy (unlike the Dithyramb etc.) has the *ἥδυσμα* of metre in the dialogue, and that of melody only in the choral parts (see on 1, 1447 b 28). *ἑκάστῳ*, therefore, is loosely put for *ἑκατέρῳ* (comp. Pol. 3. 12, 1282 b 38, and HSt. s. v.).

δρώντων: scil. *τῶν μιμουμένων*, the subject being omitted as it is b 26 in a 13, b 31, 1450 a 10, a 21, and 26, 1461 b 29. Other Aristotelian instances of this ellipse with a gen. absolute may be seen in Bon. Ind. 149 b 29. Tyrwhitt, with less probability, as it seems to me, supplies *μίμησις* with *δρώντων*, comparing 3, 1448 a 29 *μιμοῦνται δρῶντας.*

οὐ δι' ἀπαγγελίας: scil. *μιμουμένων.*

δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου means practically *δι' ἐλεεινῶν καὶ φοβερῶν*, 'by b 27 piteous and alarming scenes'; comp. Goulston's paraphrase, 'per misericordiam metumque factis expressum'. The more abstract form of expression is adopted in order to prepare the way for *τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων.* For the use of the preposition in this connexion comp. b 30 *διὰ μέτρων περαίνεσθαι.*—De part. an. 3. 4, 666 b 15 *περαίνονται* [scil. *αἱ κινήσεις*] *διὰ τοῦ ἕλκειν καὶ ἀνιέναι.*—Plato Gorg. 450 D *διὰ λόγου πᾶν περαίνουσι.*—Rep. 392 D *δι' ἀμφοτέρων περαίνουσιν* (v. Bernays, Zwei Abhandl. p. 85). This excitement of pity and fear is, as far as the poet is concerned, the end of Tragedy, but it is in truth only a means to its ultimate end, its *κάθαρσις* of such emotions.

1449 b 27 **τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν**, '*its* catharsis of such emotions', just as *ποιεῖσθαι τὴν μίμησιν* (1, 1447 a 22; 6, 1449 b 31) means 'to make *their* imitation, and *ποιεῖν τὴν ἡδονήν* (4, 1448 b 18), 'to produce *its* pleasure' (comp. 4, 1448 b 7, and Kühner, Gr. Gr.[3] 2. 1 p. 593). The article, in fact, is not so otiose as is usually supposed. This interpretation of the article removes more than one of the preliminary difficulties in this much debated passage, the implication being that a cathartic effect is not peculiar to Tragedy; so that the text is seen at once to stand in close relation to the passage in Pol. 8. 7 (v. Fr. V), in which the existence of several forms of catharsis is affirmed. Aristotle recognizes there a catharsis of 'enthusiasm' effected by certain kinds of music, as well as a catharsis of pity and fear effected by Tragedy; and there is reason to think that a catharsis of laughter also must have been similarly posited as the effect and ultimate justification of Comedy in the lost Second Book of the Poetics. *τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων*, therefore, is a general expression for this whole group of disturbing emotions (enthusiasm, pity, fear, etc.), instead of being, as is so often thought, either limited to the two emotions (pity and fear) which appear in the context, or applying to the emotions in general.

The great difficulty, however, in this formula is as to the interpretation of *κάθαρσις*. Is the term to be understood as a physiological metaphor, in the sense of 'purging', or 'clearing away'; or as a metaphor from the religious rite of lustration, in the sense of 'purification'? The ancient evidence, in Aristotle and elsewhere, is to my mind very decidedly in favour of the first interpretation.

I.

This, the pathological interpretation, as it may be called, is now generally associated with the names of Weil (1848) and Bernays (1857), who each independently arrived at a very similar conclusion[1]. It is in reality much older; all its essential points in fact are to be found in Tyrwhitt's note on the present passage: 'Ex his quae de Musica dicuntur [i.e. in Pol. 8. 7], colligere licet, opinor, Aristotelem similem quandam ratiocinationem de poesi etiam

[1] See H. Weil, Ueber die Wirkung der Tragödie nach Aristoteles, Verhandl. der zehnten Versammlung deutscher Philologen zu Basel, p. 140 (comp. his Études sur le drame antique, p. 158); the article of Bernays is reprinted in his Zwei Abhandlungen p. 1. I have shown elsewhere (J. of Phil. 27 p. 267) that the pathological interpretation of *κάθαρσις* was not unknown in Italy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

tragica instituisse, qua scilicet probaret affectus misericordiae et metus, qui in tragoediis vehementissime excitantur, non ex eo nutriri et validiores effici, quod Plato criminabatur, sed contra levari et exhauriri; et proinde affectuum horum purgationem opus esse proprium et quasi finem Tragoediae; cum caeterae Poesis species vel ad doctrinam, vel ad delectationem magis aptae sint.' To understand Aristotle's position we have to go back to Plato's condemnation of the Drama in the Tenth Book of the Republic. One of Plato's points is, that the Drama appeals mainly to two of the inferior elements in the soul, our faculty for grief (*τὸ θρηνῶδες, τὸ ἐλεεινόν*) and our faculty for laughter; and that its effect is to gratify these at the expense of the reason, and ultimately to weaken or nullify the self-control prescribed by reason (Rep. 605 c–606 c). As a view like this, supported by so great a name, could hardly be ignored by Aristotle in an Art of Poetry based throughout on the assumption of the legitimacy of the Drama, and of the emotional effects it aims at, his catharsis theory may very well be supposed to have been intended as his answer to the Platonic indictment. Though the formal exposition of the theory, as it was to be read in the complete Poetics, is no longer before us, it is still possible to recover some idea of it from the two statements in the Politics on the 'cathartic' effect of certain kinds of music. In Pol. 8. 6, 1341 a 21, as a reason for leaving the flute to professionals, instead of making it part of a liberal education for all, Aristotle explains that the flute, instead of having an 'ethical' effect, is simply orgiastic or exciting, and to be kept for the times when the hearing of music is a 'catharsis' rather than a form of instruction: *οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ αὐλὸς ἠθικὸν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὀργιαστικόν, ὥστε πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους αὐτῷ καιροὺς χρηστέον ἐν οἷς ἡ θεωρία κάθαρσιν μᾶλλον δύναται ἢ μάθησιν.* It will be seen that a sharp distinction is drawn here between the emotional effect of the flute, and the 'ethical' effect of certain other kinds of music; and that *κάθαρσις* is in Aristotle's view connected with the former rather than with the latter. A much more important passage, however, is that in Pol. 8. 7, 1341 b 32, which will be found in extenso among the Fragments of the Poetics (Fr. V). It begins by assuming a current division of 'airs' into *ἠθικά, πρακτικά*, and *ἐνθουσιαστικὰ μέλη*[1], and a similar

[1] The distinction here is between (1) the music that imitates character, and has thus a reflex influence on the character of the hearer (comp. Pol. 8. 5, 1340 a 6); (2) that which imitates action (comp. Plato Rep. 399 A), and moves us to it; and (3) that which imitates, and so arouses in us, the orgy of emotion termed by the Greeks 'enthusiasm'.

1449 b 27 classification of 'harmonies' or modes. The most 'ethical' harmonies may be practised by all, as a regular part of their lives; whereas the other two kinds are to be left to professionals. This tolerance of the 'enthusiastic harmonies' in a well-ordered state Aristotle justifies by showing that they stand in much the same position as Tragedy. There are certain emotions, he tells us, which arise in some degree in every man's soul, and in a disquieting degree (ἰσχυρῶς) in certain of us, e.g. pity and fear. Enthusiasm is one of these disturbing emotions. Experience, however, shows that the enthusiastic music (that of the hymns of Olympus, for instance) has a salutary effect on those subject to accesses (κατοκώχιμοι) of enthusiasm, restoring them to a normal condition of calm and peace (καθισταμένους: comp. Bon. Ind. 356 a 35 and 375 a 8), just as though they had undergone a cure or *catharsis* at the hands of a physician (ὥσπερ ἰατρείας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως). The same sort of treatment (πάσχειν) is required by other emotional natures also, e.g. by those liable to accesses of pity and fear, and by the rest of mankind likewise, in so far as they have a share in these feelings; all want a certain *catharsis*, a pleasurable relief (κουφίζεσθαι) from emotion. And it is in just the same way (i.e. by the relief they bring) that the cathartic airs give a harmless delight to mankind. The sense of κάθαρσις in the Politics is well explained by Sepulveda in his note on 8. 6, 1341 a 23: 'Purgatio intelligitur expulsio cuiuspiam affectus'; and again in that on 8. 7, 1342 a 6 (τῷ δὲ ἧττον διαφέρει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον): 'Itaque plus et minus, tamen omnes moventur affectibus, a quibus iucunde per musicam sanantur et quasi medicamento quodam adhibito purgantur' (comp. J. of Phil. 27 p. 269)[1]. The term in fact is a metaphor from medicine,

[1] To the passages in Italian writers quoted in this article I may add one from A. S. Minturnus (1559), De Poeta p. 64: 'Quamobrem cum miserabiles horribilesque eventus Tragoedia spectandos ad perturbationum vacuitatem in medium proferat, non est profecto, si miserationem commovet pavoremque infert, quod morbos animi alere atque augere videatur. An Platoni, nedum Aristoteli Musica probatur, quae nisi motus in animo cieret, nunquam sane eum purgaret. Nam afflatu furoris qui essent concitati, cum modis ac numeris canticisque sacris, qui ad animi expiationem adhiberi solebant, uterentur, his quidem ita expiabantur, ac si aliqua potione purgarentur; Homerica poesis, quod vim mentis et ad miserandum et ad timendum permoveat, improbanda est? Scilicet ad depellendam aegrotationem, quae veneni instar habet, vis ciens in corpore motiones medicina vehementis noxiaeque naturae excitatur; ad morborum expiationem animus commoveri non debet?' The parallel statement in his Arte Poetica p. 77 is: 'Nè più forza haurâ il Physico di spengere il fervido veleno della infermitâ, che'l corpo afflige, con la velenosa medicina; che 'l Tragico di purgar l'animo delle impetuose perturbationi.'

as Aristotle intimates by making it a synonym for ἰατρεία (ὥσπερ ἰατρείας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως), in a context too which presents a whole series of words which either have, or may have, a medical meaning (πάθος, πάσχειν, ἰσχυρῶς, κίνησις, κατοκώχιμοι, καθισταμένους, κουφίζεσθαι, καθαρτικά)[1]. In Greek physiology and pathology κάθαρσις is a very general term for a physical clearance or discharge, the removal by art or an effort of nature of some bodily product (some περίττωμα, as Aristotle would call it), which, if allowed to remain, would cause discomfort or harm. The κάθαρσις of the soul as described in the Politics is a similar process in reference to certain emotions (πάθη)—the tacit assumption being apparently that the emotions in question are analogous to those peccant humours in the body which, according to the ancient humoral theory of medicine, have to be expelled from the system by the appropriate κάθαρσις. With some adaptation of the statements and hints in Pol. 8. 7, as thus interpreted, it is not difficult to recover the outlines at any rate of the Aristotelian theory of the cathartic effect of Tragedy: Pity and fear are elements in human nature, and in some men (τοὺς ἐλεήμονας καὶ τοὺς φοβητικούς) they are present in a disquieting degree (ἰσχυρῶς). With these latter the tragic excitement is a necessity (ἀναγκαῖον πάσχειν); but it is also in a certain sense good for all. It serves as a sort of medicine, producing a *catharsis* to lighten and relieve the soul (κουφίζεσθαι[2]) of the accumulated emotion within it; and as the relief is wanted, there is always a harmless pleasure attending the process of relief. This, then, may be taken as Aristotle's answer to the Platonic argument in the Republic; it shows that the pleasure we derive from the moving scenes in Tragedy is not, as Plato had maintained, a demoralizing, but on the contrary a harmless pleasure (χαρὰ ἀβλαβής). The legitimacy of this pleasure is assumed throughout the Poetics (see especially 14, 1453^{b} 11), but its precise nature is not explained, either in the existing book or elsewhere, by Aristotle. It falls naturally enough, however, into its place in the classification of pleasures in the Nicomachean Ethics, which recognizes the existence of a class of things as pleasurable not directly and in themselves, but through their effect, as being of the nature of cures or remedies (ἰατρεῖαι) to remove the disquietude

[1] Nearly all these terms are to be found in the Oeconomia Hippocratis of Foës; see Döring's Kunstlehre des Aristoteles p. 319 for a discussion of them.

[2] Comp. Probl. 4. 30, 880^{a} 31 οἷς οὖν πολὺ τὸ τοιοῦτον, ἀνάγκη πολλάκις ἐπιθυμεῖν τούτους ἀποκαθαίρεσθαι· κουφίζονται γάρ.

1449 b 27 arising from an unsatisfied want, and restore us to a normal condition of body or mind (Eth. N. 7. 13, 1152 b 34; 7. 15, 1154 b 17). The tragic excitement, which in the language of the Politics, acts as an *ἰατρεία* or *κάθαρσις*, is clearly a pleasure of this kind, one of those described by Aristotle as *ἰατρεύοντα ἡδέα*. A further point in his idea of *κάθαρσις* may perhaps be noticed, as suggested at any rate by his use of the term to express the effect of Tragedy on the mind. A *catharsis* in the medical sense of the word is an *ἰατρεία*, and only for occasional use; and its analogue, the *παθημάτων κάθαρσις*, may very well be presumed to resemble it in this respect[1]. In assuming Tragedy, therefore, to have a cathartic rather than a permanent moral effect, Aristotle would seem to have been mindful of the position of the Drama in Greek life, and to have seen that the dramatic performances in the theatre were not sufficiently frequent or continuous to generate a moral habit, or make a lasting impression for good or evil on character—a point overlooked not only by Plato but also by Lessing and most of the modern interpreters of the Aristotelian theory of Tragedy (comp. E. Müller, Theorie der Kunst bei den Alten 2 p. 378).

In the phrase *παθημάτων κάθαρσις* the genitive after *κάθαρσις*, denoting the object purged away or removed, is a construction not uncommon in Aristotle's physiological writings (v. Bon. Ind. 354 b 22); and it is found also in other authors, e.g. Hippocrates 1 p. 104 K. *πτυέλων καθάρσεις*.—p. 654 *καθάρσεις τοῦ θερμοῦ ἐκ τοῦ σώματος*.—3 p. 502 *τῶν ἀπὸ πλευμόνων καθάρσεις*.—Thucydides 2. 49 *ἀποκαθάρσεις χολῆς*.—Demosthenes 64. 12 *κάθαρσις αἵματος*.—Polybius 5. 100. 6 *ἀνακάθαρσις πτώματος*. The same construction is found with *κάθαρσις* (etc.) in its metaphorical application to the analogous process in the mind: Plato Phaed. 69 B *κάθαρσίς τις τῶν τοιούτων πάντων*[2], 'a purging away of all such things' (Jowett), where the object purged away or removed is shown by the context to be certain affections of the soul (*ἡδονῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων*).—Plutarch De cap. ex inimicis utilit. 91 F *τῶν παθῶν τούτων ποιούμενος εἰς τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἀποκαθάρσεις*.—Iamblichus De myst. 1. 12 *κάθαρσις παθῶν*.—Hierocles in Aur. carm. p. 124 (Needham) *ἡ τῶν λυμαινομένων παθῶν ἐκκάθαρσις*.—p. 134 *κάθαρσις τῆς οἰήσεως*.—p. 194 *ἀποκάθαρσις νείκους*.

[1] Comp. what is said of the flute and its cathartic music in Pol. 8. 6, 1341 a 21.

[2] Aristotle's *τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν* may perhaps be an unconscious reminiscence of the phrase in Plato.

The idea of *κάθαρσις*, in the sense of a working-off of emotion brought about by something that excites emotion, was not unknown in late Greek literature; it is recognized in reference to music by Plutarch and Aristides Quintilianus, and in reference to the Drama by Iamblichus and Proclus. The theories reproduced by these writers are clearly of Peripatetic origin, and on exactly the same lines as the Aristotelian justification of the emotional forms of music and of the Drama in the brief statement in the Politics. **1449 b 27**

(1) In his very curious chapter on the *ἀκροθώρακες*, on whom wine is said to have a sedative effect, Plutarch illustrates the paradox (Qu. conv. 3. 8, 657 A) by a parallel instance, that of the sad airs at funerals, which, while exciting the grief of the mourners, at the same time work off their sorrow:—

ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ θρηνῳδία καὶ ὁ ἐπικήδειος αὐλὸς ἐν ἀρχῇ πάθος κινεῖ καὶ δάκρυον ἐκβάλλει [*ἐκκαλεῖ* Emperius], *προάγων δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς οἶκτον οὕτω κατὰ μικρὸν ἐξαιρεῖ* [*ἐξερᾷ* Bernays] *καὶ ἀναλίσκει τὸ λυπητικόν· ὁμοίως ἴδοις ἂν καὶ τὸν οἶνον, ὅταν σφόδρα ταράξῃ καὶ παροξύνῃ τὸ ἀκμαῖον καὶ θυμοειδές, αὖθις καταδύοντα* [*? καταλύοντα*], *καὶ καθιστάντα τὴν διάνοιαν ὡς πορρωτέρω μέθης προϊοῦσαν ἡσυχάζειν.*

(2) The language in Aristides Quintilianus De Musica 3. 25 (p. 13 Jahn), on the cathartic effect of the music and dancing in the Bacchic and other mysteries, has a more distinctly Aristotelian imprint on it:—

διὸ καὶ τὰς Βακχικὰς τελετὰς καὶ ὅσαι ταύταις παραπλήσιοι λόγου τινὸς ἔχεσθαί φασιν, ὅπως ἂν ἡ τῶν ἀμαθεστέρων πτοίησις διὰ βίον ἢ τύχην ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταύταις μελῳδιῶν τε καὶ ὀρχήσεων ἅμα παιδιαῖς ἐκκαθαίρηται.

(3) There are two passages in Iamblichus, which may serve to illustrate the Aristotelian idea of *κάθαρσις*. In De myst. 3. 9 (ed. Parthey), writing as a Neoplatonic occultist against the naturalistic explanation of enthusiasm, he insists that it is an error to regard the effect of the enthusiastic music as being of the nature of a mere *ἀποκάθαρσις*, a working-off or evacuation (*ἀπέρασις*) of some morbid product within the soul:—

ἀπέρασιν δὲ καὶ ἀποκάθαρσιν ἰατρείαν τε οὐδαμῶς αὐτὸ κλητέον. οὐδὲ γὰρ κατὰ νόσημά τι ἢ πλεονασμὸν ἢ περίττωμα πρώτως ἐν ἡμῖν ἐμφύεται, θεία δε αὐτοῦ συνίσταται ἡ πᾶσα ἄνωθεν ἀρχὴ καὶ καταβολή.

There is reason to think that the theory thus set aside was that of Theophrastus, and, through him, of Aristotle. And it will be seen how completely the language of the above passage har-

1449 b 27 monizes with the pathological interpretation of the formula, *ὥσπερ ἰατρείας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως* in the Politics. The second passage is in De myst. I. 11 :—

αἱ δυνάμεις τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων παθημάτων τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν πάντῃ μὲν εἰργόμεναι καθίστανται σφοδρότεραι, εἰς ἐνέργειαν δὲ βραχεῖαν [so Bernays; *βραχεῖς* vulg.] *καὶ ἄχρι τοῦ συμμέτρου προαγόμενοι χαίρουσι μετρίως καὶ ἀποπληροῦνται, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἀποκαθαιρόμεναι πειθοῖ καὶ οὐ πρὸς βίαν ἀναπαύονται. διὰ δὴ τοῦτο ἔν τε κωμῳδίᾳ καὶ τραγῳδίᾳ ἀλλότρια πάθη θεωροῦντες ἵσταμεν τὰ οἰκεῖα πάθη καὶ μετριώτερα ἀπεργαζόμεθα καὶ ἀποκαθαίρομεν.*

The theory Iamblichus is accepting for the moment is that the passions cannot be suppressed for any length of time with impunity; that they require an occasional outlet (comp. *ἀποκαθαιρόμεναι*) to keep them quiet; and that the secret of our interest in the Drama is that it serves to work off emotion (*τὰ οἰκεῖα πάθη ἀποκαθαίρομεν*). It is clear that Iamblichus must have had a pathological explanation of the effect of the Drama before him. But he has taken the edge off the Aristotelian theory by giving it an ethical turn; it will be seen that he makes the *catharsis* of passions mean the same thing as the moderation of them (*μετριώτερα ἀπεργαζόμεθα καὶ ἀποκαθαίρομεν*), thus anticipating by many centuries the interpretation of *παθημάτων κάθαρσις* now usually associated with the names of Heinsius and Lessing.

(4) The cathartic effect of the Drama is one of the many controversial points discussed by Proclus in his commentary on Plato's Republic. The passages bearing on it will be found quoted under Fr. V. According to Proclus the Aristotelian answer to Plato was that the Drama serves a useful purpose as an outlet for emotions which would disturb the peace of the soul, if their just claims were not recognized and from time to time duly satisfied by means of some such gratification as is supplied in the theatre. This view of the effect of the Drama Proclus attributes to Aristotle; his reference, however, to other apologists for the Drama may make one hesitate to believe him to have found it for himself in the now lost Second Book of the Poetics. The statement in its existing form seems rather to have been taken from some follower of Aristotle, possibly from Theophrastus, its phraseology representing the sense rather than the words of the Aristotelian original.

Disengaged from its Neoplatonic surroundings in Iamblichus and Proclus, the catharsis theory before them may be thus

reconstructed in outline: The Drama has a therapeutic (comp. 1449 b 27
Proclus τὸ πεπονηκὸς αὐτῶν θεραπεύσαντας) rather than a directly moral effect; and the excitement it supplies is required by us at times (comp. Proclus δεόμενα δέ τινος ἐν καιρῷ κινήσεως) to carry off (comp. παθῶν ἀπεράσεις in both Iamblichus and Proclus) or purge away (comp. Iamblichus πάθη . . . ἀποκαθαίρομεν) certain emotions, and relieve the soul of the disquietude they would cause (comp. Proclus ἀνενοχλήτους ἡμᾶς ἀπ' αὐτῶν . . . ποιεῖν), if defrauded of the satisfaction naturally due to them (comp. Proclus πρὸς ἀφοσίωσιν τῶν παθῶν). The whole theory in fact is simply a fuller and more complete version of that we still have in brief in the Politics, with ἀποκάθαρσις or ἀπέρασις in place of the primitive Aristotelian term, κάθαρσις.

II.

Notwithstanding the arguments of Weil and Bernays, the old interpretation of παθημάτων κάθαρσις, which makes it mean the 'purification' of certain passions, is far from being extinct even in our own day. Κάθαρσις is supposed to be a metaphor from the religious rite of purification, whereby the hand or soul was cleansed from some pollution or stain of sin. Understood in this sense, therefore, the term would naturally imply that certain passions require 'purification' from something, i. e. from something more or less of the nature of an impurity. What this element of impurity is, and in what sense the emotions in question are supposed to become 'pure', are points on which there is no slight divergence of opinion among the upholders of this interpretation of κάθαρσις. The principal explanations which have been propounded may be roughly distinguished and classified as follows[1]:—

(1) Tragedy is said to purify pity and fear, because the frequent excitement of these emotions in the theatre has a tendency to weaken their force, and thus moderate and reduce them to just measure (Heinsius, Milton, Lessing, etc.).

(2) The lessons and examples in Tragedy have a purifying and moderating effect on pity, fear, and other evil passions (Victorius, etc.).

(3) The tragic pity and fear are regarded as pure, because they are aroused not by real suffering, but only by the imaginary

[1] Comp. Twining[2] 2 p. 3, and Weil l. c. p. 135.

1449 b 27 woes of the theatre; so that there is no admixture of pain in them (Batteux, etc.).

(4) They are regarded as pure, because, as aroused by Tragedy, they are disinterested emotions, with no self-regarding element in them (Brandis, Susemihl).

(5) They are pure, because the sublimity of Tragedy exalts pity and fear into high and noble forms of feeling (Hermann).

The first of these, the only view that calls for serious consideration, has an especial interest for us owing to the fact that in the eighteenth century it found a very distinguished exponent in Lessing. It must be admitted, however, that Lessing himself did little more than expand the old idea of 'moderating' the passions, and translate it back into the language of the Nicomachean Ethics. 'The tragic purification of the passions,' he says, 'consists merely in the conversion of pity and fear into virtuous habits of mind. But as with every virtue, according to Aristotle, there are on either side of it extremes of excess and defect, between which it stands as a mean, Tragedy, if it is to turn pity into virtue, must be able to purify us from both extremes of pity; and it must do the same thing with fear likewise.'[1] The whole theory, as stated even by Lessing, is open to many and very grave objections. (1) It confuses two distinct things, the purification of a feeling and the purification of the soul from a feeling. (2) It confuses the ideas of 'pure' and 'moderate', though there is no direct logical or other relation between them; excess or defect in certain matters may be a fault, but they cannot be termed 'impurities'. (3) It rests on a false hypothesis as to the position of Tragedy in the social life of ancient Greece; the performance of Tragedy was too

[1] 'Da nämlich, es kurz zu sagen, diese Reinigung in nichts anderm beruht, als in der Verwandlung der Leidenschaften in tugendhafte Fertigkeiten, bei jeder Tugend aber, nach unserm Philosophen, sich diesseits und jenseits ein Extrem findet, zwischen welchem sie inne steht: so muss die Tragödie, wenn sie unser Mitleid in Tugend verwandeln soll, uns von beiden Extremen des Mitleids zu reinigen vermögend sein; welches auch von der Furcht zu verstehen. Das tragische Mitleid muss nicht allein, in Ansehung des Mitleids, die Seele desjenigen reinigen, welcher zu viel Mitleid fühlet, sondern auch desjenigen, welcher zu wenig empfindet. Die tragische Furcht muss nicht allein, in Ansehung der Furcht, die Seele desjenigen reinigen, welcher sich ganz und gar keines Unglücks befürchtet, sondern auch desjenigen, den ein jedes Unglück, auch das entfernteste, auch das unwahrscheinlichste, in Angst setzt' (Hamb. Dram. St. 78). As Heinsius had said something very like this long before him (v. Zerbst, Ein Vorläufer Lessing's in der Aristotelesinterpretation p. 29), Lessing's originality here is not so marked as his power of statement.

occasional to have a marked and abiding effect on the moral character of the hearers (v. supra, p. 176). (4) Even if the tragic excitement of emotion be supposed to have been sufficiently frequent to produce a habit, it does not follow that the resulting habit would be one of moderation in the matter of feeling; we have no right to suppose that the habitual indulgence of strong emotion (e. g. pity and fear) will weaken its force or reduce it to just measure. Habits according to Aristotle arise from corresponding activities, *ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται* (Eth. N. 2. 1 p. 1103 b 21). We should expect, therefore, that the strong emotion aroused by Tragedy would, if habitualized by repetition, end in a habit of strong emotion, not in a habit of subdued or moderate emotion, not in that mean state of feeling which Aristotle identifies with virtue. The primary error, however, in this and similar interpretations of *παθημάτων κάθαρσις* is that it reads a directly moral meaning into the term, as though the theatre were a school, and the tragic poet a teacher, of morality. That, however, is not Aristotle's theory; the great function of the tragic poet, he thinks, is to excite certain emotions, and procure us the pleasure that must accompany such excitement (Poet. 14, 1453 b 11). This pleasurable excitement of emotion, in fact, is with him the end and aim of Tragedy, so far as the poet himself is concerned. The statesman, however, viewing human nature and society as a whole, is able to look beyond all this, and see the ultimate justification of the existence of Tragedy. In the Politics, accordingly, Aristotle recognizes the usefulness of Tragedy, explaining that it supplies a natural want, as a sort of *catharsis* of emotion, which as emotional creatures men require from time to time to keep their souls in health and quietude. This is a reasonable apology for Tragedy, and a sufficient answer to Plato's criticism. One may perhaps also say of it, that it is more consonant with fact and experience than the moral or disciplinary purpose which many still profess to regard as the true *raison d'être* of the theatre. 1449 b 27

ἁρμονίαν καὶ μέλος. The *καί* is explanatory, *μέλος* being added as a synonym to explain *ἁρμονία* (v. on 1, 1447 a 22). b 29

διὰ μέτρων is opposed to *διὰ μέλους*: comp. Probl. 19. 31, 920 a 12 *διὰ τὸ πολλαπλάσια εἶναι τότε τὰ μέλη ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις τῶν μέτρων.*—Plato Symp. 187 D *μέλεσί τε καὶ μέτροις.*—Lysis 205 A *οὔ τι τῶν μέτρων δέομαι ἀκοῦσαι οὐδὲ μέλος.*—Isocrates 191 B *ταῖς ᾠδαῖς καὶ τοῖς μέτροις.* b 30

1449 b 31 **πράττοντες ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν**, scil. *οἱ μιμούμενοι.* Aristotle is thinking not of the poet but of the performers, who tell the story by acting it on the stage (v. on 3, 1448 a 23). *πράττοντες* recalls the idea of the *δρώντων* in the preceding definition of Tragedy.

b 33 **ὁ τῆς ὄψεως κόσμος.** *ὄψις* is usually rendered by 'spectaculum,' 'apparatus,' 'scenery,' or *mise en scène*; according to Twining it comprehends 'scenery, dresses—the whole visible apparatus of the theatre'. This explanation is too wide; the reference is merely to the visible appearance of the *actors* when got up in character by the *σκευοποιός* or costumier (see on 6, 1450 b 20). Aristotle accordingly more than once uses the word in a concrete sense in the plural, because each of the characters would require a special and distinctive make-up. The formula *ὁ τῆς ὄψεως κόσμος* implies that the visible make-up of the actors is of the nature of a decorative adjunct (v. on 4, 1449 a 29), a mere accessory to the poet's work (v. 6, 1450 b 16), on which he, as an artist, has no right to rely for his effects (v. 14, 1453 b 7). The term *ὄψις* like many other technical words in the Poetics was probably already familiar in this sense in the language of the theatre (comp. Festschrift Theodor Gomperz dargebracht p. 166).

μελοποιία (properly the making of *μέλη*) replaces the original term *μέλος* as a synonym for it; comp. 6, 1450 b 16, and Pol. 8. 7, 1341 b 23 *τὴν μουσικὴν ὁρῶμεν διὰ μελοποιίας καὶ ῥυθμῶν οὖσαν.*

b 34 **λέγω δὲ λέξιν μὲν ταύτην** is to be compared with *λέγω γὰρ μῦθον τοῦτον* in 6, 1450 a 4 (v. ad loc.). A definition is given because *λέξις* is a term with several meanings (v. on 21, 1459 a 12). The present definition describes the *λέξις* in a play in reference to the poet, as the 'composition of the verses'; that which comes later on, in 6, 1450 b 13, views it rather from the side of the dramatic personages, as the 'expression of their thought in words'.

b 35 **μέτρων** has the concrete sense of 'verses', like *τοῖς μέτροις* in 1, 1447 a 29 (comp. on b 30).

b 36 **πᾶσαν.** *πᾶσιν*, the emendation of Madius, may perhaps seem to be supported by the fragment of Democritus (fr. 165 Diels), *ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ὃ πάντες ἴσμεν.* But no change is really wanted; instead of defining *μελοποιία* Aristotle thinks it enough to say that its whole nature is too obvious to require explanation.

ἐπεὶ δὲ πράξεώς ἐστι κτέ. Comp. *μίμησις πράξεως* in the preceding definition. Having spoken of the externals of a tragedy, its *ὄψις*, *λέξις* and *μελοποιία*, Aristotle passes on to elements of another kind, those which constitute its internal content. The subject in a

tragedy is an action with the personages concerned therein as 1449 b 36
agents. The *μῦθος*, the fable or plot of the play, represents the action as such; the *ἦθος* and *διάνοια* manifested in the language of the dramatis personae represent the personality of the agents. Oedipus, for instance, is in a poem only a name for a certain group of qualities, moral and intellectual, which his actions and the language put into his mouth reveal to us (comp. 9, 1451 b 7).

ποιούς τινας εἶναι κατά τε τὸ ἦθος καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν. Intellectual b 37
as well as moral states are included under *ποιότητες* (Cat. 8, 8 b 29). A little further on, however, in 1450 a 5, Aristotle uses the term *ποιούς τινας* as though it naturally referred rather to the *ἦθος* or moral character. For the antithesis between *ἦθος* and *διάνοια* comp. Pol. 8. 1, 1337 a 38 *οὐδὲ φανερὸν πότερον πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν πρέπει μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος*, and the distinction assumed throughout the Nicomachean Ethics and elsewhere between the *ἠθικαί* and the *διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταί*.

πέφυκεν begins the apodosis. There are thus in the natural 1450 a 1
order of things, says Aristotle, two distinguishable factors in the action of the individual agent, his *ἦθος* and his *διάνοια*; these are the inner causes of men's actions, and of the success or failure of their lives. *πέφυκεν* is, like the Platonic *φύσιν ἔχει* (Rep. 473 A, 489 B), impersonal. Vahlen illustrates this usage from Pol. 2. 2, 1261 b 7 *οὔτε πέφυκε μίαν οὕτως εἶναι τὴν πόλιν*.—4. 12, 1296 b 26 *ἐνταῦθα πέφυκεν εἶναι δημοκρατίαν*, and Demosthenes 14, 30 *τὰς κρήνας καὶ τὰ φρέατα ἐπιλείπειν πέφυκεν*.

κατὰ ταύτας = *κατὰ τὰς πράξεις*; comp. a 19 *κατὰ δὲ τὰς πράξεις* a 2
εὐδαίμονες ἢ τοὐναντίον.

τῆς μὲν πράξεως ὁ μῦθος ἡ μίμησις. To complete the statement a 3
Aristotle might very well have added a clause like *τῶν δὲ πραττόντων τὰ ἤθη καὶ αἱ διάνοιαι*; and it has been suggested (J. of Phil. 5 p. 119) that these words or something equivalent must have dropped out. In a context like the present, however, this second point may have been left to be mentally supplied by the reader (comp. Vahlen ad loc.), as the emphatic mention of the first point (*τῆς μὲν πράξεως κτέ.*) is enough to suggest it (comp. De interpr. 14, 23 b 30, and Waitz ad loc.). For this use of *μέν* solitarium comp. 26, 1462 b 5, and Waitz on An. pr. 2. 11, 61 a 19.

τοῦτον (= *τοῦτο*) is preparative and explained by *τὴν σύνθεσιν τῶν* a 4
πραγμάτων. The assimilation of gender has been a stumbling-block to Madius and others, though found again in 22, 1458 a 26

1450 ᵃ 4 *αἰνίγματός τε γὰρ ἰδέα αὕτη ἐστί, τὸ λέγοντα ὑπάρχοντα ἀδύνατα συνάψαι* (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr.[3] 2, 1 p. 74).

ᵃ 6 **διάνοιαν**, scil. *εἶναι λέγω*. Instead of attempting a definition, Aristotle evades the difficulty by saying that *διάνοια* is manifested in the argumentative and reflective utterances of the dramatis personae (comp. infra ᵇ 11). The statement here is merely provisional, as one may see by comparing the fuller exposition in 19, 1456 ᵃ 34–ᵇ 8—where we are told among other things that the *διάνοια* of a personage may be shown in his actions as well as in his words. *Διάνοια* in the sense it bears in the Poetics is, like *ἦθος*, an element in the personality of the dramatis personae. It is their intellectual capacity, as evinced in their language (or it may be, in their actions), and it is to be seen whenever they argue or make an appeal to the feelings of their hearers, in other words, when they reason or plead with one of the other dramatis personae in the same sort of way as a rhetor might do. Hence it is that the general theory of the *διάνοια* in a play is said (19, 1456 ᵃ 34) to belong to Rhetoric rather than Poetry; and a speech with a great display of *διάνοια* in it is a rhetorical speech (v. on ᵇ 6). The term answering to Aristotle's *διάνοια* in Isocrates is *ἐνθυμήματα*, 'arguments': Isocr. 191 A *μετὰ μέτρων καὶ ῥυθμῶν ἅπαντα ποιοῦσιν . . . ἃ τοσαύτην ἔχει χάριν, ὥστ' ἂν καὶ τῇ λέξει καὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν ἔχῃ κακῶς, ὅμως αὐταῖς ταῖς εὐρυθμίαις καὶ ταῖς συμμετρίαις ψυχαγωγοῦσι τοὺς ἀκούοντας.*—319 D *καὶ γὰρ τῇ λέξει ποιητικωτέρᾳ καὶ ποικιλωτέρᾳ τὰς πράξεις δηλοῦσι, καὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν ὀγκωδεστέροις καὶ καινοτέροις χρῆσθαι ζητοῦσιν.*

λέγοντες: comp. ᵇ 6 *ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων*, and ᵇ 7 *πολιτικῶς ἐποίουν λέγοντας*. Aristotle is thinking more immediately of the *ῥήσεις* in a tragedy, and of the intellectual, i. e. the rhetorical or argumentative, capacity they may reveal in the personages.

ᵃ 7 **ἀποδεικνύασίν τι**: ᵇ 11 *ἀποδεικνύουσί τι ὡς ἔστιν ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν.*—19, 1456 ᵃ 37 *τό τε ἀποδεικνύναι καὶ τὸ λύειν.*—Rhet. 1. 1, 1355 ᵃ 5 *ἡ δὲ πίστις ἀπόδειξίς τις· τότε γὰρ πιστεύομεν μάλιστα ὅταν ἀποδεδεῖχθαι ὑπολάβωμεν.*

ἢ καὶ ἀποφαίνονται γνώμην. The equivalent in ᵇ 12 is the more general expression, *ἢ καθόλου τι ἀποφαίνονται*, but it is hardly worth while to bring the two passages into unison by restoring here (with Bernays, Zwei Abhandl. p. 155) *ἢ καθόλου ἀποφαίνονται*, on the assumption that *γνώμην* may have come in as a gloss. A *γνώμη* as defined in the Rhetoric is a maxim, or general proposition relating to the conduct of life: Rhet. 2. 21, 1394 ᵃ 21 *ἔστι δὲ γνώμη ἀπό-*

φανσις, οὐ μέντοι περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον, οἷον ποῖός τις Ἰφικράτης, 1450 a 7
ἀλλὰ καθόλου· καὶ οὐ περὶ πάντων καθόλου, οἷον ὅτι τὸ εὐθὺ τῷ καμπύλῳ ἐναντίον, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὅσων αἱ πράξεις εἰσί, καὶ αἱρετὰ ἢ φευκτά ἐστι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν. The corresponding Latin term was *sententia*: Quintilian 8. 5. 3 *Antiquissimae sunt quae proprie . . . sententiae vocantur, quas Graeci γνώμας appellant: utrumque autem nomen ex eo acceperunt, quod similes sunt consiliis aut decretis.*

μέρη εἶναι ἕξ. An answer to the question announced in 1, a 8
1447 a 10 *ἐκ πόσων καὶ ποίων ἐστὶ μορίων.*

καθ' ὃ ποιά τις ἐστὶν ἡ τραγῳδία. The word *μέρος* being ambiguous (Metaph. Δ 25, 1023 b 12; Z 10, 1034 b 32), this clause had to be added to mark the distinction between the 'parts' at present under consideration and those to be enumerated hereafter in chap. 12. The parts here described are the formative constituents of a tragedy; whereas those defined in chap. 12 are the sections into which it is divided. It is through these various formative constituents that we are able to speak of a tragedy as *ποία τις*—as good or bad, as *ἠθική* or *πεπλεγμένη* or *παθητική*, or whatever else it may be said to be, when we come to judge of its quality.

οὐκ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν = *οὐκ ὀλίγοι τῶν ποιητῶν.* The *ὡς εἰπεῖν* which a 12
follows should perhaps be transposed and inserted after *πᾶν* in the next line. Of the many emendations that have been propounded the simplest certainly is that of Bursian, *οὐκ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν* ⟨*ἀλλὰ πάντες*⟩, on which that formerly suggested by myself, *ὀλίγου αὐτῶν* ⟨*ἅπαντες*⟩ (J. of Phil. 14 p. 44), was based. *οὐκ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν*, however, has on it a certain stamp of genuineness. The sense seems to be this: The six parts are in the nature of things possible elements in every tragedy, so to say; and due use has been made of them by not a few of the poets. The statement may be compared with those in a 15, a 36, and 18, 1456 a 3, where the existence is recognized of plays weak or deficient in some of the parts. For the sense of *ἔχει* in this passage (='admits of', 'has in it the possibility of') comp. 2, 1448 a 7; and for the distinction between it and *κέχρηνται*, Eth. N. 7. 4, 1146 b 32 *ὁ ἔχων μὲν οὐ χρώμενος δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ.*—1147 a 1 *ἔχοντα μὲν ἀμφοτέρας* [scil. *τὰς προτάσεις*] *οὐδὲν κωλύει πράττειν παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, χρώμενον μέντοι τῇ καθόλου ἀλλὰ μὴ τῇ κατὰ μέρος* (comp. Bon. Ind. 854 b 37).

εἴδεσι: see on 4, 1449 a 7. a 13

ὄψεις: see on 6, 1449 b 33.

1450 a 13 **πᾶν**, i.e. every play; comp. 12, 1452 b 18 *ἁπάντων*.—18, 1456 a 31 *ἐξ ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλο*.

a 15 **μέγιστον κτέ.** Aristotle proceeds at this point to arrange the six elements in the order of their relative importances; and he begins by asserting, with an abundance of reasons which seems to imply that it was a subject of controversy at the time, the supreme importance of the *μῦθος*. As it is the first duty of a tragedy to represent an action, the *μῦθος* or story of action in it must be the first and most essential element in its construction. The characters, i.e. the personal agents, are mainly required in order to work out the story, and as means to that end; so that this element is to be deemed of secondary and subordinate significance as compared with the *μῦθος*. The paramount importance of plot in Drama has been re-asserted with equal emphasis in our own time by an eminent living dramatist: 'The idea, the plot, always comes first. The plot, in a sense, is nine-tenths of a play' (H. A. Jones, Strand Magazine 34 p. 379).

ἡ τῶν πραγμάτων σύστασις = *ὁ μῦθος*. As the action in a tragedy is a whole of some magnitude (comp. 4, 1449 a 19; 6, 1449 b 25), it must have a plurality of incidents (*πράγματα*) embodied in it. What Aristotle means by a combination of incidents may be seen from his synopses of the Iphigenia and Odyssey in 17, 1455 b 2 sqq.

a 17 **βίου**: Plato Laws 817 B *ἡμεῖς ἐσμὲν τραγῳδίας αὐτοὶ ποιηταὶ κατὰ δύναμιν ὅτι καλλίστης ἅμα καὶ ἀρίστης· πᾶσα οὖν* [? *γοῦν*] *ἡμῖν ἡ πολιτεία ξυνέστηκε μίμησις τοῦ καλλίστου καὶ ἀρίστου βίου, ὃ δή φαμεν ἡμεῖς γε ὄντως εἶναι τραγῳδίαν τὴν ἀληθεστάτην*.—Lycurgus in Leocr. 102 *οἱ ποιηταὶ μιμούμενοι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον*. Alcidamas described the Odyssey as a *καλὸν ἀνθρωπίνου βίου κάτοπτρον* (Aristot. Rhet. 3. 3, 1406 b 12). Of Menander also it was said: *Ὦ Μένανδρε καὶ βίε, πότερος ἄρ' ὑμῶν πότερον ἀπεμιμήσατο;* (Nauck, Aristophanis Byz. Fragm. p. 249).

καὶ εὐδαιμονίας: Plato Rep. 603 C *πράττοντας, φαμέν, ἀνθρώπους μιμεῖται ἡ μιμητικὴ βιαίους ἢ ἑκουσίας πράξεις καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν ἢ εὖ οἰομένους ἢ κακῶς πεπραγέναι*.

a 18 **ἐν πράξει.** According to the definition in Eth. N. 1. 6, 1098 a 16 happiness is a certain kind of activity, a *ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετήν*. Comp. Phys. 2. 6, 197 b 4 *ἡ δὲ εὐδαιμονία πρᾶξίς τις· εὐπραξία γάρ*.—Pol. 7. 3, 1325 a 32 *ἡ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία πρᾶξίς ἐστιν* (also Eth. N. 1. 8, 1098 b 21; Rhet. 1. 5, 1360 b 14).

τὸ τέλος: Eth. N. 1. 8, 1098 b 18 *πράξεις τινὲς λέγονται καὶ ἐνέργειαι τὸ τέλος*.

οὐ ποιότης: Eth. N. 10. 2, 1173 a 14 *οὐδὲ γὰρ αἱ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνέρ-* 1450 a 18
γειαι ποιότητές εἰσιν, οὐδ' ἡ εὐδαιμονία.

πράττουσι: scil. *οἱ μιμούμενοι.* The reference is to the actors a 21
(see on 3. 1448 a 23) rather than the poets.

συμπεριλαμβάνουσιν, scil. *ἐν τῇ μιμήσει*, 'they include in the representation'; *συμπεριλαμβάνειν* in this sense is not infrequent in later Greek (v. HSt. s. v.). It is hardly necessary, therefore, to reject it for the reading of one of the apographs, *συμπαραλαμβάνουσιν*, though it is no doubt quite true that manuscripts are apt to confuse the two prepositions.

διὰ τὰς πράξεις: *διά* in this connexion must mean 'with a view a 22
to', 'for the sake of', as in Thuc. 2. 89. 4 *διὰ τὴν σφετέραν δόξαν.*

καὶ ὁ μῦθος. The *καί* is explanatory, 'that is to say'.

τὸ δὲ τέλος μέγιστον ἁπάντων: modelled on the proverb in Plato a 23
Rep. 377 A *ἀρχὴ παντὸς ἔργου μέγιστον*, which reappears in Aristotle Soph. el. 33, 183 b 22 *μέγιστον γὰρ ἴσως ἀρχὴ παντός, ὥσπερ λέγεται.*—Probl. 10. 13, 892 a 29 *ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴ παντὸς ἔργου μέγιστον· ἥμισυ γάρ.*

τῶν νέων. As it is clear from 14, 1453 b 28 that Euripides is not a 25
classed among the old poets (*οἱ παλαιοί*), *οἱ νέοι*, 'the moderns,' must mean the poets from Euripides downwards. It is to be observed also that, when Aristotle a little further on in this chapter distinguishes between *οἱ ἀρχαῖοι* and *οἱ νῦν*, the point noted as characteristic of 'the moderns' (*ῥητορικῶς ποιοῦσι λέγοντας*) is manifestly true of Euripides, and was recognized as true of him by the ancients themselves (see on *ῥητορικῶς*, b 8).

ἀήθεις: 24, 1460 a 11 *οὐδέν' ἀήθη ἀλλ' ἔχοντα ἤθη. ἀήθης* is, like other compounds of *α* privativum (De anima 2. 10, 422 a 26; Metaph. Δ 22, 1022 b 32), an ambiguous word, as it may mean either 'destitute of character', or merely 'deficient in character'. Aristotle must be using it in this latter sense, since a play with personages wholly destitute of character is hardly conceivable. The language in the illustration which follows from painting, *οὐδὲν ἔχει ἦθος*, is an instance of a common form of exaggeration, just like that in the saying of Pope, *Most women have no characters at all.*

τοιοῦτοι: i. e. *ἀήθεις.* a 26

οἷον . . . πέπονθεν: De gen. an. 5. 3, 783 a 6 *ἔστι δ' ἔνια τῶν ζῴων ἃ μαλακὴν μὲν ἔχει τὴν τρίχα ἧττον δὲ λεπτήν, οἷον τὸ τῶν δασυπόδων πρὸς τὸ τῶν προβάτων πέπονθεν.*—Rhet. 3. 2, 1404 b 22 *οἷον ἡ Θεοδώρου φωνὴ πέπονθε πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ὑποκριτῶν.*

1450 a 26 **γραφέων.** For other illustrations from painting see on 2. 1448 a 5.

a 27 **Πολύγνωτον.** The same view of him, as one who knew how to indicate character in painting, is implied in Pol. 8. 5, 1340 a 37 *τὰ Πολυγνώτου κἂν εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν γραφέων ἢ τῶν ἀγαλματοποιῶν ἐστιν ἠθικός.*

a 28 **Ζεύξιδος.** This taken in connexion with what is said of him later on, in 25, 1461 b 12, would seem to show that, in Aristotle's view, Zeuxis sacrificed expression to beauty.

a 29 **ῥήσεις**: i. e. the speeches put into the mouths of the personages in a play or poem (comp. 15, 1454 a 31; 18, 1456 a 31). The word had been already used in this technical sense by both Plato and Aristophanes.

ἠθικάς. In the Rhetoric the *ἠθικὸς λόγος* is one designed to create a favourable idea of the speaker's *ἦθος*, in contradistinction to the *παθητικὸς λόγος*, which addresses the feelings, and the *ἀποδεικτικὸς λόγος*, which addresses the reason of his audience. In matters of imitative art, however, the usual meaning of *ἠθικός* is *μιμητικὸς ἤθους*, 'expressive of character' (comp. Bon. Ind. 315 b 21)—which is the sense the word has in the present and other passages in the Poetics. Thus in 18, 1456 a 1 a certain kind of tragedy is termed the *ἠθικὴ τραγῳδία*, 'the tragedy of character', because its main interest is as a portraiture of character; in 23, 1459 b 16 the Odyssey is described as *ἠθική*, because it is more of a portraiture of character than the Iliad; in 24, 1460 b 3 certain passages in a poem are termed *ἠθικὰ μέρη*, as serving to bring out the *ἦθος* of the personages in the story.

λέξει καὶ διανοίᾳ εὖ πεποιημένας, 'made perfect in the matter of language and thought'. The same use of the dative is found in a 36 *τῇ λέξει καὶ τοῖς ἤθεσιν ἀκριβοῦν.*—24, 1460 b 2 *τῇ δὲ λέξει δεῖ διαπονεῖν*; and in Alcidamas De soph. 12 *οἱ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἀκριβῶς ἐξειργασμένοι* [scil. λόγοι].

a 30 **⟨οὔπω⟩ ποιήσει ὃ ἦν τῆς τραγῳδίας ἔργον**: Rhet. 3. 2, 1404 b 2 *ὁ λόγος, ἐὰν μὴ δηλοῖ, οὐ ποιήσει τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον.* The Arabic version seems to suggest *οὔπω* (see on 9, 1451 b 13) rather than *οὐ*. For the fut. with *οὔπω* comp. Eth. N. 5. 10, 1135 a 22 *ὥστε ἔσται τι ἄδικον μὲν ἀδίκημα δὲ οὔπω, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ ἑκούσιον προσῇ.*—6. 13, 1144 b 35 *ὥστε τὴν μὲν ἤδη τὴν δ' οὔπω εἰληφὼς ἔσται.* The imperfect in *ὃ ἦν τῆς τραγῳδίας ἔργον* implies that the point has been already settled in the preceding discussion (comp. Bon. Ind. 754 a 40), the reference being presumably to 6, 1449 b 36, where Tragedy is said to be a *μίμησις πράξεως*.

ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον, scil. *ποιήσει*, as in Eth. N. 6. 8, 1141 b 18 *εἰ γὰρ εἰδείη ὅτι τὰ κοῦφα εὔπεπτα κρέα καὶ ὑγιεινά, ποῖα δὲ κοῦφα ἀγνοοῖ, οὐ ποιήσει ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ' ὁ εἰδὼς ὅτι τὰ ὀρνίθεια* [*κοῦφα καὶ*] *ὑγιεινὰ ποιήσει μᾶλλον*. For the form of antithesis comp. De caelo 2. 3, 286 a 5 *πόρρω δ' οὐχ οὕτω τῷ τόπῳ, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ . . . ὀλίγην ἔχειν αἴσθησιν*, and the instances collected by Vahlen (ad loc.) and Schwab (Schanz's Beiträge 4. 1, p. 66). 1450 a 31

τούτοις refers back to the *ῥήσεις ἠθικαὶ καὶ λέξει καὶ διανοίᾳ εὖ πεποιημέναι* of a 29. Aristotle's point is, that the dramatic effectiveness of a tragedy depends before all else on its plot, and that no literary or rhetorical brilliancy will make up for a weak plot.

ψυχαγωγεῖ: comp. b 17 *ψυχαγωγικόν*. Said of a work of art the a 33
word means no more than to 'move' or 'rivet the attention', and is thus the equivalent of our word 'attract' or (as people now sometimes say) 'fascinate'. This sense of *ψυχαγωγεῖν* is as old as Xenophon: Mem. 3. 10, 6 *ὃ δὲ μάλιστα ψυχαγωγεῖ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, τὸ ζωτικὸν φαίνεσθαι, πῶς τοῦτο ἐνεργάζῃ τοῖς ἀνδριᾶσιν;* It is found more than once in Isocrates: 24 D *δέδεικται τοῖς ἐπιθυμοῦσι τοὺς ἀκροωμένους ψυχαγωγεῖν ὅτι τοῦ μὲν νουθετεῖν καὶ συμβουλεύειν ἀφεκτέον, τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα λεκτέον οἷς ὁρῶσι τοὺς ὄχλους μάλιστα χαίροντας*.—191 A *τοσαύτην ἔχει χάριν, ὥστ' ἂν καὶ τῇ λέξει καὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν ἔχῃ κακῶς, ὅμως αὐταῖς ταῖς εὐρυθμίαις καὶ ταῖς συμμετρίαις ψυχαγωγοῦσι τοὺς ἀκούοντας*. Later writers also often use the word in the sense of to 'attract' or 'please'; comp. the Antiatticista in Bekker's Anecdota 116 *ψυχαγωγεῖν: τὸ τέρπειν*, and Vahlen, Symb. Phil. Bonn. p. 168.

αἵ τε περιπέτειαι καὶ ἀναγνωρίσεις. These are considered later a 34
on in chap. 11. It will be observed that Aristotle uses the two terms without explanation, as though they were already part of the established language of the theatre. The appositional clause comes in as an afterthought, at some distance from the words it illustrates (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr.[3] 2. 1 p. 282).

συνίστασθαι is apparently a middle in 24, 1460 a 34 also (v. ad loc.). a 37

οἷον καὶ introduces not an instance but a parallel from a different class of things just like *ὥσπερ καί*, from which it is often hardly distinguishable in sense (comp. Top. 6. 9, 148 a 4; Eth. N. 9. 1, 1164 a 15; Rhet. 3. 11, 1412 a 11; 3. 12, 1413 b 25). In De mem. 1, 450 b 20 and in Plato Phaedr. 255 C *οἷον* is so completely equivalent to *ὥσπερ* as to have a *οὕτως* as its antecedent. In Poet. 25, 1460 b 33 *οἷον . . . ταύτῃ* is practically the same thing as *ὥσπερ . . . οὕτως*.

1450 a 38 **ἀρχή.** A little before this the *μῦθος* was said to be the *τέλος τῆς τραγῳδίας* (a 22). From one point of view it is the *ἀρχή*, as being the necessary basis of every tragedy; from another it is the *τέλος*, because it is this much more than the characters that Tragedy as a *μίμησις πράξεως* has to represent.

ψυχή: Isocrates 142 c *ἔστι γὰρ ψυχὴ πόλεως οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἢ πολιτεία.*—261 c *πᾶσα πολιτεία ψυχὴ πόλεώς ἐστιν.*—[Demosthenes] 60. 23 *ἡ τῶνδε τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀρετὴ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἦν ψυχὴ τἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν*—Martianus Capella 3, 268 *Est accentus, ut quidam putaverunt, anima vocis.*

a 39 **παραπλήσιον κτέ.** This clause Castelvetro and others would transpose and insert after *σύστασιν πραγμάτων* in a 33. It comes in, however, naturally enough where it stands, as an afterthought to illustrate the secondary position (*δεύτερον δὲ τὰ ἤθη*) of the element of character in a play. So also in the sister art of painting, says Aristotle, the colouring is of subordinate importance in comparison with the design which makes the work to mean something and be like something; a portrait is a portrait, and will give us the pleasure of one, even though executed in mere whites and greys; whereas a medley of much more beautiful colours without a design to give them meaning will not produce the same pleasure, because we cannot see that it represents anything. The nature of the pleasure found in a work of imitative art was explained in 4, 1448 b 13.

b 1 **εἰ γάρ τις ἐναλείψειε κτέ.** The sense is thus given by Goulston: 'si quis tabulam, pigmentis licet pulcherrimis, temere fusimque illeverit; non perinde spectantem oblectet, ac si, albo licet colore, imaginem delinearet certam: pari modo in tragoediis absque constitutione rerum minus valent mores quam morum expers fabula.' The object left to be understood with *ἐναλείψετε* is *τὸν πίνακα*, the 'panel' or 'canvas', as we should say; *ἀλείφειν* and *ἐπαλείφειν* are used in just the same way, in the sense of covering a surface with colour. *ἐναλείφειν*, it is to be observed, has apparently a different kind of object in De gen. an. 2. 6, 743 b 23 *οἱ γραφεῖς ὑπογράψαντες ταῖς γραμμαῖς οὕτως ἐναλείφουσι τοῖς χρώμασι τὸ ζῷον* ('painters first sketch the outline of the figure before proceeding to work it out in colour'). *χύδην* means 'without system or order', i.e. without a design to give form and sense to the whole. The direct opposite of this unmeaning medley of the most beautiful colours (*εἴ τις ἐναλείψειε τοῖς καλλίστοις φαρμάκοις χύδην*) is a portrait in plain whites and greys (*λευκογραφήσας εἰκόνα*); in what follows,

therefore, *εἰκόνα* serves as an antithesis to *χύδην* (comp. Vahlen, Symb. Phil. Bonn. p. 166) and *λευκογραφήσας* to *τοῖς καλλίστοις φαρμάκοις*. *λευκογραφεῖν*, as a derivative from *λευκογράφος* (a word no longer to be found), is to 'paint monochromes in white', i.e. in shades of white and grey (it would seem) on a dark ground. Zeuxis, whom Aristotle has just mentioned in a 27, was among other things a painter of monochromes in white—*pinxit et monochromata ex albo* (Pliny N. H. 35. 64; comp. Brunn, Gr. Künstler[2] 2 p. 55). A portrait, however, even though it be a mere monochrome in whites (comp. *λευκογραφήσας εἰκόνα*), will have a meaning, and give the mind the intellectual pleasure which accompanies the recognition of the meaning (comp. 4, 1448 b 15); whereas a medley of beautiful colours has no meaning, and the pleasure it gives the beholder is of a wholly different order (comp. 4, 1448 b 18 *οὐχ ᾗ μίμημα ποιήσει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀλλὰ διὰ . . . τὴν χροιάν*). The antithesis, therefore, is simply between beautiful colours without an *εἰκών*, and an *εἰκών* without any beauty of colour. Vahlen's view of the import of these words is somewhat different. He thinks that *λευκογραφήσας* may denote the preliminary sketch (like *ὑπογράφειν* in the above-quoted passage in the De gen. an.) in white, which is afterwards filled in with colour, when the picture comes to be finished; so that the clause may be taken to describe two stages in the process of painting, (1) *λευκογραφεῖν εἰκόνα*, and (2) *ἐναλείφειν φαρμάκοις*, and serves to illustrate the order of procedure in Tragedy, where the *μῦθος* is said to come first, as the *ἀρχὴ τῆς τραγῳδίας*, and the *ἤθη* second: 'orationis formam sic accipio, εἴ τις ἐναλείψειε τοῖς καλλίστοις φαρμάκοις χύδην, οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως εὐφράνειεν καὶ λευκογραφήσας εἰκόνα εἰ ἐναλείψειε φαρμάκοις[1], ut *χύδην*, h. e. nulla ante delineatione facta, et *λευκογραφήσας εἰκόνα* inter se opponantur'. This very subtle interpretation seems to me to read more into Aristotle's words than is required for the argument. 1450 b 1

ἔστιν τε μίμησις πράξεως κτέ. supports the statement (a 38–39) before the parenthesis by recalling the general fact on which it is based (v. a 20–23). b 3

τρίτον δὲ ἡ διάνοια. As the intellectual quality of the dramatis personae comes out mainly in what they are made to say, *διάνοια* is provisionally explained (see on a 6) as a power of making the best of one's case or of saying the right thing. b 4

[1] Aristotle would perhaps have said: *οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως εὐφράνειε καὶ εἰ λευκογραφήσας εἰκόνα οὕτως ἐναλείψειε τοῖς φαρμάκοις.*

1450 b 5 **τὰ ἐνόντα,** scil. ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν, as in Isocr. 292 E ὑπισχνοῦνται τοιούτους ῥήτορας τοὺς συνόντας ποιήσειν ὥστε μηδὲν τῶν ἐνόντων ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι παραλιπεῖν (comp. Bon. Ind. 250 a 56). The whole expression τὰ ἐνόντα καὶ τὰ ἁρμόττοντα covers the same ground as that in Rhet. 2. 22, 1396 b 5, τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα καὶ τὰ ἐπικαιρότατα.

b 6 **ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων** has been taken to mean 'in soluta oratione' (Paccius), and 'in orationibus' (Valla) or 'in eloquentia', 'bei der Beredsamkeit' (Vahlen). The explanation, however, in the context, ἐποίουν λέγοντας (b 7), is enough to show that the λόγοι Aristotle has in mind are the λόγοι in a play, i.e. the ῥήσεις put into the mouths of the personages. This is apparently the sense the word bears in the next sentence also, τῶν λόγων ἐν οἷς μηδ' ὅλως ἔστιν ὅ τι προαιρεῖται ἢ φεύγει ὁ λέγων (b 9).

τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ ῥητορικῆς ἔργον. Aristotle seems to be thinking of what is said in a play by the chief personages (e.g. the tragic hero), and of the kind of intellectual capacity (διάνοια) revealed in their statements. One has to remember that the chief personages in ancient Tragedy are not ordinary men, and that the tragic hero is expressly said by Aristotle (13, 1453 a 10–21) to be always in the best tragedies a man of great position and lineage. In a play, therefore, such personages might very well be made to speak πολιτικῶς, 'like statesmen', and to show a statesmanlike power of saying what is appropriate to the situation before them (τὰ ἁρμόττοντα). But it would also be possible to make them speak ῥητορικῶς, 'like rhetors', with something of the rhetor's cleverness in seizing on the various possible points that may be urged on the occasion (τὰ ἐνόντα, i.e. τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα). Though ῥητορική stands in a certain relation to πολιτική (Rhet. 1. 2, 1356 a 27), the distinction between them is a very real one with Aristotle; πολιτική is with him the practical wisdom of the statesman (Eth. N. 6. 8, 1141 b 23), and ῥητορική only a form of the art of argumentation—a δύναμις τοῦ πορίσαι λόγους (Rhet. 1. 2, 1356 a 33), or a δύναμις περὶ ἑκάστου τοῦ θεωρῆσαι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν (Rhet. 1. 2, 1355 b 26). There is no reference to πολιτική in chap. 19. Aristotle may perhaps have felt that the practice of the later dramatists (οἱ νῦν) was too firmly established to admit of change, and that the tragic personages accordingly must still be allowed to speak ῥητορικῶς, as they did in the Tragedy of his time.

b 7 **ἀρχαῖοι**: the dramatists anterior to Euripides (see on 6, 1450 a 25).

πολιτικῶς . . . λέγοντας, which Valla rendered by 'civiliter dicentes', is often taken to mean 'to speak the language of civil life', like ordinary citizens, as distinct from the professional orator. But as the context shows that the ability to speak *πολιτικῶς* implies something of *πολιτική* in the speaker (comp. Newman on Pol. 2. 11, 1273 b 12), *πολιτικῶς* would seem rather to mean 'like a *πολιτικός*'—the statesman being assumed to say that which is befitting (*τὰ ἁρμόττοντα*) without any ostentation of rhetorical cleverness (comp. HSt. s. v. *πολιτικός*). Vahlen (Symb. phil. Bonn. p. 175) supposes the expression to coincide in sense with the *ἠθικῶς λέγειν* of Rhet. 3. 17, 1418 a 38, which means *ἀπὸ προαιρέσεως λέγειν*, as opposed to *ἀπὸ διανοίας λέγειν* (Rhet. 3. 16, 1417 a 23). The objection to this interpretation is twofold. (1) Aristotle is to all appearance not contrasting *διάνοια* with *ἦθος*, but distinguishing between the two forms it may assume in the dramatic *ῥήσεις*. (2) *πολιτικῶς λέγειν* can hardly be identical with *ἠθικῶς λέγειν*; the personages in Comedy speak *ἠθικῶς*, but it would be a paradox to say of them that they speak *πολιτικῶς*, in the sense of there being something of *πολιτική* in their utterances. 1450 b 7

ῥητορικῶς. Euripides is termed by Aristophanes (Pax 534) a *ποιητὴς ῥηματίων δικανικῶν*. Quintilian also (10. 1, 68) thinks the study of his plays one of the best preparations for the bar: *Illud quidem nemo non fateatur necesse est, iis qui se ad agendum comparant utiliorem longe fore Euripidem. namque is et sermone . . . magis accedit oratorio generi et sententiis densus et in iis quae a sapientibus tradita sunt paene ipsis par, et dicendo ac respondendo cuilibet eorum qui fuerunt in foro diserti comparandus.* b 8

ἦθος. A statement is said to have *ἦθος* in it when it reveals the moral purpose of the speaker, the kind of thing that he purposes to do or not to do. *ἦθος* is an element in oratory also, as the credibility of the orator often depends on the impression one forms of his character. The language in the text may be compared with that in Rhet. 2. 21, 1395 b 13 *ἦθος δ' ἔχουσιν οἱ λόγοι ἐν ὅσοις δήλη ἡ προαίρεσις· αἱ δὲ γνῶμαι πᾶσαι τοῦτο ποιοῦσι διὰ τὸ ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸν τὴν γνώμην λέγοντα καθόλου περὶ τῶν προαιρετῶν, ὥστ' ἂν χρησταὶ ὦσιν αἱ γνῶμαι, καὶ χρηστοήθη φαίνεσθαι ποιοῦσι τὸν λέγοντα.*—3. 16, 1417 a 16 *ἠθικὴν δὲ χρὴ τὴν διήγησιν εἶναι. ἔσται δὲ τοῦτο ἂν εἰδῶμεν τί ἦθος ποιεῖ. ἓν μὲν δὴ τὸ προαίρεσιν δηλοῦν, ποιὸν δὲ τὸ ἦθος τῷ ποιὰν ταύτην· ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ποιὰ τῷ τέλει. διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔχουσιν οἱ μαθηματικοὶ λόγοι ἤθη, ὅτι οὐδὲ προαίρεσιν· τὸ γὰρ οὗ ἕνεκα οὐκ ἔχουσιν. ἀλλ' οἱ Σωκρατικοί· περὶ τοιούτων γὰρ λέγουσιν.*

1450 b 9 **ὁποῖά τις.** This (the reading of A^c) is very rightly retained by Vahlen, who translates the clause by 'quod aperiat voluntatem, qualia quis in quibus apertum non est aut appetat aut fugiat'; the explanation is added to show that *προαίρεσις* is to be taken in a wide sense, which may include aversion as well as desire. For an explanatory clause of this form comp. 16, 1455 a 10 *συνελογίσαντο τὴν εἱμαρμένην ὅτι ἐν τούτῳ εἵμαρτο ἀποθανεῖν*, and Plato Rep. 535 A *μέμνησαι οὖν τὴν προτέραν ἐκλογὴν τῶν ἀρχόντων, οἵους ἐξελέξαμεν;*

ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἔστι δῆλον is added because there are situations in which the moral purpose of the agent is too obvious to require to be revealed in an 'ethical' speech; see 19, 1456 b 7 for a parallel statement on the subject of *διάνοια*.

προαιρεῖται. Though the usual opposite of *φεύγειν* is the simple verb *αἱρεῖσθαι* (Bon. Ind. 18 b 3), there is a certain propriety in *προαιρεῖται* in a clause explanatory of *προαίρεσις*. The word is found in a similar antithesis in Eth. N. 10. 1, 1172 a 25 *τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα προαιροῦνται, τὰ δὲ λυπηρὰ φεύγουσιν.*

b 9* **διόπερ κτέ.** In the Rhetoric we are told that a mathematical argument does not admit of any colouring of character, because the facts with which it deals are indifferent to us—not objects of either desire or aversion: Rhet. 3. 16, 1417 a 19 *διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔχουσιν οἱ μαθηματικοὶ λόγοι ἤθη, ὅτι οὐδὲ προαίρεσιν· τὸ γὰρ οὗ ἕνεκα οὐκ ἔχουσιν.* In like manner a speech in a play may be on a subject wholly indifferent to the speaker, and in that case there is no room for any infusion of *ἦθος* into his statement.

b 12 **καθόλου τι ἀποφαίνονται** replaces the *ἀποφαίνονται γνώμην* in a 7 (v. ad loc.).

τέταρτον δὲ τῶν ἐν λόγῳ κτέ. On the reading which I have ventured to introduce into the text see the J. of Phil. 5 p. 119[1]. It is clear that the four elements in a tragedy, the *μῦθος ἤθη διάνοια* and *λέξις*, belong to it as a work of literature, and that the music and 'spectacle' are accessories, which attach to it only when it comes to be acted on the stage. Apart from these accessories, a tragedy is, like an epic (comp. 23, 1459 b 10), a *μίμησις ἐν λόγῳ* (see on 1, 1447 a 29), and all the elements which constitute it are *ἐν λόγῳ*. *τὰ ἐν λόγῳ*, therefore, is a comprehensive designation for the four literary elements, as distinct from the non-literary elements (*τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν* b 15), the music and 'spectacle', with which the enumeration concludes. If *τῶν μὲν λόγων* be retained, the genitive

[1] Comp. Markland's *ἐστιν ἐν ὑπολόγῳ* for *ἐστι μὲν ὑπὸ λόγῳ* in Lysias 4. 18, and Canter's *ἀκοὴ ἐν ἡμῖν* for *ἀκοὴ μὲν ἡμῖν* in Clem. Al. Str. 7. 36, 852 P.

has to be taken as an objective gen. after λέξις. Valla renders the words by 'orationum dictio', Paccius by 'sermonum dictio', and Goulston by 'ipsarum orationum elocutio'. The main difficulty, however, is in the particle, which has never been satisfactorily explained. Vahlen formerly (Symb. Phil. Bonn. p. 181) connected the clause with that which follows in ^{b} 15 τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν κτέ., supposing the sense to be 'viertens für die Dialoge (τῶν λόγων) die sprachliche Form; für das übrige (τῶν λοιπῶν) die Melopöie'. His later view (1885) is that the μέν in τῶν μὲν λόγων may be an instance of μέν solitarium, and that Aristotle may have meant at first to append something about the μέλη (τῶν δὲ μελῶν . . .). Such a division of the fourth part, it seems to me, is wholly inconsistent with the general scheme of the six parts, which is throughout this chapter so clearly before Aristotle's mind, as well as with the express mention of the μελοποιία in its proper place in the next sentence. 1450^{b} 12

ὥσπερ πρότερον εἴρηται. If the reference is to 6, 1449^{b} 34, where the λέξις is defined as ἡ τῶν μέτρων σύνθεσις, Aristotle must have forgotten the exact terms of his previous formula. The point, however, is practically the same in both instances; λέξις is to be understood in the sense of 'diction' or 'expression in language', and not in any of the other senses which the word might bear (see on 23, 1459^{a} 12). ^{b} 13

διὰ τῆς ὀνομασίας = διὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων, i. e. by means of the words or language of the speaker. As the ὄνομα, which includes the verb and the adverb as well as the noun, is the directly significant part of all language, ὀνομασία means practically the same thing as vocabulary or language. ^{b} 14

ἑρμηνείαν, 'communication', 'expression'; the Latin equivalent for it is *interpretatio*. After ἑρμηνείαν we may supply τῶν ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ, the spoken word being the outward sign or expression of a thought in the mind: De interpr. 1, 16^{a} 3 ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων σύμβολα. On the meaning of ἑρμηνεία in Aristotle see Waitz, Organon 1 p. 323, and Steinthal, Gesch. der Sprachwissenschaft[2] 1 p. 235.

ἔχει τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν = ταὐτὸ δύναται, 'is practically the same thing' (see on 1, 1447^{a} 8). ^{b} 15

[πέντε]. Similar instances of an intrusive numeral will be found in Rhet. 1. 2, 1356^{a} 21, and 1. 13, 1373^{b} 3 (v. Roemer ad loc.). Vahlen accepts the correction πέμπτον, in the sense of *quinto loco*: 'reliquarum autem partium (h. e. quae post illas quattuor iam ^{b} 16

1450 b 16 reliquae sunt duae) quinto loco *μελοποιία* gravissimum est condimentum, *ὄψις* autem ad poeticam artem omnino non pertinet'.

μέγιστον τῶν ἡδυσμάτων: see on 6, 1449 b 25 (*ἡδυσμένῳ*). For the pleasure given by music comp. Pol. 8. 5, 1339 b 20 *τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν πάντες εἶναί φαμεν τῶν ἡδίστων.*—1340 a 2 *δεῖ μὴ μόνον τῆς κοινῆς ἡδονῆς μετέχειν ἀπ' αὐτῆς, ἧς ἔχουσι πάντες αἴσθησιν· ἔχει γὰρ ἡ μουσικὴ τὴν ἡδονὴν φυσικήν, διὸ πάσαις ἡλικίαις καὶ πᾶσιν ἤθεσιν ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῆς ἐστι προσφιλής.*—b 15 *οἱ μὲν γὰρ νέοι διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν ἀνήδυντον οὐδὲν ὑπομένουσιν ἑκόντες, ἡ δὲ μουσικὴ φύσει τῶν ἡδυσμένων* [? *ἡδυσμάτων*] *ἐστίν.* Bernays (Zwei Abhandl. p. 157) supposed that a further statement on the subject of music, like that in the Anonymus De Comoedia (Kaibel, CGF. I p. 52), *μέλος τῆς μουσικῆς ἐστιν ἴδιον, ὅθεν ἀπ' ἐκείνης τὰς αὐτοτελεῖς ἀφορμὰς δεήσει λαμβάνειν,* may have dropped out after *ἡδυσμάτων.*

b 17 **ψυχαγωγικόν**: see on a 33.

ἀτεχνότατον: 13, 1453 b 7 *τὸ δὲ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως τοῦτο παρασκευάζειν ἀτεχνότερον καὶ χορηγίας δεόμενόν ἐστιν.* *ἄτεχνος* is frequently used in the sense of 'depending on means outside the art itself'; comp. Rhet. 3. 16, 1416 b 18 *σύγκειται γὰρ ἔχων ὁ λόγος τὸ μὲν ἄτεχνον, οὐθὲν γὰρ αἴτιος ὁ λέγων τῶν πράξεων, τὸ δ' ἐκ τῆς τέχνης.* The opposite of it in this sense is *ἔντεχνος* (Bon. Ind. 119 b 4).

b 18 **ἡ γὰρ τῆς τραγῳδίας δύναμις** *κτέ.* The tragic effect may be produced by a good tragedy even without any actual performance of it on a stage, i. e. as a mere work of literature (comp. 14, 1453 b 4, and 26, 1462 a 11). The reading of A^c here, *ὡς γάρ*, is defended by Vahlen, who translates it by *quia enim* (*wenn nämlich*), on the assumption that the apodosis is omitted in the same way as in Eth. N. 8. 6, 1157 b 3 *οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ δι' αὐτοὺς φίλοι· ᾗ γὰρ ἀγαθοί* [scil. *φίλοι εἰσίν*].—8. 10, 1159 b 10 *οἱ χρήσιμοι δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς ἐπὶ πλεῖον διαμένουσιν· ἕως γὰρ ἂν πορίζωσιν ἡδονὰς ἢ ὠφελείας ἀλλήλοις* [scil. *διαμένουσιν*], and certain more or less similar passages. The present passage (with the reading *ὡς γάρ*) does not seem to me to be a genuine parallel. On behalf of the amended reading (*ἡ γάρ*) it has to be remembered that a confusion between *ἡ* and the compendium for *ὡς* is not so uncommon in MSS. of a certain date (Bast, Comm. Palaeogr. p. 780).

ἄνευ ἀγῶνος. *ἀγών* is generally rendered by *certamen* or 'contest', but it is not clear that that is the sense Aristotle attaches to it in the present and other places (7, 1451 a 6; 13, 1453 a 27) of the Poetics. It seems to mean rather little more than a 'public performance'. Similarly *ἀγωνίζεσθαι* in 7, 1451 a 8 and 24, 1460 a 9

means apparently 'to perform in public', *συναγωνίζεσθαι* in 18, 1456 a 26 'to take part in such a performance'; and *ἀγώνισμα* in 9, 1451 b 37 a 'work to be performed in public'. The word *ἀγωνιστής*, likewise, in Pol. 8. 7, 1342 a 18 and Probl. 19. 15, 918 b 28, means no more than a 'public' or 'professional performer' (comp. *πρωταγωνιστής* etc.). In Rhet. 3. 12, 1413 b 4 *ἀγωνιστικὴ λέξις* means the style allowable in public speaking, as distinct from the *γραφικὴ λέξις*, the more formal style required for a purely literary work. The idea of contest or competition, therefore, is not always a recognizable element in the meaning of this group of words (comp. Nitzsch, De historia Homeri 2 p. 113). 1450 b 18

ἀγῶνος καὶ ὑποκριτῶν: 13, 1453 a 27 *ἐπὶ τῶν σκηνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγώνων*.—Probl. 19. 15, 918 b 28 *ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑποκριτὴς ἀγωνιστής*.—Rhet. 3. 12, 1413 b 8 *ἔστι δὲ λέξις γραφικὴ μὲν ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη, ἀγωνιστικὴ δὲ ἡ ὑποκριτικωτάτη κτἑ.* The present clause shows that the *ὄψις* is *ἥκιστα οἰκεῖον τῆς ποιητικῆς*; the next, that it is *ἀτεχνότατον*.

ὄψεων: for the plural see on 6, 1449 b 33. b 20

σκευοποιοῦ, the theatrical costumier, who enabled the actors to appear in character by supplying the masks, dresses, and other paraphernalia of their make-up; comp. Aristophanes Eq. 230 *καὶ μὴ δέδιθ᾽· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐξῃκασμένος. ὑπὸ τοῦ δέους γὰρ αὐτὸν οὐδεὶς ἤθελε τῶν σκευοποιῶν εἰκάσαι* (v. Schol. ad loc.).—Aelian V. H. 2. 13 *οἱ σκευοποιοὶ ἔπλασαν αὐτὸν ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα ἐξεικάσαντες.*—Pollux 4. 115 *σκευὴ μὲν ἡ τῶν ὑποκριτῶν στολή . . . σκευοποιὸς δὲ ὁ προσωποποιός.*—2. 47 *ἡ δὲ νέα κωμῳδία καὶ προσωποποιὸν εἴρηκεν ὃν ἡ ἀρχαία σκευοποιὸν ἐκάλει* (v. Meineke, FCG. 4 p. 680). For *σκευή* in the sense of the make-up of actors see Eurip. Suppl. 1054, Aristoph. Ran. 108, Plato Rep. 577 B.

κεῖται: as has been stated in the definition of Tragedy in 6, 1449 b 25 (comp. Bon. Ind. 380 b 43). b 23

τελείας καὶ ὅλης. Although there is strictly speaking a certain distinction between the idea of 'complete' (*τέλειος*: v. Metaph. Δ 16, 1021 b 12) and that of 'whole' (*ὅλος*: v. Metaph. Δ 26, 1023 b 26), the two terms are so closely allied in sense as to be all but synonymous: Phys. 3. 6, 207 a 7 *ἄπειρον μὲν οὖν ἐστιν οὗ κατὰ ποσὸν λαμβάνουσιν αἰεί τι λαβεῖν ἔστιν ἔξω. οὗ δὲ μηδὲν ἔξω, τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ τέλειον καὶ ὅλον· οὕτω γὰρ ὁριζόμεθα τὸ ὅλον, οὗ μηθὲν ἄπεστιν . . . ὅλον δὲ καὶ τέλειον ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ πάμπαν ἢ σύνεγγυς τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν.* b 24

ἐχούσης τι μέγεθος: see on 4, 1449 a 19 and 6, 1449 b 25. b 25

1450 b 25 **μηδὲν ἔχον μέγεθος**, ‘of no size,’ as we say, means the same thing as *πάμμικρον* in b 37 (Sauppe ap. Teichmüller, Aristot. Forsch. I p. 54), just as in 6, 1450 a 28 *οὐδὲν ἔχει ἦθος* means practically ‘has but very little character’ in it.

b 27 **μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης**. By a ‘beginning’ Aristotle does not mean something without antecedents, but only something that may be detached as it were from its antecedents, and viewed apart from them as the first term in a new series of events.

b 28 **μετ᾽ ἐκεῖνο δ᾽**: comp. b 30 *μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο*.—b 31 *καὶ μετ᾽ ἐκεῖνο*.—An. pr. I. 4, 25 b 35 *καλῶ δὲ μέσον μὲν ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ ἄλλο ἐν τούτῳ ἐστίν*.

b 34 **ἰδέαις**. *ἰδέα*, ‘form,’ ‘sort,’ or ‘kind,’ is frequently used, just like *εἶδος*, which has much the same sense, without any genitive to explain it. Instances of this allusive, or rather evasive, use will be found in 5, 1449 b 8, in 19, 1456 b 3, and in 22, 1458 b 18. It is a favourite term with Isocrates also: 24 C *ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς ἰδέαις ταύταις κατεχρήσαντο*.—36 A *χρὴ δὲ δοκιμάζειν τὰς ἀρετὰς οὐκ ἐν ταῖς αὐταῖς ἰδέαις ἁπάσας, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν δικαιοσύνην ἐν ταῖς ἀπορίαις, τὴν δὲ σωφροσύνην ἐν ταῖς δυναστείαις κτέ*.—319 D *ταῖς ἄλλαις ἰδέαις ἐπιφανεστέραις καὶ πλείοσιν ὅλον τὸν λόγον διοικοῦσιν*.—De perm. § 183 *τὰς ἰδέας ἁπάσας, αἷς ὁ λόγος τυγχάνει χρώμενος, διεξέρχονται τοῖς μαθηταῖς*. For instances from other authors see Campbell’s Essay on Plato’s use of language, Rep. of Plato 2 p. 301.

τὸ καλὸν κτέ. Having just laid it down that the *μῦθος* must be a complete whole, Aristotle assumes that it must also be a beautiful whole, and proceeds to show that, if it is to be that, it must be of a certain magnitude, neither too long nor too short. Beauty, he says, depends on two conditions: the beautiful object must be (1) large enough to allow of our seeing the orderly arrangement of its parts, and (2) not so large as to be incapable of being taken in as a whole in one *coup d’œil*. With this we may compare Metaph. M 3, 1078 a 36 *τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ μέγιστα εἴδη τάξις καὶ συμμετρία καὶ τὸ ὡρισμένον*—where *τάξις* corresponds with the first, and *τὸ ὡρισμένον* with the second of the two conditions in the present passage. For the form of the opening statement comp. De long. vitae 5, 466 a 26 *τὰ μεγάλα καὶ ζῷα καὶ φυτά*.

ζῷον: 23, 1459 a 20 *ἵν᾽ ὥσπερ ζῷον ἓν ὅλον ποιῇ τὴν οἰκείαν ἡδονήν*. The analogy between a literary whole and a living organism is postulated in Plato Phaedr. 264 C *ἀλλὰ τόδε γε οἶμαί σε φάναι ἄν, δεῖν πάντα λόγον ὥσπερ ζῷον συνεστάναι σῶμά τι ἔχοντα αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ, ὥστε μήτε ἀκέφαλον εἶναι μήτε ἄπουν, ἀλλὰ*

μέσα τε ἔχειν καὶ ἄκρα, πρέποντ' ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ γεγραμμένα 1450 b 34
(comp. Hermias and W. H. Thompson ad loc., and Dionysius Hal. 5, p. 381 R.); and also in Rhet. 3. 14, 1415 b 7 ἂν μὴ τοιοῦτος ᾖ [scil. ὁ ἀκροατής], οὐθὲν δεῖ προοιμίου, ἀλλ' ἢ ὅσον τὸ πρᾶγμα εἰπεῖν κεφαλαιωδῶς, ἵνα ἔχῃ ὥσπερ σῶμα κεφαλήν [scil. ὁ λόγος]—where the exordium of a speech is likened to the head of a body. The same assumption underlies many of the terms of early grammar or rhetoric, e.g. κῶλον, ἄρθρον, σύνδεσμος (see on 20, 1456 b 38), ἀκέφαλος, κολοβός, μείουρος (see on 26, 1462 b 6). I am unable, therefore, to accept Susemihl's view, that ζῷον both here and in chap. 23 means a picture or statue (*Gemälde, Bild*)—though it certainly has that sense in a passage not very unlike this in form, in Plato Polit. 277 B ἀτεχνῶς ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ὥσπερ ζῷον τὴν ἔξωθεν μὲν περιγραφὴν ἔοικεν ἱκανῶς ἔχειν κτέ. It seems to mean here a living, as distinct from an artificial, whole, as it clearly does in another Aristotelian passage, Top. 1. 15, 106 a 20 τῷ καλῷ τῷ μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ ζῴου τὸ αἰσχρόν [scil. ἐναντίον], τῷ δ' ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκίας τὸ μοχθηρόν. In saying καὶ ζῷον καὶ ἅπαν πρᾶγμα ὃ συνέστηκεν ἐκ τινῶν Aristotle passes from the living wholes called ζῷα to a large kind of whole, 'everything made up of parts', a formula wide enough to include the creations of human art as well as those of nature. This addition is of some importance for the argument; it prepares us for the application of the general law to the case of the μῦθος, which, as a σύστημα or σύστασις πραγμάτων (comp. 6, 1450 a 15), is a πρᾶγμα ὃ συνέστηκεν ἐκ τινῶν. I may add that the conjunctions in Aristotle's statement (καί . . . καί = *cum . . . tum*) seem to imply that the stress is really on the second of the two points.

πρᾶγμα, a 'thing': Top. 1. 5, 102 a 18 ἴδιον δ' ἐστὶν ὃ μὴ δηλοῖ b 35
μὲν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, μόνῳ δ' ὑπάρχει καὶ ἀντικατηγορεῖται τοῦ πράγματος, οἷον ἴδιον ἀνθρώπου τὸ γραμματικῆς εἶναι δεκτικόν.—De anima 3. 8, 432 a 3 πρᾶγμα οὐθέν ἐστι παρὰ τὰ μεγέθη, ὡς δοκεῖ, τὰ αἰσθητὰ κεχωρισμένον.—Plato Crat. 390 D Κρατύλος ἀληθῆ λέγει λέγων φύσει τὰ ὀνόματα εἶναι τοῖς πράγμασιν.

ταῦτα = τὰ μέρη, implied in συνέστηκεν ἐκ τινῶν.

μέγεθος ὑπάρχειν μὴ τὸ τυχόν: De gen. an. 2. 6, 745 a 5 ἔστι γάρ b 36
τι πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις πέρας τοῦ μεγέθους.—Pol. 7. 4, 1326 a 35 ἔστι τι καὶ πόλεσι μεγέθους μέτρον, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων, ζῴων φυτῶν ὀργάνων.

μεγέθει: Eth. N. 4. 7, 1123 b 6 ἐν μεγέθει γὰρ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία, b 37
ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι, οἱ μικροὶ δ' ἀστεῖοι καὶ

1450 b 37 *σύμμετροι, καλοὶ δ' οὔ.* Similarly in Pol. 7. 4, 1326 a 33, speaking of the size of the *καλλίστη πόλις*, Aristotle explains that *τὸ καλὸν ἐν πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει εἴωθε γίνεσθαι.*

τάξει. According to Top. 3. 1, 116 b 21, beauty is thought to consist in *συμμετρία* (*τὸ δὲ κάλλος τῶν μελῶν τις συμμετρία δοκεῖ εἶναι*); and according to Metaph. M 3, 1078 a 36 in *τάξις καὶ συμμετρία καὶ τὸ ὡρισμένον.* In the beauty of a *μῦθος*, however, there is no room for the idea of *συμμετρία.* A well-constructed story involves a certain order in its incidents and a limit of length; but there is nothing in it directly corresponding to the symmetry or proportion which is one element in the beauty of a living creature.

b 38 **συγχεῖται.** The reason for our not seeing any beauty in a very minute creature is that we perceive it as a whole too quickly to discern the parts and the order and symmetry there may be in them. *συγχεῖται* = 'becomes blurred, or indistinct', as in H. A. 7. 5, 585 b 34 *συγκεχυμένον μέλαν*, and the other passages noted in Bon. Ind. 709 b 43.

θεωρία, 'sight' or 'view' (comp. Bon. Ind. 329 a 31).

b 39 **ἀναισθήτου χρόνου.** There is no necessity to bracket *χρόνου* (with Bonitz). The time a thing takes to be seen may be of perceptible or of imperceptible duration; and in the latter case it may very well be described as an *ἀναίσθητος χρόνος*, a time too short for one to be conscious of its duration. This expression, *ἀναίσθητος χρόνος*, appears in the definition of the 'sudden' or 'instantaneous' in Phys. 4. 13, 222 b 15 *τὸ δ' ἐξαίφνης τὸ ἐν ἀναισθήτῳ χρόνῳ διὰ μικρότητα ἐκστάν* (comp. Probl. 3. 10, 872 b 9). The equivalent in the Analytics is *ἄσκεπτος χρόνος*: An. post. 1. 34, 89 b 10 *ἡ δ' ἀγχίνοιά ἐστιν εὐστοχία τις ἐν ἀσκέπτῳ χρόνῳ τοῦ μέσου, οἷον εἴ τις ἰδὼν ὅτι ἡ σελήνη τὸ λαμπρὸν ἀεὶ ἔχει πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον, ταχὺ ἐνενόησε διὰ τί τοῦτο, ὅτι διὰ τὸ λάμπειν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου.* The converse of all this is the assertion in Probl. 19. 21, 919 a 32, that the longer the time is, the more perceptible it is: *πλείων ὁ χρόνος ὁ τοῦ βαρέος, οὗτος δὲ μᾶλλον αἰσθητός.* According to the stricter psychology of the De sensu (7, 448 a 24) there is no such thing as a *χρόνος ἀναίσθητος.*

οὔτε παμμέγεθες: comp. the rule for the size of the *πόλις* in Pol. 5. 2, 1302 b 35 and 7. 4, 1326 a 35.

1451 a 2 **οἷον εἰ κτέ.** refers back to *παμμέγεθες.* Other instances of an illustration with *οἷον* (= e.g.) at some distance from the main statement will be found in 18, 1456 a 13; 19, 1456 b 11; 20,

1457^{a}27; 22, 1458^{a}29; 26, 1462^{b}7. Comp. Soph. el. 24, 180^{a}20 *καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἥμισυ εἰπόντες τοῦ ἔπους δός μοι Ἰλιάδα σημαίνομεν, οἷον τὸ μῆνιν ἄειδε θεά*; and Eth. N. 1. 9, 1099^{b}2 *ἐνίων δὲ τητώμενοι ῥυπαίνουσι τὸ μακάριον, οἷον εὐγενείας, εὐτεκνίας, κάλλους.* 1451^{a}2

ὥστε marks the apodosis (comp. 9, 1452^{a}10 and Bon. Ind. 873^{a}31). ^{a}3

καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν συστημάτων. The argument proceeds on the assumption of an analogy between a beautiful whole that addresses the eye, and one that addresses the mind; and the conclusion is that as the one is *εὐσύνοπτον*, so the other must be *εὐμνημόνευτον*. At this point Aristotle changes his construction, repeating his original statement (1450^{b}34) in the form required for an argument from analogy, *καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν συστημάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζῴων . . . οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μύθων*, with *συστημάτων* as a short equivalent for the foregoing *ἅπαν πρᾶγμα ὃ συνέστηκεν ἐκ τινῶν*. A *σύστημα* is a product of combination, something that comes into being through a union, natural or artificial, of parts into a whole; a state, for instance, is a *σύστημα* (Eth. N. 9. 8, 1168^{b}32) as being due to a combination of classes or individuals, and a *ζῷον* is a *σύστημα* (De gen. an. 2. 4, 740^{a}20), as being an organized whole of parts. The present passage, however, implies a more restricted sense of *σύστημα*, as though the term were properly applicable only to a whole that is made, as distinct from an organic whole, which grows to be what it is. This or some similar sense is suggested by the passage also in Eth. N. 9. 8, 1168^{b}32 *ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ πόλις τὸ κυριώτατον μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ πᾶν ἄλλο σύστημα, οὕτω καὶ ἄνθρωπος*—where the implication is that a man is not a *σύστημα* proper, though his composite nature gives him a certain resemblance to one.

The difficulty in the manuscript reading *σωμάτων* is that the word would have to be understood in one of two senses, either in that of 'material substances', or in that of 'living bodies'. The first interpretation is out of the question, since beauty is in the *τάξις* or *συμμετρία τῶν μερῶν*, and, therefore, in the form, not in the matter, of things. The second, which makes *ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων* and *ἐπὶ τῶν ζῴων* mere synonyms, leaves us without any equivalent for the *ἅπαν πρᾶγμα ὃ συνέστηκεν ἐκ τινῶν* of his original statement (1450^{b}34), which was, if I am not mistaken, far too important for Aristotle's argument to be ignored in any *résumé* of it (comp. J. of Phil. 5 p. 120).

1451 a 3 **ἐπὶ τῶν ζῴων**: see on 1450 b 36.

a 4 **εὐσύνοπτον**, 'easily taken in as a whole by the eye', as opposed to *εὐμνημόνευτον* (a 5), 'easily taken in as a whole by the memory'. The word, however, is metaphorically used as equivalent to *εὐμνημόνευτος* in 23, 1459 a 33, as also in Rhet. 3. 9, 1409 a 35 *λέγω δὲ περίοδον λέξιν ἔχουσαν ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν αὐτὴν καθ' αὑτὴν καὶ μέγεθος εὐσύνοπτον. ἡδεῖα δ' ἡ τοιαύτη καὶ εὐμαθής . . . εὐμαθὴς δὲ ὅτι εὐμνημόνευτος.*

a 6 **ὅρος ⟨ὁ⟩ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας**: the limit in practice, in contradistinction to the theoretic limit of length, *ὁ κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος ὅρος* (a 9). In actual practice the length of the play is determined by the conditions of the public performances (*ἀγῶνες*) in which it will be presented on the stage; the time it is to occupy there is fixed by custom and convention rather than theory.

a 7 **τὴν αἴσθησιν**, scil. *τῶν θεατῶν* (see on 15, 1454 b 15); comp. 4, 1449 a 8 *πρὸς τὰ θέατρα.* The language here, though quite general, seems to refer more especially to the power of attention in the audiences.

ἑκατὸν τραγῳδίας ἀγωνίζεσθαι: an extreme instance like the *μυρίων σταδίων ζῷον* in a 2. The subject of *ἀγωνίζεσθαι*, if expressed, would be 'the performers', *ἀγωνίζεσθαί τι* in stage matters being synonymous with *ὑποκρίνεσθαί τι*; comp. Demosth. 19, 246 *τοῦτο δὲ τὸ δρᾶμα . . . Μόλων ἠγωνίζετο.*—250 *ἃ ἠγωνίσω καὶ ἀκριβῶς ἐξηπίστασο.*—337 *τὰ Θυέστου . . . ἠγωνίζετο* (see on 6, 1450 b 18). In the sense of 'contend', as said of the dramatic poet, it would require an instrumental dative (*τραγῳδίαις*) after it. The personification implied in Tyrwhitt's rendering, 'si centum tragoedias in theatro certare oporteret', is (I think) questionable in Aristotle. Goulston takes *ἀγωνίζεσθαι* as a passive (=*agi*), as it certainly sometimes is.

a 8 **πρὸς κλεψύδρας**. For the preposition comp. fr. 468 Teubn. *μέτρον τί ἐστιν ὕδατος πρὸς μεμετρημένον ἡμέρας διάστημα ῥέον . . . πρὸς δὴ τοῦτο ἠγωνίζοντο οἱ μέγιστοι καὶ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ἀγῶνες.*

a 9 **ὥσπερ ποτὲ καὶ ἄλλοτέ φασιν**. The idea of tragedies having been at some date or other timed by the clepsydra is to my mind highly improbable, and there is no hint of such a thing elsewhere. The language also here is not free from difficulties. Tyrwhitt translates it by 'quemadmodum aliquando alias etiam factum esse perhibent'; and Vahlen (Berlin Academy, Sitzungsberichte 1897 p. 639) by 'wie man sagt, dass sie auch sonst gespielt haben'. To get this out of the words, and make them relate to Tragedy,

or rather the past history of Tragedy, it becomes necessary to supply (with Vahlen) an *aorist* infinitive, *ἀγωνίσασθαι*, from the preceding imperfect *ἠγωνίζοντο*, and also to make *ποτὲ καὶ ἄλλοτε* mean simply 'once' or 'formerly', though its natural meaning would be 'at a certain other time'. Two instances have been pointed out of *ποτὲ καὶ ἄλλοτε*: Xenophon Anab. 6. 4. 12 *ὑμᾶς δεῖ παρασκευάζεσθαι ὡς μαχουμένους εἴ ποτε καὶ ἄλλοτε* [='si unquam alias']; Lucian Hermot. 24 *ἤδη γάρ ποτε καὶ ἄλλοτε* [='alias quondam'] *πρεσβύτου ἀνδρὸς ἤκουσα διεξιόντος*. These, however, are not enough to show that *ποτὲ καὶ ἄλλοτε* can only refer to an indefinite past or future; with a verb in the present it may very well refer to the indefinite present also, and have the sense of 'at certain other times', just in the same way as *ποτέ*, with a present, means 'at certain times' in Soph. el. 16, 175 a 27 *συμβαίνει δέ ποτε καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς διαγράμμασιν*, and in the familiar antithesis of *ποτέ* and *ἀεί*. M. Schmidt's correction, *εἰώθασιν* (for *φασιν*), though perhaps too bold, yields an unimpeachable sense, 'as is regularly done at certain other times', i.e. by another class of *ἀγωνισταί*, the pleaders in the law-courts. As a variation on it, to make the sense clearer, I would suggest *ὥσπερ ποτὲ καὶ ἄλλοι εἰώθασιν*. 1451 a 9

ὁ δὲ . . . ὅρος is appositional to what follows.

ὁ μείζων, scil. *μῦθος*; comp. Tyrwhitt's rendering 'quo maior est fabula'. a 10

σύνδηλος is explained in the reference to this passage in 24, 1459 b 18 *τοῦ μὲν οὖν μήκους ὅρος ἱκανὸς ὁ εἰρημένος· δύνασθαι γὰρ δεῖ συνορᾶσθαι τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὸ τέλος*.

ἐν ὅσῳ μεγέθει κτέ. A reminiscence apparently of the language of Plato Rep. 423 B *Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὗτος ἂν εἴη καὶ κάλλιστος ὅρος τοῖς ἡμετέροις ἄρχουσιν, ὅσην δεῖ τὸ μέγεθος τὴν πόλιν ποιεῖσθαι . . . Τίς, ἔφη, ὅρος; Οἶμαι μέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τόνδε· μέχρι οὗ ἂν ἐθέλῃ αὐξανομένη εἶναι μία, μέχρι τούτου αὔξειν, πέρα δὲ μή*. a 12

κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἐφεξῆς γιγνομένων, scil. *τῶν πραγμάτων* (see on 6, 1449 b 26). The consequents must be always the natural or necessary effect of the antecedents. A well-constructed *μῦθος* is a consecutive whole, not a mere series of incidents which happen to follow one after the other in actual order of time (comp. 10, 1452 a 19); and it is this that differentiates it from a history or a biography (comp. 9, 1451 a 36), which records everything that may have befallen a community or an individual, however loose and separate the various incidents were in themselves

1451 a 12 (comp. 23, 1459 a 23). The poetic story in fact must satisfy our sense of logic, incident following after incident as its necessary and inevitable, or as its probable and natural consequence. The technical meaning of the terms *εἰκός* and *ἀναγκαῖον* in Aristotle may be seen from An. post. 2. 27, 70 a 4 *τὸ μὲν εἰκός ἐστι πρότασις ἔνδοξος· ὃ γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἴσασιν οὕτω γινόμενον ἢ μὴ γινόμενον, ἢ ὂν ἢ μὴ ὄν, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν εἰκός, οἷον τὸ μισεῖν τοὺς φθονοῦντας ἢ τὸ φιλεῖν τοὺς ἐρωμένους.*—Rhet. 1. 2, 1357 a 34 *τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἰκός ἐστιν ⟨τὸ⟩ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γινόμενον . . . τὸ περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν.*—Metaph. Γ 5, 1010 b 28 *τὸ ἀναγκαῖον οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν.*—Δ 5, 1015 a 34 *τὸ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν ἀναγκαῖόν φαμεν οὕτως ἔχειν.* The distinction between the two terms had been already recognized by Plato: Theaet. 149 C *εἰκός τε καὶ ἀναγκαῖον.*—Tim. 40 E *ἄνευ τε εἰκότων καὶ ἀναγκαίων ἀποδείξεων λέγουσιν.* They were, it would seem, already established in the rhetorical terminology of the sophists (Stallbaum on Tim. 40 E).

a 13 **εἰς εὐτυχίαν κτέ.** This is obviously meant to apply only to the tragic hero, not to the secondary personages in the play, about whom Aristotle has very little to say. Though he acknowledges the legitimacy of a transition from misery to happiness as a dramatic motive—it will be remembered that it is the motive in the Iphigenia in Tauris (comp. 17, 1455 b 12 *καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἡ σωτηρία*)—he does not think it so distinctively tragic or so effective in Tragedy as the opposite kind of transition, that from happiness to misery (13, 1453 a 14 sqq.).

a 14 **μεταβάλλειν.** The synonym for this in 13, 1453 a 2 is *μεταπίπτειν.* The implied subject of *μεταβάλλειν* is 'the tragic hero'; comp. 13, 1452 b 34 *οὔτε τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ἄνδρας δεῖ μεταβάλλοντας φαίνεσθαι ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν,* and 14, 1453 a 1 *οὐδ' αὖ τὸν σφόδρα πονηρὸν ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν μεταπίπτειν.*

a 16 **μῦθος δ' ἐστὶν εἷς κτέ.** See Schoemann, Opusc. Acad. 3 p. 31.

ὥσπερ τινὲς οἴονται: i. e. certain post-Homeric poets, whose theory apparently is inferred from their practice (comp. a 21).

a 17 **πολλὰ καὶ ἄπειρα**: De caelo 1. 9, 278 a 19 *ὁρῶμεν . . . πλείω καὶ ἄπειρα ὄντα τὰ ὁμοιοειδῆ.* Vahlen (Rh. Mus. 28 p. 184) quotes also Plato Theaet. 159 A *ἐλέγομεν ὡς πολλὰ μὲν εἴη τὰ ποιοῦντα καὶ ἄπειρα.*—Tim. 31 A *πότερον οὖν ὀρθῶς ἕνα οὐρανὸν προσειρήκαμεν, ἢ πολλοὺς καὶ ἀπείρους λέγειν ἦν ὀρθότερον;*

τῷ ἑνὶ: Phys. 2. 5, 196 b 28 *τὸ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀόριστον· ἄπειρα γὰρ ἂν τῷ ἑνὶ συμβαίη.* On the strength of this parallel

τῷ ἑνί in the present passage is taken as a neuter[1] by Vahlen, who translates the clause accordingly by 'in unam rem innumera cadunt'. This interpretation, it seems to me, misses the point —the distinction Aristotle assumes between the many things that befall the individual (*πολλὰ τῷ ἑνὶ συμβαίνει*), i.e. that he suffers or has done to him, and the many things that he does (*πράξεις ἑνὸς πολλαί εἰσιν* a 18). That *τῷ ἑνί* is masculine here is shown not only by *περὶ ἕνα* (a 17), *πράξεις ἑνός* (a 18), and *ὅσα αὐτῷ συνέβη* (a 25) in the context, but also by the parallel in 23, 1459 a 23, *ὅσα ἐν τούτῳ συνέβη περὶ ἕνα ἢ πλείους.* 1451 a 17

ἐνίων, which has been questioned by Spengel and others, is an understatement of a kind not so uncommon in Aristotle (see on 6, 1450 a 12). The sense is: In the infinite variety of things that befall the individual in the course of his life there are some [i.e. many] which it is impossible to bring into relation with the rest, as parts of one connected whole. The qualifying *ἐνίων* is like *ἐνίοτε* in 23, 1459 a 27 *οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς χρόνοις ἐνίοτε γίνεται θάτερον μετὰ θάτερον, ἐξ ὧν ἓν οὐδὲν γίνεται τέλος. ἐξ ὧν ἐνίων* has been rendered by 'ex quorum aliquibus' (Tyrwhitt), or 'quorum ex quibusdam' (Hermann). In the parallel, however, in Dem. 18. 12 *περὶ ὧν ἐνίων* both Weil and Goodwin regard *ἐνίων* as appositional; and the same view has been taken of the word in Dem. 19. 260 (*τὰς ἀκροπόλεις αὐτῶν ἐνίων*), and in Xen. Anab. 6. 6. 34 (*περὶ ὑμῶν ἐνίων*). Another instance of this same ambiguity is in Meteor. 1. 3, 339 b 9 *πολὺ καὶ τῶν ἄστρων ἐνίων ἐλάττων ἐστίν* (comp. L. Dindorf in HSt. s. v. *ἔνιος*). There is a clear instance of the appositional use of *ἔνιοι*, in a different case, in Poet. 9, 1451 b 19 *ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις ἐνίαις μὲν κτέ.* a 18

πάντες ἐοίκασιν ἁμαρτάνειν: comp. 23, 1459 a 29, 37. a 19

Ἡρακληΐδα. Several Ἡράκλειαι were known in antiquity (Kinkel, EGF. 1 p. 212, 249, 254). a 20

Θησηΐδα: Kinkel, 1 p. 217.

προσήκειν = 'must be', 'ought to be' according to the fitness of things, as in Meteor. 1. 3, 340 a 26, De anima 1. 5, 411 b 15, Rhet. 2. 2, 1379 b 3, and Plato Rep. 362 c. a 22

Ὀδύσσειαν: for the absence of the article see on 4, 1448 b 38. a 24

οὐκ ἐποίησεν ἅπαντα ὅσα αὐτῷ συνέβη: i.e. his poem was not made to cover the whole ground of the life of Ulysses, but only a selected section of it, a limited group of incidents sufficiently a 25

[1] The version in the Paraphrase of Averroes, *uni rei multa accidunt*, implies the same interpretation.

1451 a 25 coherent and connected to form a single action of the requisite kind (*μίαν πρᾶξιν οἵαν λέγομεν* a 28). The unity in the story of the Odyssey, as Aristotle conceives it, may be seen from his survey of the poem in 17, 1455 b 17. The sense of the *οὐκ ἐποίησεν ἅπαντα* in the text may be illustrated by the very similar expressions in 18, 1456 a 13 *τὸν τῆς Ἰλιάδος ὅλον ποιεῖν μῦθον*, a 16 *πέρσιν Ἰλίου ὅλην ποιεῖν*, and 23, 1459 a 32 *τὸν πόλεμον ποιεῖν ὅλον*.

οἷον πληγῆναι μέν, scil. *αὐτῷ συνέβη*. This and the second incident, *μανῆναι δὲ προσποιήσασθαι ἐν τῷ ἀγερμῷ*, are given as examples of two disconnected events in the life of Ulysses (*ὧν οὐδὲ θατέρου γενομένου ἀναγκαῖον ἢ εἰκὸς θάτερον γενέσθαι*, a 27). The antithetic particles (*μέν, δέ*) imply a difference between them; the one (*πληγῆναι*) is a *πάθος*, and the other (*μανῆναι προσποιήσασθαι*) a *πρᾶξις*—a distinction which the preceding context (see on a 17) shows to have been already present in Aristotle's mind. I have ventured to restore *οὐδέ* in place of *οὐδέν* for two reasons, partly because with *οὐδέν* the verb (*γενέσθαι*) seems to have two subjects (*οὐδέν* and *θάτερον*), and partly because the *ὧν* being followed by *θατέρου* and *θάτερον* naturally refers to the two incidents just mentioned. It has been urged, as one of the difficulties in this statement, that the wounding of Ulysses is actually part of the Odyssey, being described at considerable length in the story of the Discovery in Od. 19, 392–466. The Discovery is certainly part of the action of the Odyssey (v. 17, 1455 b 21), but the incident on Parnassus is in a very different position; it comes in as an episode (v. 17, 1455 b 23), not as one of the series of incidents which form the action of the poem. The action in the Odyssey (summarized in 17, 1455 b 17 sqq.) extends over a space of some six weeks; but the encounter of the boy Ulysses with the boar belonged to a period of his life not covered by the Odyssey. The second incident, his feigned madness, is said to have been part of the story in the Cypria (Kinkel, EGF. p. 18). Bergk (Gr. Litt. 1 p. 711) thinks there may have been some epic in which both incidents were included. The superior unity of the Homeric Epic is emphatically reasserted in 23, 1459 a 30.

a 27 **ὧν** = *ἀλλὰ τούτων*.

a 28 **μίαν πρᾶξιν οἵαν λέγομεν**, 'a single action of the kind we are describing', i.e. one that forms a coherent and closely connected whole. The opposite of this is the *μία πρᾶξις πολυμερής* of the inferior epics (23, 1459 b 1). The reading of A^c, *οἵαν λέγοιμεν*, may have arisen through ΟΙΑΝ being misread, and taken to stand for *οἷ' ἄν*.

διαφέρεσθαι καὶ κινεῖσθαι has been rendered in various ways— 1451 ^{a} 34
by 'diversum reddatur vel moveatur' (Victorius), by 'dissolvatur et luxetur' (Heinsius), and by 'differatur et moveatur' (Tyrwhitt). The general sense is clear: when a part in a whole is removed, by being transferred to another place or withdrawn altogether, the continuity of the whole is broken at that point. Both *διαφέρεσθαι* and *κινεῖσθαι* seem to be (as Heinsius must have seen) metaphors from surgery. *διαφέρεσθαι* may be regarded as a synonym for *διίστασθαι*, the term in use in medical Greek for the diastasis of a limb as distinct from a complete luxation (*ἐξίστασθαι* or *ὀλισθάνειν*); comp. Hippocrates 3 p. 132 K. *ὁκόσα διίσταται καὶ ὁκόσα ὀλισθάνει*. If this view is correct, the *κινεῖσθαι* which follows will mean to be 'dislocated'. Hippocrates often has *κινεῖσθαι* and *κίνημα* in the sense of 'displacement' as an equivalent for diastasis (comp. 3 p. 81 K. *ἢν δέ τι κινηθῇ ἐκ τῆς χώρης*).

προσὸν ἢ μὴ προσόν: comp. Metaph. Λ 10, 1076 ^{a} 2 *οὐθὲν γὰρ ἡ ἑτέρα* [scil. *οὐσία*] *τῇ ἑτέρᾳ συμβάλλεται οὖσα ἢ μὴ οὖσα*, and Plato Rep. 449 D *μέγα γάρ τι οἰόμεθα φέρειν καὶ ὅλον εἰς πολιτείαν ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ ὀρθῶς γιγνόμενον*. For this use of the participle see Goodwin, Syntax of Gk. moods and tenses § 829 (*b*).

οὐδὲν μόριον: it is not a part of the whole, but an accident or ^{a} 35
addition to it; comp. De gen. an. I. 4, 717 ^{a} 34 *οὐθὲν γάρ εἰσι μόριον τῶν πόρων οἱ ὄρχεις, ἀλλὰ πρόσκεινται καθάπερ τὰς λαίας προσάπτουσιν αἱ ὑφαίνουσαι τοῖς ἱστοῖς*. In Metaph. Γ 5, 1010 ^{a} 30 *οὗτος* [scil. *ὁ περὶ ἡμᾶς τόπος*] *οὐθὲν ὡς εἰπεῖν μόριον τοῦ παντός ἐστιν*, the phrase means practically 'is as nothing compared with', just like *οὐδὲν μέρος* in Isocrates 90 E *εἴ τις ἀθρήσειε καὶ σκέψαιτο τὰς τῶν Ἑλλήνων συμφοράς, οὐδὲν ἂν μέρος οὖσαι φανεῖεν τῶν . . . ἡμῖν γεγενημένων*.

φανερὸν δὲ κτέ. In Aristotle's view a history is a chronicle, or ^{a} 36
register, of events taken just as they came in order of time, however separate and disconnected they may have been in themselves (23, 1459 ^{a} 21). The present distinction between a history, in this sense of the term, and a poetic story is a corollary to what he lays down in chaps. 7–8 on the unity and logical coherence of the parts in a well-constructed story. The action in such a story is a *πρᾶξις μία καὶ ὅλη* (^{a} 32), i. e. a whole with a beginning, middle, and end (7, 1450 ^{b} 26); each incident resulting from something that goes before it, and the entire series from the state of things presupposed, as the *ἀρχή* of the whole, at the opening. Given a personage of a certain character and in a certain position as the

1451 a 36 beginning of the story, all the rest must be the natural or necessary consequence of this initial situation. Hence it follows that the incidents in the poetic story are not only possible but also always possible, because they are such as may or must happen at any time, whenever the man and the circumstances are found together. Aristotle accordingly notes two great points of contrast between history and poetry: (1) whereas the former is a record of actual events (*τὰ γενόμενα*), the latter describes rather possible incidents of another kind, *τὰ δυνατὰ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον* (a 38); (2) whereas the one tells us what is true only of some particular person (or persons) at a particular time, the other tells us something universally true (*τὰ καθόλου* b 7), something that will hold good at all times of all persons of the same type in a similar set of circumstances.

a 38 **τὰ δυνατὰ**, scil. *γενέσθαι* (comp. b 32). The qualifying *κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον* excludes the third kind of *δυνατά*, viz. *τὰ γενόμενα*. These also are obviously possible (see b 17 and De interpr. 13, 23 a 7), but as mere *γενόμενα* they belong to history rather than poetry. A little further on, however (b 29), Aristotle explains that under certain conditions even historic incidents may be a legitimate subject for poetry.

b 1 **οὐ τῷ ἢ ἔμμετρα λέγειν** *κτέ.*: see 1, 1447 b 11, where it is shown that metre is only one of the accidents of poetry.

b 4 **διαφέρει**, scil. *ὁ ἱστορικὸς τοῦ ποιητοῦ.*

b 6 **σπουδαιότερον** is the opposite of *φαυλότερον*. In Plato also *σπουδαῖος* (v. Ast, Lex. s.v.) is applied to things in the sense of *ἄξιος σπουδῆς*, 'of serious value or interest', as the opposite of either 'trivial' (*φαῦλος*) or 'ludicrous' (*γελοῖος*: see on 4, 1448 b 34). Poetry, as Aristotle conceives it, is 'more philosophic', because of the large and generalized view of human nature which it implies; it tells us in effect what all men of a certain character may or must do in a certain set of circumstances, whereas historic truth is limited to particular times and persons. A great master of rhetoric, Diderot, has enlarged on this text in a well-known passage in his Éloge de Richardson (Œuvres t. 3 p. 18 ed. 1821): 'O Richardson! j'oserai dire que l'histoire la plus vraie est pleine de mensonges, et que ton roman est plein de vérités. L'histoire peint quelques individus; tu peins l'espèce humaine: l'histoire attribue à quelques individus ce qu'ils n'ont ni dit, ni fait; tout ce que tu attribues à l'homme, il l'a dit et fait: l'histoire n'embrasse qu'une portion de la durée, qu'un point de la surface du globe; tu

as embrassé tous les lieux et tous les temps. Le cœur humain, 1451 b 6
qui a été, est et sera toujours le même, est le modèle d'après lequel tu copies. Si l'on appliquait au meilleur historien une critique sévère, y en a-t-il aucun qui la soutînt comme toi? Sous ce point de vue, j'oserai dire que souvent l'histoire est un mauvais roman; et que le roman, comme tu l'as fait, est une bonne histoire. O peintre de la nature! c'est toi qui ne mens jamais.'

μᾶλλον τὰ καθόλου. *μᾶλλον* implies a qualification, which re- b 7
appears in another form in b 9 *οὗ στοχάζεται ἡ ποίησις ὀνόματα ἐπιτιθεμένη*. Poetry deals with 'characters' rather than actual individuals, and with universal rather than particular truth. Its universality, however, is somewhat disguised by the proper names it attaches to its characters, which acquire in this way a certain resemblance to the real personages of history. A reason for the retention in Tragedy of traditional names is given further on, in b 15.

τὰ καθόλου . . . τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον. The present explanation of the terms may be compared with that in De interpr. 7. 17 a 39 *λέγω δὲ καθόλου μὲν ὃ ἐπὶ πλειόνων πέφυκε κατηγορεῖσθαι, καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ ὃ μή, οἷον ἄνθρωπος μὲν τῶν καθόλου, Καλλίας δὲ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον*: comp. also Rhet. 1. 2, 1356 b 28 *οὐδεμία δὲ τέχνη σκοπεῖ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον, οἷον ἡ ἰατρικὴ ⟨οὐ⟩ τί Σωκράτει τὸ ὑγιεινόν ἐστιν ἢ Καλλίᾳ, ἀλλὰ τί τῷ τοιῷδε ἢ τοῖς τοιοῖσδε*.—2. 4, 1382 a 4 *ἡ μὲν ὀργὴ ἀεὶ περὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, οἷον Καλλίᾳ ἢ Σωκράτει, τὸ δὲ μῖσος καὶ πρὸς τὰ γένη*. For a similar use of *καθόλου* see 17, 1455 b 1. The element of 'universality' in Greek Tragedy, as Aristotle understands it, means no more than is indicated in his present distinction between a poem and a history; and it is in no wise peculiar to Tragedy. Aristotle tells us it was to be seen in the Comedy of his time (b 11); and it is found in just the same way in the modern novel—even in the historical and in the so-called realistic novel. In all these forms of imaginative literature the personages are, as we say, 'characters', in other words, ideal personalities, made to act and speak in accordance with the law of character which the author has assumed for each. The novel, however (owing in some degree to its length), admits of characters of a subtlety and complexity which would have been simply impossible in the ancient Drama. The Greek dramatist was practically restricted to the larger and more obvious types of character, which did not require much explanation to make them intelligible to his public in the brief space of time allotted to his work.

1451 [b] 10 ὀνόματα ἐπιτιθεμένη = καίπερ ὀνόματα ἐπιτιθεμένη; comp. 25, 1461 [a] 30 οὐ πινόντων οἶνον. The characters in the Drama are 'universals', i. e. types of character rather than actual individuals; that is what poetry really means them to be, notwithstanding the individualizing proper names it attaches to them. The alternative rendering of ὀνόματα ἐπιτιθεμένη, 'in giving names to its personages' ('dum nomina imponit', Heinsius), would imply that the names were definitely chosen as significant of character. This would be true to some extent of those in Comedy (see infra on [b] 13 τὰ τυχόντα ὀνόματα), but not of those in Tragedy. As abstracts of character the personages ought to have general names, like those in Theophrastus, instead of the individualizing proper names given them in Drama.

For the use of the middle verb in this connexion comp. 21, 1457 [b] 34 and Homer Od. 8. 552 οὐ μὲν γάρ τις πάμπαν ἀνώνυμός ἐστ' ἀνθρώπων . . . ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τίθενται, ἐπεί κε τέκωσι, τοκῆες.

[b] 12 ἤδη: i. e. now that the New Comedy has taken the place of the Old (see on 5, 1449 [b] 8), Comedy instead of satirizing individuals (like Cleon or Socrates) tells imaginary stories of imaginary personages labelled with imaginary names.

[b] 13 διὰ τῶν εἰκότων. The same use of the preposition is found in 26, 1462 [a] 16 δι' ἧς αἱ ἡδοναὶ συνίστανται. It denotes the basis or chief ingredient in a compound, as it often does in later Greek, e. g. in expressions like τὸ δι' ἀλόης, τὸ διὰ κολοκυνθίδος, etc. in the medical writers; comp. also Dionysius Hal. 5 p. 14 R. διὰ γὰρ τῶν εὐτελεστάτων τε καὶ ταπεινοτάτων ὀνομάτων πέπλεκται πᾶσα ἡ λέξις.

οὕτω, the reading of A^c, is too idiomatic to be lightly surrendered (comp. Bon. Ind. 546 [b] 13). The Arabic version is said to imply not οὕτω but οὐ; the same Arabic word, however, which Dr. Margoliouth renders by *nequaquam*, would seem to occur also in the Arabic text in 6, 1450 [a] 30, where it may be taken to represent οὔπω. One may suspect, therefore, that the Greek reading before the Syriac translator in the present passage was οὔπω, a mere corruption of οὕτω.

τὰ τυχόντα ὀνόματα. Ritter has a note here on the names of the characters in the New Comedy. Aristotle's point is this. In the Old Comedy the names of the chief characters were already fixed and prescribed for the poet, because actually borne by the persons whom he wished to satirize. Socrates, Cleon, Agathon, Euripides are instances of such names in Aristophanes. But in the New Comedy the names were not thus fixed. In calling a

soldier Thraso or Pyrgopolinices, for instance, the poet did not mean to satirize some actual person of that name; the name was a matter of choice or accident—invented it may be by the poet himself, or borrowed by him from his predecessors or from life. Such names may no doubt be stock-names, or have a certain conventional or etymological appropriateness as suggestive of certain types of character (comp. Dieterich, Pulcinella p. 45); but they obviously stand on quite a different footing from the real names in Aristophanes. Names also like Phormio, Chremes, Menedemus, etc., were in Comedy fictitious names, though outside Comedy they may have been borne by real persons (comp. on b 21). 1451 b 13

ὑποτιθέασιν, 'lay down as a foundation,' so that the story may look like one founded on fact (comp. 17, 1455 b 12).

ἰαμβοποιοί: see on 4, 1448 b 27 and 5, 1449 b 8. b 14

τῶν γενομένων ὀνομάτων ἀντέχονται: comp. Evanthius De Comoedia b 15
4, 2 (Kaibel, CGF. 1 p. 66) *omnis comoedia de fictis est argumentis; tragoedia saepe ab historica fide petitur.* The reading *γενομένων* has been questioned, but (as it seems to me) without sufficient reason. *τὰ γενόμενα ὀνόματα* are the already existing names, as fixed in history or legend (*γνώριμα* b 20), in contradistinction to a newly-invented name (comp. *τὰ ὀνόματα πεποίηται* b 22), or one which, whether new or not, is arbitrarily assigned to a character by the poet (*τὰ τυχόντα ὀνόματα* b 13) at the time of writing.

πιθανόν (comp. *πιστεύομεν* in the next line) is the Greek equivalent b 16
of our modern term 'convincing', and practically synonymous with *εἰκός* (comp. 24, 1460 a 27) and *ἔνδοξον* (Bon. Ind. 593 a 45). The word was sufficiently established to be applied even by Xenophon to a work of art which has a look of life and reality: Mem. 3. 10, 7 *ὁμοιότερά τε τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς καὶ πιθανώτερα ποιεῖς φαίνεσθαι.* In 17, 1455 a 30 *πιθανός* is said of a person, the poet who writes 'convincingly'. The adv. *πιθανῶς* has the same sense in Aristophanes Thesm. 266 *ἀνὴρ μὲν ἡμῖν οὑτοσὶ καὶ δὴ γυνὴ τό γ' εἶδος· ἢν λαλῇς δ', ὅπως τῷ φθέγματι γυναικιεῖς εὖ καὶ πιθανῶς* ('play the woman well and convincingly').

ἐνίαις: see on 8, 1451 a 18 for this appositional use of the word. b 19

Ἀνθεῖ was first suggested, somewhat tentatively, by Welcker in b 21
his Gr. Tragödien p. 995. 'The Flower' would certainly be a very strange title for a Greek tragedy. The play being on a purely fictitious story, the names also of the characters, instead of being taken over from legend or history, were fictions, and due to the choice of the poet himself. But they need not be supposed

1451 b 21 to have been new or newly-coined names. Ἀνθεύς, for instance, seems to have been known already in mythical history as the name of certain legendary personages; and not so very long after Agathon's time it was actually borne by an Athenian citizen (Kirchner, Prosopographia Attica 953). In this respect, therefore, it was in just the same position as so many of the names in Comedy, Chremes, Menedemus, Phormio, and the like.

b 23 **εὐφραίνει**: an incidental recognition of pleasure as the immediate end of Tragedy (see 14, 1453 b 12, and Döring, Kunstlehre des Aristoteles p. 104). *εὐφραίνειν* serves as a transitive to *χαίρειν*: Top. 2. 6, 112 b 21 *ἔτι καὶ εἰ αὐτὸ αὐτῷ συμβεβηκὸς ἔθηκεν ὡς ἕτερον διὰ τὸ ἕτερον εἶναι ὄνομα, καθάπερ Πρόδικος διῃρεῖτο τὰς ἡδονὰς εἰς χαρὰν καὶ τέρψιν καὶ εὐφροσύνην· ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα τοῦ αὐτοῦ, τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὀνόματά ἐστιν. εἰ οὖν τις τὸ χαίρειν τῷ εὐφραίνεσθαι φήσει συμβεβηκέναι, αὐτὸ ἂν αὐτῷ φαίη συμβεβηκέναι.*—Eth. E. 3. 2, 1231 a 6 *τῶν ὀσμῶν ταύταις χαίρουσιν ὅσαι κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς εὐφραίνουσιν.* The word may describe the pleasurable effect of anything, e.g. that of a painting (Poet. 6, 1450 b 2), of music (Pol. 8. 5, 1339 b 24), and of odours (Eth. E. l. c.; Rhet. 3. 4, 1407 a 10).

ὥστ᾽ οὐ πάντως ἂν εἴη ζητητέον. Spengel suggested that the *εἶναι* of the MS. should be bracketed. In these negative statements of result with *ὥστε οὐ*, which are so common in Aristotle, the verb is usually either in the indicative, (1) expressed or (2) understood, or (3) in the potential optative, as the following passages from the Organon may suffice to show: (1) An. pr. 1. 36, 48 a 36 *ὥστε οὐκ ἔσται μέσον τοῦ* A B.—Top. 8. 11, 151 b 30 *ὥστε οὐ τῷ ταὔτ᾽ εἶναι γίνεται ὁ συλλογισμός* [comp. Poet. 22, 1458 b 5]. (2) An. pr. 1. 32, 47 a 35 *ὥστ᾽ οὐκ εἴ τι συμβαίνει τεθέντων τινῶν, πειρατέον ἀνάγειν εὐθύς.*—Top. 6. 5, 142 a 4 *ὥστ᾽ οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν ἀεὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ὁρισμὸς ἀποδοτέος* [comp. Metaph. Z 12, 1038 a 12]. (3) An. post. 1. 12, 77 b 12 *ὥστ᾽ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐν ἀγεωμετρήτοις περὶ γεωμετρίας διαλεκτέον.*—An. pr. 1. 16, 36 a 14 *ὥστε οὐδενὶ ἢ οὐ παντὶ τῷ* Γ *τὸ* B *ἐνδέχοιτ᾽ ἂν ὑπάρχειν.*—Top. 6. 12, 149 b 2 *ὥστ᾽ οὐκ ἂν εἴη χρῶμα πυρὶ μεμιγμένον.*—Soph. el. 6, 168 b 4 *ὥστ᾽ εἰ ὁ ἔλεγχος συλλογισμός τις, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ὁ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἔλεγχος.* Two instances of *εἶναι* for *ἂν εἴη* are to be found in MSS. of great antiquity and value, one in Par. A of Plato (Tim. 17 B), and the other in K^b of the Nicomachean Ethics (8. 2, 1155 b 20). The error may have arisen either from the omission of *ἄν*, a word very apt to be lost in MSS., or through *ὥστ᾽ οὐ* being misread and turned into *ὡς τοῦ* (as it has been in fact in A^c).

τὰ γνώριμα ὀλίγοις γνώριμά ἐστιν. It may be observed here that Antiphanes, who belonged to the generation before Aristotle, was not of the same opinion on this point (v. fr. 191 Kock). 1451 b 25

δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων refers back to the distinction drawn in the earlier part of the chap. (1451 b 1–5) between a poetic story and a history; a history was said to be still a history even if put into a metrical form. From this Aristotle once more (v. 1. 1447 b 11) draws the conclusion that the story is a more essential part of a poem than the language or versification. b 27

ὅσῳ ποιητὴς κτἑ. is added as a further reason for regarding the story (rather than the verse) as the great and essential thing in a poem. The argument, which might have been more clearly stated, tacitly assumes what we have been told of the *μῦθος* and its pre-eminent importance in chap. 6. The poet's function, says Aristotle, is to imitate (*ποιητὴς κατὰ τὴν μίμησιν*), and it is actions that he imitates (*μιμεῖται δὲ τὰς πράξεις*): but the *μῦθος* in a poem is what represents the action (*τῆς μὲν πράξεως ὁ μῦθος ἡ μίμησις*, 6, 1450 a 4); the *μῦθος* therefore is the poet's first business, and he must be accordingly a *ποιητὴς τῶν μύθων μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν μέτρων.* b 28

ποιητὴς κατὰ τὴν μίμησιν: 1, 1447 b 15 *οὐχ ὡς κατὰ τὴν μίμησιν ποιητὰς ἀλλὰ κοινῇ κατὰ τὸ μέτρον προσαγορεύοντες.* Vahlen, in the discussion on this chapter in his Beiträge, maintains that *μίμησις* may involve the idea of a poetic reconstruction of the traditional materials: 'Also die nach dem Gesetz der Wahrscheinlichkeit und Nothwendigkeit vollzogene dichterische Umbildung (*μίμησις*) des gegebenen, von Sage oder Geschichte überlieferten Stoffes macht den dramatischen Dichter aus' (Beitr. 1 p. 29). Such a meaning can hardly be ascribed to *μίμησις* (see on 1, 1447 a 16); it is rather part of the general idea of *ποίησις* (see on 1, 1447 b 23), which in the case of a traditional story implies a certain free handling of the materials to adapt them to the purposes of poetry (comp. 14, 1453 b 25).

κἂν ἄρα συμβῇ γενόμενα ποιεῖν. Up to this point the subject of a poem has been assumed to be always a *μῦθος*, a fictitious story (see on 5, 1449 b 9), either invented by the poet himself (b 12, b 21) or adapted from legend. Aristotle, however, now remembers that there may be such a thing as an historical play, one with incidents taken from actual history (*γενόμενα*). Such incidents, he explains, are legitimate subjects for poetry, if they admit of being exhibited as probable and natural, as well as actual occurrences. It is only b 29

1451 b 29 in this aspect, and on this condition, that they are admissible in poetry; as so many mere facts they belong to the domain of history. κἂν ἄρα = καὶ ἐὰν ἄρα, the ἄρα implying that the supposition is not very probable (Kühner, Gr. Gr.^{3} 2. 2 p. 324).

b 33 **τῶν δὲ ἁπλῶν μύθων κτέ.** An episodic story, as here defined, offends against the rule of unity and consecutiveness of incident laid down in chap. 8. Aristotle's theory is that in a well-constructed story every incident is wanted (8, 1451 a 32); so that a plot with irrelevant incidents violates a fundamental principle of dramatic construction. Plots of this faulty kind, he adds, are sometimes produced even by good poets through the practical exigencies of the theatre; as a play is expected to be of a certain length, if the story proves too short, it may have to be artificially lengthened out by the insertion of superfluous episodes. Tyrwhitt points to the Prometheus as an instance of this: 'Fabulae ἐπεισοδιώδους luculentum satis exemplum habemus Promethea Aeschyli. Episodia enim Oceani, 284–396. et Iûs, 563–885. nec inter se, neque cum fabula principali ullam habent connexionem aut necessariam aut verisimilem . . . Satis manifestum est et Io et Oceanum, et ipsas etiam Oceanidas, quae chorum constituunt, in id tantum sine ulla verisimilitudine induci, ut argumentum tenue in iustam Tragoediae magnitudinem extendant.' The episodic plot is mentioned here because of its resemblance to a history, since its incidents have no more necessary interconnexion than those in a chronicle. The paragraph, therefore, is a very natural sequel to the preceding discussion (b 1–32); and it is in its right place where it stands. Those who wish to find another place for it do so mainly on the ground that the text presupposes the distinction between the ἁπλοῦς and the πεπλεγμένος μῦθος explained in the next chapter. This anticipatory use of a technical term, however, is not so uncommon in Aristotle. Thus—to say nothing of his use of κάθαρσις in 6, 1449 b 28—we find him talking of περιπέτεια and ἀναγνώρισις or ἀναγνωρισμός in 6, 1450 a 34 and 10, 1452 a 16, and giving an explanation of them afterwards in chap. 11. Besides this it has to be remembered that the expression ἁπλοῦς μῦθος need not be assumed to have been an invention of Aristotle's; for it may very well have been merely adopted by him as one of the already existing terms of dramatic criticism (see infra on ἐπεισοδιώδεις, and on 6, 1449 b 33, 1450 a 34). Another difficulty was found in the text by Tyrwhitt, who proposed to remove it by reading τῶν δὲ ἄλλων μύθων, a suggestion which the Arabic Version is believed to

confirm. The traditional reading τῶν δὲ ἁπλῶν μύθων is supposed 1451 b 33
to restrict the fault in question to the ἁπλοῦς μῦθος, whereas the same fault was no doubt quite possible in the πεπλεγμένος μῦθος also. No such restriction, however, is involved in the text. All that Aristotle implies here is a distinction between the worst form of the ἁπλοῦς μῦθος and the worst form of the πεπλεγμένος μῦθος. The worst fault in the one is the irrelevant episode. That in the other is no doubt the ἀναγνώρισις διὰ σημείων, which is so emphatically condemned in 16, 1454 b 20 as the least artistic of Discoveries.

ἐπεισοδιώδεις. An ἐπεισοδιώδης μῦθος is a plot in which the continuity of the action is not maintained. That the term was fairly established in this sense is shown by the metaphorical use of it in Metaph. Λ 10, 1076 a 1 *ἐπεισοδιώδη τὴν τοῦ παντὸς οὐσίαν ποιοῦσιν· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἡ ἑτέρα τῇ ἑτέρᾳ συμβάλλεται οὖσα ἢ μὴ οὖσα.*— N 3, 1090 b 19 *οὐκ ἔοικε δ' ἡ φύσις ἐπεισοδιώδης οὖσα . . . ὥσπερ μοχθηρὰ τραγῳδία.*

τὰ ἐπεισόδια: for the origin of the term see on 12, 1452 b 20. b 34
In this definition of the ἐπεισοδιώδης μῦθος, as also in 4, 1449 a 28 and 18, 1456 a 31, ἐπεισόδιον has the technical sense given it in 12, 1452 b 20 *ἐπεισόδιον δὲ μέρος ὅλον τραγῳδίας τὸ μεταξὺ ὅλων χορικῶν μελῶν*, 'an episode is all that comes in in the interspace between two entire choral songs'. In other words the ἐπεισόδια together with the πρόλογος and ἔξοδος are the acted parts of the play, the 'acts', as we should say. The term, however, often has the more general meaning of an 'insertion'; a sense which takes us back to the early days of the Drama, when Tragedy was still essentially choral, and the episode, or acted part, was only a sort of interlude in the singing. There are several instances even in the Poetics of this sense of the word. In 17, 1455 b 13 the accessories worked into the story are termed 'episodes'—the process of working them in being ἐπεισοδιοῦν (v. 17, 1455 b 1; 24, 1459 b 30); and in 23, 1459 a 36 the Catalogue of the Ships is said to be one of the 'episodes' in the Iliad. The adj. ἐπεισοδιώδης in the present context involves the same notion; the ἐπεισοδιώδης μῦθος is one with acts or incidents inserted into it, i. e. only loosely connected with the main course of the story.

ὑποκριτάς. *κριτάς*, the reading of certain of the apographs, has b 37
an air of plausibility, but it is difficult to see how the judges, whatever their weaknesses, could be responsible for the particular fault under consideration, the undue lengthening out of the story through the insertion of irrelevant episodes. The statement in

1451b 37 the text has to be read in the light of that in 7, 1451a 6, where Aristotle draws a distinction between the theoretical and the practical limit of length, and explains that the latter depends on conditions imposed by the public performances (*πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν*). As every play, as an acting play (comp. *ἀγωνίσματα* in the context), has by custom to be of a certain length, the poet, if his story proves too short, may have to spin it out (*παρὰ τὴν δύναμιν παρατείναντες*) by the insertion of additional incidents, which will break the sequence of the story (*διαστρέφειν τὸ ἐφεξῆς*, 1452a 1). *διὰ τοὺς ὑποκριτάς*, 'with a view to the actors,' may be taken as equivalent to *διὰ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν*, 'because the play has to be acted' (comp. Ueberweg ad loc.); the more concrete form of expression makes an antithesis to the *δι' αὑτούς* in b 36. A much less probable interpretation of these words is that the actors are assumed to put pressure on the poet to make him provide them with parts of sufficient importance.

ἀγωνίσματα: see on 6, 1450b 18; comp. Schol. Eurip. Phoen. 88 *ὦ κλεινὸν οἴκοις*: *ἡ τοῦ δράματος διάθεσις ἐνταῦθα ἀγωνιστικωτέρα γίνεται· τὰ γὰρ τῆς Ἰοκάστης παρελκόμενά εἰσι· καὶ ἕνεκα τοῦ θεάτρου ἐκτέταται* (v. Trendelenburg, Gramm. gr. de arte tragica iudiciorum rel. p. 91).

b 38 **παρατείναντες.** The story being too short, they stretch it out, as it were, to make it fill up the time. This can only be done in two ways, either by a diffuse treatment of the incidents (comp. 26, 1462b 2–7), or by the insertion of additional incidents not wanted for the main purpose of the story. A similar combination of a present and an aorist participle is found in 16, 1455a 2 *ἀκούων . . . καὶ μνησθείς*, and in 22, 1458b 19 *ποιήσαντος . . . μετατιθέντος*.

1452a 1 **διαστρέφειν . . . τὸ ἐφεξῆς**: comp. Aeschylus Suppl. 1017 *ἴχνος τὸ πρόσθεν οὐ διαστρέψω φρενός*. The sense is that a side incident is introduced, one not in the natural course of the story—not in line with the rest.

ἀναγκάζονται. They do so because they cannot help it, not like the inferior order of poets, through their own fault (*δι' αὑτούς*). For another instance of *ἀναγκάζεσθαι* see 14, 1454a 12.

a 3 **καὶ μάλιστα.** The *καί* emphasizes *μάλιστα* (comp. De sensu 3, 440b 12; De part. an. I. 5, 643a 24; also Riddell, Digest of Idioms § 133). At this point Aristotle recognizes a new element of interest in Tragedy, the element of surprise, but only incidentally, in order to bring it under the canon of construction laid down in

chap. 7. The *φοβερὰ καὶ ἐλεεινά* of Tragedy, he says, have the 1452 a 3
very greatest effect on the mind, when they come in unexpectedly, but at the same time as the natural or necessary consequence of incidents within the play itself (*δι' ἄλληλα*).

τὸ θαυμαστόν, the element of the marvellous, is recognized as a 4
a legitimate source of interest in Tragedy in 24, 1460 a 12. Teichmüller has a lengthy discussion on it (Aristotelische Forschungen 2 p. 282 sqq.).

οὕτως, i. e. if they come about *δι' ἄλληλα*, through incidents in a 5
the preceding part of the play.

ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου καὶ τῆς τύχης. Aristotle treats the two terms here as synonymous, though a distinction is drawn between them in Phys. 2. 4–6 (Bon. Ind. 780 b 33; comp. Torstrik, Hermes 9 p. 425).

ὥσπερ ἐπίτηδες: De caelo 2. 8, 290 a 33 *ἡ φύσις . . . ἔοικεν ὥσπερ* a 7
ἐπίτηδες ἀφελεῖν πάντα δι' ὧν ἐνεδέχετο προϊέναι καθ' αὑτά.

ἀνδριὰς ὁ τοῦ Μίτυος κτέ. Excerpted by the compiler of the a 8
De mirab. ausc. 156, 846 a 22. The same story is told, apparently from another source, by Plutarch, De sera num. vind. 553 D *καὶ τὸ Μίτυος τοῦ Ἀργείου κατὰ στάσιν ἀναιρεθέντος ἀνδριάντα χαλκοῦν ἐν ἀγορᾷ θέας οὔσης ἐμπεσεῖν τῷ κτείναντι τὸν Μίτυν καὶ ἀνελεῖν.* A certain Mitys of Argos is mentioned in [Demosthenes] 59, 33 in connexion with an occurrence which took place in B. C. 374.

θεωροῦντι is usually understood to mean 'when he was looking a 9
at it' ('spectanti incidens,' Tyrwhitt; comp. Bon. Ind. 328 a 5). But as the parallel in Plutarch has *θέας οὔσης*, Dacier would seem to be right in translating it by 'au milieu d' une grande fête', taking it in the sense of 'being present at a *θεωρία*, or public spectacle'.

ὥστε: see on 7, 1451 a 3. a 10

εἰσὶ δὲ τῶν μύθων κτέ. Chap. 10 is a sequel to 9. 1452 a 1–11, a 12
and an application of its results. The real point is not in the formalistic distinction between the two kinds of *μῦθοι*, with which it opens (a 12–18), but in the assertion that follows, viz. that even the complex story comes under the general canon of construction laid down in chap. 7, and that the element of surprise (the *ἀναγνώρισις* and *περιπέτεια*) must be, like everything else in a play, part of the unity of the whole, the natural or necessary consequence of something before it (*ἐκ τῶν προγεγενημένων* a 19).

εὐθὺς: see on 5, 1449 a 36. a 14

ὥσπερ ὥρισται, i. e. in chaps. 7–8. a 15

περιπετείας ἢ ἀναγνωρισμοῦ: see on 6, 1450 a 34. Both terms are explained in the next chapter.

1452 a 17 **δὲ λέξις.** The editors generally acquiesce in the corrected reading *δὲ ἐξ ἧς*, in lieu of which Vahlen has *δέ ἐστιν ἐξ ἧς*, and Susemihl *δ' ἐστὶν ἧς*. I have suggested that Aristotle may possibly have written *πεπλεγμένην δὲ λέγω ἧς*, on the supposition that *λέξις* may be taken to represent *λεγ̃ης*.

a 18 **ταῦτα,** i.e. *ἀναγνωρισμὸς* and *περιπέτεια.*

a 20 **ταῦτα.** If any correction is wanted, *αὐτά* or *τὰ μετ' αὐτά* is perhaps simpler than either *τὰ ὕστερα* (Gomperz) or *τἀναντία* (Bonitz)—though this last has certainly the great advantage of supplying an easy explanation of the *καθάπερ εἴρηται* in 11, 1452 a 23. The objection to *ταῦτα* is its supposed inelegance and superfluity. It is not more inelegant, however, than the *γίγνεσθαι* that immediately precedes it (*ταῦτα δὲ δεῖ γίνεσθαι . . . ὥστε . . . γίγνεσθαι ταῦτα*); and its apparent superfluity is a common phenomenon with demonstratives in Greek (v. Kühner, Gr. Gr.[3] 2. 1 p. 660).

διαφέρει τὸ γίγνεσθαι τάδε διὰ τάδε ἢ μετὰ τάδε. Aristotle's construction after *διαφέρει* is not always quite the same as that in the present passage. (1) The disjunctive is sometimes doubled: Rhet. 1. 15, 1375 b 20 *οὐδὲν διαφέρει ἢ μὴ κεῖσθαι ἢ μὴ χρῆσθαι* [comp. Poet. 9, 1451 b 1; 18, 1456 a 30]. (2) It may be replaced by a *καί*: An. post. 1. 11, 77 a 13 *τὸ δὲ μέσον οὐδὲν διαφέρει εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι λαβεῖν*—or by *τε καί*: Soph. el. 18, 177 a 6 *διαφέρει δὲ πλεῖστον ἐρωτώμενόν τε καὶ μὴ λύειν λόγον.* (3) A clause also with *εἰ* may take the place of one with the infinitive: De interpr. 9, 18 b 36 *οὐδὲ τοῦτο διαφέρει εἴ τινες εἶπον τὴν ἀντίφασιν ἢ μὴ εἶπον.*—Soph. el. 17, 176 a 6 *οὐδὲν γὰρ τοῦτο διαφέρει ἢ εἰ ἤρετο κτέ.* [comp. Poet. 18, 1456 a 30].

a 22 **περιπέτεια,** as a stage-term, seems to mean a complete change or reversal of situation within the limits of a single scene or act [v. Festschrift Theodor Gomperz dargebracht p. 168]. Apart from the stage it has the sense of a sudden change of fortune in Rhet. 1. 11, 1371 b 10, *καὶ αἱ περιπέτειαι* [*repentinae mutationes,* Goulston] *καὶ τὸ παρὰ μικρὸν σῴζεσθαι ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων* [scil. *ἡδύ*]. *πάντα γὰρ θαυμαστὰ ταῦτα*; and that of a reversal of the natural order of things in H. A. 8. 2, 590 b 13[1]. This same idea of an unforeseen reversal of fortune is implied also in the adj. *περιπετής* in Herod. 8. 20 *περιπετέα τε ἐποιήσαντο σφίσι αὐτοῖσι τὰ πρήγματα,* and in

[1] Bekker's punctuation of this passage requires to be amended, as the whole statement from *καί τις συμβαίνει* in b 13 to *σαρκοφάγα ἐστίν* in b 20 is a digression. The clause that precedes it, *οἱ δὲ κάραβοι κρατοῦσι μὲν τῶν μεγάλων ἰχθύων* (b 12), is answered by *νέμονται δ' οἱ κάραβοι τὰ ἰχθύδια* in b 20.

Eurip. Andr. 982 περιπετεῖς ἔχεις τύχας, καὶ ξυμφορὰν τήνδ' ἐσπεσοῦσ' ἀμηχανεῖς. Every tragedy, according to Aristotle (7, 1451^{a} 13), describes a transition from happiness to misery or vice versa; but in the 'complex story' the change, however gradual it may be, seems to the hero to come upon him all at once, by a sudden reversal of the state of things; he thinks himself a happy man (let us say) at the beginning of an act, and a miserable man at the end of it. It has been argued, however, by Vahlen (Beitr. 2 p. 6), and more recently by Dr. Lock (Class. Rev. 9, 251)[1], that a περιπέτεια in Aristotle's sense of the term is something different from this—that it is conceived as arising when a man's actions (τῶν πραττομένων) are found to have consequences the direct opposite of what the agent meant or expected. The language in ^{a} 25 (v. ad loc.) hardly justifies such a very artificial interpretation of a word like περιπέτεια, which must be presumed to have been already an established and well-understood term of dramatic technique (see on 6, 1450^{a} 34, and comp. 10, 1452^{a} 15). If we refrain from putting pressure on isolated points, the general sense and connexion of ideas in Aristotle's statement is sufficiently clear. He begins by assuming (1) a working definition of περιπέτεια (ἡ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν πραττομένων μεταβολὴ καθάπερ εἴρηται), with an addition to remind us (2) that even an incident like this (καὶ τοῦτο δὲ) is in a well-constructed play κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, i. e. the natural or necessary consequence of antecedents in the story (10, 1452^{a} 18–20), as it is for instance (3) in the Oedipus Tyrannus (^{a} 24–26), and (4) in the Lynceus (^{a} 27–29). In the O. T. the sudden fall of Oedipus is the consequence of the revelation of his parentage (δηλώσας ὃς ἦν ^{a} 26), and the revelation of his parentage the consequence of the presence of the messenger from Corinth (ἐλθὼν ^{a} 25). Similarly in the Lynceus the sudden change of situation—the salvation of Lynceus and death of his enemy (^{a} 29)—is the consequence of certain incidents in a previous act (συνέβη ἐκ τῶν πεπραγμένων ^{a} 28). This second instance—which seems to be added as a reminder that the περιπέτεια may be a turn for good (comp. τὸν δὲ σωθῆναι ^{a} 29) as well as a turn for evil—is too clearly described to leave any opening for any subtleties of interpretation. Aristotle's language puts before us an act or scene, which begins with Lynceus being led off for execution (ὡς ἀποθανούμενος ^{a} 27) and ends with his salvation (σωθῆναι ^{a} 29). This was the περιπέτεια—the εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν πραττομένων μεταβολή (^{a} 22)—of the Lynceus;

1452^{a} 22

[1] Pye anticipated this suggestion in his Commentary on the present passage.

1452 a 22 and as it came about according to Aristotle through incidents in the preceding portion of the play (*συνέβη ἐκ τῶν πεπραγμένων* a 28), it was in conformity with the great law of construction laid down in the preceding chapter and elsewhere.

a 23 **καθάπερ εἴρηται** may be taken (with Vahlen) as = *κατὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους τρόπους*, i. e. *εἰς εὐτυχίαν ἢ εἰς δυστυχίαν*, as was said in 7, 1451 a 13, and tacitly assumed in 6, 1450 a 3, a 17. If we accept Bonitz's correction in 10, 1452 a 20, the reference will be to that passage.

καὶ τοῦτο δὲ *κτἑ.* By omitting the stop before these words Vahlen makes them part of the definition of *περιπέτεια*. But it is much more natural to take them as an additional clause, like that in 10, 1452 a 18 *ταῦτα δὲ δεῖ γίνεσθαι κτἑ.*—in which case the illustrations from the O. T. and Lynceus are given as instances not of *περιπέτεια* in general, but of the kind of *περιπέτεια* which accords with Aristotelian principles of construction.

ὥσπερ λέγομεν: 'in the way we are saying', what follows being the explanation of this. The reference is to the formula at the end of chap. 10, *ἢ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς γίγνεσθαι ταῦτα.*

a 24 **τῷ Οἰδίποδι**: Soph. O. T. 924. The Oedipus Coloneus is never mentioned in the Poetics or elsewhere in Aristotle.

a 25 **ἐλθὼν** *κτἑ.* 'Bene factum est quod ipsam tragoediam adhuc superstitem habemus, nam alioqui ex Aristotelis verbis credere deberemus Nuntium eo consilio venisse ut Oedipum a metu circa matrem liberaret' (Tyrwhitt). It is to be remembered that the Messenger in the O. T. arrives in the scene (911–1085) preceding the peripety (1110–1185). Even after the announcement of the death of Polybus Oedipus is not quite freed from his old anxieties, as Merope, his supposed mother, is still living; all further disquietude on that account the Messenger seeks to allay by his assurance that Oedipus was no son of Merope but a foundling, whom he had himself received from one of the servants of Laius. This disclosure is enough for Iocasta (1056); but neither Oedipus nor the chorus has as yet any suspicion of its import. It is only in the next scene (1110–1185) that he learns the whole truth, and thus falls, all at once as it were, from happiness into misery. This is in brief the peripety in the O. T.; and it is, as Aristotle says, the natural result of the arrival of the Messenger and his disclosure in the preceding scene. Vahlen and others point to this passage, *ἐλθὼν ὡς εὐφρανῶν . . . τοὐναντίον ἐποίησεν*, as evidence for their contention, that a peripety is said to take place when something

done by a man with a certain end in view has consequences of a 1452 a 25
directly opposite kind. If that were the meaning, the peripety in the O. T. would surely be a fact in the life of the Messenger, not the turning-point in that of Oedipus.

εὐφρανῶν: O. T. 934 sqq.

ἀπαλλάξων κτέ.: O. T. 989 sqq.

δηλώσας ὃς ἦν: O. T. 1016 sqq. It is this that leads to the a 26
examination of the Servant in the following scene, which is the immediate cause of the catastrophe.

τοὐναντίον: not the opposite of what the man intended, but the changed situation. The meaning is sufficiently shown by the use of *τὸ ἐναντίον* in the first line of the chapter.

Λυγκεῖ: the Lynceus of Theodectes; comp. 18, 1455 b 29 and a 27
Nauck, TGF.[2] p. 801. It is clear from Aristotle's account that it must have been a play with a 'double plot' (v. 13, 1453 a 30).

τὸν μὲν συνέβη κτέ. The construction is changed in order to a 28
show that the new situation was the result of something that had gone before it, some incident in a preceding scene (*συνέβη ἐκ τῶν πεπραγμένων*).

τῶν πεπραγμένων: comp. 10, 1452 a 19 *ὥστε ἐκ τῶν προγεγενημένων συμβαίνειν κτέ.*, and 18, 1455 b 30 *δέσις μὲν τά τε προπεπραγμένα καὶ ἡ τοῦ παιδίου λῆψις.*

ἀναγνώρισις. Aristotle has already laid it down in 10, 1452 a 18 a 29
that the Discovery should arise *ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς συστάσεως τοῦ μύθου*, and he does not repeat his rule in the present chapter. He assumes that in a 37 (*ἡ μάλιστα τοῦ μύθου*), and also later on, in chap. 16, which is a sort of appendix to this discussion (see esp. 16, 1455 a 16).

πρὸς εὐτυχίαν . . . ὡρισμένων: comp. Eurip. fr. 218 ed. Nauck a 31
(TGF.[2] p. 424) *φεῦ φεῦ, τὸ δοῦλον ὡς ἁπανταχῇ γένος πρὸς τὴν ἐλάσσω μοῖραν ὥρισεν θεός.*

περιπέτειαι. The plural is used, just as in 6, 1450 a 34, 18, a 33
1456 a 19, 24, 1459 b 10, to denote the concrete instances of *περιπέτεια*, as actual incidents in plays. The formal incongruity of number in the juxtaposition of *ἀναγνώρισις* and *περιπέτειαι* in the present passage is certainly not greater than that in 9, 1451 b 3 *μετὰ μέτρου ἢ ἄνευ μέτρων*, or Thuc. 2. 4. 2 *λίθοις τε καὶ κεράμῳ βαλλόντων.* See also the instances quoted on 19, 1456 b 1 (*μέγεθος καὶ μικρότητα*).

οἵαν. Bon. Ind. 50 a 26 would restore *οἵαν* for *οἷον* in Magna mor. 2. 8, 1207 b 18. If (with Vahlen) we retain the MS. reading

1452 ª 33 *οἷον* (= e.g.), it becomes necessary to understand *περιπέτειαν* after *ἔχει*.

ἡ ἐν τῷ Οἰδίποδι, scil. *ἀναγνώρισις*.

ª 34 **πρὸς ἄψυχα καὶ τὰ τυχόντα.** The *καί* here means 'even', not 'and', as is often assumed by the interpreters. Aristotle distinguishes between three possible forms of Discovery, according as it relates to (1) persons, (2) things, or (3) acts or deeds. In dealing with the second form he adds that the things recognized may be even of a very casual kind, *καὶ τὰ τυχόντα*—thinking perhaps of objects like certain of the *σημεῖα* mentioned in 16, 1454 ᵇ 21 sqq.

ª 35 **ἔστιν ὡς ὅπερ εἴρηται συμβαίνει.** If we adopt Vahlen's suggestion, *ἔστιν, ⟨ὅσ'⟩ ὥσπερ εἴρηται συμβαίνει*, we have to dissever *τὰ τυχόντα* from *ἄψυχα*, and take *ὅσ' ὥσπερ εἴρηται συμβαίνει* as an explanation of it. It is not easy to see how *τὰ τυχόντα*, i.e. concrete things of some sort or other, can be said to 'happen' or 'come about' (*συμβαίνει*) in a particular way. Spengel's reading *ὅπερ εἴρηται* aptly recalls the idea of *ἀναγνώρισις* as defined at the beginning of this paragraph, *ἐξ ἀγνοίας εἰς γνῶσιν μεταβολή, ἢ εἰς φιλίαν ἢ εἰς ἔχθραν*. As this recognition of 'things' however is not a *μεταβολὴ εἰς φιλίαν ἢ εἰς ἔχθραν*, but at best only a means to that, Aristotle throws in the qualifying *ἔστιν ὡς* ('in a way', 'in a sense') —an expression that always implies some reserve or limitation; comp. Phys. 2. 5, 197 ª 10 *ἔστιν ὡς οὐδὲν ἀπὸ τύχης δόξειεν ἂν γίγνεσθαι*.—De anima 3. 2, 425 ᵇ 22 *καὶ τὸ ὁρῶν ἔστιν ὡς κεχρωμάτισται*.—De mem. 1. 450 ᵇ 20 *ἢ ἔστιν ὡς ἐνδέχεται καὶ συμβαίνει τοῦτο*;—Eth. N. 5. 12, 1136 ᵇ 30 *καὶ ἔστιν ὡς τὰ ἄψυχα κτείνει*. The construction *πρὸς ἄψυχα συμβαίνει* is sufficiently assured by the parallel in Pol. 7. 17, 1336 ᵇ 31 *συμβαίνει δὲ ταὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὁμιλίας καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων*—where *ταὐτὸ τοῦτο* recalls a previous statement just in the same way as the *ὅπερ εἴρηται* in the amended text of the present passage (comp. J. of Phil. 14 p. 45).

ª 36 **πέπραγε** is transitive, as often in Aristotle, if our existing texts are to be trusted (comp. Bon. Ind. 632 ª 17).

ἀναγνωρίσαι: see on ᵇ 5.

ª 37 **μάλιστα τοῦ μύθου**: comp. 10, 1452 ª 18 *γίνεσθαι ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς συστάσεως τοῦ μύθου*. As the relationship between the parties is presupposed, the discovery of it in the course of the play is a very natural kind of incident.

μάλιστα τῆς πράξεως is explained by what follows, *ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη ἀναγνώρισις κτέ.*

ἢ ἔλεον ἕξει ἢ φόβον. The grammatical subject is *ἀναγνώρισις*, 1452 a 38
καὶ περιπέτεια being overlooked (see on 26, 1462 a 16). The Discovery will produce pity, when it synchronizes with the *πάθος* or anguish of the hero, as it does in the O. T.; but may also only suggest the coming of evil, in which case it will arouse fear. It is to be remembered that pity arises through the spectacle of suffering actually present and before us; whereas fear is apprehension of evil still to come (see on 13, 1452 b 32).

ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀτυχεῖν καὶ τὸ εὐτυχεῖν κτέ. is a further reason for b 2
saying that the discovery of relationships is *ἡ μάλιστα τῆς πράξεως* (a 37). If the play has a happy ending, like the Lynceus (a 27) or the Iphigenia in Tauris for instance, such a Discovery will be a very natural way of bringing that about; and it is equally natural in the O. T. and other plays with an unhappy ending.

τινῶν ἐστιν ἀναγνώρισις. For the emphatic position of the in- b 3
definite pronoun comp. Soph. el. 13, 173 b 3 *ἥ τε ὄρεξις τινὸς ὄρεξις καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία τινὸς ἐπιθυμία καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον τινὸς διπλάσιον.*

ἀναγνωρίσαι, scil. *τίνες εἰσίν* (to be supplied from the preceding b 5
δῆλος ἅτερος τίς ἐστιν), 'to reveal who they are', 'to make themselves known'—not as Tyrwhitt renders it, 'se invicem agnoscere'. The simple verb *γνωρίζειν* has (just like our English 'discover') two meanings, that of 'to learn' (= *γιγνώσκειν*) and that of 'to make known' (= *γνώριμον ποιεῖν* or *δηλοῦν*). The first sense reappears in certain of the compounds (*προγνωρίζειν, συγγνωρίζειν*), and the second in others (*διαγνωρίζειν, ἐπιγνωρίζειν*). *ἀναγνωρίζειν* recalls both senses of *γνωρίζειν*, sometimes meaning 'to recognize', and sometimes 'to reveal'. (1) It means to 'recognize' in 14, 1453 b 31 *ἀναγνωρίσαι τὴν φιλίαν*, and (with *φιλίαν* or some such word understood) in 14, 1453 b 35, 1454 a 3, 6, 8. This is the sense of *ἀναγνωριοῦντος* also in 16, 1455 a 15—where *τὸ τόξον* is understood, as the context (*τὸ τόξον γνώσεσθαι*) will show; and of *ἀναγνωρίσαι* in 11, 1452 a 35 *εἰ πέπραγέ τις ἢ μὴ πέπραγεν ἀναγνωρίσαι*, 'utrum fecerit aliquis an non fecerit agnoscere' (Ritter). Another instance is in the passive, *ἀνεγνωρίσθη ὑπὸ τῆς τροφοῦ*, in 16, 1454 b 27. (2) On the other hand the word must mean 'reveal' in 16, 1454 b 32 *ἀνεγνώρισεν ὅτι Ὀρέστης*, 'manifestum fecit se esse Orestem' (Ritter), and in the parallel in 17, 1455 b 9, where *ὅτι Ὀρέστης* or some equivalent has to be understood after *ἀνεγνώρισεν* (comp. 17, 1455 b 21). The same sense is found in the passive in the present context (b 6), *τῷ Ὀρέστῃ ἀνεγνωρίσθη*, which means 'was revealed to Orestes', rather than 'was recog-

1452 b 5 nized' by him; and also (if I am not mistaken) in *ἀνεγνωρίσθησαν* in 16, 1455 a 3. A third sense has been found for *ἀναγνωρίσας* in 17, 1455 b 21, on which see note.

b 6 **Ἰφιγένεια**: comp. 16, 1454 b 32. The reference is to Eurip. Iph. Taur. 727 sqq.

τῷ Ὀρέστῃ is probably not a dative of the agent but equivalent to *πρὸς τὸν Ὀρέστην*.

b 7 **ἐκείνου** is to be taken as a genitive after the *ἀναγνωρίσεως* that follows in b 8 (comp. *τινῶν* b 3, and *θατέρου* b 4). For a genitive depending on a following genitive compare *ἑκάστου* in 18, 1456 a 6 (v. ad loc.), and Plato Rep. 534 B *λόγον ἑκάστου . . . τῆς οὐσίας* [comp. Campbell, Rep. of Plato 2 p. 185].

b 9 **περὶ ταῦτ' ἐστί.** There is no reason to delete the preposition. The *μῦθος* being a *μίμησις πράξεως* (comp. esp. 10, 1452 a 13), two parts of the *μῦθος* (the *περιπέτεια* and *ἀναγνώρισις*) are said to relate to certain portions of the *πρᾶξις*, i.e. to the kind of incidents already considered in the preceding statement (10, 1452 a 12—11, 1452 b 8). The *μῦθος* in fact has a *περιπέτεια* and *ἀναγνώρισις* because the *πρᾶξις* which it represents is conceived as having them. It will be observed that the 'simple plot' of 10, 1452 a 12 is now tacitly set aside, no doubt on account of its inferior dramatic value (v. 13, 1452 b 31).

b 11 **εἴρηται**, 'has been already described, or explained'; comp. 25, 1460 b 24 *τὸ γὰρ τέλος εἴρηται.*—De anima 2. 8, 420 b 21 *τὸ δ' αἴτιον ἐν ἑτέροις εἰρήσεται.*—Eth. N. 4. 7, 1127 a 18 *οἱ μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ὁμιλοῦντες εἴρηνται.*

πάθος δ' ἐστὶ πρᾶξις κτέ. The term *πάθος* requires definition because of the variety of senses attaching to it. In ordinary language it often involves the idea of great suffering, and has the concrete sense of a great trouble or affliction of body or mind: Metaph. Δ 21, 1022 b 19 *πάθος λέγεται . . . αἱ βλαβεραὶ ἀλλοιώσεις καὶ κινήσεις, καὶ μάλιστα αἱ λυπηραὶ βλάβαι. ἔτι τὰ μεγέθη τῶν συμφορῶν καὶ λυπηρῶν πάθη λέγεται* (comp. Bon. Ind. 557 a 26). The sense the present definition gives the word was probably one already established in theatrical usage (see on 6, 1450 a 34). The *πάθος* is, just like the *ἀναγνώρισις* and the *περιπέτεια*, one of the incidents of the play and as such part of the *πρᾶξις* or action. Aristotle defines it accordingly as a *πρᾶξις* of a certain kind, a *πρᾶξις φθαρτικὴ ἢ ὀδυνηρά*. Apart from the theatre the terms *πάθος* and *πρᾶξις* are natural opposites (comp. 1, 1447 a 28 and Eth. N. 5. 7, 1132 a 9).

πρᾶξις φθαρτικὴ ἢ ὀδυνηρά κτέ.: compare the enumeration of 'things piteous' (*ἐλεεινά*) in Rhet. 2. 8, 1386 a 4 *ὅσα τε γὰρ τῶν λυπηρῶν καὶ ὀδυνηρῶν φθαρτικά, πάντα ἐλεεινά, καὶ ὅσα ἀναιρετικά, καὶ ὅσων ἡ τύχη αἰτία κακῶν μέγεθος ἐχόντων. ἔστι δ' ὀδυνηρὰ μὲν καὶ φθαρτικὰ θάνατοι καὶ αἰκίαι σωμάτων καὶ κακώσεις καὶ γῆρας καὶ νόσοι καὶ τροφῆς ἔνδεια κτέ.* 1452 b 11

ἐν τῷ φανερῷ θάνατοι: i.e. violent deaths on the stage, before the eyes of the spectators, such as Horace condemns in A. P. 185 (comp. Tumlirz, Die tragischen Affecte Mitleid und Furcht nach Aristoteles, p. 16). b 12

περιωδυνίαι signifies bodily agonies, as the context shows; comp. Eth. E. 1. 5, 1215 b 18 *πολλὰ γάρ ἐστι τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀποβαινόντων, δι' ἃ προΐενται τὸ ζῆν, οἷον νόσους περιωδυνίας χειμῶνας.*

ὅσα τοιαῦτα serves to include the less physical forms of pain. In the Oedipus Tyrannus, which Aristotle so constantly holds up as the perfect model of a tragedy, the *πάθος* is the mental anguish of Oedipus (O. T. 1317 sqq.) much more than the physical horror of his self-inflicted blindness. b 13

Bernays (Zwei Abhandl. p. 167) and Bernhardy (Gr. Litt. 2. 2³ p. 236), as well as most of the recent editors of the Poetics, agree with Ritter in rejecting chapter 12 as an interpolation. The reasons advanced by Ritter against it are threefold:—(1) that it breaks the continuity of the main discussion; (2) that it gives us a string of names and definitions of the external accidents of Tragedy, which it was not at all necessary for Aristotle's purposes to consider—'non nisi nuda nomina exhibentur, quorum descriptio non ex fine tragoediae proposito, non ex interna eius forma et constitutione, id quod deceret philosophum, sed ex habitu illius externo petitur'; (3) that the form of the conclusion, a mere repetition of the opening sentence, betrays the hand of an interpolator. These arguments, however, which are hardly so conclusive as has been supposed, ignore a good many points which have to be taken into account in the general balance of probabilities. (1) There is the mark of style; the terminology in *κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν καὶ εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται κεχωρισμένα* is Aristotelian, and the brevity of these clear-cut definitions can hardly be said to be un-Aristotelian. (2) Aristotle may very well be conceived to have felt that the 'parts' *κατὰ τὸ ποσόν* were not only of great technical importance but also too obvious and too recognized to be passed over in silence; and further that, as certain of them (*πρόλογος* and *ἐπεισόδιον*) had been already mentioned in the book, a short note b 14

1452^b 14 explaining what they were might be expected. (3) Besides this, it has to be borne in mind that the very term 'parts', in the present sense of the word, had actually appeared in the definition of Tragedy in 6, 1449^b 25 *ἡδυσμένῳ λόγῳ χωρὶς ἑκάστῳ τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοῖς μορίοις*. In the analysis also of Tragedy in 6, 1450^a 7 *ἀνάγκη οὖν πάσης τραγῳδίας μέρη εἶναι ἕξ, καθ' ὃ ποιά τις ἐστὶν ἡ τραγῳδία*, the only motive for the qualifying clause *καθ' ὃ ποιά τις ἐστὶν ἡ τραγῳδία* is to distinguish the parts under consideration from another series of parts of a different kind—the *μέρη κατὰ τὸ ποσόν* of the present chapter. It is clear that Aristotle was already thinking of these latter; and the clause added prepares us, as it were, for a more formal recognition of them.

The doubt as to the genuineness of this chapter is often supposed to be confirmed by the difficulty of reconciling one or two of its definitions with the known facts of the Drama as seen in the works of the three great tragedians. If we look at the structure of our surviving Greek tragedies, certain of these definitions are either inadequate or untrue. 'It is not true to say that the stasimon is distinguished from the parodus by the absence of anapaests and trochaics. Anapaests are far from being universal in the parodus, while they occur not uncommonly at the beginning of stasima . . . and in the Medea one of the stasima (1081–1115) is anapaestic throughout. Again, the ordinary trochaic metre is frequently found in stasima, while trochaic tetrameters are equally unknown both to the stasima and the parodi of tragedy' (Haigh, Tragic Drama of the Greeks p. 356; comp. Westphal, Prolegomena zu Aeschylus Tragödien p. 57). The question, however, on which so much ingenuity has been expended, admits of another answer if one remembers Aristotle's purpose in writing. His work is, in intention at any rate, a practical treatise, an *Art* of Poetry, not a record of learned research; and it was written for the benefit of the men of his own day, and with reference to the theatrical conditions of the time. Although he thinks that in certain particulars the existing practice of the stage should be reformed by a return to that of the older dramatists, the general assumption in the Poetics is the theatre as it was in the middle of the Fourth Century. One of the chief difficulties a student of the older Drama finds in this chapter is in a point relating to the Chorus. We do not know much of the economy of the later Tragedy; but one thing is fairly ascertained, that the chorus was no longer what it had been in the age of Sophocles and Euripides.

Aristotle himself tells us (18, 1456 ^{a} 28) that its songs, instead of forming a more or less integral part of the play, had degenerated into mere lyrical intermezzi (*ἐμβόλιμα*). This, however, can hardly have been the only change it had undergone. The probability is that the dramatic dance also had been curtailed, and that, when once in its place in the orchestra, the chorus simply sang its pieces without any accompanying dance. What the comic poet Plato (fr. 130 Kock) said of the choruses of his day: 1452 ^{b} 14

ὥστ' εἴ τις ὀρχοῖτ' εὖ, θέαμ' ἦν· νῦν δὲ δρῶσιν οὐδέν,
ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἀπόπληκτοι στάδην ἑστῶτες ὠρύονται,

was presumably as true of those of Tragedy as of the rest in Aristotle's age. If it was true of Tragedy, however, the new state of things would naturally imply a new technique in the treatment of the *χορικά*; the so-called *στάσιμα* would be what their name in fact suggests, stationary songs, as opposed to the *πάροδοι* or entrance-songs; and there would accordingly be no place in them for verses in a metre of movement. The definition of the *στάσιμον*, therefore, as a *μέλος ἄνευ ἀναπαίστου καὶ τροχαίου* may not be quite so paradoxical as it seems at first sight (comp. Westphal l. c. p. 64). The difficulty we find in this instance seems to be really due to the grammarians having transferred the word *στάσιμον* from the later to the earlier Tragedy, where the position of the 'sung parts' (as Aristotle calls them) was the same, though their structure and dramatic importance were not the same. This conclusion is confirmed by the way in which the ancients dealt with this chapter. The explanations of *πάροδος*, *στάσιμον*, etc., in the grammarians (to be seen in Westphal l. c. and elsewhere) reproduce the definitions in the text, but with modifications manifestly due to a desire to re-shape them into conformity with the actual facts of the great Drama, that of Sophocles and Euripides. 'Duodecimi capitis circumscriptio cum haud quaquam ad omnes tragoedias quadraret, pars eorum qui postea id genus tractarunt eam additis aliis notionibus amplificare, pars eam vocibus accuratius terminatis emendare, pars eam aliquo modo varietati rerum quae apud poetas obversatur adaptare studuerunt, unde haud paucae dissensiones manarunt' (L. Schmidt, De parodi et stasimi nominibus p. viii). This may perhaps be taken as evidence not only for the antiquity of the definitions in this chapter (comp. Consbruch, Comm. in honorem Gu. Studemund p. 223), but also for their having made their appearance in a work of considerable authority at the time.

1452^{b}15 **πρότερον**: in chap. 6.

εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται: Metaph. Δ 25, 1023^{b}12 *μέρος λέγεται ἕνα μὲν τρόπον εἰς ὃ διαιρεθείη ἂν τὸ ποσὸν ὁπωσοῦν.*

^{b}18 **ἁπάντων.** The sense of this sentence seems to be rightly understood by Tyrwhitt (who is here only following Goulston): 'Atque hae quidem communes sunt tragoediarum omnium; propriae vero quarundam sunt e scena cantus et *κόμμοι*, sive planctus.' For the neuter *ἁπάντων* comp. *πᾶν* in 6, 1450^{a}13 and *ἐξ ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλο* in 18, 1456^{a}31. Hermann with less probability supposes *χορευτῶν* to be understood (comp. Haigh, Tragic Drama of the Greeks p. 361). Others, understanding *δραμάτων*, imagine Comedy as well as Tragedy to be meant.

ταῦτα. It is not clear whether this refers to all the parts mentioned, or only to the two chorica, the *πάροδος* and *στάσιμον*. I incline to the second alternative, notwithstanding the arguments that have been urged against it (Klein, De partibus formisque quibus tragoediam constare voluerit Aristoteles p. 5). Aristotle is thinking primarily of the parts sung; and by a very natural association of ideas he passes from the parts sung by the chorus first to the lyrical passages sung by an actor (or actors), and then to the dirges sung by an actor (or actors) and the chorus in conjunction.

τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνῆς, the solos (*μονῳδίαι*), duets, and trios sung by the characters on the stage. These dramatic lyrics are recognized in Probl. 19. 15, 918^{b}26, and contrasted with the songs of the chorus: *τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνῆς οὐκ ἀντίστροφα, τὰ δὲ τοῦ χοροῦ ἀντίστροφα· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑποκριτὴς ἀγωνιστὴς καὶ μιμητής, ὁ δὲ χορὸς ἧττον μιμεῖται* (see also Probl. 19. 30, 920^{a}8—48, 922^{b}16). Comp. Suidas *Μονῳδία· ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνῆς ᾠδὴ ἐν τοῖς δράμασι. καὶ μονῳδεῖν τὸ θρηνεῖν. μονῳδία λέγεται ὅταν εἷς μόνος λέγῃ τὴν ᾠδὴν καὶ οὐχ ὁμοῦ ὁ χορός.*

^{b}19 **πρόλογος.** The term, which appears several times in Aristophanes, is used in the sense the present definition gives it in 5, 1449^{b}4, and in Rhet. 3. 14, 1415^{a}8 *τὰ τοῦ δικανικοῦ προοίμια δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι ταὐτὸ δύναται ὅπερ τῶν δραμάτων οἱ πρόλογοι καὶ τῶν ἐπῶν τὰ προοίμια . . .* (^{a}18) *καὶ οἱ τραγικοὶ δηλοῦσι περὶ ⟨οὗ⟩ τὸ δρᾶμα, κἂν μὴ εὐθὺς ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ προλόγῳ γέ που.*

^{b}20 **ἐπεισόδιον** may be compared with *ἐξόδιον* (from *ἔξοδος*); it seems to be derived from *ἐπείσοδος*, in the sense the word has in Sophocles O. C. 729 *ὁρῶ τιν' ὑμᾶς ὀμμάτων εἰληφότας φόβον νεώρη τῆς ἐμῆς ἐπεισόδου* ('my coming in upon you'). This seems to me a more

probable explanation than those noted by Haigh, Tragic Drama of the Greeks p. 353. 1452 b 20

πάροδος. For the definitions of it in the grammarians see J. Aschauer, Ueber die Parodos und Epiparodos in der griechischen Tragödie p. 5. As the negative part of the definition of *στάσιμον, ἄνευ ἀναπαίστου καὶ τροχαίου*, must be supposed to differentiate it from the parodus, it seems clear that in the view of the writer of this chapter anapaestic and trochaic passages were not out of place in the parodus. In the existing Greek tragedies, however, trochaic passages are all but unknown in the parodi, though they are common enough in Comedy: there is no instance of them in Sophocles or Euripides, and apparently only one in Aeschylus (Persae 155). All this points to the conclusion (comp. Westphal l. c. p. 64) that it is a later form of Tragedy that Aristotle is thinking of, and that the practice of the tragedians in this matter had changed since the time of Euripides. For the actual use of trochaics in the tragic parodi there is some faint evidence in Schol. Aristoph. Ach. 204 *γέγραπται δὲ τὸ μέτρον τροχαϊκὸν πρόσφορον τῇ τῶν διωκόντων σπουδῇ. ταῦτα δὲ ποιεῖν εἰώθασιν οἱ τῶν δραμάτων ποιηταὶ κωμικοὶ καὶ τραγικοί, ἐπειδὰν δρομαίως εἰσάγωσι τοὺς χορούς, ἵνα ὁ λόγος συντρέχῃ τῷ δράματι.* b 22

λέξις ὅλη. Ever since Twining's time there has been a tendency to press the meaning of *λέξις*, and distinguish it from *μέλος* (comp. K. O. Müller, Kleine deutsche Schriften 1 p. 510); it is supposed to stand for recitative, or to be a general term including recitative and song. This interpretation is hardly reconcileable with the language of the adjacent definitions. (1) The definition of the *στάσιμον*, as a *μέλος ἄνευ ἀναπαίστου καὶ τροχαίου*, presupposes the possibility of a *μέλος with* anapaests and trochaics; (2) the definition also of *ἐπεισόδιον*, as that which is *μεταξὺ ὅλων χορικῶν μελῶν*, will not apply to the first *ἐπεισόδιον*, if the parodus which precedes it is not to be regarded as a *μέλος* (comp. Westphal l. c. p. 58). *λέξις ὅλη* is to be compared with the *μέρος ὅλον* in the preceding definitions of *πρόλογος, ἐπεισόδιον* and *ἔξοδος*. The traditional reading *λέξις ὅλου χοροῦ* involves a distinction between the entire chorus and individual *χορευταί*, which would probably have had very little meaning in Aristotle's day, when the chorus had practically ceased to take a serious part in the action of the play. b 23

στάσιμον. For the origin of this technical sense of the word it is usual to refer to Aristophanes Vesp. 270 *ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ στάντας ἐνθάδ', ὦνδρες, ᾄδοντας αὐτὸν ἐκκαλεῖν*, as showing that

1452 b 23 *στάσιμον* meant the song sung when the chorus had taken up its position in the orchestra; and to Ran. 1280 *μή, πρίν γ' ἂν ἀκούσῃς χἀτέραν στάσιν μελῶν*—where the Scholiast explains *στάσιν μελῶν* by *στάσιμον μέλος ὃ ᾄδουσιν ἱστάμενοι οἱ χορευταί.* The interpretation, however, of this second passage is by no means clear, as *στάσις μελῶν* may very well mean a 'set of songs', a *σύστημα μελῶν.* The general sense of the adj. *στάσιμος* is 'without movement' or 'action' (= *ἀκίνητος*), and hence 'steady', 'stable', 'quiet'. The *στάσιμον,* accordingly, should be the 'stationary song', as distinct from the *πάροδος,* a song of movement. This is exactly what Plato Comicus implies in his description of the chorus of his time (see above); and it is in accordance with the statements of the grammarians, e.g. that in Schol. Eurip. Phoen. 202 *τοῦτο τὸ μέλος στάσιμον λέγεται· ὅταν γὰρ ὁ χορὸς μετὰ τὴν πάροδον λέγῃ τι μέλος πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἀνῆκον ἀκίνητος μένων, στάσιμον λέγεται τὸ ᾆσμα,* and that in Schol. Soph. Trach. 216 *τὸ μελιδάριον οὐκ ἔστι στάσιμον ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς ὀρχοῦνται.* If we may suppose that in Aristotle's time the chorus after the *πάροδος* stood motionless in its place in the orchestra, the songs in this part of a tragedy would be rightly termed *στάσιμα*; and the absence of anapaests and trochaics would be a good formal mark of distinction between them and the *πάροδοι.*

b 24 **ἀναπαίστου**: not the foot itself, but the verse or verses made up of it.

τροχαίου: trochaic verse or verses, in the same way as *ἴαμβος* often means an iambic verse. The reason for the exclusion of the trochaic tetrameter is that, as one of the *κινητικὰ μέτρα,* it has a special fitness for the dance (see on Poet. 4, 1449 a 21).

b 30 **τοῖς νῦν εἰρημένοις**, i.e. in the discussion in chaps. 7–11, which dealt with the *μῦθος* in general and its unity of structure. Aristotle now turns to the question of the particular form of *μῦθος* required to produce the emotional effect of Tragedy (pity and fear).

b 31 **μὴ ἁπλῆν ἀλλὰ πεπλεγμένην**: see the explanation of these terms in 10, 1452 a 12–18. The finest kind of tragedy involves a complex plot, because the element of surprise (comp. 9, 1452 a 4, and 14, 1454 a 4) in the complex plot accentuates the tragic impression (comp. 6, 1450 a 33 and 9, 1452 a 4). It may be observed, as an instance of Aristotle's inconsistency in matters of language, that in 13, 1453 a 13 the *ἁπλοῦς μῦθος* is the opposite of the *διπλοῦς,* not (as here) of the *πεπλεγμένος μῦθος.*

b 32 **φοβερῶν καὶ ἐλεεινῶν εἶναι μιμητικήν**: as was assumed in the definition of Tragedy (6, 1449 b 27), and again in 9, 1452 a 2 and

11, 1452^a 38. φοβερὰ καὶ ἐλεεινά (scil. πράγματα) is a comprehensive designation for the incidents distinctive of Tragedy, just as γελοῖα describes those of Comedy. A tragic scene may be either φοβερόν, 'alarming', suggestive of coming evil or danger to the hero, or ἐλεεινόν, 'piteous', a representation of his anguish and suffering. Fear (the opposite of hope) relates to the future; pity to evil or suffering actually present and before us. In Aristotle's time the definition of fear was 'expectation of coming evil', προσδοκία κακοῦ (Eth. N. 3. 9, 1115^a 9), or προσδοκία μέλλοντος κακοῦ (Plato Laches 198 B); or, as he puts it in Rhet. 2. 5, 1382^a 21, λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ. In pity on the other hand the evil or suffering, instead of being possible and prospective, is actual and before our eyes as it were: Rhet. 2. 8, 1385^b 13 ἔστω δὴ ἔλεος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινομένῳ κακῷ φθαρτικῷ ἢ λυπηρῷ (comp. Tumlirz, Die tragischen Affecte Mitleid und Furcht nach Aristoteles p. 15). The distinction between the φοβερά and ἐλεεινά in a play may be seen in the Oedipus Tyrannus, in which we are gradually prepared for the piteous incidents of the catastrophe by a series of premonitions of coming evil in the earlier scenes. The sympathetic interest we are thus made to take in the fortunes of the tragic hero depends, according to Aristotle, on one condition, his being more or less like ourselves (ὅμοιος), i. e. neither exceptionally good nor exceptionally wicked. This ethical similarity is what renders fear for another possible with us, as we are told in the context, 13, 1453^a 5 φόβος περὶ τὸν ὅμοιον; and in the Rhetoric the same is said of pity: Rhet. 2. 8, 1386^a 24 τοὺς ὁμοίους ἐλεοῦσι . . . κατὰ ἤθη. It would be easy, if it were worth while, to amplify the present statement by further illustrations from the corresponding chapters of the Rhetoric (2. 5 and 2. 8). The general point of view, however, in the two discussions is not the same. The pity and fear of the Rhetoric are the pity and fear of the judges whom the rhetor is addressing; it is part of his art to work, it may be, on their fears, and deter them from an adverse decision by showing how injurious its consequences may be to them and theirs. But the apprehension the tragic poet arouses in us is not of this personal description; it is a disinterested fear for another, the danger that arouses it being that of the hero, not that of the audience in the theatre. The point being so obvious, it is strange to see a diametrically opposite view taken by a critic of such distinction as Lessing. 'Aristotle's fear (he tells us) is not the fear which the impending evil of another arouses in us for

1452 b 32 that other; it is the fear that arises for ourselves from our likeness to the sufferer; it is the fear that the misfortunes, which we see hanging over him, may befall ourselves; it is the fear that we may ourselves become the pitied object' (Hamb. Dram. St. 75). The rhetoric of Lessing's statement may perhaps conceal the underlying confusion of thought: he has confused our fear that something *will* happen with our recognition of the possibility that something *may* happen to us. This latter is the general condition of all sensibility to pity and fear; but it is not a πάθος, and cannot, therefore, be identical with either of these emotions (comp. Tumlirz l.c. p. 7; Zeller, Phil. d. Gr. 2. 2[3] p. 783). Lessing has an equally paradoxical view of the Aristotelian ἔλεος—one inspired, if I am not mistaken, by Hobbes rather than by Aristotle himself. He thinks that according to Aristotle 'the feeling of pity is impossible without fear for ourselves . . . fear is a necessary ingredient in pity' (Hamb. Dram. St. 77); one of his modern followers even goes so far as to assert that the Aristotelian pity is only 'a disguised fear' ('eine verkappte Furcht', Döring, Kunstlehre des Aristoteles p. 310). This rapprochement of the two feelings is not warranted by the texts in the Rhetoric[1]. A distinction between them is implied not only in the present, but also in other passages of the Poetics; comp. ἔλεος καὶ φόβος (6, 1449 b 27; 14, 1453 b 12), ἢ ἔλεον ἕξει ἢ φόβον (11, 1452 a 38), οὔτε ἔλεον οὔτε φόβον (scil. ἔχοι ἄν, 13, 1453 a 3), φοβερὸν καὶ ἐλεεινόν (9, 1452 a 2; 13, 1452 b 32; 14, 1453 b 1), οὔτε ἐλεεινὸν οὔτε φοβερόν (13, 1453 a 1,

[1] The logical weakness of Lessing's reasoning at times may be seen from his interpretation of Rhet. 2. 5, 1382 b 26, where the enumeration of φοβερά is summed up in a brief formula, ὡς δ' ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, φοβερά ἐστιν ὅσα ἐφ' ἑτέρων γινόμενα ἢ μέλλοντα ἐλεεινά ἐστιν—'speaking generally, one may say that all evils are fearful, which arouse pity when they befall or are about to befall others'. On the strength of this Lessing tells us that with Aristotle pity necessarily involves a feeling of fear: 'So dachte Aristoteles von dem Mitleiden, und nur hieraus wird die wahre Ursache begreiflich, warum er in der Erklärung der Tragödie nächst dem Mitleiden, nur die einzige Furcht nannte. Nicht als ob diese Furcht hier eine besondere von dem Mitleiden unabhängige Leidenschaft sey . . . sondern weil, nach seiner Erklärung des Mitleids, dieses die Furcht nothwendig einschliesst; weil nichts unser Mitleid erregt, als was zugleich unsere Furcht erwecken kann' (Hamb. Dram. St. 75). But the fact that a particular kind of evil (e.g. a painful death) is in one relation a cause of fear and in another of pity is not enough to show the substantial identity of the two feelings, or to prove that one of them includes the other. Aristotle's φοβερά ἐστιν ὅσα ἐλεεινά ἐστιν is not an analysis of the feeling of φόβος, but merely an attempt to determine the kind of facts to which it relates.

6). It will be seen from the instances just quoted that in the formula 'pity and fear', pity comes first, whereas in the corresponding formula *φοβερά* often precedes *ἐλεεινά*. The explanation may perhaps be this, that Aristotle (like Plato) assumes a tragedy to be a picture of human suffering (*πάθος*); so that the excitement of pity is its primary and essential purpose, the element of fear coming in as a sort of secondary matter, to quicken our sympathy with the tragic hero, and prepare us for a catastrophe. In a play like the Oedipus Tyrannus, for instance, which Aristotle has so constantly in mind, the *φοβερά* precede the *ἐλεεινά* and lead up to them; but the great tragic interest is in the later scenes, in which Oedipus becomes an object of pity. 1452 b 32

πρῶτον μὲν is answered by *οὐδ' αὖ* in 1453 a 1 (comp. Plato b 34
Symp. 219 E; Laws 935 A).

The connexion between the main points in the discussion in this and the next chapter is as follows. After laying down (1) the general rule that, if a tragedy is to arouse pity and fear in us, the tragic hero must be a man of a certain type of character (13, 1452 b 34), Aristotle adds (2) that the tragic effect is enhanced by the play having an unhappy ending (13, 1453 a 12), and (3) weakened by a 'double plot', in which the unhappiness of certain of the personages is balanced by the happiness of others (13, 1453 a 30); and (4) that stories of horror in which kinsmen are involved have an especial tragic interest and value (14, 1453 b 14). This last leads him off (5) into a discussion on Discovery and its place in a play (14, 1453 b 26); the conclusion being (6) that, where kinsmen are concerned, the best form of tragedy is one in which a timely Discovery prevents the actual perpetration of the contemplated deed of horror (14, 1454 a 4).

ἐπιεικεῖς, the opposite of *μοχθηρούς* in a 36; in ordinary usage *ἐπιεικής* is often synonymous with *σπουδαῖος* or *χρηστός* (comp. 15, 1454 b 13), and opposed to *φαῦλος* (comp. 26, 1462 a 2) and similar terms (Bon. Ind. 271 b 36). The sense we are to attach to the term in this passage is shown by the equivalent that replaces it in 13, 1453 a 8 *ἀρετῇ διαφέρων καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ*. Aristotle tells us that a man of great worth and virtue is not sufficiently like ourselves (*ὅμοιος*) for the purposes of Tragedy, because his sufferings will create an overpowering feeling of indignation or disgust instead of pity. It is difficult to reconcile his present view with what he tells us elsewhere of the tragic hero (see on 13, 1453 a 16), or his present use of the term *ἐπιεικής* with that in 15, 1454 b 13.

1452 b 34 Besides this, according to the Rhetoric it is quite possible for one who is *ἐπιεικής* to be an object of pity: Rhet. 2. 8, 1385 b 34 *κἂν οἴωνταί τινας εἶναι τῶν ἐπιεικῶν* (scil. *ἐλεοῦσιν*). All this may perhaps show that strict consistency of language is not always to be expected even in Aristotle.

b 36 **μιαρόν**: as an offence to our moral or religious feelings; comp. 14, 1453 b 39, 1454 a 3.

b 38 **φιλάνθρωπον.** The situation having no *πάθος*, actual or prospective, does not arouse any kind of tragic emotion; it does not appeal to our 'philanthropy', or our pity, or our fears. It is assumed here that *τὸ φιλάνθρωπον* has some sort of tragic value, but not the same as *τὸ ἐλεεινόν* or *τὸ φοβερόν*. *τὸ φιλάνθρωπον* is that which appeals to the *φιλάνθρωποι*. The *φιλάνθρωπος*, or tender-hearted man, is able to feel a certain commiseration even for the wicked in misfortune; this feeling, however, is not pity proper, since it lacks the moral basis of all pity, the belief that the misfortune is not deserved. This interpretation of *τὸ φιλάνθρωπον* accords with the use of the term in the context (1453 a 3; comp. 18, 1456 a 21), as well as with the ordinary Greek conception of *φιλανθρωπία*, 'fellow-feeling', 'kindliness', 'tender-heartedness' (comp. L. Schmidt, Ethik der Gr. 2 p. 277). A certain affinity between *φιλανθρωπία* and pity is recognized in Rhet. 2. 13, 1390 a 19, where the tender-heartedness of the young is said to make them easily moved to pity: *ἐλεητικοὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ γέροντές εἰσιν ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ ταὐτὸ τοῖς νέοις· οἱ μὲν γὰρ διὰ φιλανθρωπίαν, οἱ δὲ δι' ἀσθένειαν* (comp. Tumlirz l.c. p. 13). A very different sense has been attached to the word by Twining and others, who suppose that the situation described as *φιλάνθρωπον* is one that satisfies our sense of poetical justice, a true lover of mankind being bound to rejoice at the punishment of evil-doers. Any one who remembers what *φιλανθρωπία* meant to a Greek, will at once see the improbability of this somewhat artificial rendering of *τὸ φιλάνθρωπον* in Aristotle.

1453 a 2 **μεταπίπτειν**: comp. the use of *μεταβάλλειν* in 7, 1451 a 14 (and passim), and that of *μεταβαίνειν* in 18, 1455 b 27.

a 4 **περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον.** *περί* = 'in the case of', i.e. as we say, 'for'; the preposition enables Aristotle to join *φόβος* and *ἔλεος* in the same construction. For this use of *περί* comp. Eth. N. 3. 9, 1115 a 22 *εἴ τις ὕβριν περὶ παῖδας ἢ γυναῖκα φοβεῖται.*—Plato Rep. 539 A *ἵνα μὴ γίγνηται ὁ ἔλεος οὗτος περὶ τοὺς τριακοντούτας σοι.*—Lysias 168, 39 *περὶ τοὺς οὐδὲν ἔχοντας κακὸν ἐλεημονέστατοι δοκοῦντες εἶναι.*

ἀνάξιον: Rhet. 2. 8, 1385 b 13 ἔστω δὴ ἔλεος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινομένῳ κακῷ φθαρτικῷ ἢ λυπηρῷ τοῦ ἀναξίου τυγχάνειν, ὃ κἂν αὐτὸς προσδοκήσειεν ἂν παθεῖν ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ τινά, καὶ τοῦτο ὅταν πλησίον φαίνηται. 1453 a 4

δυστυχοῦντα: for the participle see Goodwin, Synt. of Gr. Moods and Tenses 829 (*b*). Another instance of the construction will be found in 14, 1453 b 23.

περὶ τὸν ὅμοιον. This disinterested fear, which rests, just like a 5
pity, on a basis of sympathy, is not recognized in the Rhetoric, where the point of view from which the emotions are considered is different (see on 13, 1452 b 32). The antithesis in the text, ὁ μὲν περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιόν ἐστιν ὁ δὲ περὶ τὸν ὅμοιον, is too strongly put, since pity also is περὶ τὸν ὅμοιον, as one may see from Rhet. 2. 8, 1386 a 24 καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους ἐλεοῦσι κατὰ ἡλικίας, κατὰ ἤθη, κατὰ ἕξεις, κατὰ ἀξιώματα, κατὰ γένη.

δι' ἁμαρτίαν τινά: a 16 δι' ἁμαρτίαν μεγάλην. ἁμαρτία in the a 10
Aristotelian sense of the term is a mistake or error of judgement (*error* in Lat.), and the deed done in consequence of it is an ἁμάρτημα (*erratum*). In the Ethics an ἁμάρτημα is said to originate not in vice or depravity but in ignorance of some material fact or circumstance: Eth. N. 5. 10, 1135 b 12 τὰ μὲν μετ' ἀγνοίας ἁμαρτήματά ἐστιν ὅταν μήτε ὃν μήτε ὃ μήτε ᾧ μήτε οὗ ἕνεκα ὑπέλαβε πράξῃ· ἢ γὰρ οὐ βάλλειν ἢ οὐ τούτῳ ἢ οὐ τοῦτον ἢ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα ᾠήθη . . . ὅταν μὲν οὖν παραλόγως ἡ βλάβη γένηται, ἀτύχημα, ὅταν δὲ μὴ παραλόγως ἄνευ δὲ κακίας, ἁμάρτημα (comp. Rhet. 1. 13, 1374 b 6). This ignorance, we are told in another passage, takes the deed out of the class of voluntary acts, and enables one to forgive or even pity the doer: Eth. N. 3. 2, 1110 b 31 οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια αἰτία τοῦ ἀκουσίου ἀλλὰ τῆς μοχθηρίας, οὐδ' ἡ καθόλου (ψέγονται γὰρ διά γε ταύτην), ἀλλ' ἡ καθ' ἕκαστα, ἐν οἷς καὶ περὶ ἃ ἡ πρᾶξις· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ συγγνώμη (comp. Thuc. 1. 32. 5). In thus making the tragic story turn on an ἁμαρτία Aristotle is probably thinking more immediately of the Oedipus Tyrannus (comp. 14, 1453 b 29). It is strange that the ἁμαρτία or ἁμαρτία μεγάλη, of which Aristotle is speaking, should have been taken by Tumlirz (l. c. p. 25) and others to mean not an error of judgement, but some ethical fault or infirmity of character, like those indicated in 15, 1454 b 12. The Sophoclean Oedipus is a man of hasty temper (comp. O. T. 807), but his ἁμαρτία was not in that, but in the 'great mistake' he made, when he became unwittingly the slayer of his own father.

1453 a 12 ἀνάγκη ἄρα κτέ. is a corollary to what has just been said on the construction of the καλλίστη τραγῳδία; two other forms of Tragedy, which had often been adopted by poets, are pronounced to be of inferior tragic quality and value.

τὸν καλῶς ἔχοντα μῦθον: comp. the expressions in the context, *τὴν σύνθεσιν τῆς καλλίστης τραγῳδίας* (13, 1452 b 31), and *ἡ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην καλλίστη τραγῳδία* (13, 1453 a 22).

a 13 ἁπλοῦν . . . διπλοῦν: see on 13, 1452 b 31. The meaning of *διπλοῦς* in this connexion is explained later on, in a 31.

a 16 ἢ βελτίονος μᾶλλον ἢ χείρονος. No reason is given for this significant addition, but the intention of it is clear enough; it is an attempt to bring the present conception of the tragic hero as being *ὅμοιος*, like ourselves, of only average character and virtue, into line with that in certain other statements about him. Apart from this chapter, in fact, the general assumption in the Poetics is that the tragic hero should be not like the average man, but better than that—*βελτίων ἢ καθ' ἡμᾶς* (2, 1448 a 4, 18; 16, 1454 b 9; comp. 25, 1460 b 34). For the purposes of the present chapter, however, which deals with the emotional effect of Tragedy and its conditions another and a somewhat different conception of the tragic hero is required; if we are to pity him and fear for him, he must be, like Oedipus and the pathetic characters in Euripides, a personage of a very human type, one like what we are ourselves. It would take some discussion to reconcile the two views, and explain away the inconsistency of language into which Aristotle has drifted.

a 17 τὸ γιγνόμενον: Meteor. 1. 14, 352 b 19 *δηλοῖ δὲ τὸ γιγνόμενον*.—2. 8, 367a 11 *τεκμήριον δ' ἐστὶ . . . καὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον περὶ ταύτας τὰς νήσους*.—De resp. 21, 480 b 26 *μαρτυρεῖ τὸ γινόμενον*.—Pol. 7. 14, 1334 a 5 *μαρτυρεῖ τὰ γιγνόμενα τοῖς λόγοις*.—Xenophon Hiero 9. 3 *ὡς δὲ ταῦτα καλῶς ἔχει, μαρτυρεῖ τὰ γιγνόμενα* (= 'quod vere fit, die Erfahrung': Sauppe, Lexil. Xenoph. p. 25).

a 18 ἀπηρίθμουν: perhaps a metaphor from the counting of money, in which each coin has to be accepted and allowed to pass as good. '*ἀπαριθμεῖν* nova significatione dicit . . . est ergo *ἀπαριθμεῖν recevoir, mettre en conte, et approuver*'. (Casaubon, in Musei Oxon. litt. conspectus 1 p. 28.) In HSt. it is rendered by 'narrare', and in Liddell and Scott by 'recount'.

a 20 Ἀλκμέωνα. On this (the Attic) form of the name see HSt. s. v. and Meisterhans, Gr.[3] p. 35. It survives in A[c] in Rhet. 2. 23, 1397 b 3 and it is implied in *Ἀλκμεωνίδης*, the form the patronymic always has in the Ath. Pol.

Εὐριπίδῃ. Aristotle's conclusion as to the best form of Tragedy enables him to say a good word for Euripides, who had been blamed by critics for the unhappy ending of many of his plays. He insists that the procedure of Euripides is right, and points in confirmation to the eminent success of his plays on the stage, where in spite of all his faults Euripides is acknowledged to be the most moving and the most tragic of the tragedians. With this we may compare the estimate of Euripides in Quintilian 10. 1. 68 *in adfectibus vero cum omnibus mirus, tum in iis qui in miseratione constant facile praecipuus.* There is a long discussion of this passage by Neidhardt, Diss. Halenses 3 p. 279. 1453 ^{a} 24

αὐτὸ: the object after *ἐγκαλοῦντες*, and preparative to *ὅτι τοῦτο δρᾷ*. For the construction comp. Eth. N. 4. 1, 1120 ^{b} 17 *ἐγκαλεῖται τῇ τύχῃ ὅτι οἱ μάλιστα ἄξιοι ὄντες ἥκιστα πλουτοῦσιν.*—9. 8, 1168 ^{a} 32 *ἐγκαλοῦσι δὴ αὐτῷ οἷον ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ πράττει.*

τοῦτο δρᾷ: comp. 23, 1459 ^{a} 29 and Bon. Ind. 205 ^{a} 42.

ἀγώνων: see on 6, 1450 ^{b} 18. ^{a} 27

τραγικώταται: i.e. as arousing most directly the two distinctively tragic emotions of pity and fear (comp. 13, 1452 ^{b} 33 *τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον τῆς τοιαύτης μιμήσεώς ἐστιν*). Similarly in the context (^{a} 29) Euripides is termed *τραγικώτατος τῶν ποιητῶν*, because he is the greatest master of the art of arousing these same emotions (comp. Neidhardt l. c. p. 281).

αἱ τοιαῦται = *αἱ εἰς δυστυχίαν τελευτῶσαι.* ^{a} 28

ἂν κατορθωθῶσιν. The proper management Aristotle has in mind is often supposed to be that of the actors, stage-managers, etc., responsible for the execution of the piece. This interpretation, as was long ago pointed out by Düntzer (Rettung d. aristot. Poetik p. 159), makes the clause a superfluity, since it is obvious that, to succeed on the stage, every play requires fairly good acting and an adequate presentation. After *ἂν κατορθωθῶσιν* we have to supply *ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ* (comp. *εὖ οἰκονομεῖ*, scil. Euripides, in the next line); the sense is that the poet, having chosen a good tragic subject, must handle it with all due skill and care to secure a satisfactory result (comp. 14, 1453 ^{b} 25). *κατορθοῦν* is practically synonymous with *εὖ οἰκονομεῖν*, the term which replaces it in the context (^{a} 29).

τὰ ἄλλα. An admission that Euripides, though a master of ^{a} 29 emotional effect (*τραγικώτατος*), is not always equally admirable in his treatment of the other points in a tragedy. His artistic shortcomings are often noted in the Poetics. His plots are directly

1453 a 29 or indirectly criticized in 14, 1453 b 28, in 15, 1454 b 1, and in 16, 1454 b 31; his characters in 15, 1454 a 28–32, and in 25, 1461 b 20; and his choruses in 18, 1456 a 27.

οἰκονομεῖ. This seems to be the first instance of the use of the word in literary criticism. In the grammarians and writers on style *οἰκονομία* (*οἰκονομεῖν, οἰκονομικός*, etc.) is the regular technical word for the disposition of the materials and management of the various points in an oration or a poem (v. HSt. s. v., and Trendelenburg, Gramm. gr. de arte poetica iudiciorum rel. p. 91 and p. 149).

a 31 **ὑπό τινων.** A reference perhaps to the critics who are said to have disapproved of the sad ending of so many of the tragedies of Euripides (supra a 24).

σύστασις ἡ διπλῆν τε τὴν σύστασιν ἔχουσα. Aristotle has to use the periphrasis *σύστασιν ἔχουσα* instead of the simple *συνεστῶσα*, since *διπλῆ συνεστῶσα* would not have conveyed the sense required. Though there is a certain inelegance in this juxtaposition of *σύστασις* and *σύστασιν*, the reading is sufficiently certified by the very similar repetition of *φύσις* in several Aristotelian passages: De part. an. 2. 8, 653 b 33 *ἡ τῶν ὀστῶν φύσις . . . σκληρὰ τὴν φύσιν οὖσα*.—De gen. an. 5. 5, 785 a 23 *φύσει λευκοτέραν αὐτῶν εἶναι τὴν τῶν πτερῶν φύσιν*.—Eth. N. 7. 15, 1154 b 20 *φύσει δ' ἡδέα, ἃ ποιεῖ πρᾶξιν τῆς τοιᾶσδε φύσεως*, and in the Platonic Epinomis 990 B *οὐκ ἂν ῥᾳδίως ποτὲ πᾶσα φύσις ἱκανὴ γένοιτο θεωρῆσαι μὴ θαυμαστῆς μετέχουσα φύσεως* (comp. Lobeck on Sophocles Aj. 277, cited by Vahlen).

a 32 **καθάπερ ἡ Ὀδύσσεια**: see the synopsis of the Odyssey in 17, 1455 b 16–23.

καὶ τελευτῶσα κτέ. explains *διπλῆν τὴν σύστασιν ἔχουσα*, as is sometimes the case with the second of two words or clauses coupled by *τε καί* (v. Ast, Lex. Plat. 3 p. 365, and Torstrik on De anima 1. 2, 405 a 27).

a 34 **θεάτρων**: comp. 4, 1449 a 9 *πρὸς τὰ θέατρα*.—Plato Laws 700 E *τὰ θέατρα ἐξ ἀφώνων φωνήεντ' ἐγένοντο*.—Aristoxenus ap. Ath. 632 B *τὰ θέατρα ἐκβεβαρβάρωται*. *θέατρον*, in the sense of 'the audience', is common enough, but the above quoted passages show that the word may be used in the plural also, in the sense of 'the audiences'. The audiences in these days, says Aristotle, are too weak to like the strong situations of the great Tragedy.

a 35 **κατ' εὐχὴν ποιοῦντες τοῖς θεαταῖς**: Plato Gorg. 502 A *χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς θεαταῖς*.

ἔστιν δὲ οὐχ αὕτη. The *οὐχ* here negatives the proposition, and not the proximate word, *αὕτη*. Bäumlein, Gr. Partikeln p. 308 (followed by Kühner, Gr. Gr.^{3} 2. 2 p. 179), quotes a very similar passage from Isocrates 4, 130 *ἔστι δ' οὐχ οἷόν τ' ἀποτρέπειν*, and explains the position of the negative as due to a desire to avoid the collocation *οὐδ' ἔστι* (i. e. *οὐ δέ ἐστι*). *αὕτη* (=*τοῦτο*) is the subject with its gender assimilated to that of the predicate (v. on 6, 1450 a 4). 1453 a 35

ἀπὸ τραγῳδίας ἡδονή: 'the pleasure *of* Tragedy', as we should say (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr.^{3} 2. 1 p. 336). For this use of the preposition comp. Top. 1. 15, 106 a 37 *τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ πίνειν ἡδονῇ*.—Eth. N. 10. 2, 1173 b 28 *αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν ἡδοναί*.—Plato Rep. 582 B *τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰδέναι ἡδονῆς*. For the absence of the article see Bon. Ind. 546 a 51.

κωμῳδίας οἰκεία. The conclusions of the Orestes and Alcestis of Euripides were said to verge on Comedy (v. Trendelenburg, Gramm. gr. de arte poetica iudiciorum rel. p. 36). a 36

ἐκεῖ γὰρ *κτέ*. The reference is probably to the Orestes of Alexis or some other comedy on the same subject (comp. Kock, CAF. 2 p. 358).

Ἔστιν μὲν οὖν *κτέ*. Aristotle now passes on to the second of the two points announced at the beginning of chap. 13, *πόθεν ἔσται τὸ τῆς τραγῳδίας ἔργον* (13, 1452 b 29). b 1

ὄψεως: see on 6, 1449 b 33. We may suppose him to be thinking of such theatrical artifices as the fearful appearance of the Furies in the Eumenides, and the rags and tatters of certain of the heroes of Euripides.

πρότερον, 'naturally prior', i. e. better, as in Aristoph. Ran. 76 and Plato Lach. 183 B. This sense of *πρότερον* is recognized in Cat. 12, 14 b 6 *εἰώθασι δὲ καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ τοὺς ἐντιμοτέρους καὶ μᾶλλον ἀγαπωμένους ὑπ' αὐτῶν προτέρους φάσκειν παρ' αὐτοῖς εἶναι.* Compare also the use of *πρώτη* in a 30 and a 33. b 3

ποιητοῦ ἀμείνονος. As the poet is an imitative artist in language, a *μιμητὴς ἐν λόγῳ* (v. on 1, 1447 a 28), it follows that the poetic effect has to be produced by language, and not by means other than language.

ὁρᾶν: i. e. *ὁρᾶν τὰ πράγματα γινόμενα.* b 4

φρίττειν denotes the cold shudder (*φρίκη*: v. W. H. Thompson on Plato Phaedr. 251 A) experienced in moments of intense fear or horror. This may arise even from the mere thought of something horrible: De motu an. 7, 701 b 22 *διὸ καὶ φρίττουσι καὶ φοβοῦνται* b 5

1453 b 5 *νοήσαντες μόνον.* And it is often said to arise from what one hears: Aeschylus Ag. 1242 *τὴν μὲν Θυέστου δαῖτα παιδείων κρεῶν ξυνῆκα καὶ πέφρικα.*—Sophocles El. 1408 *ἤκουσ' ἀνήκουστα δύστανος ὥστε φρῖξαι.*—Trach. 1044 *κλύουσ' ἔφριξα.*—Plato Rep. 387 B *τὰ περὶ ταῦτα ὀνόματα πάντα τὰ δεινά τε καὶ φοβερὰ ἀποβλητέα, Κωκυτούς τε καὶ Στύγας καὶ ἐνέρους καὶ ἀλίβαντας καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα τούτου τοῦ τύπου ὀνομαζόμενα φρίττειν δὴ ποιεῖ ὡς † οἴεται † πάντας τοὺς ἀκούοντας.*

b 8 **ἀτεχνότερον**: see on 6, 1450 b 17. In such instances the effect depends too much on the ' *σκευοποιός* (or costumier), and too little on the poet himself.

χορηγίας. The word has been taken to mean 'adminiculum' (Valla), 'impendium' (Paccius), 'choragi opera et sumptus' (Heinsius), 'suppeditatio aliena' (Tyrwhitt), 'expensive apparatus' (Twining, Hermann), 'apparatus' (L. and S.), and 'Unterstützung durch äussere Mittel' (Ueberweg, after Vahlen, Beitr. 2 p. 20). This last rendering, which is practically the same as Tyrwhitt's, is probably right. It aptly points the contrast between the means supplied by the poet himself, and those which are outside his art and have to be furnished by others; and it is also in accordance with Aristotle's use of *χορηγία* and *χορηγεῖν* in the Ethics and Politics (v. Bon. Ind. 852 b 52 and 60). Thus in Eth. N. 10. 8, 1178 a 24 he says *τῆς ἐκτὸς χορηγίας ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἐπ' ἔλαττον δεῖται* (scil. *ἡ τοῦ νοῦ ἀρετή*), and in 1. 11, 1101 a 15 (comp. 10. 9, 1179 a 11) *τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν ἐνεργοῦντα καὶ τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀγαθοῖς ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένον.* More than one, however, of the recent interpreters of the Poetics seem to have assumed (with Heinsius) that in a discussion on matters theatrical *χορηγία* must be supposed to retain its original theatrical sense, that of the service of a choregus. The answer to this is that we constantly find Aristotle even in the Poetics using the technical terms of the theatre in the more general sense they had or had acquired in ordinary language. Instances of this are *ἀγωνίζεσθαι* (24, 1460 a 9), *συναγωνίζεσθαι* (18, 1456 a 26), *πρωταγωνιστής* (4, 1449 a 18), *ἐπεισόδιον* (17, 1455 b 23), *ἐπεισοδιοῦν* (17, 1455 b 1), *ἐπεισοδιώδης* (9, 1451 b 34), *ἀπὸ μηχανῆς* (15, 1454 b 2), *ἐκ περιπετείας* (16, 1454 b 29), *ὑποκριτικά* (20, 1457 a 21). It seems to be agreed too that the duties of the choregus were mainly, if not entirely, with the chorus, and that he had nothing to do with the make-up of the actors (A. Müller, Gr. Bühnenalterthümer p. 336).

b 9 **τὸ τερατῶδες**. The reference here is to the appearance of certain of the more monstrous creations of Greek mythology. Such

abnormal personages required on the stage a peculiar make-up and special masks: Pollux 4. 141 τὰ δὲ ἔκσκευα πρόσωπα Ἀκταίων ἐστὶ κερασφόρος . . . ἢ Ἄργος πολυόφθαλμος, ἢ Εὐίππη ἡ Χείρωνος ὑπαλλαττομένη εἰς ἵππον παρ᾽ Εὐριπίδῃ (comp. Sommerbrodt, Scaenica p. 204). In existing plays we have a clear instance of a personage of this kind in the βούκερως παρθένος, Io, in Prom. 588 (comp. 674), and in the Furies in the Eumenides, who are said to look more like Gorgons than women (Eum. 48). The prominence of such figures in the dramas of Aeschylus was noted by the ancients: Vita Aeschyli (p. 2 Dind.) ταῖς τε γὰρ ὄψεσι καὶ τοῖς μύθοις πρὸς ἔκπληξιν τερατώδη μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς ἀπάτην κέχρηται. 1453 b 9

τὸ τερατῶδες on the stage may be φοβερόν, and thus a means—though an illegitimate one (supra b 7)—of producing a tragic effect (φόβος). When it does not serve this dramatic purpose (τὸ τερατῶδες μόνον), however, it is out of place in Tragedy, since the pleasure it gives us is not the true tragic pleasure, which depends on the excitement of pity and fear (τὴν ἀπ᾽ ἐλέου καὶ φόβου ἡδονὴν b 12), and on that alone. Aristotle does not stop to explain our pleasure in τὸ τερατῶδες, but it is easy to supply the omission, if one remembers that anything of the nature of a τέρας is marvellous (θαυμαστόν; comp. Herodotus 4. 28 and Plato Hipp. mai. 283 c), and that the marvellous is recognized by Aristotle (τὸ θαυμαστὸν ἡδύ, 24, 1460 a 17) as one of the great causes of human pleasure (see on 9, 1452 a 4).

κοινωνοῦσιν = κοινὸν ἔχουσιν (Bon. Ind. 400 a 39). b 10

φανερόν. The argument here may be thus restated: A play is b 13
essentially a μίμησις πράξεως (6, 1449 b 36 and passim); if it is to arouse pity and fear, therefore, it must do that through the ἐλεεινὰ καὶ φοβερά in its πρᾶξις (ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν), not through merely material accessories supplied *ab extra* by others (comp. supra b 7).

τοῦτο: i.e. τὸ ἐλεεινὸν καὶ φοβερόν. For similar instances of this allusive use of the neuter of the demonstrative, which is so common in all Greek (Kühner, Gr. Gr.[3] 2. 1 p. 35), see 13, 1453 a 24; 17, 1455 a 26; 24, 1460 a 8.

ποῖα οὖν δεινὰ ἢ ποῖα οἰκτρά. Aristotle amends his question b 14
ποῖα δεινά by the alternative ποῖα οἰκτρά. The tragic poet is not concerned with δεινά in general, but only with those calculated to arouse pity (οἰκτρά). ἢ = *vel potius*, as in De anima 2. 5, 417 a 5 ὧν ἐστιν ἡ αἴσθησις καθ᾽ αὑτὰ ἢ τὰ συμβεβηκότα τούτοις (v. Pacius ad loc. and Kühner, Gr. Gr.[3] 2. 2 p. 297). As Aristotle proceeds to show, the deed of horror (τὸ δεινόν) may be either actual or only

1453 b 14 contemplated; and if actual, it may be either within the play itself, and identical with the *πάθος* (v. 11, 1452 b 11), or anterior to the action of the play, and distinct from the *πάθος*. In the Oedipus Tyrannus, for instance, the deed of horror, the slaying of Laius, takes place before the opening of the play, the action of which is made up (1) of a series of *φοβερά* (alarming incidents) leading up to the catastrophe, and (2) a *πάθος*, which consists in the agony and remorse of Oedipus (see on 11, 1452 b 13).

b 16 **τὰς τοιαύτας πράξεις** = *τὰς δεινὰς πράξεις*. With such actions there are three possibilities: the parties concerned (the slayer and the slain, for instance) may be either (1) friends, or (2) enemies, or (3) indifferent to each other; in all three situations there is something *δεινόν*, but it is only the first that is felt to be especially piteous; it is therefore at once *δεινόν* and *οἰκτρόν*, and thus eminently adapted for the purposes of Tragedy (*ταῦτα ζητητέον* b 22).

b 17 **ἂν μὲν οὖν ἐχθρὸς ἐχθρόν**, scil. *τοιαῦτα ποιῇ*, understood from the preceding *εἶναι . . . τὰς τοιαύτας πράξεις*. In many instances the ellipse is not so easily supplied, e.g. in Rhet. 1. 6, 1363 a 27 (*ἀγαθά ἐστι*) *καὶ τὰ ἴδια καὶ ἃ μηδείς, καὶ τὰ περιττά.*—Rhet. 2. 23, 1397 b 20 *καὶ ὅτι εἰ μηδὲ Θησεὺς ἠδίκησεν, οὐδ᾽ Ἀλέξανδρος, καὶ εἰ μηδ᾽ οἱ Τυνδαρίδαι, οὐδ᾽ Ἀλέξανδρος, καὶ εἰ Πάτροκλον Ἕκτωρ, καὶ Ἀχιλλέα Ἀλέξανδρος* (comp. Vahlen on the present passage).

οὐδὲν ἐλεεινὸν, scil. *ποιεῖ*. There is nothing in the deed then to call forth pity either for the doer or the sufferer. That the doer of the deed may sometimes claim our pity, is not distinctly said, but it is clear from the instances which follow, Orestes, Medea, Oedipus, etc.; it is incidentally recognized also in the analysis of 'the involuntary' in Eth. N. 3. 1, 1109 b 31 *ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἑκουσίοις ἐπαίνων καὶ ψόγων γινομένων, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις συγγνώμης, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἐλέου* (comp. 3. 2, 1111 a 1).

b 18 **μέλλων**, scil. *ποιεῖν*, just as in b 21 *μέλλῃ* = *μέλλῃ ἀποκτείνειν*. The alternative *οὔτε μέλλων* is added because pity may be aroused by the spectacle of impending, as well as by that of actually present anguish: Rhet. 2. 8, 1386 b 1 *τὰ γεγονότα ἄρτι ἢ μέλλοντα διὰ ταχέων ἐλεεινότερα* (comp. 2. 5, 1382 b 26).

πλὴν κατ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος: i.e. in this, as also in the following case (*οὐδ᾽ ἂν μηδετέρως ἔχοντες*), the spectacle of suffering humanity may arouse a certain human feeling (akin to pity) for the sufferer (see on 13, 1452 b 38), but it is not, in the proper sense of the term, 'piteous', since the moral condition of pity is wanting; we cannot say that the man ought not to suffer (comp. 13, 1453 a 4).

When the parties, however, are related to one another (ὅταν δ' ἐν ταῖς φιλίαις ἐγγένηται τὰ πάθη), the evil comes from a quarter from which it was not to be expected, and the situation is 'piteous' as well as horrible; comp. Rhet. 2. 8, 1386 a 11 (ἐλεεινόν ἐστι) τὸ ὅθεν προσῆκεν ἀγαθόν τι πρᾶξαι [ὑπάρξαι Vahlen] κακόν τι συμβῆναι. 1453 b 18

ἐν ταῖς φιλίαις. φιλία here practically means 'cognatio' (comp. Bon. Ind. 818 b 10). b 19

ἤ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον. As defined in 11, 1452 b 11 πάθος includes other forms of suffering besides violent deaths. b 21

τὴν Κλυταιμνήστραν ἀποθανοῦσαν, 'the slaying of Clytaemnestra.' For this use of the participle see on 13, 1453 a 4 (δυστυχοῦντα). On the alternative spelling Κλυταιμήστρα see Roscher's Lex. s.v. and Vitelli, Studi Italiani 1 p. 239. There is hardly a trace of it in the MSS. of Homer (Ludwich, Homerica I–V p. 5; comp. Wilamowitz, Commentariolum grammaticum IV p. 11). b 23

αὐτὸν: emphatic as in 9, 1451 b 36; 21, 1457 b 34; 24, 1460 a 6. b 25

εὑρίσκειν is followed by an infinitive in 14, 1454 a 11 εὗρον . . . παρασκευάζειν, and (in the middle) in Eurip. Med. 195 οὐδεὶς λύπας ηὕρετο μούσῃ καὶ πολυχόρδοις ᾠδαῖς παύειν.

εἰδότας καὶ γιγνώσκοντας, scil. πράττοντας. Instead of saying ἔστι γίνεσθαι τὴν πρᾶξιν ὑπ' εἰδότων καὶ γιγνωσκόντων, Aristotle introduces the qualification in the clause with ὥσπερ, which thus becomes a substantive part of the statement (comp. 11, 1452 a 23; 18, 1456 a 27; 21, 1457 b 24). b 28

γιγνώσκοντας: Rhet. 2. 1, 1378 a 14 ἐνδέχεται μὴ τὰ βέλτιστα συμβουλεύειν γιγνώσκοντας.—Demosth. 10. 17 ταῦτα τοίνυν ἕκαστον εἰδότα καὶ γιγνώσκοντα παρ' αὑτῷ κτέ.

Εὐριπίδης: see on 6, 1450 a 25.

Μήδειαν: Eurip. Med. 1236. b 29

ὁ Σοφοκλέους Οἰδίπους: comp. 15, 1454 b 8. Sophocles is named because there were others who had dramatized the Oedipus story (Nauck, TGF.[2] p. 967) as well as Sophocles. b 31

μὲν οὖν: see on 22, 1458 a 25. b 32

ἔξω τοῦ δράματος: 15, 1454 b 7 ἔξω τῆς τραγῳδίας.—17, 1455 b 8 ἔξω τοῦ μύθου.—24, 1460 a 29 ἔξω τοῦ μυθεύματος. There is a reference to this form of dramatic construction in Eth. N. 1. 11, 1101 a 32 τὰ παράνομα καὶ δεινὰ προϋπάρχειν ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις.

ὁ Ἀλκμέων ὁ Ἀστυδάμαντος: Nauck, TGF.[2] p. 777 and 964. b 33

τῷ τραυματίᾳ Ὀδυσσεῖ: another name perhaps for the Ὀδυσσεὺς ἀκανθοπλήξ of Sophocles (Nauck l. c. p. 230).

ἀναγνωρίσαι, scil. τὴν φιλίαν, as in b 31 (see on 16, 1454 a 32). b 35

1453 b 38 **τό τε γὰρ μιαρὸν κτέ.**: i.e. it offends our moral sensibilities (see on 13, 1452 b 36) as a sin against the laws of natural affection; and it is untragic also, through the absence of the element of suffering.

1454 a 1 **ποιεῖ ὁμοίως**, said of a dramatic personage, recalls the idea of *γινώσκοντα μελλῆσαι καὶ μὴ πρᾶξαι* in 1453 b 38.

ἐν Ἀντιγόνῃ: Soph. Ant. 1231.

τὸν Κρέοντα ὁ Αἵμων, scil. *τοῦτο ποιεῖ*, i.e. *μέλλει ἀποκτείνειν ἀποκτείνει δὲ οὔ* (comp. a 6), as is implied in Goulston's paraphrase, 'Creontem patrem Haemon sciens perimere conatus est, nec perfecit tamen.' The ellipse is not unlike that in *ἂν μὲν οὖν ἐχθρὸς ἐχθρόν* in 1453 b 17.

a 2 **βέλτιον**, scil. *τοῦ γινώσκοντα πρᾶξαι.*

a 4 **ἐκπληκτικόν.** *ἔκπληξις* is a very general term for the loss of self-possession that may result from a mental shock. In use, however, it often has the more special sense of extreme surprise; the definition of it in fact in Top. 4. 5, 126 b 17 is *θαυμασιότης ὑπερβάλλουσα*, 'admiratio exsuperans' (Pacius). The Discovery is said both here and in 16, 1455 a 17 to be 'astounding', just in the same way as a *περιπέτεια*—which in a play is so intimately connected with the Discovery—is said in Rhet. 1. 11, 1371 b 10 to be *θαυμαστόν*. The affinity of sense between *ἐκπληκτικόν* and *θαυμαστόν* is indirectly shown by the fact that Aristotle describes the 'pursuit of Hector' in the Iliad in one place as *θαυμαστόν* (24, 1460 a 14), and in another as *ἐκπληκτικόν* (25, 1460 b 25). I cannot agree with Tumlirz (Die tragischen Affecte Mitleid und Furcht nach Aristoteles p. 34), who supposes that, as used in the Poetics, the terms *ἔκπληξις* and *ἐκπληκτικόν* denote the excitement or tension with which the audience awaits the Discovery.

κράτιστον = *potissimum*. Aristotle's view of the construction exemplified in the Iphigenia in Tauris is presumably this, that the full effect of Tragedy is attained in the most artistic way, without the adjunct of physical suffering, and with the minimum of offence to our moral sensibilities. His ultimate preference for this construction is intelligible enough in itself; and we have been prepared for it to some extent by his recognition throughout this chapter of the legitimacy of a situation like that in the Iphigenia, in which the deed of horror, though contemplated, is not actually carried out (comp. *μέλλων* 1453 b 18, *μέλλῃ* b 21, *μέλλοντα* b 34). The criterion which now determines the relative value of these

possible situations in Tragedy is a moral one, their effect not on the emotions, but on the moral sensibility of the audience. The first of the four situations is set aside as *μιαρόν*, 'morally offensive' (1453 b 38); the second (*τὸ γινώσκοντα πρᾶξαι*; see on a 2) also is *μιαρόν*; the third just avoids being that (1454 a 3), because the unholy deed is done in ignorance; the fourth, however, in which a timely Discovery saves us from the rude shock to our moral feelings which is inevitable even with the third kind of plot, is pronounced to be *κράτιστον*. This seems to be the rationale of the present classification, and the explanation of the discrepancy between the statement in the text and that in 13, 1453 a 24. In chap. 13 Aristotle was thinking only of the emotional effect of tragedy as produced by the most obvious means; here he comes to see that the same effect may be produced in a finer form without their aid. It is his somewhat tardy recognition of the necessity of avoiding *τὸ μιαρόν* that has caused this change of view. 1454 a 4

ἐν τῷ Κρεσφόντῃ: a play of Euripides (Nauck, TGF.² p. 497). It is referred to in Eth. N. 3. 2, 1111 a 11 *οἰηθείη δ' ἄν τις καὶ τὸν υἱὸν πολέμιον εἶναι ὥσπερ ἡ Μερόπη*. a 5

ἐν τῇ Ἰφιγενείᾳ: comp. 17, 1455 b 9. a 7

ἐν τῇ Ἕλλῃ. Nothing more seems to be known of the play (Nauck p. 837). a 8

διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο reverts to what was said as far back as 1453 b 19–22; the whole of the intervening statement (1453 b 22 *τοὺς μὲν οὖν*—1454 a 8 *ἀνεγνώρισεν*) is a digression. Other digressions of considerable length are found in chap. 1 (see on 1, 1447 b 11), in chap. 9 (see on 9, 1451 b 27), in chap. 15 (see on 15, 1454 b 8), and in chap. 22 (see on 22, 1458 a 31). a 9

πάλαι: in 13, 1453 a 19. Aristotelian instances of *πάλαι* in a back-reference may be seen in An. post. 2. 19, 100 a 14 (comp. 13, 97 b 7), in Phys. 8. 3, 254 a 16 (comp. 253 a 32 and b 10), in Pol. 2. 4, 1262 b 29 (comp. 1262 a 26), and 3. 11, 1282 a 15 (comp. 1281 a 42).

ζητοῦντες: comp. Metaph. Θ 6, 1048 a 30 *διὸ ζητοῦντες καὶ περὶ τούτων διήλθομεν*.—Xenophanes Fr. 18 (Diels) *οὔτοι ἀπ' ἀρχῆς πάντα θεοὶ θνητοῖς ὑπέδειξαν, ἀλλὰ χρόνῳ ζητοῦντες ἐφευρίσκουσιν ἄμεινον*. Quintilian (5. 10. 120) has a very similar observation on the discovery of the various forms of argument in oratory: *Neque enim artibus editis factum est ut argumenta inveniremus, sed dicta sunt omnia antequam praeciperentur, mox ea scriptores observata et collecta ediderunt.* a 10

1454 a 12 **ἀναγκάζονται**: comp. 9, 1452 a 1. They are obliged to keep to these well-known stories (comp. 9, 1451 b 23), because they have not the art to discover or invent new ones equally fitted for the purposes of Tragedy.

a 13 **τὰ τοιαῦτα . . . πάθη**: see 14, 1453 b 19–22.

a 17 **χρηστά.** *χρηστός*, which, as Aristotle tells us in the context (a 20), may be applied to anything good of its kind, is replaced in b 13 by *ἐπιεικής*; it is equivalent to *σπουδαῖος* as used in 2, 1448 a 2, the common opposite of both being *φαῦλος* or *πονηρός*.

a 18 **ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη**: in 6, 1450 b 8.

a 21 **τὸ μὲν χεῖρον**: Pol. 1. 5, 1254 b 13 *τὸ ἄρρεν πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ φύσει τὸ μὲν κρεῖττον τὸ δὲ χεῖρον.*—H. A. 9. 1, 608 b 8 *διόπερ γυνὴ ἀνδρὸς ἐλεημονέστερον καὶ ἀρίδακρυ μᾶλλον, ἔτι δὲ φθονερώτερον καὶ μεμψιμοιρότερον καὶ φιλολοίδορον μᾶλλον καὶ πληκτικώτερον· ἔστι δὲ καὶ δύσθυμον μᾶλλον τὸ θῆλυ τοῦ ἄρρενος καὶ δύσελπι καὶ ἀναιδέστερον καὶ ψευδέστερον κτέ.* In the Politics we are told that owing to the weakness of the rational faculty in them, the virtue of which women are capable is not so high as that of a man (Pol. 1. 13, 1260 a 20). Rhet. 1. 5, 1361 a 6 summarizes the Greek idea on this point: *θηλειῶν ἀρετὴ σώματος μὲν κάλλος καὶ μέγεθος, ψυχῆς δὲ σωφροσύνη καὶ φιλεργία ἄνευ ἀνελευθερίας.*

ὅλως φαῦλον. In the Politics, where the slave is viewed as a being of the very lowest intellectual and moral capacity, Aristotle allows him only the bare modicum of virtue required to enable him to do his work: *ἀρετῆς δεῖται μικρᾶς καὶ τοσαύτης ὅπως μήτε δι' ἀκολασίαν μήτε διὰ δειλίαν ἐλλείψῃ τῶν ἔργων* (Pol. 1. 13, 1260 a 35).

a 22 **τὸ ἁρμόττοντα**, scil. *τὰ ἤθη ποιῆσαι* (see on a 24 *τρίτον τὸ ὅμοιον*). In the individual character there must be nothing at variance with that of the class to which the individual belongs; in a woman, for instance, there should be nothing 'unwomanly'. The opposite of *ἁρμόττον* in a 30 is *ἀπρεπὲς καὶ μὴ ἁρμόττον.* This same use of the term is occasionally found in later criticism, e. g. in Schol. Soph. El. 126 *τὸ 'εἴ μοι θέμις τάδ' αὐδᾶν' λίαν ἠθικὸν καὶ ἁρμόζον γυναιξίν.*

a 23 **γυναικείῳ**, scil. *ἤθει*; comp. Plato Laws 790 A *γυναικεῖά τε καὶ δούλεια ἤθη.* *ἦθος* in this connexion practically means a 'character', i. e. one of the personages, just as it does again further on in 24, 1460 a 11. An approximation to this sense is found in Plato, who uses the word now and then for a man or other creature possessing character: Phaed. 81 E *ἐνδοῦνται δέ* [scil. *αἱ ψυχαί*], *ὥσπερ εἰκός, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἤθη, ὁποῖ' ἄττ' ἂν καὶ μεμελετηκυῖαι τύχωσιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ, οἷον τοὺς μὲν γαστριμαργίας . . . μεμελετηκότας . . . εἰς τὰ τῶν ὄνων*

γένη καὶ τῶν τοιούτων θηρίων εἰκὸς ἐνδύεσθαι [v. Stallb. ad loc.].— Rep. 496 B γενναῖον καὶ εὖ τεθραμμένον ἦθος.—503 C τὰ βέβαια ταῦτα ἤθη (comp. Festschrift Th. Gomperz dargebracht p. 165). 1454 a 23

ἀνδρείαν. On the ἀνδρεία of women see Pol. 1. 13, 1260 a 22 and 3. 4, 1277 b 21. In the present passage, however, Aristotle finds a certain incongruity in the idea of an ἀνδρεία γυνή, as though the affinity of ἀνδρεῖος with ἄνδρες were still felt.

δεινὴν has been rightly explained by Günther (Grundzüge der trag. Kunst p. 280) as meaning 'clever', i.e. 'clever in speech and argument' ('*tüchtig im Reden*', '*beredt*')—a quality which according to Greek notions was quite out of place in a woman (Pol. 1. 13, 1260 a 30; 3. 4, 1277 b 23). That this rather than 'terrible' is the meaning of δεινήν here is shown by the illustration in a 31, ἡ τῆς Μελανίππης ῥῆσις, where the reference is to the δεινότης or rhetorical 'cleverness' of the speech put into the mouth of Melanippe by Euripides. a 24

τὸ ὅμοιον, scil. τὸ ἦθος ποιῆσαι, as is implied in the clause of interpretation, τοῦτο γὰρ ἕτερον τοῦ χρηστὸν τὸ ἦθος καὶ ἁρμόττον ποιῆσαι. Instead of saying ὅμοια, to correspond with ἁρμόττοντα in a 22, Aristotle lapses into the singular ὅμοιον, through the influence, as it would seem, of the singular in ἀνδρεῖον μὲν τὸ ἦθος in the context. In the absence of an example in a 28 sqq. to illustrate the neglect of this canon, the meaning of ὅμοιον is not very clear; but a hint of it may be gathered from the language in the analogy in 1454 b 10 ὁμοίους ποιοῦντες καλλίους γράφουσιν, where ὁμοίους (said of a portrait) means 'like the original'. This may very well be the sense of ὅμοιον in the present passage; the literary portrait produced by the poet should be 'like the original', i.e. like what the personage in question is in history or legend (comp. 1454 b 12). The fact of ὅμοιος being used in a somewhat different sense in 2, 1448 a 6, 12 and 13, 1453 a 5 only shows how inattentive Aristotle is at times to uniformity of language.

ὥσπερ εἴρηται, 'in the present sense of this term (ἁρμόττον)'. a 25

ὁμαλόν: i.e. the character should always remain the same, without change or modification in the course of the play. The canon reappears in Horace A.P. 126 *servetur ad imum* [scil. *persona*] *qualis ab incepto processerit, et sibi constet.* The logical scheme of these four canons of character may be presented thus: the ἦθος of the dramatic personage should be (1) χρηστόν, not inconsistent with goodness of disposition; (2) ἁρμόττον, not inconsistent with the ἦθος of the class to which the personage belongs; (3) ὅμοιον, not a 26

1454 a 26 inconsistent with the received idea of the particular personage; (4) ὁμαλόν, not inconsistent with itself.

ἀνώμαλός τις. Aristotle is perhaps thinking of Achilles, as a character subject to sudden changes of mood; comp. fr. 168 (Teubn.) Ἀριστοτέλης φησὶν ἀνώμαλον εἶναι τὸ Ἀχιλλέως ἦθος, and Eustathius on Il. 24, 569 (v. Roemer, Bavarian Academy, Sitzungsb. 1884 p. 297).

ὁ τὴν μίμησιν παρέχων, as the explanatory καὶ τοιοῦτον ἦθος ὑποτιθείς shows, means the original of the dramatic portrait, the personage as known from history or legend.

a 29 **μὴ ἀναγκαίου**: 'not required for the purposes of the story'. The gratuitous πονηρία of Menelaus in the Orestes is noted again in 25, 1461 b 20; the Scholiast also on the Orestes more than once draws attention to the evil nature Euripides has given him (τὸ κακόηθες τῆς γνώμης). On the reading ἀναγκαίου see J. of Phil. 14 p. 46. I am not able to quote an Aristotelian instance of ἀναγκαῖος as a feminine, but it is certainly good Attic, and common enough in Plato. Though Aristotle's tendency was to treat such adjectives as of three terminations, his practice varied in the case of several (e.g. βέβαιος, ἑκούσιος, ἐλευθέριος, ἴδιος, τέλειος), if our existing texts are to be trusted.

a 30 **⟨ὁ τοῦ⟩ Ὀδυσσέως**: comp. τῆς Μελανίππης in the next line. The article has to be restored in like manner before Ὀδυσσέως in 16, 1454 b 26 and Ὀρέστης in 16, 1454 b 31. In all other passages in the Poetics—and they are very numerous—the rule laid down by Fitzgerald (Selections from the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, p. 163) as to the use of the article in Aristotle with the names of dramatis personae is duly observed. The same is true of the Nicomachean Ethics (see my Textual criticism of the Nic. Ethics p. 52), and Politics. In the Politics ὁ Σωκράτης is regularly used for the Socrates in Plato's dialogues, and in 2. 4, 1262 b 11 ὁ Ἀριστοφάνης means the Aristophanes in Plato's Symposium, The rule in fact is observed in twenty passages in the Politics, and ignored in two only, in 8. 3, 1338 a 28—where we may restore ⟨ὁ⟩ Ὀδυσσεύς, and in 8. 7, 1342 b 23—where the true reading is probably ⟨τῷ⟩ Σωκράτει. Similarly in the Rhetoric there are at least eighteen instances of the observance of the rule and but two exceptions, viz. 2. 23, 1400 a 27—where we may restore ⟨ὁ⟩ Ὀδυσσεύς (comp. 3. 15, 1416 b 1 and b 12), and 3. 14, 1415 b 30—where the correction ⟨ὁ⟩ Σωκράτης is confirmed by the parallel in 1. 9, 1367 b 8.

ἐν τῇ Σκύλλῃ: comp. 26, 1461 b 32. The Scylla Aristotle has in mind has been often supposed to be a tragedy of Euripides. But there is apparently no mention elsewhere of a tragedy with this title by Euripides (comp. Wilamowitz, Analecta Eurip. p. 159), and the language in 26, 1461 b 32 seems to point rather to a dithyramb. All discussion has been set at rest by Gomperz's recovery among the Vienna papyri of a fragment of some ancient critical treatise, which mentions the *θρῆνος* of Ulysses (i.e. a portion of the Scylla) as the work of the dithyrambic poet Timotheus: *εἰσὶν δὲ τινὲς οἳ ὃν μὲν προτίθενται οὐ μειμοῦνται* [*δὲ*], *ἄλλον δὲ καὶ τοῦτον καλῶς, εἰ τυγχάνοιεν ἐνέχοντες ἔννοιαν καὶ παράδειγμα παρ' ἡμεῖν αὐτοῖς, ὥσπερ καὶ Τειμόθεος ἐν τῷ θρήνῳ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως εἰ μέν τινα μειμεῖται καὶ τὸ ὅμοιόν τινι οἶδεν, ἀλλ' οὐ τῷ Ὀδυσσεῖ* (v. Gomperz, Vienna Academy, Anz. der phil. hist. Classe 1886, v; comp. Wilamowitz, Timotheos p. 111). To this Aristotle appends a second instance, one from a tragedy, as though conscious of the first being not quite to the point. 1454 a 31

ἡ τῆς Μελανίππης ῥῆσις, in the *Μελανίππη ἡ σοφή* of Euripides (Nauck, TGF.[2] p. 509). The rationalistic argument put into her mouth against the popular idea of monsters (*τέρατα*) was in Aristotle's view (see on *δεινὴν* a 24) an exhibition of cleverness out of place in a woman.

ἡ ἐν Αὐλίδι Ἰφιγένεια: Iph. Aul. 1211 sqq. and 1368 sqq. a 32

χρὴ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἤθεσιν κτέ. There should be a unity of character just as there should be a unity of action in every play. This incidental reference to the action reminds Aristotle of a point (the use of the *μηχανή*) which had not been considered in his general theory of the plot in chaps. 8–11. a 33

τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τὸ εἰκός: comp. especially 9, 1451 a 38 and 10, 1452 a 24. a 34

ἢ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ εἰκὸς, scil. *εἶναι* (Bon. Ind. 239 a 22; see on 24, 1459 b 9). a 35

λύσεις: see 18, 1455 a 24, 1456 a 9, where the *λύσις* (the unravelling, or dénouement) is distinguished from the *δέσις* or *πλοκή* (the knotting, or intrigue). This is the first appearance of these terms in this sense, though they may be presumed to have been already well established in the technical language of the theatre (see on 10, 1452 a 15). a 37

ἐν τῇ Μηδείᾳ: Eurip. Med. 1317. b 1

μηχανῆς. On the mechanical contrivance, whereby a god or other personage was suddenly brought on, or removed from

1454 b 1 the stage, see Haigh, Attic Theatre[3] p. 209. Aristotle regards a dénouement effected by such means as an inartistic way out of the difficulty, or else allowable only in certain exceptional cases (b 3–6). A similar view of the *μηχανή* is implied in Plato Crat. 425 D *οἱ τραγῳδοποιοί, ἐπειδάν τι ἀπορῶσιν, ἐπὶ τὰς μηχανὰς καταφεύγουσι θεοὺς αἴροντες.* From this theatrical use the term is sometimes metaphorically extended to matters apart from the stage, when a difficulty is solved by means which savour too much of artifice or miracle. Thus even in the present context (b 2) the sudden appearance of Athene in Il. 2. 166 is said to be *ἀπὸ μηχανῆς*; and in Metaph. A 5, 985 a 18 reason is said to come in as a deus ex machina in the cosmogony of Anaxagoras: *Ἀναξαγόρας τε γὰρ μηχανῇ χρῆται τῷ νῷ πρὸς τὴν κοσμοποιίαν, καὶ ὅταν ἀπορήσῃ διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστί, τότε παρέλκει αὐτόν.*

b 2 **τὰ περὶ τὸν ἀπόπλουν**: Il. 2. 155; comp. Porphyry on Il. 2. 144, p. 26 Schrader: *ἡ Ἀθηνᾶ παραγίνεται ἀπὸ μηχανῆς* [so cod. Townl.] *ὥσπερ καθεύδοντα τὸν Ὀδυσσέα ἐγείρουσα.* His note on Il. 2. 73 (where Agamemnon tries the feeling of his army) is worth quoting as a typical attempt to reconcile Homeric practice and Aristotelian theory: *διὰ τί ὁ Ἀγαμέμνων ἀπεπειρᾶτο τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, καὶ οὕτως ἔπραξεν ὥστε ὀλίγου τὰ ἐναντία συμβῆναι ἢ ἐβουλεύετο; καὶ τὸ κώλυμα ἀπὸ μηχανῆς· ἡ γὰρ Ἀθηνᾶ ἐκώλυσεν· ἔστι δὲ ἀποίητον τὸ μηχάνημα λύειν ἄλλως εἰ μὴ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ μύθου. φησὶ δὲ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης* (Fr. 142 Teubn.) *ποιητικὸν μὲν εἶναι τὸ μιμεῖσθαι τὰ εἰωθότα γίνεσθαι καὶ ποιητῶν*[1] *μᾶλλον τὸ κινδύνους παρεισάγειν· εἰκὸς δὲ καὶ ἐκ λοιμοῦ πεπονημένους καὶ τῷ μήκει τοῦ χρόνου ἀπαυδήσαντας . . . μὴ εὐθὺς παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ἔξοδον ἀλλὰ πειραθῆναι ἡγήσασθαι δεῖν εἰ οὕτως ἔχουσιν . . . ἡ δὲ λύσις οὐκ ἀπὸ μηχανῆς· ὅταν γὰρ διὰ τῶν εἰκότων γίγνηται, οὐ μηχανὴ τοῦτ' ἔστιν, ἅμ'* [? *ἀλλ'*] *ὅτε πρόσκειται θεός· ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' εἰπὼν ὃ εἰκὸς ἦν αὐτοῖς γίνεσθαι εἰς θεὸν ἀνέθηκε τὸν Ὀδυσσέα διανοηθῆναι ταῦτα δρᾶν ἃ πρᾶξαι ἂν εἰκός ἐστιν* (p. 24–25 Schrader).

ἀλλὰ μηχανῇ κτέ.: '*μηχανῇ* breviter dicit pro *θεῷ ἀπὸ μηχανῆς*' (Ritter). This clause (which ends apparently with *θεοῖς ὁρᾶν* in b 6) is a digression within a digression; Aristotle remembers

[1] Instead of *καὶ ποιητῶν* (for which various corrections have been proposed) I would restore *κἀποίητον* (v. J. of Phil. 28 p. 252). The sense is: 'Though as a rule it is artistic to represent what is usual, and inartistic (*ἀποίητον*) to introduce hazardous situations (*κινδύνους*), still under the circumstances there is a certain propriety and probability (*εἰκὸς δὲ*) in the Homeric story.' If this view is correct, the quotation from Aristotle's Ἀπορ. Ὁμ. does not end at the words *κινδύνους παρεισάγειν*, as is supposed by Rose and Heitz.

that the appearance of a god on the stage may be necessary for a certain purpose, to reveal matters of interest which lie outside the play itself as being either anterior or subsequent to the action of the piece. This may be taken as a tacit apology for the procedure of Euripides, who opens several of his plays with a prologue delivered by a god to explain the historical antecedents of the situation, and concludes others with a sort of epilogue, in which a god announces the future fortunes of the personages (see Haigh, Tragic Drama p. 246–7). A distorted reminiscence of this statement may be recognized in the Horatian precept, A. P. 191 *nec deus intersit nisi dignus vindice nodus inciderit.* 1454 b 2

ἄλογον is a general term for that which cannot be seen to be either necessary or probable (see above 1454 a 36 *ἀναγκαῖον ἢ εἰκός*), in other words for that which does not admit of explanation, that which we find unaccountable. It is of frequent occurrence in the later chapters of the Poetics (see esp. 24, 1460 a 28 and 25, 1461 b 14). The clause continues the statement in 1454 a 37–b 2. No improbability can be allowed within the story (*ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν*) of the play, unless it happens to be in the part only presupposed and not actually presented on the stage (*ἔξω τῆς τραγῳδίας*). Bonitz (Ind. 343 a 32) seems to take a different view of the clause, connecting it with that which immediately precedes it, *μηχανῇ χρηστέον κτἑ.* The rule in the text is repeated in very similar terms in 24, 1460 a 27. b 6

μηδὲν εἶναι, scil. *δεῖ*, understood from a 37.

ἔξω τῆς τραγῳδίας: see on 14, 1453 b 32. b 7

τὸ ἐν τῷ Οἰδίποδι: see 24, 1460 a 29.

ἐπεὶ δὲ *κτἑ.* At this point Aristotle returns to the subject of the *ἤθη*, which according to his theory (1454 a 17–26) should be at once *χρηστά, ἁρμόττοντα, ὅμοια*, and *ὁμαλά*, in order to meet any doubt that may arise as to the possibility of an *ἦθος* being at once *χρηστόν* and *ὅμοιον*. He shows that the corresponding difficulty has been solved in a sister art, that of the portrait-painter, who without sacrificing the likeness makes a man look handsomer than he is (*ὁμοίους ποιοῦντες καλλίους γράφουσιν*); so that, if the painter can do this, there is no reason why the literary artist also should not be able to represent a tragic personage truthfully, with any infirmities of character which form part of the received idea of him (*ὀργίλους καὶ ῥᾳθύμους καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντας ἐπὶ τῶν ἠθῶν* b 12), and at the same time as a good man (*ἐπιεικεῖς* b 13). b 8

βελτιόνων: see 2, 1448 a 4, 11, 18. b 9

1454 b 9 **ἡμᾶς**, 'we poets', as is shown by what follows in b 11 *οὕτω καὶ τὸν ποιητήν*. Aristotle speaks as though his hearers were poets, and studying the art of poetry for practical purposes. The Poetics in fact, whatever else they may be, are a practical treatise on Poetry; and the assumption throughout is that one is to learn from them how to write a good poem. Similarly in Rhet. 1. 8, 1366 a 12 *ἡμᾶς* means 'we orators' (*δέοι ἂν τὰ ἤθη τῶν πολιτειῶν ἑκάστης ἔχειν ἡμᾶς*).

b 10 **καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι.** Aristotle might no doubt have said *ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι*. Vahlen illustrates the construction from Soph. el. 16, 175 a 27 *συμβαίνει δέ ποτε καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς διαγράμμασιν· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ ἀναλύσαντες ἐνίοτε συνθεῖναι πάλιν ἀδυνατοῦμεν· οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐλέγχοις εἰδότες παρ' ὃ ὁ λόγος συμβαίνει συνεῖραι διαλῦσαι τὸν λόγον ἀπoροῦμεν*, and other parallels in Aristotle (v. Bon. Ind. 546 b 25).

b 12 **ὀργίλους καὶ ῥᾳθύμους**, 'too quick or too slow to anger'; the contrast is like that between *ὀξύς* and *ῥᾴθυμος* in Eth. E. 8. 5, 1240 a 1 *ἀνομοίοις χαίρουσιν, οἷον αὐστηροὶ εὐτραπέλοις καὶ ὀξεῖς ῥᾳθύμοις*. **καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντας** is added in order to include all similar defects of character, i.e. defects which are not incompatible with a general goodness of disposition.

b 14 [**παράδειγμα σκληρότητος**]. For the reason for bracketing the two words see J. of Phil. 14 p. 47. If they are not an ordinary 'adscript', they may possibly represent a marginal note by Aristotle himself to indicate that a second instance, one of *σκληρότης* [obstinacy?], was to be added. According to Galen (t. 18. 2 p. 879–80 K.) notes of a very similar description were to be found embedded in the text of Hippocrates.

Ἀγάθων: perhaps, as Tyrwhitt suggests, in his Telephus (Nauck, TGF.[2] p. 764).

b 15 **διατηρεῖν.** This quasi-imperatival use of the infinitive (without *δεῖ* or *χρή*) is common enough in Aristotle (Bon. Ind. 343 a 22). For the compound *διατηρεῖν* comp. Eth. N. 10. 8, 1178 a 13 *διατηροῦντες τὸ πρέπον ἑκάστῳ*.—Aeschines in Ctes. 6 *ὅταν διατηρηθῶσιν οἱ νόμοι*.—Philemon 94. 6 Kock *ὅς γε ταῦτα πάντα διατηρεῖ*. At this point Aristotle sums up by saying that the rules laid down for the *μῦθος* and *ἤθη* in a play must be observed throughout by the poet. But besides these general principles of construction, it is necessary in practice to consider the spectators (comp. Teichmüller, Aristot. Forsch. 2 p. 204) and the impression (*αἰσθήσεις*) the work is likely to make on them when presented on the stage, as it is easy to produce a bad impression through some fault of practical stage-craft. This seems to be the sense of the present

passage; Aristotle, however, avoids details, and refers to another 1454 b 15
writing of his for a fuller explanation of his precept. The incident mentioned in 17, 1455 a 26 may perhaps be taken as an instance of the kind of fault he has in mind.

τὰ παρὰ τὰς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀκολουθούσας αἰσθήσεις. For *παρά* in a sense approximating to that of *διά* see Bon. Ind. 562 a 10 and Bernays, Dialoge des Aristot. p. 138. *αἰσθήσεις* means the impression produced on the spectators, i.e. as we should say, the stage-effect of a play. The qualification, however, *τὰς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀκολουθούσας τῇ ποιητικῇ*, limits the responsibility of the poet to that part of the stage-effect which directly depends on his own art (*ἀκολουθούσας τῇ ποιητικῇ*); so far as it depends on that of others —actors, costumiers, and the like—it is not within his province (6, 1450 b 17). This interpretation, which is as old as Victorius, is much more probable than that of Bernays and others, who suppose the reference in the text to be to the business of the costumier and stage-manager. Throughout the Poetics Aristotle resolutely ignores all such matters as outside the art of poetry proper; and it is inconceivable that he should have given them any special attention in a work like the dialogue *περὶ ποιητῶν* (*ἐν τοῖς ἐκδεδομένοις λόγοις*). For the plural *αἰσθήσεις* comp. *ὄψεις* in 6, 1450 a 13, b 20, and Kühner, Gr. Gr.[3] 2. 1 p. 17.

ἐν τοῖς ἐκδεδομένοις λόγοις: i.e. in the now lost dialogue *περὶ* b 18
ποιητῶν, as Bernays following Victorius has shown (Dialoge des Aristot. p. 27; comp. Bon. Ind. 226 b 35). The reference must be to a work (1) by Aristotle himself, (2) published and written for publication, and (3) on a kindred subject.

This and the next two chapters form a sort of Appendix; b 19
they discuss a series of special points and rules of construction which had been omitted in the sketch of the general theory of the *μῦθος*. If these afterthoughts seem out of place here, it is to be remembered that there is an even stronger instance of matter out of place in 15, 1454 a 37. An excursus on the different forms of Discovery is justified not only by the great dramatic interest of the Discovery (6, 1450 a 33), but also by the important part it plays in 14, 1453 b 30.

εἴρηται πρότερον: 11, 1452 a 29.

ᾗ πλείστῃ χρῶνται: Pol. 7. 11, 1330 b 11 *οἷς γὰρ πλείστοις χρώ-* b 20
μεθα πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ πλειστάκις, ταῦτα πλεῖστον συμβάλλεται πρὸς τὴν ὑγίειαν.—Hippocrates 1 p. 40 K. *οἷς εἴθισται ὁ ἄνθρωπος πλείστοισί τε καὶ αἰεὶ χρῆσθαι.*

1454 b 22 **σύμφυτα**: comp. H. A. 7. 5, 585 b 31.

λόγχην κτέ. From some unknown play (Nauck, TGF.[2] p. 855); the allusion is to the mark said to have been visible on the *Σπαρτοί* of Thebes. The accusative *λόγχην* Aristotle seems to regard as an instance of *attractio inversa,* since he continues the construction by saying *ἀστέρας* instead of *ἀστέρες*.

b 23 **Καρκίνος**: Nauck, TGF.[2] p. 797. For the ellipse of the verb (*ἐποίησε*) see on 14, 1453 b 17.

ἐπίκτητα: De gen. an. 1. 17. 721 b 29 *οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὰ σύμφυτα προσεοικότες γίνονται τοῖς γονεῦσιν οἱ παῖδες ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐπίκτητα· οὐλάς τε γὰρ ἐχόντων τῶν γεννησάντων ἤδη τινὲς ἔσχον ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς τόποις τῶν ἐκγόνων τὸν τύπον τῆς οὐλῆς, καὶ στίγμα ἔχοντος ἐν τῷ βραχίονι τοῦ πατρὸς ἐπεσήμηνεν ἐν Χαλκηδόνι τῷ τέκνῳ . . . τὸ γράμμα.*

b 24 **οὐλαί**: as in Od. 19. 392 and Eurip. El. 573.

τὰ δὲ ἐκτός. The term in the New Comedy for tokens of this kind was *γνωρίσματα* (see on 17, 1455 a 20).

b 25 **ἐν τῇ Τυροῖ**: a play of Sophocles (Nauck, TGF.[2] p. 272). With *οἷον* we have to understand *ἡ ἀναγνώρισις γίνεται*—the construction changing, as sometimes happens when a second instance of not quite the same order is introduced by *οἷον*; comp. De anima 2. 10, 422 b 5 *σημεῖον δὲ τὸ μήτε κατάξηρον οὖσαν τὴν γλῶτταν αἰσθάνεσθαι μήτε λίαν ὑγράν· αὕτη γὰρ ἁφὴ γίνεται τοῦ πρώτου ὑγροῦ, ὥσπερ ὅταν προγευματίσας τις ἰσχυροῦ χυμοῦ γεύηται ἑτέρου, καὶ οἷον τοῖς κάμνουσι πικρὰ πάντα φαίνεται διὰ τὸ τῇ γλώττῃ πλήρει τοιαύτης ὑγρότητος αἰσθάνεσθαι.*—Rhet. 3. 2, 1404 b 18 *διὸ δεῖ λανθάνειν ποιοῦντας, καὶ μὴ δοκεῖν λέγειν πεπλασμένως ἀλλὰ πεφυκότως· τοῦτο γὰρ πιθανόν, ἐκεῖνο δὲ τοὐναντίον· ὡς γὰρ πρὸς ἐπιβουλεύοντα διαβάλλονται, καθάπερ πρὸς τοὺς οἴνους τοὺς μεμιγμένους, καὶ οἷον ἡ Θεοδώρου φωνὴ πέπονθε πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ὑποκριτῶν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ λέγοντος ἔοικεν εἶναι, αἱ δ' ἀλλότριαι.*

b 27 **ὑπὸ τῆς τροφοῦ**: Od. 19. 386–475.

b 28 **ὑπὸ τῶν συβοτῶν**: Od. 21. 205–225. The distinction Aristotle finds between the two instances is this: whereas the scar is seen by Euryclia by accident and in the natural course of things, with the herdsmen Ulysses directly points to it *πίστεως ἕνεκα*, in order to convince them of the truth of his disclosure: Od. 21. 217 *καὶ σῆμα ἀριφραδὲς ἄλλο τι δείξω, ὄφρα μ' ἐὺ γνῶτον πιστωθῆτόν τ' ἐνὶ θυμῷ, οὐλήν, τήν ποτέ με σῦς ἤλασε λευκῷ ὀδόντι.* In one of his lost writings, perhaps the *Ἀπορήματα Ὁμηρικά*, Aristotle criticized this Discovery as resting on an error of logic: *Ἀριστοτέλης δέ, φασίν, ἐπιλαμβάνεται τοῦ τοιούτου ἀναγνωρισμοῦ, λέγων ὡς ἄρα κατὰ τὸν*

ποιητὴν τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγῳ πᾶς οὐλὴν ἔχων Ὀδυσσεύς ἐστιν (fr. 208 Heitz; Porph. in Od. p. 126 Schrader). 1454 b 28

πίστεως ἕνεκα, scil. *χρώμεναι τοῖς σημείοις.*

ἐκ περιπετείας: 'repentino quodam casu' (Victorius), as in b 29 Polyb. 32, 22. *οὐ τύχῃ τὸ πλεῖον συνεργῷ χρώμενος οὐδ' ἐκ περιπετείας, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῆς ἀγχινοίας καὶ φιλοπονίας.* The ordinary interpretation of *αἱ ἐκ περιπετείας*, 'quae ex peripetia oriuntur' (Tyrwhitt), makes it refer to the *περιπέτεια* or turn in the story, and assumes the Discovery in the Odyssey to be consequent on the Peripety, whereas it is rather one of the means to it. It is to be remembered (1) that *περιπέτεια* is not always a term of the theatre in Aristotle (see on 11, 1451 a 22); and (2) that even in the Poetics he is very apt to use such terms in the sense they bore in ordinary speech (see on 14, 1453 b 8 *χορηγίας*).

ἐν τοῖς Νίπτροις: Od. 19, 392 (comp. 26, 1460 a 26). On this, b 30 the earliest mode of citing Homer, see Bergk, Gr. Litteraturgeschichte 1 p. 496.

ἀνεγνώρισεν ὅτι Ὀρέστης: 'manifestum fecit se esse Orestem' b 32 (Ritter), as the context shows, *ἐκείνη μὲν γὰρ διὰ τῆς ἐπιστολῆς, ἐκεῖνος δὲ αὐτὸς λέγει κτέ.*; comp. the parallel in 17, 1455 b 9 *θύεσθαι μέλλων ἀνεγνώρισεν . . . εἰπὼν ὅτι κτέ.* For the senses of *ἀναγνωρίζειν* in the Poetics see on 11, 1452 b 5.

διὰ τῆς ἐπιστολῆς, scil. *ἀνεγνώρισεν ὅτι Ἰφιγένεια.* The reference is to Iph. Taur. 727 sqq.

αὐτὸς λέγει: Iph. Taur. 800 sqq. In Aristotle's view this latter b 34 Discovery is very like that in Od. 21. 205: just as Ulysses points to his scar to convince the herdsmen, so Orestes, to convince his sister (comp. 808 *ἔχεις τι τῶνδέ μοι τεκμήριον;*), makes a statement showing his familiarity with their family history and the old home in Argos (comp. 822 *ἃ δ' εἶδον αὐτός, τάδε φράσω τεκμήρια*).

διό τι ἐγγύς. Vahlen restores *διὸ ἐγγύς τι*, which is no doubt the b 35 more usual order when *τι* is connected with an adverb. But there are certainly some instances of the order in the text, e.g. Thuc. 7. 57. 1 *οὐ κατὰ δίκην τι μᾶλλον.*—Xen. Hiero 1. 21 *ἦ οὖν ὁρᾷς τι τοὺς τυράννους ἥδιον . . . ἰόντας;*—Cyr. 1. 6. 11 *οἴει τι, ἔφη, ἧττον τοῦτο εἶναι αἰσχρόν;*—Plato Prot. 327 B *οἴει ἄν τι, ἔφη, μᾶλλον κτέ.*

Τηρεῖ: Nauck, TGF.[2] p. 257. b 36

ἡ τῆς κερκίδος φωνή, the actual expression of Sophocles (as it b 37 would seem) is to be compared with the Euripidean *ἱστότονα πηνίσματα, κερκίδος ἀοιδοῦ μελέτας* in Aristophanes Ran. 1315—

1454 b 37 where the allusion is to the humming-sound of the shuttle in its passage to and fro (comp. Dict. of Antiq.[3] 2 p. 767). In *κερκίδος φωνή*, however, there is a suggestion that the shuttle told Philomela's story for her; comp. Achilles Tatius 5. 5 *ἡ γὰρ Φιλομήλας τέχνη σιωπῶσαν εὕρηκε φωνήν· ὑφαίνει γὰρ πέπλον . . . καὶ πρὸς αὐτὴν* [scil. *Πρόκνην*] *ἃ πέπονθε τῇ κερκίδι λαλεῖ.* In Aristotle's view a disclosure by such means as these is quite as inartistic as that of Orestes in the Iphigenia (800).

διὰ μνήμης, τῷ αἰσθέσθαι τι ἰδόντα. Vahlen (omitting the comma) supposes this to be the same as *τῷ διὰ μνήμης αἰσθέσθαι τι ἰδόντα,* and explains it thus: '*τῷ αἰσθέσθαι* . . . non tam *percipiendo* significat quam *offerendo obiiciendo quod sensibus percipi possit,* ut quae in exemplis dicuntur *κλαῦσαι, δακρῦσαι.*' *τῷ αἰσθέσθαι τι ἰδόντα* accordingly has been taken to mean 'when the sight of some object awakens a feeling' (Butcher), or 'indem ein Anblick schmerzliche Empfindungen wachruft' (Gomperz). It is more natural, however, to take *τῷ αἰσθέσθαι* in the sense of 'by becoming conscious of' (comp. Bon. Ind. 754 a 43 for the aorist), and as an equivalent for *τῷ μνησθῆναι.* The connexion between the two terms may be seen from De mem. 1, 450 b 18 *ὁ γὰρ ἐνεργῶν τῇ μνήμῃ θεωρεῖ τὸ πάθος τοῦτο* [i. e., the impression left by experience] *καὶ αἰσθάνεται τούτου.* In default of a word corresponding to our 'consciousness', Aristotle has to use *αἴσθησις* and *αἰσθάνεσθαι* in lieu of it (Bon. Ind. 21 a 1; comp. my Textual Criticism of the Nic. Ethics p. 65). In the illustrations which follow the emphasis is on the participles *ἰδών* and *ἀκούων . . . καὶ μνησθείς,* not on *ἔκλαυσεν* and *ἐδάκρυσεν*; the actual manifestations of the awakened memories (*ἔκλαυσεν, ἐδάκρυσεν*) are only the accidents, which happen to be found in the instances under consideration. *ἰδόντα* is a circumstantial participle (comp. *μεταβαλοῦσα* in 4, 1449 a 14). It is loosely put for 'seeing or hearing' (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr.[3] 2. 2. p. 570).

1455 a 1 **ἐν Κυπρίοις**: Nauck, TGF.[2] p. 775. Nothing more is known of the play.

a 2 **ἐν Ἀλκίνου ἀπολόγῳ**: Od. 8. 521 sqq. (comp. 8. 83 sqq.). In Rhet. 3. 16, 1417 a 13 the designation covers the ground of Od. 9–12. See on 1454 b 30 for this mode of citing Homer.

a 4 **ἐν Χοηφόροις**: Aesch. Choeph. 168–234 (comp. Eurip. El. 520). Electra reflects on what she sees, and concludes that it is her brother Orestes who has come home. It will be observed that in

the other instances of ἀναγνώρισις ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ the discovery is made by the party who overhears the reflexion of the other. 1455 ^{a} 4

ὁ Ὀρέστης. For the article compare Herod. 1. 68 *συνεβάλλετο τὸν Ὀρέστεα . . . τοῦτον εἶναι.* ^{a} 5

Πολυΐδου. It is agreed that this was the Attic form of the name (Kock, CAF. 1 p. 508; Schulze, Qu. Epicae p. 111). As literary criticism was part of the business of a sophist, the probability is that this suggestion of the 'Sophist Polyidus' was propounded in some critical discussion on the technique of the dramatists; it is quite unnecessary to suppose him to have been also a dramatic poet (with Welcker, Gr. Trag. 1043), or to identify him with a certain dithyrambic poet of the same name (with Bernhardy, Gr. Litt.[3] 2 p. 756). Aristotle reverts to this suggestion in 17, 1455 ^{b} 10. ^{a} 6

Τυδεῖ: Nauck, TGF.[2] p. 803. Nothing more is known either of this or of the other two plays mentioned, the *Φινεῖδαι* (Nauck p. 841) and *Ὀδυσσεὺς ψευδάγγελος* (Nauck p. 839). It is impossible to say who the personage here referred to was (comp. Tyrwhitt on 11, 1452 ^{a} 27). ^{a} 9

ἐκ παραλογισμοῦ: comp. ^{a} 4 *ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ.* Vahlen, who connects this directly with *συνθετή*, supposes the two factors in the Discovery to be a *συλλογισμός* on the side of the one, and a *παραλογισμός* on the side of the other of the two parties: 'quae [scil. *ἀναγνώρισις*] ut ex simplici unius ratiocinatione prodire, ita composita esse potest alterius ex syllogismo, paralogismo alterius' (comp. also the discussion in his 'Zur Kritik Aristotelischer Schriften' p. 16). The illustration, however, from the *Ὀδυσσεὺς ψευδάγγελος* does not seem to imply anything more than an erroneous inference by one party (*παραλογισμὸς ὁ θατέρου*) from some statement made by the other. The reasoning in this instance Aristotle appears to regard as the illogical parallel to that in the Choephoroe: just as the recognition of Orestes by Electra came about through a *συλλογισμός* on her part, so that of A by B, the two personages in the *Ὀδυσσεὺς ψευδάγγελος*, is supposed to come about through a *παραλογισμός* on the part of the latter. The fallacy to be found there may have arisen from the ambiguity of the word 'know'. A having said 'I shall know the bow', B may have taken this to mean that he would 'know it again' (*ἀναγνωριοῦντος*)—which was not true (comp. *ὃ οὐχ ἑωράκει*). In our ignorance of the play and its plot it is idle to speculate further as to the way in which the actual Discovery may have been worked ^{a} 13

1455 a 13 out in it. The present is one of many passages showing Aristotle's affection for the forms of logic even when dealing with matters of poetry (see on 16, 1454 b 28).

θατέρου: comp. 11, 1452 b 4. The error in the text of A^c (*θεάτρου*) is the converse of that in the inferior MSS. of Plato's Laws 659 A (*θατέρου* for *θεάτρου*).

a 15 **ὡς δὴ** *κτέ.* Both text and interpretation here are in the highest degree doubtful. *ὡς δὴ ἐκείνου ἀναγνωριοῦντος* seems to be practically an object-clause after *ποιῆσαι*; for this use of the gen. absol. with *ὡς* see Kühner, Gr. Gr.[3] 2. 2 p. 93, or Goodwin, Synt. of Gk. Moods and Tenses § 917 (comp. Lobeck on Soph. Aj. 281). After *ἀναγνωριοῦντος* we may understand *τὸ τόξον*, from *τὸ τόξον ἔφη γνώσεσθαι* in the preceding line—the distinction between *γνώσεσθαι* and *ἀναγνωριοῦντος* being like that between *λῆψις* and *ἀνάληψις* in De mem. 2. 451 a 20 *οὔτε γὰρ μνήμης ἐστὶν ἀνάληψις ἡ ἀνάμνησις οὔτε λῆψις.*

διὰ τούτου ποιῆσαι. *ποιῆσαι* here may perhaps have the sense of 'suppose' or 'assume' (comp. Herod. 7. 184; Xenoph. An. 5. 7. 9; Ast, Lex. Plat. 3 p. 136). The comma usually placed after *τούτου* has been removed in order that *διὰ τούτου* may be connected with *ποιῆσαι*, so as to mean 'through' or 'in consequence of this statement'; comp. the use of *διά* in Soph. el. 1, 165 a 1 *ὁ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τινῶν ἐστι τεθέντων ὥστε λέγειν ἕτερόν τι ἐξ ἀνάγκης τῶν κειμένων διὰ τῶν κειμένων.* If the comma is retained, *ἀναγνωριοῦντος διὰ τούτου* must mean either 'would reveal himself by this' (see on 11, 1452 b 5), or 'would recognize him by this'. Butcher, keeping *παραλογισμόν*, and reading with Bekker and the Aldine *ἐποίησε* instead of *ποιῆσαι*, translates the clause thus: 'This remark led Odysseus to imagine that the other would recognize him through the bow, thus suggesting a false inference.'

a 18 **οἷον τὸ ἐν τῷ Σοφοκλέους Οἰδίποδι**: comp. 15, 1454 b 7 *οἷον τὸ ἐν τῷ Οἰδίποδι*—where a certain incident in the story of the O. T. is said to be *ἄλογον*, just as here another is said to be *εἰκός*. That the Discovery in the O. T. is probable was shown in 11, 1452 a 26 (*δηλώσας ὃς ἦν*).

τῇ Ἰφιγενείᾳ: Iph. Taur. 582.

a 19 **ἐπιθεῖναι γράμματα** is 'dare epistolam' (comp. Iph. Taur. 770 *ἐπιστέλλει*), not as Bon. Ind. 281 a 44 says, 'addere epistolam'. The dative of the person *to whom* is omitted, for reasons which a reader of the play will easily understand. It is omitted also for the sake of brevity in Herod. 3. 43 *γράψας δὲ ἐς Αἴγυπτον ἐπέθηκε*

(scil. τὸ βυβλίον), which Valckenaer explains as meaning 'tradidit epistolam in Aegyptum perferendam'. 1455 a 19

αἱ γὰρ τοιαῦται μόναι κτέ. The difficulty in this clause is obvious, and it has long been recognized. Vahlen's explanation is as follows: 'haec planissima sunt quamquam a Spengelio prave intellecta. neque enim hoc voluit illas agnitiones unicas esse quae careant indiciis et monilibus, sed hoc dicit: hae ἀναγνωρίσεις per se solae sunt (constant) sine illis extrinsecus adminiculis ascitis. et haec quidem sic universe significantur verbis τῶν πεποιημένων σημείων καὶ περιδεραίων, quoniam ea nunc non attinebat singillatim per suas species referre.' The real crux of the passage, however, is in σημείων; as used at the beginning of the chapter, in the account of the first species of Discovery (ἡ διὰ τῶν σημείων ἀναγνώρισις, 1454 b 21), the term denotes a visible mark or token; but the absence of a σημεῖον of that description is obviously not peculiar to this fifth and best Discovery — ἡ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων. Twining plausibly suggests that Aristotle may be using σημείων in a more general sense, and that it denotes here—as it might very well do—anything that serves as a 'sign' in the less artistic forms of Discovery. Thus in the second of these the statement of Orestes is a sort of σημεῖον; in Euripides it is actually described as a τεκμήριον (see on 1454 b 34). The same may be said of the tears (ἔκλαυσεν, ἐδάκρυσεν) in the third species of Discovery. As for the fourth (ἡ ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ), to judge from the instances, it may depend on a sign (comp. τεκμήριον, Aesch. Choeph. 205), or it may result from a reflexion overheard, which thus serves as a sign. In comparison however with that in the O. T. or Iphigenia, all these forms of Discovery are in Aristotle's judgment more or less artificial (comp. πεποιημένων), and thus of inferior artistic value.

δεραίων: comp. Eurip. Ion 1431 δέραια παιδὶ νεογόνῳ φέρειν.— a 20
Menander (Lefebvre, Fragments d'un MS. de M.) Ἐπιτρέποντες 28 κἀκκείμενον παιδάριον εὗρον νήπιον ἔχον δέραια καὶ τοιουτονί τινα κόσμον.—86 δός μοι, γύναι, τὰ δέραια καὶ γνωρίσματα.—Alciphron Ep. 3. 63 μετὰ τῶν σπαργάνων δέραιά τινα καὶ γνωρίσματα περιθεῖσαι.

δεῖ δὲ τοὺς μύθους κτέ. This begins a series of supplementary a 22
rules for the guidance of the dramatic poet in practice. When writing his play in the study he must (1) see the various incidents in it as it were, so as to anticipate the impression they are likely to produce on the stage; and also (2) feel to some extent the

1455 a 22 various emotions of his personages, if his picture of emotion is to be convincing (1455 a 23–34). After these five further rules are added in the course of this and the following chapter.

συναπεργάζεσθαι: comp. a 30 *συναπεργαζόμενον*, and Rhet. 2. 8, 1386 a 31 *ἀνάγκη τοὺς συναπεργαζομένους σχήμασι καὶ ἐσθῆτι καὶ ὅλως τῇ ὑποκρίσει ἐλεεινοτέρους εἶναι. συναπεργάζεσθαι*, ‘to finish off’, stands in the same relation to *ἀπεργάζεσθαι* as *συμπληροῦν* and *συντελεῖν* to *πληροῦν* and *τελεῖν*. It is to be remembered that in Aristotle's view (6, 1450 a 36; 9, 1451 b 28) the language is but a secondary matter by comparison with the *μῦθος*. Plutarch's story of Menander's mode of working may be worth quoting: De gloria Ath. 4, 347 E *λέγεται δὲ καὶ Μενάνδρῳ τῶν συνήθων τις εἰπεῖν· Ἐγγὺς οὖν, Μένανδρε, τὰ Διονύσια, καὶ σὺ τὴν κωμῳδίαν οὐ πεποίηκας; τὸν δὲ ἀποκρίνασθαι, Νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς ἔγωγε πεποίηκα τὴν κωμῳδίαν· ᾠκονόμηται γὰρ ἡ διάθεσις* [= ‘the plan’]· *δεῖ δ᾽ αὐτῇ τὰ στιχίδια ἐπᾶσαι.*

a 23 **πρὸ ὀμμάτων τιθέμενον**: De mem. 1. 450 a 4 *ὁ νοῶν, κἂν μὴ ποσὸν νοῇ, τίθεται πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποσόν, νοεῖ δ᾽ οὐχ ᾗ ποσόν.*—Probl. 40. 14, 957 a 22 *τό τε ἐνύπνιόν ἐστιν ὅταν διανοουμένοις καὶ πρὸ ὀμμάτων τιθεμένοις ὕπνος ἐπέλθῃ* (comp. Bon. Ind. 509 b 30).

οὕτω repeats the idea of *πρὸ ὀμμάτων τιθέμενον*; what follows, *ἐναργέστατα ὁρῶν κτέ.*, is added as an explanation.

ὁρῶν. Vahlen retains the article before *ὁρῶν*, and supposes an hyperbaton like that in 6, 1449 b 23. The article, however, is certainly not wanted, and may easily be explained as a dittographia.

a 26 **Καρκίνῳ.** The play referred to is assumed on the strength of this statement to have been entitled the Amphiaraus. Nothing more is known of it than what Aristotle here tells us, that the incongruity of a certain incident in it was observed and resented by the audience.

a 27 **ἐξ ἱεροῦ ἀνῄει**: ‘e templo exibat’ (Paccius), ‘e fano exiit’ (Victorius), ‘e templo ascenderat’ (Tyrwhitt), ‘had left the temple’ (Twining), ‘ex delubro redibat’ (Ritter), ‘was on his way from the temple’ (Butcher), ‘hatte das Heiligtum bereits verlassen’ (Gomperz).

ὃ μὴ ὁρῶντ᾽ ἂν τὸν θεατὴν κτέ. The sense is: If the incident had not been visibly before them, as part of the action of the piece (*τὰ πραττόμενα*), the incongruity would not have been noticed by the audience (*τὸν θεατήν*: see on 26, 1461 b 28); but they could not help observing it when actually put before their eyes on the stage. To guard against this kind of mistake, therefore, the poet

should in his mind's eye see his various incidents beforehand, so as to anticipate the impression they will make in the theatre. In the same way we are told in another place (24, 1460 a 15) that the absurdity in the Pursuit of Hector in the Iliad would be observed on the stage, though it passes unnoticed in the poem. 1455 a 27

ὅσα δὲ δυνατὸν: comp. a 23 ὅτι μάλιστα. a 29

τοῖς σχήμασιν: the attitudes and gestures in which great emotion finds expression. The meaning here is apparently this: If the poet is to portray great emotion convincingly, he must feel it himself; and if he feels it, he cannot but express it to some extent in gesture as well as in word. Aristotle, therefore, does not agree with the theory that the poet should write in cold blood, and that poetry is a matter of pure art and intellect; his view rather is that some emotional excitement is one of the conditions required for a strong and convincing picture of passion. With this we may compare the Horatian maxim, *Si vis me flere, dolendum est primum ipsi tibi* (A. P. 102), and that of Pope (Eloisa to Abelard 366), 'He best can paint 'em [i.e. their woes] who can feel 'em most'; or the perhaps even weightier dictum of Wordsworth (Pref. to Lyrical Ballads), 'It will be the wish of the Poet to bring his feelings near to those of the persons whose feelings he describes, nay, for short spaces of time, perhaps, to let himself slip into an entire delusion, and even confound and identify his own feelings with theirs.' How consonant all this is with the actual experience of many great imaginative writers may be seen from the evidence cited by Biese, Das Metaphorische in der dichterischen Phantasie p. 24 (Berl. 1889). In the Carpentariana p. 193 a story is told of Domenichino as showing that the same emotional excitability is not unknown even among painters: 'Le Dominiquin avoit coûtume de jouer, pour ainsi dire, le rôle de toutes les figures qu'il vouloit representer; & de dire tout haut ce que la passion qu'il leur donnoit, pouvoit inspirer. Lorsqu'il peignoit le Martyre de S. André, le Carache le surprit comme il étoit en colere, parlant d'une voix terrible & menaçante; & il travailloit pour lors à un Soldat qui menace le Saint. Après que l' enthousiasme fut passé, le Carache courut l'embrasser, & lui avoua qu'il avoit été ce jour-là son Maître; & qu'il venoit d'apprendre de lui, la véritable manière de réussir dans les expressions.'

πιθανώτατοι . . . οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν: Quintilian 6. 2. 27 *In iis* a 30
quae verisimilia esse volemus, simus ipsi similes eorum qui vere patiuntur affectibus. In the next clause χειμαίνει . . . καὶ χαλεπαίνει

1455 a 30 . . . ἀληθινώτατα explains πιθανώτατοι, and ὁ χειμαζόμενος καὶ . . . ὁ ὀργιζόμενος corresponds with οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν. For the meaning of πιθανός see on 9, 1451 b 16.

ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως. The same use of ἀπό is found in Eth. N. 4. 4, 1122 b 13 ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης δαπάνης τὸ ἔργον ποιήσει μεγαλοπρεπέστερον.—Meteor. 2. 3, 359 a 7 ὥστε τὰ πλοῖα ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τῶν ἀγωγίμων βάρους ἐν μὲν τοῖς ποταμοῖς ὀλίγου καταδύνειν, ἐν δὲ τῇ θαλάττῃ μετρίως ἔχειν.—Mech. 22. 854 b 7 ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν πλεῖον ἀπέχῃ τοῦ ὑπομοχλίου ὁ μοχλός, ῥᾷον κινεῖ καὶ πλεῖον ἀπὸ τῆς ἰσχύος τῆς αὐτῆς.

a 31 ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν: De insomn. 2, 460 b 3 ῥᾳδίως ἀπατώμεθα περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες, ἄλλοι δ' ἐν ἄλλοις, οἷον ὁ δειλὸς ἐν φόβῳ, ὁ δ' ἐρωτικὸς ἐν ἔρωτι.

χειμαίνει . . . χαλεπαίνει are intransitive (comp. HSt. s.v. χειμαίνω). The usual interpretation is that of Victorius, who makes them mean 'fluctuare facit alium' (or 'excitat fluctus in animis auditorum') and 'ad iram commovet'. As far, however, as the present passage is concerned, any such reference to the feelings of the audience is out of place; the poet is not supposed to make them angry (for instance), but to put before them a picture of anger which they can accept as sufficiently like reality (see on 19, 1456 b 1). The clause in fact is only an amplification of the πιθανώτατοι οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσίν εἰσιν which precedes it.

χειμαζόμενος: comp. infra b 21 χειμασθείς. The subst. χειμών is similarly used of mental distress or agitation in Epicurus, p. 62, 18 Usener, λύεται πᾶς ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς χειμών, where it is the opposite of ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀταραξία (comp. Lobeck, Phryn. p. 387, and the Index to Meineke's FCG. p. 1148).

a 32 ἀληθινώτατα, which qualifies χειμαίνει as well as χαλεπαίνει, is emphatic, as its position shows. It is stronger than πιθανώτατα, the word which Aristotle might very well have used in this context.

διὸ εὐφυοῦς κτέ. Aristotle's curt and allusive statement needs some little expansion to bring out his meaning. It may perhaps be rewritten thus: the imaginative power of identifying oneself for the time with one's personages, which poetry demands, is a matter not of art, but of nature and temperament; it requires a natural gift or else a touch of madness in the poet's mental constitution. This natural gift consists in a certain impressionability of soul; and the illusions of madness arise from a distempered form of the same quality.

εὐφυοῦς. εὐφυής (more fully εὐφυὴς πρός τι) is a general term

for one with a natural gift and aptitude for something, as distinct 1455 a 32
from one who acquires a power by training or study; comp. 22, 1459 a 7, and Top. 3. 2, 118 a 22 φιλοπονεῖν ἀρνούμεθα, ἵνα εὐφυεῖς εἶναι δόξωμεν. The word is of frequent occurrence in Plato, as well as in Aristotle, and it is occasionally found in Isocrates also. In the present passage the poetic imagination is tacitly assumed to be a matter of nature, and to be the outcome in some instances of a healthy, and in others, of an unhealthy nature. The alternative εὐφυοῦς ἢ μανικοῦ might be largely illustrated from Probl. 30. 1, where the connexion between 'great wit' (as Dryden calls εὐφυΐα) and madness is considered at length. The writer of the Problem (one of Aristotle's immediate followers, as it would seem) shows that they have a common physiological basis—that the 'melancholic temperament' underlies all exceptional ability, and that a more or less morbid form of it is to be seen in madness, and in certain states of mind akin to madness, e.g. enthusiasm and 'ecstasy'; comp. esp. Probl. 30. 1, 954 a 34 πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ . . . νοσήμασιν ἁλίσκονται μανικοῖς ἢ ἐνθουσιαστικοῖς, ὅθεν Σίβυλλαι καὶ Βάκιδες καὶ οἱ ἔνθεοι γίνονται πάντες . . . Μαρακὸς δὲ ὁ Συρακούσιος καὶ ἀμείνων ἦν ποιητής, ὅτ' ἐκσταίη. A close relation between genius and madness is implied also in Rhet. 2. 15, 1390 b 26 καὶ ἐνίοτε ἂν ᾖ ἀγαθὸν τὸ γένος, ἐγγίνονται διά τινος χρόνου ἄνδρες περιττοί, κἄπειτα πάλιν ἀναδιδωσιν· ἐξίσταται δὲ τὰ μὲν εὐφυᾶ ['clever', 'quick-witted'] γένη εἰς μανικώτερα ἤθη . . . τὰ δὲ στάσιμα ['steady', 'painstaking'] εἰς ἀβελτερίαν καὶ νωθρότητα.

ἢ μανικοῦ. The alternative here is a rationalistic recognition a 33
of the ancient idea of the poet being 'possessed' and 'inspired' at the moment of poetic creation. Plato plays on this idea in his 'praise of madness' in Phaedr. 245 A ὃς δ' ἂν ἄνευ μανίας Μουσῶν ἐπὶ ποιητικὰς θύρας ἀφίκηται, πεισθεὶς ὡς ἄρα ἐκ τέχνης ἱκανὸς ποιητὴς ἐσόμενος, ἀτελὴς αὐτός τε καὶ ἡ ποίησις ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν μαινομένων ἡ τοῦ σωφρονοῦντος ἠφανίσθη; and he returns to it in other dialogues (comp. Apol. 22 B, Meno 99 C, Ion 533 E sqq., Laws 719 C). For the survival of the notion in later literature see W. H. Thompson's note on Phaedr. 245 A.

οἱ μὲν . . . οἱ δὲ. The singulars which precede are practically equivalent to plurals, εὐφυῶν . . . μανικῶν (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr.[3] 2. 1 p. 86).

εὔπλαστοι, 'capable of assuming a variety of moods', i.e. as we should say, 'impressionable' or 'emotional'; comp. the Platonic ἁπαλὴ ψυχή in Phaedr. 245 A τρίτη δ' ἀπὸ Μουσῶν κατοκωχή τε

1455 a 33 *καὶ μανία, λαβοῦσα ἁπαλὴν καὶ ἄβατον ψυχήν*, and the explanation of Hermias (p. 98 Couvreur) *ἁπαλὴν δὲ λέγει τὴν εὔπλαστον καὶ εὐπαθῶς ἔχουσαν πρὸς ὑποδοχὴν τοῦ θείου.* The word is properly used of material substances which, instead of being hard and rigid, are easily made to take various shapes; comp. De gen. an. 3. 11, 761 a 32 *πολύμορφα τὰ ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ μᾶλλόν ἐστι τῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ· τό τε γὰρ ὑγρὸν εὐπλαστοτέραν ἔχει τὴν φύσιν τῆς γῆς* (also Plato Rep. 588 D). A metaphorical extension of meaning, not unlike that in the text, is found in Plato Laws 666 B *ἐπίκουρον τῆς τοῦ γήρως αὐστηρότητος ἐδωρήσατο τὸν οἶνον φάρμακον, ὥστε ἀνηβᾶν ἡμᾶς καὶ δυσθυμίας λήθην γίγνεσθαι, μαλακώτερόν τ' ἐκ σκληροτέρου τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος, καθάπερ εἰς πῦρ σίδηρον ἐντεθέντα, γιγνόμενον, καὶ οὕτως εὐπλαστότερον εἶναι.* This impressionability of soul, which marks the poetic genius (*εὐφυής*), may be explained on the principles set forth in Probl. 30. 1, where the melancholic temperament is said to show itself in a certain variability of mood (*ἀνώμαλοί εἰσιν οἱ μελαγχολικοί*), and a general capacity for strong feeling (*ἡ φύσις δήλη ῥέπουσα πρὸς τὰ πάθη*).

a 34 **ἐκστατικοί** describes the extreme form of the emotionalism of the melancholic temperament; some of the 'melancholic' are apt to be so completely carried away by their feelings as to be actually beside themselves for the time. According to Probl. 30. 1 a tendency to this description of 'melancholy' was observable in most of the poets (*τῶν περὶ τὴν ποίησιν οἱ πλεῖστοι*, 953 a 28); a certain Maracus of Syracuse—like our own Christopher Smart and others—was said to have been at his best in moments of derangement, *Μαρακὸς ὁ Συρακούσιος καὶ ἀμείνων ἦν ποιητής, ὅτ' ἐκσταίη* (954 a 38). Among Aristotelian instances of *ἐξίστασθαι, ἔκστασις*, and *ἐκστατικός*, as terms of mental pathology, the following may be noted: De gen. et corr. 1. 8, 325 a 19 *οὐδένα γὰρ τῶν μαινομένων ἐξεστάναι τοσοῦτον ὥστε τὸ πῦρ ἓν εἶναι δοκεῖν καὶ τὸν κρύσταλλον.*—H. A. 6. 22, 577 a 12 *ἐξίσταται καὶ μαίνεται.*—Cat. 8, 9 b 36 *ἥ τε μανικὴ ἔκστασις καὶ ἡ ὀργὴ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα* [scil. *ποιότητες*]· *ποιοὶ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτας λέγονται, ὀργίλοι τε καὶ μανικοί.*—Probl. 30. 1, 953 a 17 *ἡ περὶ τοὺς παῖδας ἔκστασις* [said of Hercules slaying his children in his madness]. —a 22 *ὁ μὲν* [i. e. Ajax] *ἐκστατικὸς ἐγένετο παντελῶς.*—b 14 *τῶν μελαγχολικῶν ὅσοι ἐκστατικοί.* Theophrastus H. P. 9. 13, 4 has *ἐκστατικός* in the active sense of producing *ἔκστασις*: *γίνονται δέ τινες τῶν γλυκειῶν* [scil. *ῥιζῶν*] *αἱ μὲν ἐκστατικαὶ καθάπερ ἡ ὁμοία τῷ σκολύμῳ περὶ Τεγέαν, ἣν καὶ Πάνδειος ὁ ἀνδριαντοποιὸς φαγὼν ἐργαζόμενος ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ ἐξέστη· αἱ δὲ θανατηφόροι κτέ.* This technical

use of these words is perhaps another proof of the influence of the 1455^{a} 34
language of Hippocrates (v. Foes, Oeconomia Hippocratis s.v. *ἔκστασις*) on that of Aristotle and his school.

ἐξεταστικοί, the reading of the MS., is surely impossible in a context like the present. *ἐξετάζειν* denotes to 'scrutinize' or 'examine', i.e. to exercise one's critical faculty on something. It is clear, however, as any reader of Probl. 30. 1 must see, that Aristotle is not thinking here of the critical but of the imaginative power of the poet, and that he wishes to distinguish two forms of it, one springing from a healthy, and the other from a more or less morbid state of mind. An instance of the corruption of *ἐκστατικός* into *ἐξεταστικός* is found in the MSS. of Aspasius' commentary on the Nic. Ethics, p. 136. 3 ed. Heylbut. Mr. A. O. Prickard has pointed out to me a similar corruption in Longinus 38. 5 (*ἐξετάσεως* for *ἐκστάσεως*).

τούς τε λόγους: comp. 24, 1460^{a} 27. A new point is introduced in the same way in 24, 1460^{a} 26 (*προαιρεῖσθαί τε δεῖ*), and in several places in the later Books of the Nicomachean Ethics (e.g. 8. 1, 1155^{a} 11, 16; 9. 1, 1164^{b} 1, etc.). This is the third of Aristotle's supplementary rules (see on ^{a} 22). It will be observed that he now changes his construction, infinitives taking the place of the preceding participles, just as though he had begun by saying *δεῖ δὲ τοὺς μύθους συνιστάντα καὶ τῇ λέξει συναπεργαζόμενον ὅτι μάλιστα πρὸ ὀμμάτων τίθεσθαι . . . καὶ τοῖς σχήμασιν συναπεργάζεσθαι.* For *λόγος* in the sense of the argument in a play or poem comp. 17, 1455^{b} 17 and 24, 1460^{a} 27 (also Aristoph. Pax 148, and Hesychius *λόγος· ἡ τοῦ δράματος ὑπόθεσις*).

ἐκτίθεσθαι καθόλου: i.e. to set out in a general form, to reduce it ^{b} 1
to its simplest terms by ignoring its accidents, its personal and other accessories. On the logical or philosophic use of *ἐκτίθεσθαι* in Aristotle see Vahlen, Beitr. 2 p. 83 and Poste's Sophistici Elenchi p. 153 (comp. Maier, Syllogistik des Aristoteles 2. 2 p. 142).

ἐπεισοδιοῦν, scil. *τοὺς λόγους*, as in Rhet. 3. 17, 1418^{a} 33 *δεῖ τὸν λόγον ἐπεισοδιοῦν ἐπαίνοις*. It means to work in the accessory incidents (*ἐπεισόδια*; see on 9, 1451^{b} 33) into the story as outlined in the preliminary sketch.

τῇ θεῷ. The goddess meant is Artemis, to whom Iphigenia ^{b} 5
had been offered in sacrifice (*τυθείσης τινὸς κόρης* ^{b} 3) at Aulis.

ἀνεῖλεν ὁ θεὸς . . . ἐλθεῖν ἐκεῖ. The reading here was practically ^{b} 7
settled long ago by Düntzer (Rettung d. Aristot. Poetik p. 180). Aristotle is merely reproducing in his own form the statement in

1455 b 7 Iph. Taur. 82, where Orestes, in an address to Apollo, is made to say: ἐλθὼν δέ σ' ἠρώτησα πῶς τροχηλάτου μανίας ἂν ἔλθοιμ' ἐς τέλος πόνων τ' ἐμῶν· σὺ δ' εἶπας [= ἀνεῖλεν ὁ θεός] ἐλθεῖν Ταυρικῆς μ' ὅρους χθονός [= ἐλθεῖν ἐκεῖ], ἔνθ' Ἄρτεμις σὴ ξύγγονος βωμοὺς ἔχει, λαβεῖν τ' ἄγαλμα θεᾶς . . . λαβόντα δ' . . . Ἀθηναίων χθονὶ δοῦναι. This incident in the previous history of Orestes is outside the actual story or plot of the Iphigenia (ἔξω τοῦ μύθου); all that is really essential for the dramatic situation is that τῷ ἀδελφῷ συνέβη ἐλθεῖν τῆς ἱερείας.

b 8 **ἔξω τοῦ μύθου**, which seems to have been explained by the adscript ἔξω τοῦ καθόλου, is equivalent to ἔξω τοῦ δράματος (see on 14, 1453 b 32), outside the action of the piece.

b 9 **ληφθεὶς** = συλληφθείς (comp. Bremi on Lysias in Eratosth. § 16). **ἀνεγνώρισεν**, scil. ὅτι Ὀρέστης (see on 11, 1452 b 5).

b 10 **Πολύιδος**: see on 16, 1455 a 6.

b 12 **ὑποθέντα τὰ ὀνόματα**: 9, 1451 b 13 τὰ τυχόντα ὀνόματα ὑποτιθέασιν. The proper names are required to serve as a basis for the story, and impart to it an appearance of reality. Aristotle seems to speak for the moment as though the whole story, names and all, were of the poet's creation, as it was in the New Comedy and in certain tragedies (9, 1451 b 11, 19). If the stories, however, were traditional, the chief names were generally part of the tradition, and taken over from it by the dramatist. A reason for the retention of historic names in Tragedy has been given in 9, 1451 b 15.

b 13 **ἐπεισοδιοῦν**: comp. b 1 ἐπεισοδιοῦν καὶ παρατείνειν.

ὅπως δὲ ἔσται. Another, perhaps the only other Aristotelian instance of this quasi-imperative, is in Rhet. 3. 18, 1419 b 6 ὅπως οὖν τὸ ἁρμόττον αὐτῷ λήψεται. Aristotle addresses his audience (see on 15, 1454 b 9), as he does in the concluding paragraph of the Sophistici Elenchi (33, 184 b 3), and exhorts them to bear in mind the rule he is pointing out.

οἰκεῖα: appropriate to the person. The madness of Orestes in the Iphigenia is a return of that which seized him just after the murder of his mother (Iph. Taur. 83); his purification also is naturally suggested by his guilt as a matricide (Iph. Taur. 1031 sqq.).

b 14 **ἡ μανία**: Iph. Taur. 281 sqq.

b 15 **τῆς καθάρσεως**: Iph. Taur. 1163 sqq.

b 18 **παραφυλαττομένου**: comp. the use of φυλάττειν in Hom. Od. 4 670 ὄφρα μιν αὐτὸν ἰόντα λοχήσομαι ἠδὲ φυλάξω ἐν πορθμῷ.

αὐτὸς δέ. In Aristotle, just as in other writers, a *δέ* is occasionally used after a participial clause to mark a contrast between the two parts of the sentence (see my Textual Criticism of the Nic. Ethics p. 34). 1455 b 21

χειμασθείς: comp. 17, 1455 a 31.

ἀναγνωρίσας †τινάς† αὐτός. On behalf of the amended reading (*ὅτι* instead of *τινὰς*) it may be noted that in 25, 1461 b 1 A^c has *τί* instead of *ὅτι*. The language here is a reminiscence of that in Od. 21. 207, where Ulysses reveals himself to the herdsmen: *ἔνδον μὲν δὴ ὅδ' αὐτὸς ἐγὼ κακὰ πολλὰ μογήσας ἤλυθον*—the Homeric *κακὰ πολλὰ μογήσας* being represented by Aristotle's *χειμασθείς*, *ἤλυθον* by *ἀφικνεῖται*, and *ὅδ' αὐτὸς ἐγώ* by *ἀναγνωρίσας ὅτι αὐτός*. Twining (followed by Vahlen, Beitr. 2 p. 86; comp. Berlin Academy, Sitzungsberichte 1898, p. 266[1]) adopts a suggestion of Castelvetro's, that *ἀναγνωρίσας τινάς* (the traditional reading) may be taken to mean 'making himself known to some of his people'. The interpretation, besides being against Aristotelian usage (see on 16, 1454 b 32), requires us to take *αὐτός* with *ἐπιθέμενος*, and gives it an undue degree of emphasis. There is no point in saying that Ulysses attacked the suitors 'himself'; and it was not true that he attacked them 'by himself' or 'alone' (comp. Aristot. fr. 176 Teubn.). This difficulty was not felt by either Castelvetro or Twining, as the reading in the texts of their time was not *αὐτὸς* but *αὐτοῖς*.

ἐσώθη: comp. the use of *σωτηρία* in b 12, 14. The double ending of the Odyssey has been formally recognized already, in 13, 1453 a 32. b 22

τὸ ἴδιον: the peculiar or characteristic part of the Odyssey, as distinct from the 'episodes', or accessories. b 23

[1] Vahlen (in this paper in the Sitzungsberichte) points to an instance of *ἀναγνωρίζειν τινά*, in the sense of 'cause some one to recognize' in Diodorus Sic. 4. 59. 6 *κατορθώσας δὲ τὰ προειρημένα* [scil. Theseus] *κατήντησεν εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας καὶ τὸν Αἰγέα διὰ τῶν συμβόλων ἀνεγνώρισεν.* This solitary instance, however, occurring as it does in an author like Diodorus, and in a passage which is certainly not free from difficulties, is hardly sufficient to show that the word may have had the same sense and construction in Aristotle; the sense given it is too abnormal, too unlike the Aristotelian use of the word in other passages in the Poetics and elsewhere, to be accepted as probable. Vahlen thinks the simple *γνωρίζειν* also is used in the same way in Plutarch Theseus 12 *τὸν δὲ υἱὸν ἀνακρίνας ἠσπάζετο καὶ συναγαγὼν τοὺς πολίτας ἐγνώριζεν, ἡδέως δεχομένους διὰ τὴν ἀνδραγαθίαν.* It seems to me that the object after *ἐγνώριζεν* in this passage is *τὸν υἱόν* (comp. Meursius, Theseus c. 8), and that *ἐγνώριζεν* means either 'introduced him' (comp. Plut. Fab. Max. 21) or 'acknowledged him'.

1455^{b} 24 **Ἔστι δὲ πάσης τραγῳδίας κτέ.** The fourth of these supplementary rules. The complication and dénouement are of such paramount importance, that two tragedies with the same sort of complication and dénouement should be regarded as substantially the same, however different they may be in other respects. It is quite possible to succeed in the one point and fail in the other; but they are both of equal moment, and require equal attention from the poet. This view of the drift of the paragraph assumes that the sentence *δίκαιον . . . κρατεῖσθαι* in 1456^{a} 7–10 should follow after *μέχρι τοῦ τέλους* in 1455^{b} 32. A mere definition of *δέσις* and *λύσις* would have no place in these chapters, unless it were made to lead up to some practical precept, such as we have in *δεῖ δὲ ἄμφω ἀεὶ κρατεῖσθαι* in 1456^{a} 10.

δέσις . . . λύσις: see on 15, 1454^{a} 37.

^{b} 25 **ἔξωθεν**: see on 14, 1453^{b} 32.

ἔνια τῶν ἔσωθεν πολλάκις. It is not necessary to transpose *πολλάκις* and insert it after the preceding *τὰ μὲν ἔξωθεν*. The *δέσις*, says Aristotle, comprises not only the presupposed part of the story (*τὰ ἔξωθεν*, or *τὰ προπεπραγμένα*), but also in many instances (*πολλάκις*) some portion of the action within the play. In the Iph. Taur. the *δέσις* extends as far as l. 391. In the O. T. on the other hand the entire *δέσις* is presupposed, the *λύσις* beginning with the opening scene.

^{b} 29 **Λυγκεῖ**: see on 11, 1452^{a} 27. The Lynceus is cited as an instance of a play with a *δέσις* partly presupposed and partly within the limits of the action of the piece.

^{b} 30 **τοῦ παιδίου**, Abas, the child of Lynceus and Danaus' daughter Hypermnestra.

^{b} 32 **τραγῳδίας δὲ εἴδη κτέ.** The fifth of the supplementary rules. There are four species of Tragedy—each arising apparently (like the species of Democracy in Pol. 4. 12, 1296^{b} 27) through the prominence in it of some one of the several elements in a play. Aristotle insists that for an ideally good tragedy all these elements of interest are wanted, and that in so critical an age none can be neglected with impunity (*μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἅπαντα δεῖ πειρᾶσθαι ἔχειν κτέ.* 1456^{a} 3). The species he is now talking of, or at any rate three out of the number, were probably no discovery of his; terms like *πεπλεγμένη τραγῳδία, παθητικὴ τραγῳδία,* and *ἠθικὴ τραγῳδία* may very well be supposed to have been already sanctioned and current in the technical language of the theatre (comp. on 9, 1451^{b} 33). If the *περιπέτεια* and *ἀναγνώρισις* are

'the whole thing' (as we say), the play is πεπλεγμένη; if the element of πάθος is especially prominent, it is παθητική; if it is mainly a portraiture of character, it is ἠθική; and if it depends largely on the 'spectacle', it is 'spectacular'. This last species Aristotle recognizes as a fact, but as there was no derivative from ὄψις corresponding to our 'spectacular', he has to change his form of expression and speak not of the fourth 'species', but of the fourth element (τὸ δὲ τέταρτον ὄψις), with instances, however, (αἵ τε Φορκίδες κτέ.) relating to the species of drama in which the element of ὄψις was prominent (see J. of Phil. 14 p. 50). These four elements have been already considered, though not quite so directly as Aristotle's language would imply. The περιπέτεια and ἀναγνώρισις, which are assumed to go together (comp. 11, 1452 a 32), and the πάθος have been distinguished already as elements in the μῦθος (comp. 11, 1452 b 9); and they are counted here as two parts of the play because each is the prominent factor in a distinct species of tragedy. Two other parts are mentioned, the ἤθη and the ὄψις, apparently for the same reason. If nothing is said of the remaining 'parts' of Tragedy, the reason is obvious; there was no existing species of Tragedy that could be described as consisting mainly of διάνοια or λέξις or μελοποιία. Vahlen and others assume a lacuna in b 34 (after ἀναγνώρισις), on the supposition that Aristotle must have had something to say about the ἁπλῆ τραγῳδία. The ἁπλῆ τραγῳδία, however, is not a species in Aristotle's present sense of the term; and if we are to find a place for it in the text, the same logic would require a recognition of the ἀήθης τραγῳδία (6, 1450 a 25), as being the logical opposite of the ἠθικὴ τραγῳδία in the passage before us. The insertion too, which is due to a desire to bring the present statement into line with that in 24, 1459 b 8, makes it necessary to adopt a highly improbable correction, τερατῶδες, in the context (1456 a 2). 1455 b 32

τοσαῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ μέρη ἐλέχθη. In lieu of τὰ μέρη Tyrwhitt suggests τὰ μύθων, and Ueberweg τὰ μύθου or τοῦ μύθου—which would mean, if I understand Tyrwhitt's note correctly, that the ἠθικὴ τραγῳδία is based on an ἠθικὸς μῦθος. This, however, can hardly be right, if one remembers the sharp distinction drawn between ἦθος and μῦθος in 6, 1450 a 4. The present passage, due allowance being made for the Aristotelian brevity of expression, is intelligible enough in itself; the difficulty is to bring it into harmony with what is said elsewhere in other parts of the book. τοσαῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ μέρη ἐλέχθη, no doubt, implies a previous

1455b 32 statement, which it is impossible to find in the earlier chapters; and the passage in 24, 1459b 9 implies that a *ἁπλῆ* as well as a *πεπλεγμένη τραγῳδία* had been recognized among the four species of Tragedy in the passage before us. Difficulties of this kind it is better to acknowledge than to remove at the cost of reforming the text. The truth is that Aristotle is more human than we commonly suppose—that his memory is sometimes at fault, and also that he sometimes writes down what occurs to him at the moment, without stopping to reflect whether it is quite reconcilable with what he has said elsewhere. Though there are chapters in the Poetics, more especially in the early part, which are models of careful drafting, I think it clear that, as the work advances, the statement is not always equally admirable, and that it would require a great deal of revision to make it consistent throughout. The difficulty in the reference *τοσαῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ μέρη ἐλέχθη* is not unlike that in *ὥσπερ πρότερον εἴρηται* in 6, 1450b 13, and *ὅπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις* in 18, 1456a 10.

b 33 **ἡ μὲν πεπλεγμένη** *κτέ.*, appositional to the preceding *εἴδη τέσσαρα* (comp. 16, 1454b 20; 21, 1457a 31).

b 34 **παθητική**. No definition is given, as though the term (as also *ἠθική* in the next line) were sufficiently understood without one.

1456a 1 **Αἴαντες**: see Nauck, TGF.[2] p. 963 for a list of plays entitled Αἴας.

Ἰξίονες: see Nauck p. 965.

Φθιώτιδες, a play by Sophocles (Nauck p. 282).

a 2 **Πηλεύς**. The reference is perhaps to the Peleus of Sophocles (Nauck p. 239) rather than that of Euripides (Nauck p. 554).

τὸ δὲ τέταρτον ὄψις is closer to the MS. reading than Schrader's *τὸ δὲ τερατῶδες*, which has been so generally approved by recent editors. The unmeaning *οησ* of the MS. here, and again in 21, 1458a 5[1], is but one remove from *ὄψις* as it might be written in an uncial MS. (OHC = O+IC). The illustrations no doubt refer to the 'kind' instead of the 'part' brought into prominence in the kind. A certain formal incongruence, however, is not uncommon with instances introduced by *οἷον* (comp. 16, 1454b 25; 25, 1461a 24; Eth N. 4. 4, 1122a 27; Rhet. 3. 3, 1405b 35);

[1] See J. of Phil. 14 p. 50. The *οησ* of the MS. in the second instance has been supposed to represent ΟΠΣ, and in this way *ὄψ*. In early inscriptions *ψ* may appear as *φσ* or *πσ* (Meisterhans, Gr.[3] p. 3; Hoffmann, Gr. Dialekte 3 p. 612); but, as far as I am aware, there is no trace of this mode of writing in the manuscript tradition of a classical author.

Aristotle is often content to note the fact, and leave us to see its logical relation to what precedes. **1456^{a} 2**

Φορκίδες, a satyric drama by Aeschylus (Nauck p. 83).

Προμηθεύς, probably another satyric drama by Aeschylus (Nauck p. 62). There is a good deal to be said, however, in favour of Bergk's suggestion (Kl. Schr. 2 p. 753) that the plural *Προμηθεῖς* should be restored in the text.

ὅσα ἐν ᾅδου. The reference may perhaps be to plays like the *Ψυχαγωγοί* of Aeschylus (Nauck p. 87). In these last instances, owing to the nature of the subject and situation, the *ὄψις*, the make-up (see on 6, 1449^{b} 33) of the strange personages introduced, may well be supposed to have been a great feature in the play. Aeschylus, who was an innovator in matters of stage-apparatus (Sommerbrodt, Scaenica p. 183), is said to have made large use of this device: Vita Aeschyli (p. 2 Dind.) *ταῖς τε γὰρ ὄψεσι καὶ τοῖς μύθοις πρὸς ἔκπληξιν τερατώδη μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς ἀπάτην κέχρηται.* ^{a} 3

μάλιστα μὲν οὖν κτέ. A reminiscence of Aristotle's language here may be traced in Polybius 16. 20. 2: *διὸ δεῖ μάλιστα μὲν πειρᾶσθαι πάντων κρατεῖν τῶν τῆς ἱστορίας μερῶν· καλὸν γάρ· εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο δυνατόν, τῶν ἀναγκαιοτάτων καὶ τῶν μεγίστων ἐν αὐτῇ πλείστην ποιεῖσθαι πρόνοιαν.*

ἑκάστου is masculine, 'each of his various predecessors'—the genitive being dependent on *ἰδίου* as in 5, 1449^{b} 16, 13, 1452^{b} 33, and 19, 1456^{a} 35. For the hyperbaton see on 6, 1449^{b} 23. ^{a} 6

δίκαιον κτέ. This and the next sentence (*πολλοὶ — κρατεῖσθαι*) are probably out of place (see above, on 18, 1455^{b} 24). ^{a} 7

ἄλλην καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν λέγειν. The point here, the conditions under which two tragedies may be said to be the same or not, is very like that in De anima 2. 4, 416^{a} 5 *χρὴ τὰ ὄργανα λέγειν ἕτερα καὶ ταὐτὰ τοῖς ἔργοις*, and in Pol. 3. 3, 1276^{a} 18 *πῶς ποτε χρὴ λέγειν τὴν πόλιν εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀλλ' ἑτέραν.* ^{a} 8

οὐδενὶ ἴσως τῷ μύθῳ, 'ob nihil aeque ac ob fabulam' (Tyrwhitt). The dative *οὐδενί* is to be taken with *λέγειν* in the sense of 'by reason of' or 'on account of'; comp. De anima 2. 4, 416^{a} 5 (quoted above).—De sensu 7, 447^{b} 24 *φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ μὲν τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἓν ᾗ ψυχῇ οὐδενὶ ἑτέρῳ λέγειν ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ ἅμα.*—Eth. N. 3. 12, 1117^{a} 32 *τῷ δὴ τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν ἀνδρεῖοι λέγονται.* The construction in *ἴσως τῷ μύθῳ* ('equally with the story') is normal (Kühner, Gr. Gr.[3] 2. 1 p. 411); but I am not able to point out an exact parallel. It may be compared, however, with

1456 a 8 that in Eth. N. 1. 4, 1096 a 23 τἀγαθὸν ἰσαχῶς λέγεται τῷ ὄντι, and in Plato Parm. 150 A ἐξ ἴσου τῷ ἑνὶ δι' ὅλου αὐτοῦ τεταμένη; and with the use of ὁμοίως in Pol. 3. 11, 1282 b 8 ὁμοίως ταῖς πολιτείαις ἀνάγκη καὶ τοὺς νόμους φαύλους ἢ σπουδαίους εἶναι, and elsewhere. ἴσως has the sense of 'equally' in Pol. 4, 14, 1298 b 23 (Bekker), in Plato Laws 805 A, and in Demosth. 10. 74 (v. Weil ad loc.).

τοῦτο δέ (= τοῦτο δ' ἐστί) introduces an explaining clause of similar form in De gen. et corr. 1. 6, 323 a 17 οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε πᾶν τὸ κινοῦν ποιεῖν, εἴπερ τὸ ποιοῦν ἀντιθήσομεν τῷ πάσχοντι· τοῦτο δ' οἷς ἡ κίνησις πάθος.

a 9 ἡ αὐτή. Aristotle, thinking only of the identity of the two tragedies, omits to recognize the possible alternative ἢ ἄλλη (comp. 19, 1456 b 4).

a 10 κρατεῖσθαι = 'obtineri'. Vahlen illustrates this use of the word from Pol. 7. 13, 1331 b 37 δεῖ δ' ἐν ταῖς τέχναις καὶ ἐπιστήμαις ταῦτα ἀμφότερα κρατεῖσθαι, τὸ τέλος καὶ τὰς εἰς τὸ τέλος πράξεις, and Dion. Hal. 5. 556 τῆς δὲ σαφηνείας καὶ τῆς ἐναργείας ἀμφοτέρους κρατεῖν ἀπεφηνάμην. Comp. also Polyb. 16, 20. 2 (quoted above on a 3).

χρὴ δὲ κτέ. The sixth of Aristotle's supplementary rules.

a 11 εἴρηται πολλάκις. Though some hint of this may perhaps be discerned in 5, 1449 b 12 and 17, 1455 b 15, the reference here is clearly one of Aristotle's oversights (see on 18, 1455 b 32); it is not true that he has more than once laid down the rule μὴ ποιεῖν ἐποποιικὸν σύστημα τραγῳδίαν. πολλάκις, 'more than once', is the opposite of ἅπαξ (comp. Meteor. 2. 3, 356 b 27) as well as of ὀλιγάκις, just as πολλά is the opposite of ἕν as well as of ὀλίγα (Metaph. I 6, 1056 b 23).

μεμνῆσθαι καὶ μὴ ποιεῖν. For the conjunction Vahlen quotes Eth. N. 1. 7, 1098 a 26 μεμνῆσθαι δὲ καὶ τῶν προειρημένων χρὴ καὶ τὴν ἀκρίβειαν μὴ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασιν ἐπιζητεῖν.

σύστημα, scil. πραγμάτων. The μῦθος or story has been repeatedly described as a σύστασις πραγμάτων (v. 6, 1450 a 15, 32, b 32, etc.).

a 12 ἐποποιικὸν δὲ λέγω τὸ πολύμυθον, scil. σύστημα. The common punctuation (with a full stop before, and a comma after it) makes this clause the beginning of a new sentence. It is clear, I think, that it is a parenthesis, and that the illustration οἷον εἴ τις κτέ. (comp. 26, 1462 b 2) refers back to the principal statement, μὴ ποιεῖν ἐποποιικὸν σύστημα τραγῳδίαν in a 11. For other illustrations at some distance from the statements to which they relate see on 7, 1451 a 2.

πολύμυθον. The assumption here is that the story in the Iliad is a *πολύμυθον σύστημα*, one with a plurality of stories in it (comp. 24, 1462 b 8). It is not easy to reconcile this with what we are told in a later chapter (23, 1459 a 30) where the unity of story in the Iliad is emphasized. 1456 a 12

ὅσοι πέρσιν Ἰλίου ὅλην ἐποίησαν. We do not know to whom Aristotle is referring; it is just possible that Agathon may have been one of the number. For the tragedies entitled *Ἰλίου πέρσις* (or simply *Πέρσις*) see on 23, 1459 b 6. a 16

Ἀγάθων. Aristotle's sense of the importance of Agathon is shown by his many quotations from him (Bon. Ind. 4 b 5), as well as by the present and other references in the Poetics (9, 1451 b 21; 15, 1454 b 14). The context (a 21) implies that the pathos in Agathon's situations was not always of the most legitimate kind; and in the next paragraph (a 29) he is said to have set a bad precedent in the treatment of the Chorus. But whatever his artistic shortcomings may have been, we have evidence enough even in Aristophanes of his success with his own generation. There is a good deal of point, therefore, in what Aristotle is saying in support of his rule (*μὴ ποιεῖν ἐποποιικὸν σύστημα τραγῳδίαν*), that 'even Agathon failed' when he neglected it. a 18

ἐν τούτῳ μόνῳ, 'in this, and in this alone'—a pregnant use of *μόνος* like that in De somno 2, 455 a 27 *διὸ καὶ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζῴοις . . . καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἁφὴ μόνη πᾶσιν.* a 19

καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἁπλοῖς πράγμασι. I cannot think it necessary to bracket these words (with Susemihl). As *περιπέτεια*, which is the mark of the 'complex' story (10, 1452 a 16; comp. 11, 1452 a 32), is directly suggestive of it, *ἐν ταῖς περιπετείαις* is practically equivalent to *ἐν τοῖς πεπλεγμένοις πράγμασι.* Aristotle adds *καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἁπλοῖς πράγμασι*, in order to make his statement cover the whole ground by including both forms of plot. The failure of these unsuccessful poets, he says in effect, was really due not to any fault of execution, but to an initial mistake in their choice of subjects; they forgot the limitations of the Drama, and undertook to dramatize a story too long and too complex for the purposes of the stage.

ὧν βούλονται, 'the effects they desire'. The kind of effect, which is explained in the next clause (*τραγικὸν γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ φιλάνθρωπον*), may not be of the best order; but it is that which, in their anxiety to please their public, they wish to produce. a 20

τραγικὸν γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ φιλάνθρωπον. For the change of number in *τοῦτο* comp. 19, 1456 a 35; it is the converse of that in 17, a 21

1456 ^{a} 21 1455 ^{a} 33 (comp. Bon. Ind. 490 ^{b} 17). Aristotle's theory is that the tragic situation should be ἐλεεινόν—which implies that the sufferer does not deserve his misfortunes (13, 1453 ^{a} 4); he incidentally admits, however, that it may be only φιλάνθρωπον (see on 13, 1452 ^{b} 38), as it is, for instance, when the sufferings of the wicked are put before us in such a way as to arouse a certain commiseration or human feeling for the sufferers. The later Tragedy would seem to have affected this inferior form of tragic motive.

ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο κτέ. The illustrations which follow were probably taken from actual plays. The tragedies Aristotle has in mind must have involved a strong περιπέτεια with all the interest and excitement attending it; they failed, however (we are told), in spite of this and other attractions (comp. στοχάζονται ὧν βούλονται θαυμαστῶς), through an initial mistake in their subject, which was one more fitted for an epic than a play.

^{a} 23 ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο εἰκός: comp. 25, 1461 ^{b} 15. The reference is to the sophistical saying of Agathon (fr. 9 Nauck[2]), τάχ' ἄν τις εἰκὸς αὐτὸ τοῦτ' εἶναι λέγοι, βροτοῖσι πολλὰ τυγχάνειν οὐκ εἰκότα, which Aristotle has examined in Rhet. 2. 24, 1402 ^{a} 10. There is some variation of text here, as another reading, ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο ⟨καὶ⟩ εἰκός, is believed to underlie the Arabic Version. With the καί the clause adds a further point in favour of these unsuccessful plays: the kind of incident just mentioned is said to be 'probable also'. Without the καί the clause involves a criticism or condemnation, not unlike that in 13, 1453 ^{a} 35 (ἔστιν δὲ οὐχ αὕτη κτέ.), 'this is probable, however, only in Agathon's non-natural sense of the word'. A qualification of this kind (introduced by ὥσπερ or καθάπερ) is found more than once in this same chapter (^{a} 17 and ^{a} 27), and again in 21, 1457 ^{b} 24; comp. also Metaph. B 2, 998 ^{a} 2 ἅπτεται γὰρ τοῦ κανόνος οὐ κατὰ στιγμὴν ὁ κύκλος ἀλλ' ὥσπερ Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγεν ἐλέγχων τοὺς γεωμέτρας.—Rhet. 1. 5, 1361 ^{b} 4 πολλοὶ γὰρ ὑγιαίνουσιν ὥσπερ Ἡρόδικος λέγεται.

^{a} 25 καὶ τὸν χορὸν κτέ. The seventh and last of these practical rules. It reappears in the well-known precept of Horace A. P. 193 *Actoris partes chorus officiumque virile defendat, neu quid medios intercinat actus, quod non proposito conducat et haereat apte.*

^{a} 27 Εὐριπίδῃ. For the dative (conventionally rendered by *apud*) comp. Pol. 8. 5, 1339 ^{b} 8 οὐ γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ᾄδει καὶ κιθαρίζει τοῖς ποιηταῖς.—Plato Rep. 389 E οἷα καὶ Ὁμήρῳ Διομήδης λέγει.—Laws 706 D Ὀδυσσεὺς γὰρ αὐτῷ [scil. Ὁμήρῳ] λοιδορεῖ τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα. The tacit assumption here is perhaps this, that the choral songs in

Euripides, though no more ἐμβόλιμα (like those in the later Drama), 1456 a 27
were not always very closely connected with the action of the piece. A tradition of this criticism survives in the grammarians. The chorus in Phoen. 1019 the scholiast condemns as irrelevant: *πρὸς οὐδὲν ταῦτα· ἔδει γὰρ τὸν χορὸν οἰκτίσασθαι τὸν θάνατον τοῦ Μενοικέως ἢ ἀποδέχεσθαι τὴν εὐψυχίαν τοῦ νεανίσκου. ἀλλὰ περὶ Οἰδίπου καὶ τῆς Σφιγγὸς διηγεῖται τὰ πολλάκις εἰρημένα.* A more general condemnation is found in the scholiast on Aristoph. Ach. 443: *καὶ διὰ τούτων τὸν Εὐριπίδην διασύρει. οὗτος γὰρ εἰσάγει τοὺς χοροὺς οὔτε τὰ ἀκόλουθα φθεγγομένους τῇ ὑποθέσει, ἀλλ' ἱστορίας τινὰς ἀπαγγέλλοντας, ὡς ἐν ταῖς Φοινίσσαις, οὔτε ἐμπαθῶς ἀντιλαμβανομένους τῶν ἀδικηθέντων ἀλλὰ μεταξὺ ἀντιπίπτοντας.* The Roman poet Accius also must have been of the same opinion, to judge from the mutilated fragment of his Didascalica in Nonius 178, 23, *sed Euripidis, qui choros temerius in fabulis* * * *.

τὰ ᾀδόμενα: the choral, as opposed to *τὰ λεγόμενα*, the spoken a 28
parts of the play. In [Demosthenes] 60. 9 *τοὺς τῶν ᾀδομένων ποιητάς* is a way of describing the lyric poets; comp. also Plato Rep. 398 D *οὐκοῦν ὅσον γε αὐτοῦ λόγος ἐστίν, οὐδὲν δήπου διαφέρει* [scil. *τὸ μέλος*] *τοῦ μὴ ᾀδομένου λόγου.*

ἐμβόλιμα: 'carmina intercalaria' (Budaeus). The word is a 29
usually a term of chronology, as in Herod. 1. 32 and 2. 4. With the grammarians it seems to have meant 'interpolated': Hesychius *ἐμβόλιμα ἔπη· τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν γραμματικῶν ὡς ἀλλότρια καὶ νόθα ἀθετούμενα.* Cicero has the very similar word *ἐμβόλιον* in Ep. ad Q. Fr. 3. 1, 24, in the sense of an 'insertion' or 'interlude' (v. Ernesti, Lex. tech. gr. p. 118).

Twining's note on this passage is well worth quoting: 'It is curious to trace the gradual extinction of the Chorus. At first, it was *all*; then, relieved by the intermixture of dialogue, but still *principal*; then, subordinate to the dialogue; then digressive, and *ill connected* with the piece; then borrowed from *other pieces* at pleasure—and so on, to the fiddles and act-tunes, at which Dacier is so angry.'

λέξεως καὶ διανοίας. This is the usual order of the two terms in a 34
the Poetics (v. 6, 1450 a 9, 14, 29 and 24, 1459 b 16). The only instance of the reverse order, which is that of their logical importance (6, 1450 b 12; comp. Rhet. 2. 26, 1403 a 36), is in 24, 1459 b 12 *ἔτι τὰς διανοίας καὶ τὴν λέξιν ἔχειν καλῶς.* For the meaning of *διάνοια* see on 6, 1450 a 6.

κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν: comp. Phys. 4. 14, 222 b 31 *τὸ θᾶττον καὶ* a 36

1456 a 36 *βραδύτερον κατὰ πᾶσάν ἐστι μεταβολήν.* In Bon. Ind. 369 a 28 *κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν* is explained as equivalent to *διανοητικά.*

ὅσα ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου *κτέ.* In the Rhetoric three kinds of speech are recognized, according as the aim of the speaker is (1) to gain the confidence of his audience by creating in their minds a favourable idea of himself and his general credibility; or (2) to work on their feelings; or (3) to convince their reason: Rhet. 1. 2, 1356 a 1 *τῶν δὲ διὰ τοῦ λόγου ποριζομένων πίστεων τρία εἴδη ἐστίν· αἱ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἐν τῷ ἤθει τοῦ λέγοντος, αἱ δὲ ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατὴν διαθεῖναί πως, αἱ δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι ἢ φαίνεσθαι δεικνύναι κτέ.* The present summary notes the second and third of these three *εἴδη*, but ignores the first, though there is certainly nothing to exclude that sort of speech from the rhetoric of Tragedy.

a 38 **πάθη.** The instances *οἷον ἔλεον ἢ φόβον κτέ.* are added, because up to this point *πάθος* has usually meant 'suffering' or 'calamity' (11, 1452 b 11).

b 1 **ἔλεον ἢ φόβον ἢ ὀργὴν ἢ ὅσα τοιαῦτα.** According to Tumlirz (Die tragischen Affecte Mitleid und Furcht nach Aristoteles p. 28) this shows that Aristotle supposes Tragedy to arouse anger and other emotions as well as pity and fear in the mind of the spectators. There is no such reference here to the spectators; the effect meant is that on the hearer on the stage. One might just as well say that the arguments put into the mouth of a personage (*τό τε ἀποδεικνύναι κτέ.*) are addressed to the spectators, and not to some other personage in the play. The rhetoric of the speaker in a tragedy is dramatically directed to the hearer on the stage, i.e. to another of the dramatis personae. When Plato says of Euripides *ἐπίσταται . . . ῥήσεις . . . ποιεῖν . . . οἰκτρὰς καὶ τοὐναντίον αὖ φοβερὰς καὶ ἀπειλητικάς* (Phaedr. 268 C), he does not suppose him to threaten the hearers of his pieces.

μέγεθος καὶ μικρότητα, scil. *παρασκευάζειν.* The clause is an afterthought, as its logical place would be after *τό τε ἀποδεικνύναι καὶ τὸ λύειν.* The corresponding formula in Isocrates 42 C is *τά τε μεγάλα ταπεινὰ ποιῆσαι καὶ τοῖς μικροῖς μέγεθος περιθεῖναι;* and in the Rhetoric *αὔξειν καὶ μειοῦν*: Rhet. 2. 26, 1403 a 20 *τὸ δ' αὔξειν καὶ μειοῦν ἐστιν ἐνθυμήματα πρὸς τὸ δεῖξαι ὅτι μέγα ἢ μικρόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον.* The reading *μικρότητας* is retained by Vahlen, who defends the change of number by quoting (among other instances) De part. an. 4. 5, 679 b 37 *διαφέρει τῇ θέσει καὶ τοῖς μεγέθεσιν.*—680 a 29 *ἐν τῷ ψύχει καὶ ταῖς ἀλέαις.*—Plato Laws 734 A *μεγέθει καὶ πλήθει καὶ πυκνότησιν.*—

779 B ὁμαλότητί τε καὶ ὁμοιότησιν.—860 B πλήθει καὶ μεγέθεσιν. 1456 b 1
It is difficult, however, to explain the change of number with two words so closely related as μέγεθος and μικρότης, and in a formula so technical as the present. The sense also of the plural μικρότητας is obscure, as it does not seem to fall under any of the heads recognized by Bernhardy, Synt. p. 62 or Kühner, Gr. Gr.[3] 2. 1 p. 17.

καὶ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν: comp. 15, 1454 a 18 ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ πρᾶξις. b 2
Aristotle is quite aware that there is a rhetoric of action as well as a rhetoric of words. The διάνοια of the dramatis personae may be shown in their acts; they may do things, just as they say things, with a view to exciting pity, fear, etc., or with a view to creating an idea that something is or is not true, etc.; and whichever mode of expression be used, they have to follow, according to Aristotle, the same method and principles.

ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἰδεῶν δεῖ χρῆσθαι, scil. τῇ διανοίᾳ, or τοῖς τῆς b 3
διανοίας μέρεσιν. For the meaning of ἰδέα see on 7, 1450 b 34. ἀπό denotes here the logical starting-point.

μεγάλα ἢ εἰκότα. Aristotle might have expressed himself more b 4
fully by saying μεγάλα ἢ μικρὰ ἢ εἰκότα ἢ ἀπίθανα (comp. on 18, 1456 a 9).

ἄνευ διδασκαλίας = ἄνευ λόγου, 'sine docentis opera' (Tyrwhitt) b 5
it is explained by what follows, τί γὰρ ἂν εἴη τοῦ λέγοντος ἔργον; The party instructed or informed here is one of the dramatis personae, who learns the mind of another either through some act of his, or through some statement by him in words.

τὰ δὲ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, scil. ἐλεεινά, δεινά, μεγάλα κτέ.

παρὰ τὸν λόγον. For the preposition comp. b 13 and 15, b 6
1454 b 15.

εἰ φαίνοιτο ᾗ δέοι. The traditional εἰ φανοῖτο (which would have b 7
to be taken as equivalent to εἰ μέλλοι φαίνεσθαι) is against the rule laid down by Madvig, Gr. Synt. p. 119 Eng. tr. There is not much to choose between Vahlen's ᾗ δέοι and Castelvetro's ἤδη. ᾗ δέοι, however, is somewhat nearer the manuscript reading ἡδέα, and much more probable than either Tyrwhitt's ἃ δεῖ or Spengel's ἡ διάνοια. It means 'in the required light', i.e. as ἐλεεινά, or δεινά, etc. If things appear of themselves in this light, without the aid of the rhetorical art of the speaker, the speaker is not wanted. The present remark may be compared with that in 6, 1450 b 8 ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἔστι δῆλον κτέ.

τῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν λέξιν. Having briefly considered the διάνοια, b 8
the intellectual or rhetorical power revealed in the speeches of the

1456 b 8 dramatic personages, Aristotle passes on to their λέξις, the diction or language in which they are made to express themselves. This point he investigates under three heads:—(1) the parts or constituents of the diction as a whole; (2) the various kinds of names in it; and (3) the limits within which unusual names or forms of names are admissible in poetry. Before entering on this line of discussion, however, he sets aside a matter which might perhaps seem germane to his subject, the elocutionary element in the spoken language. The word *βαδίζει*, for instance, according to one's tone in uttering it, may mean 'he walks', or 'does he walk?'; and *ἄειδε* may be uttered as a command ('sing!') or as a prayer. These and similar distinctions, in Aristotle's view, belong to the language as spoken rather than to the language as written, and thus come within the province of elocution (*ὑποκριτική*) rather than that of poetry or literature proper.

b 9 **τὰ σχήματα τῆς λέξεως** means literally the different 'attitudes' or turns of meaning given to the language when it comes to be actually spoken. The same idea underlies the expression *σχήματα λέξεως* of the grammarians, as one may see from Cicero Orator 83 *Verborum collocationem illuminat iis luminibus quae Graeci quasi aliquos gestus orationis σχήματα appellant.*—Quintilian 9. 1. 13 *Si habitus quidam et quasi gestus sic* [scil. *σχήματα*] *appellandi sunt.* *σχῆμα* = 'gestus' occurs in 17, 1455 a 29 and 26, 1462 a 3 (comp. 1, 1447 a 27). Aristotle's *σχήματα τῆς λέξεως*, however, must not be identified with the *σχήματα λέξεως* or 'figures of speech', as we call them, of later writers. A 'figure of speech' is a literary artifice, a deviation from the simple and usual mode of expression for purposes of literary effect; Quintilian defines it as a *conformatio quaedam orationis remota a communi et primum se offerente ratione* (9. 1. 4), or as an oratio *a simplici rectoque loquendi genere deflexa* (9. 3. 3; comp. Ernesti, Lex. techn. gr. p. 338). In a 'figure of speech', as compared with the simple form of expression (e.g. 'Macedonia's madman' and 'Alexander'), we have a difference of words without any difference of sense; whereas in the Aristotelian *σχήματα τῆς λέξεως* we have the same words and a different sense—the difference of sense resulting from a difference of some kind in the mode of enunciation.

b 10 **ὑποκριτικῆς.** *ὑπόκρισις*, the Latin *pronunciatio*, means 'delivery' or 'elocution'. In the Rhetoric two styles of oratory are distinguished, the 'graphic' style in which the sense is fully expressed by the actual language, and the 'hypocritic' style, which requires

certain artifices of elocution to bring out the meaning: Rhet. 3. 12, 1413 b 17 τὰ ὑποκριτικὰ ἀφῃρημένης τῆς ὑποκρίσεως οὐ ποιοῦντα τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον φαίνεται εὐήθη, οἷον τά τε ἀσύνδετα καὶ τὸ πολλάκις τὸ αὐτὸ εἰπεῖν ἐν τῇ γραφικῇ ὀρθῶς ἀποδοκιμάζεται, ἐν δὲ ⟨τῇ⟩ ἀγωνιστικῇ καὶ οἱ ῥήτορες χρῶνται· ἔστι γὰρ ὑποκριτικά (comp. 3. 12, 1414 a 5). 1456 b 10

ἀρχιτεκτονικήν. The ἀρχιτέκτων is properly the master-builder, who knows the scheme of the whole work and directs the artisans and others under him: Plato Polit. 259 E ἀρχιτέκτων γε πᾶς οὐκ αὐτὸς ἐργατικὸς ἀλλ' ἐργατῶν ἄρχων . . . παρεχόμενός γέ που γνῶσιν ἀλλ' οὐ χειρουργίαν. Aristotle recognizes a similar distinction in other arts, even in medicine: Pol. 3. 11, 1282 a 3 ἰατρὸς ὅ τε δημιουργὸς καὶ ὁ ἀρχιτεκτονικός. The 'architectonic' form of ὑποκριτική involves a knowledge of its rationale and general principles, as distinct from the empiric knowledge possessed by rhapsodists, actors, orators, and other practicians. b 11

οἷον τί ἐντολὴ κτέ. refers back to τὰ σχήματα τῆς λέξεως in b 9 (comp. on 7, 1451 a 2). The classification in the text originated with Protagoras, who is said to have distinguished four (or perhaps seven) fundamental differences in our mode of speech: Diog. Laert. 9. 53 διεῖλέ τε τὸν λόγον πρῶτος εἰς τέτταρα, εὐχωλὴν ἐρώτησιν ἀπόκρισιν ἐντολήν—οἱ δὲ[1] εἰς ἑπτά, διήγησιν ἐρώτησιν ἀπόκρισιν ἐντολὴν ἀπαγγελίαν εὐχωλὴν κλῆσιν —, οὓς καὶ πυθμένας εἶπε λόγων. —Quintilian 3. 4. 10 *Protagoram transeo, qui interrogandi respondendi mandandi precandi, quod* εὐχωλὴν *dixit, partes solas putat.* It will be seen that Aristotle has arranged the σχήματα in pairs; one kind of speech may be made by a difference of intonation to mean either a command or a prayer, another either a simple statement or a threat, another either a question or an answer, and so forth with the rest. Aristotle's instances may be compared with those in Dion. Hal. 5. 46 R. τὰ μὲν ὡς ἀποφαινόμενοι λέγομεν, τὰ δ' ὡς πυνθανόμενοι, τὰ δ' ὡς εὐχόμενοι, τὰ δ' ὡς ἐπιτάττοντες, τὰ δ' ὡς διαποροῦντες, τὰ δ' ὡς ὑποτιθέμενοι, τὰ δ' ἄλλως πως σχηματίζοντες.

παρὰ γὰρ τὴν τούτων γνῶσιν κτέ. The argument here comes practically to this: That these σχήματα τῆς λέξεως are something outside the art of Poetry itself is shown by the fact that ignorance of them is not one of the usual charges brought by hostile critics against a poet; Protagoras' criticism on the first line of the Iliad may be dismissed as too trivial to deserve attention. b 13

[1] οἱ δέ = οἱ δέ φασιν, 'according to others', as it so often does in the grammarians.

1456 b 14 **ἐπιτίμημα**: see on 25, 1460 b 6.

καὶ ἄξιον: Pol. 2. 11, 1272 b 32 *ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον εἰπεῖν* (comp. Riddell, 'Digest of Idioms' § 132).

b 16 **ἄειδε**. The imperative as such merely expresses a bidding (*κελεύειν*), but a tone of authority may turn it into a command (*ἐπιτάττειν*; comp. Schmidt, Handbuch der lat. u. gr. Synonymik p. 51). Protagoras professed to understand Homer's *ἄειδε* in this dictatorial sense of the imperative, on the assumption that it was to be read as '*ἄειδε*!' Aristotle's answer is that if *ἄειδε* gets this sense, it is through the fault not of the poet but of the reciter. An echo of the criticism ascribed to Protagoras survives in Schol. Ven. A on Il. I. 1, where *ἄειδε* is said to be an instance of the poetic use of the imperative for the optative: *ὅτι κατὰ τὴν ποιητικὴν ἤτοι ἄδειαν ἢ συνήθειαν λαμβάνει* [i. e. Homer] *τὰ προστακτικὰ ἀντὶ εὐκτικῶν*.

b 20 **τῆς δὲ λέξεως** *κτέ*. This whole chapter has been condemned by Ritter and others as an interpolation; and it must be admitted that, according to our notions of the divisions of knowledge, the matter in it belongs to grammar and philology rather than to an Art of Poetry. Aristotle's divisions, however, are not always quite the same as ours, as his relegation of the theory of the simple sounds in language to 'metric' in the De Partibus (2. 16, 660 a 7) is enough to prove. The writer of the chapter takes the same view of the simple sounds, and tells us that they need not be discussed at any length in a book like the Poetics. The main difficulty, accordingly, is in his assumption that in some way or other the other 'parts of speech' come within the scope of a work on poetry. He may perhaps have thought that some analysis of language in general was logically required as a preparation for the theory of poetical language in the next two chapters, which are unquestionably germane to the main subject of the book. And apart from this one has to remember the historical connexion between grammar and poetry in Greek antiquity. Grammar seems to have originated in Greece in the criticism and interpretation of poetry; its relation to poetry was felt and acknowledged even in the time of Dionysius Thrax, who begins his treatise with the definition, *γραμματική ἐστιν ἐμπειρία τῶν παρὰ ποιηταῖς τε καὶ συγγραφεῦσιν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ λεγομένων* (p. 5 Uhlig). That certain matters of grammar come under the cognizance of poetry is implied apparently in De interpr. 4, 17 a 5, when a distinction is made between the logical and the extra-logical

forms of statement: οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι [scil. λόγοι] ἀφείσθωσαν· ῥητορικῆς γὰρ ἡ ποιητικῆς οἰκειοτέρα ἡ σκέψις (comp. Pacius ad loc.). The *a priori* objection, therefore, to this chapter is not quite so conclusive as it might seem at first sight. The chapter itself, whether an original part of the Poetics or not, has more than one mark of date about it. ἄρθρον and πτῶσις have not yet acquired their usual sense of 'article' and 'case'; λόγος still retains its peculiarly Aristotelian meaning, and the definitions of ἄρθρον, σύνδεσμος, ὄνομα and ῥῆμα seem to have been framed with conscious reference to it (see on 1457 a 10); the general terminology and logical forms throughout the chapter are Aristotelian; and there are also several isolated points and allusions which would be wholly unintelligible if it were not for the parallels and illustrations we are able to find in the unquestioned writings of Aristotle. 1456 b 20

ἁπάσης, 'taken as a whole', as opposed to the parts into which it may be divided; comp. Meteor. 4. 1, 379 b 5 ἡ θάλασσα κατὰ μέρος μὲν διαιρουμένη τάχα σήπεται, ἅπασα δ' οὔ.—Plato Theaet. 147 E τὸν ἀριθμὸν πάντα δίχα διελάβομεν.—Gorg. 502 C εἴ τις περιέλοιτο τῆς ποιήσεως πάσης τό τε μέλος κτέ.—Laws 737 E δύο μέρη τοῦ παντὸς ἀριθμοῦ. The Latin *omnis* is used in just the same way in Caesar B. G. 1. 1 *Gallia est omnis divisa in partes tres.*

τὰ μέρη. Aristotle's μέρη τῆς λέξεως is an anticipation of our 'parts of speech'; but the term covers more ground; his list of μέρη comprises three distinct kinds of 'parts': (1) the elements into which words are analyzable (στοιχεῖον and συλλαβή); (2) the various kinds of words (σύνδεσμος, ἄρθρον, etc.); and (3) the λόγος—the actual λέξις being a series of λόγοι. It includes, therefore, all the elements of language in every stage of analysis, from the simplest sounds to the proposition. It is only under the second of the above heads, i.e. in his classification of words, that Aristotle deals with the 'parts of speech' of later grammar. This passage is cited by Ammonius on the De Interpretatione: λόγου μὲν ταῦτα [i.e. articles, conjunctions, etc.] οὐ μέρη, λέξεως δὲ μέρη, ἧς καὶ ὁ λόγος αὐτὸς μέρος, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς Περὶ ποιητικῆς εἴρηται (p. 12 Busse); and there is more than one reference to it in Boethius on the same book: *Aristoteles in libris quos de poetica scripsit locutionis partes esse syllabas vel etiam coniunctiones tradidit* (2, p. 6 Meiser).—*In opere vero de poetica non eodem modo dividit locutionem, sed omnes omnino locutionis partes adposuit, confirmans esse locutionis partes elementa syllabas coniunctiones articulos nomina casus verba*

1456 b 20 *orationes. locutio namque non in solis significativis vocibus constat, sed supergradiens significationes vocum ad articulatos sonos usque consistit* (2, p. 8).

The classification before us which distinguishes words into *σύνδεσμοι, ἄρθρα, ὀνόματα, ῥήματα* and *πτώσεις*, is an advance on that in the lost Aristotelian work known as the *τέχνης τῆς Θεοδέκτου συναγωγή* (fr. 127 Teubn.), which recognized only three kinds of words, *ὀνόματα, ῥήματα*, and *σύνδεσμοι*. This lost book is mentioned by Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Quintilian in their sketches of the history of the 'parts of speech'; but they both ignore the present chapter of the Poetics. The omission, instead of justifying Ritter's athetesis of the chapter, merely shows that the Poetics were but little read in certain periods of antiquity.

b 21 **ἄρθρον**. That the word has to be transposed is shown by the position of the explanation in the following statement about it (1457 a 6).

b 22 **στοιχεῖον**: comp. Metaph. Δ 3, 1014 a 26 *στοιχεῖον λέγεται ἐξ οὗ σύγκειται πρώτου ἐνυπάρχοντος ἀδιαιρέτου τῷ εἴδει εἰς ἄλλο εἶδος· οἷον φωνῆς στοιχεῖα ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται ἡ φωνὴ καὶ εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται ἔσχατα, ἐκεῖνα δὲ μηκέτι εἰς ἄλλας φωνὰς ἑτέρας τῷ εἴδει αὐτῶν. στοιχεῖον* was properly a letter of the alphabet; it was Plato (v. Eudemus ap. Simplic. in Phys. 1 p. 7. 13 Diels) who gave it the philosophical sense of 'element', which it so often has in Aristotle. The present definition shows the influence of the philosophical associations connected with the word; a *στοιχεῖον* is defined as an indivisible voice-sound capable of serving as a constituent, or element, in an intelligible voice-sound (*συνετὴ φωνή*). In thus describing it as a 'sound' Aristotle implicitly distinguishes it from the *γράμμα*, or written symbol which stands for the sound (comp. Metaph. B 4, 1000 a 2); the distinction, however, is very far from being generally observed in Aristotle (see Diels, Elementum p. 33). The two terms are treated as synonyms in Plato Crat. 426 D.

b 23 **συνετή**. The alternative reading *συνθετή* has been accepted by several editors, as also by Steinthal (Gesch. d. Sprachwissenschaft[2] 1 p. 253) and Diels (Elementum p. 33). The main argument in favour of *συνθετή* is that, as defined in b 34, the syllable is a *φωνὴ συνθετή*, and that the syllable is viewed in sundry Aristotelian passages (Bon. Ind. 702 b 39) as a synthesis of *στοιχεῖα*. This is true enough. But it has to be remembered on the other side that Aristotle often speaks of the *στοιχεῖα* as *στοιχεῖα φωνῆς* (Bon. Ind.

702 b 35)—where *φωνή* means the same thing as the *συνετὴ φωνή* 1456 b 23 of the present passage. And if we assume *συνθετή* to be the original reading, the excepting clause (*οὐ πᾶσα δὲ κτέ.*), which puts the 'indivisible sounds' of the brutes into a different category, is irrelevant. Aristotle's argument here seems to be something like this: In the utterances of the brutes there are indivisible sounds, but these 'noises' of theirs are directly significant in themselves (De interpr. 2, 16 a 29); they are not *στοιχεῖα φωνῆς*, because they do not combine as elements to form a *φωνὴ συνετή*. The indivisible sounds, on the other hand, in human speech exist as elements in speech, and they have no meaning in themselves; the meaning in human speech is in the words and propositions —not in the 'elements' which analysis reveals in them (comp. Vahlen, Beitr. 3 p. 220). *φωνὴ συνετή* is perhaps the nearest Aristotelian equivalent for our term 'word'. It may be taken as including not only the *φωνὴ σημαντική*, the word that stands for something, but also the *φωνὴ ἄσημος*—words like *ἀμφί, περί, μέν, δέ*, etc. (Aristotle's *ἄρθρα* and *σύνδεσμοι*), which stand for nothing by themselves, though they have a certain significance in their place in intelligible human speech.

ταύτης δὲ μέρη *κτέ.*: Plato Crat. 424 C *ἆρ᾽ οὖν καὶ ἡμᾶς οὕτω δεῖ* b 25 *πρῶτον μὲν τὰ φωνήεντα διελέσθαι, ἔπειτα τῶν ἑτέρων κατὰ εἴδη τά τε ἄφωνα καὶ ἄφθογγα· οὑτωσὶ γάρ που λέγουσιν οἱ δεινοὶ περὶ τούτων· καὶ τὰ αὖ φωνήεντα μὲν οὔ, οὐ μέντοι γε ἄφθογγα*;—Phil. 18 B *ἐπειδὴ φωνὴν ἄπειρον κατενόησεν εἴτε τις θεὸς εἴτε καὶ θεῖος ἄνθρωπος, ὡς λόγος ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ Θεὺθ τινα τοῦτον γενέσθαι λέγων, ὃς πρῶτος τὰ φωνήεντα ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ κατενόησεν οὐχ ἓν ὄντα ἀλλὰ πλείω, καὶ πάλιν ἕτερα φωνῆς μὲν οὔ, φθόγγου δὲ μετέχοντά τινος, ἀριθμὸν δέ τινα καὶ τούτων εἶναι· τρίτον δὲ εἶδος γραμμάτων διεστήσατο τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα ἄφωνα ἡμῖν· τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο διῄρει τά τε ἄφθογγα καὶ ἄφωνα μέχρι ἑνὸς ἑκάστου, καὶ τὰ φωνήεντα καὶ τὰ μέσα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἕως ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν λαβὼν ἑνί τε ἑκάστῳ καὶ ξύμπασι στοιχεῖον ἐπωνόμασεν.* Here Plato's *μέσα* are Aristotle's *ἡμίφωνα*. In later theory the *ἡμίφωνα* and *ἄφωνα* of Aristotle come under the more general designation of 'consonants', *σύμφωνα*: Sextus Emp. Adv. math. 1. 100 *τὰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν* [scil. *τῶν στοιχείων*] *φωνάεντα προσαγορεύουσι τὰ δὲ σύμφωνα, καὶ φωνάεντα μὲν ἑπτά, α ε η ι ο υ ω, σύμφωνα δὲ τὰ λοιπά . . .* 102 *τῶν δὲ συμφώνων τὰ μὲν ἡμίφωνά ἐστι κατ᾽ αὐτοὺς τὰ δὲ ἄφωνα.*

φωνῆεν. The word had been already used by Euripides, fr. 578 ed. Nauck[2] *ἄφωνα φωνήεντα συλλαβὰς τιθεὶς ἐξηῦρον ἀνθρώποισι*

1456 b 25 *γράμματ' εἰδέναι.* It may be observed that both Plato (Theaet. 203 B) and Aristotle (Metaph. N 6, 1093 a 13) recognize the vowels as being seven in number.

b 26 **ἄνευ προσβολῆς**: the opposite of *μετὰ προσβολῆς* in the next line. The difference between the vowels and consonants is that the latter imply a certain *προσβολή* as the condition of their becoming audible, whereas no such *προσβολή* is required to make the vowels audible. The sense of the word *προσβολή* as here used is far from clear. It has been taken to mean *additio* (Valla), *adiectio* (Paccius), *ictus* (Victorius), *percussio* (Robortello), and *allisus* (Goulston); Castelvetro, who renders it by *percossa*, confesses that he does not know what it means. The idea of most interpreters is that the term refers in some way or other to the physical mechanism of speech; to the impact of the tongue, for instance, on the parts within the mouth, or something of that sort. Twining, who translates it by *articulation* (with Batteux), tells us in a note that it is 'literally *percussion*: i. e. of the tongue against the palate or teeth, the lips against the teeth or against each other, and all other modes of consonant articulation'. In support of this physiological interpretation Vahlen (Beitr. 3 p. 224) quotes De part. an. 2. 16, 660 a 2 *ὁ λόγος ὁ διὰ τῆς φωνῆς ἐκ τῶν γραμμάτων σύγκειται, τῆς δὲ γλώττης μὴ τοιαύτης οὔσης μηδὲ τῶν χειλῶν ὑγρῶν οὐκ ἂν ἦν φθέγγεσθαι τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν γραμμάτων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῆς γλώττης εἰσὶ προσβολαί, τὰ δὲ συμβολαὶ τῶν χειλῶν*; and argues to show that *προσβολή* may be used here in a sense wide enough to include the *συμβολὴ τῶν χειλῶν*, as well as the *προσβολὴ τῆς γλώττης*, of the De Partibus. This view, however, is open to more than one objection. (1) It is hard to see how, in the absence of some explanation in the context, *προσβολή* can stand for *προσβολὴ γλώττης*, or can be taken to include the notion of *συμβολὴ χειλῶν*. (2) Such a reference to the physiology of articulation would be out of place in the definition; the differences in the mechanism of articulation are a separate point, which Aristotle recognizes apparently for the first time in another section further on in the chapter (b 31 *ταῦτα δὲ διαφέρει σχήμασί τε τοῦ στόματος καὶ τόποις*). I think that Valla was probably right in taking *προσβολή* in the sense of *additio* or *adiectio*, i.e. as equivalent to *προσθήκη*—the word actually used by Lucian in a very similar context to mark the distinction between the vowels and semivowels (Iud. Voc. 5, 88 R.). It may be observed, too, that *προσβάλλειν* and *προστιθέναι* are synonyms in Antiphanes fr. 206 Kock. The general

sense, then, according to this view of *προσβολή*, will be that the vowels are audible by themselves (*ἄνευ προσβολῆς*); whereas the semivowels and mutes (the consonants) require the support or addition of a vowel (*μετὰ προσβολῆς*) to make them audible. This was certainly the distinction in later grammar: Dionysius Thrax p. 11 Uhlig *σύμφωνα δὲ λέγονται ὅτι αὐτὰ μὲν καθ' ἑαυτὰ φωνὴν οὐκ ἔχει, συντασσόμενα δὲ μετὰ τῶν φωνηέντων φωνὴν ἀποτελεῖ.*—Sextus Emp. Adv. math. 1. 102 *ἄφωνα δέ ἐστι τὰ . . . μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων συνεκφωνούμενα.*—Diomedes 418 P. *mutae dictae quod per se sine adminiculo vocalium non possunt enuntiari.* 1456 b 26

ἡμίφωνον: Aristoxenus (quoted below).—Dionysius Thrax p. 12 Uhlig *ἡμίφωνα δὲ λέγεται [ὅτι] παρόσον ἧττον τῶν φωνηέντων εὔφωνα καθέστηκεν ἔν τε τοῖς μυγμοῖς καὶ σιγμοῖς.*—Sextus Emp. Adv. math. 1. 102 *ἡμίφωνα μὲν ὅσα δι' αὐτῶν ῥοῖζον ἢ σιγμὸν ἢ μυγμὸν ἤ τινα παραπλήσιον ἦχον κατὰ τὴν ἐκφώνησιν ἀποτελεῖν πεφυκότα.*—Diomedes 416 P. *Semivocales dictae quod dimidium eius potestatis habent: etenim per se enuntiantur, sed per se nec syllabam nec plenam vocem faciunt.* Plato only knows the semivowels as *τὰ μέσα* (v. supra on b 24). b 27

ἔχον φωνὴν ἀκουστήν. Apart from the vowels the semivowels have some sort of sound as noises, not a distinctly audible voice-sound (*φωνὴ ἀκουστή*) like the vowels; this it is that distinguishes them from the mutes, which have no sound at all by themselves. Comp. Plato Theaet. 203 B *τό τε σῖγμα τῶν ἀφώνων ἐστί, ψόφος τις μόνον οἷον συριττούσης τῆς γλώττης· τοῦ δ' αὖ βῆτα οὔτε φωνὴ οὔτε ψόφος, οὐδὲ τῶν πλείστων στοιχείων.*—Aristoxenus ap. Dion. Hal. 5 p. 72 R. *τῶν μὴ φωνηέντων ἃ μὲν καθ' ἑαυτὰ ψόφους ὁποίους δή τινας ἀποτελεῖν πέφυκε, ῥοῖζον ἢ σιγμὸν ἢ μυγμὸν ἢ τοιούτων τινῶν ἄλλων ἤχων δηλωτικούς, ἃ δέ ἐστιν ἁπάσης ἄμοιρα φωνῆς καὶ ψόφου, καὶ οὐχ οἷά τε ἠχεῖσθαι καθ' ἑαυτά· διὸ δὴ ταῦτα μὲν ἄφωνά τινες ἐκάλεσαν, θάτερα δὲ ἡμίφωνα.*

ἄφωνον. In the definition *μετὰ προσβολῆς* serves to distinguish the mute from the vowel; the idea of it, however, is repeated in a more explicit form in *μετὰ τῶν ἐχόντων τινὰ φωνήν.* The expression *τῶν ἐχόντων τινὰ φωνήν* is wide enough to include the semivowels as well as the vowels. The semivowels are audible by themselves, though only as noises (comp. Plato Phileb. 18 C *ἕτερα φωνῆς μὲν οὔ, φθόγγου δὲ μετέχοντά τινος*); and a semivowel is sufficient to make a mute audible, though only as a noise—not as a *φωνὴ ἀκουστή.* Aristotle carefully chooses his words, therefore, in saying *γινόμενον ἀκουστόν*; since *ἔχον φωνὴν ἀκουστήν*, 'with b 28

1456 b 28 an audible voice-sound', would have been true only of the combination of a mute and a vowel.

b 31 **ταῦτα δὲ διαφέρει.** Of the five differences here noted the first and second relate to the physiological mechanism of speech; the remainder come under the head of *προσῳδία*—a term which with the ancients included breathing and accent, as well as quantity (see on 25, 1461 a 22).

σχήμασίν τε τοῦ στόματος καὶ τόποις. Plato (Tim. 75 D) is aware of the function of the teeth, lips, and tongue in the formation of speech, and has also described (Crat. 426 E) the various movements of the tongue in the utterance of certain letters (comp. Xenophon Mem. I. 4, 12). From Alexander's comment on Metaph. N 6, 1093 a 23 (p. 883 Hayduck) we learn that these points in the physiology of speech had long before this engaged the attention of Archinus, the statesman to whom Athens owed the introduction of the Ionic alphabet in 403 (see Usener, Rh. Mus. 25 p. 591).

For the *σχήματα τοῦ στόματος* comp. De audib. 800 a 16 *ἀναπνέομεν δὲ τὸν μὲν ἀέρα πάντες τὸν αὐτόν, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα καὶ τὰς φωνὰς ἐκπέμπομεν ἀλλοίας διὰ τὰς τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀγγείων διαφοράς . . . ταῦτα δέ ἐστιν ἥ τε ἀρτηρία* [i. e. wind-pipe] *καὶ ὁ πνεύμων καὶ τὸ στόμα. πλείστην μὲν οὖν διαφορὰν ἀπεργάζονται τῆς φωνῆς αἵ τε τοῦ ἀέρος πληγαὶ καὶ οἱ τοῦ στόματος σχηματισμοί.*

For the *τόποι τοῦ στόματος* as factors in articulation see more especially H. A. 4. 9, 535 a 28; De part. an. 2. 16, 660 a 1; 3. 1, 661 b 14; and Metaph. N 6, 1093 a 23 (with Alexander's note).

b 32 **δασύτητι καὶ ψιλότητι . . . καὶ τῷ μέσῳ.** The *καὶ τῷ μέσῳ* in the next line belongs equally to each of the three pairs of opposites, and not merely to the last of them.

The meaning of *δασύτης* and *ψιλότης* in speech may be seen from De audib. 804 b 8 *δασεῖαι δ' εἰσὶ τῶν φωνῶν ὅσαις ἔσωθεν τὸ πνεῦμα εὐθέως συνεκβάλλομεν μετὰ τῶν φθόγγων, ψιλαὶ δ' εἰσὶ τοὐναντίον ὅσαι γίνονται χωρὶς τῆς τοῦ πνεύματος ἐκβολῆς*; and from Dion. Hal. 5 p. 85 R. *ταῦτα* [i. e. *τὰ ψιλά*] *μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἑαυτῶν δύναμιν ἔχει μόνην, τὰ δὲ δασέα καὶ τὴν τοῦ πνεύματος προσθήκην. ψιλός*, 'without addition' (see on 1, 1447 a 29), means in this connexion 'without aspiration'. The threefold distinction in the text, as applied to the mutes, passed on to the grammarians, and became an accepted part of grammar (comp. Dion. Thrax p. 12 *τούτων* [scil. *τῶν ἀφώνων*] *ψιλὰ μὲν τρία, κ̄ π̄ τ̄, δασέα δὲ τρία, θ̄ φ̄ χ̄, μέσα δὲ τούτων τρία, β̄ γ̄ δ̄· μέσα δὲ εἴρηται ὅτι τῶν μὲν ψιλῶν ἐστι δασύτερα, τῶν δὲ δασέων ψιλότερα*, and Priscian 549 P.); and it still appears in our familiar

division of mutes into *aspiratae, mediae,* and *tenues*—where the **1456 b 32**
tenues represent the ψιλά of the Greeks.[1]

μήκει καὶ βραχύτητι. The intermediates (μέσα) in quantity are the three dichronous vowels α, ι, υ: Dion. Thrax p. 10 *τῶν δὲ φωνηέντων μακρὰ μέν ἐστι δύο, η̄ καὶ ω̄, βραχέα δὲ δύο, ε̄ καὶ ο̄, δίχρονα δὲ τρία, ᾱ ῑ ῡ· δίχρονα δὲ λέγεται, ἐπεὶ ἐκτείνεται καὶ συστέλλεται.*—Sextus Emp. Adv. math. 1. 100 *τῶν δὲ φωνηέντων τρεῖς λέγουσι διαφοράς· δύο μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν φύσει μακρὰ λέγουσι τυγχάνειν, τὸ η̄ καὶ τὸ ω̄, ἰσάριθμα δὲ βραχέα, τὸ ε̄ καὶ τὸ ο̄, τρία δὲ κοινὰ μήκους τε καὶ βραχύτητος, ᾱ ῑ ῡ, ἅπερ δίχρονα καὶ ὑγρὰ καὶ ἀμφίβολα καὶ μεταβολικὰ καλοῦσιν· ἕκαστον γὰρ αὐτῶν πέφυκεν ὁτὲ μὲν ἐκτείνεσθαι ὁτὲ δὲ συστέλλεσθαι* (comp. Dion. Hal. 5 p. 74 R., and Aulus Gellius 16. 18. 5).

ὀξύτητι καὶ βαρύτητι. A third kind of difference is to be seen **b 33**
in the differences of accent. Accent with Aristotle is a part of προσῳδία (see on b 31), but he has no special name for it; the word τόνος in Rhet. 3. 1, 1403 b 29 relates to the tone or key in which something may be said, and not, as is sometimes supposed (e. g. by Cope), to the syllabic accent in words. Aristotle's intermediate accent is clearly that conventionally indicated by a circumflex, as standing between the acute and grave, and having thus something of the nature of both. This was the received view of the phonetic value of the 'circumflex' in antiquity, though the names by which it was known referred to the form of the mark rather than the nature of the accent itself; comp. the pseudo-Sergius, 4 p. 531 Keil *Ammonius Alexandrius qui Aristarchi scholae successit* ὀξύβαρυν *vocat, Ephorus autem Cymaeus* περίσπασιν, *Dionysius Olympius* [read: *Olynthius*] δίτονον, *Hermocrates Iasius* σύμπλεκτον, *Epicharmus Syracusius* κεκλασμένην; *verum ea nunc ab omnibus* περισπωμένη *Graece vocatur, apud nos flexa, quoniam primo erecta rursus in gravem flectitur.* For further illustrations of the notion of the circumflex in antiquity see Nauck, Aristophanis Byz. fragmenta p. 13, and Wilmanns, De Varronis libris grammaticis p. 187. It is to be observed that (like Plato Crat. 399 A) Aristotle ignores the circumflex in the passage in Soph. el. 23, 179 a 14 *εἰ παρὰ προσῳδίαν ὀξεῖαν* [scil. *ὁ λόγος ἐστί*], *ἡ βαρεῖα προσῳδία λύσις,*

[1] This technical use of *tenuis* may be traced back to Lascaris, who naturalized it among the moderns; but it is not easy to see how Lascaris came by it. He may possibly have remembered the language of the pseudo-Sergius 4 p. 526 Keil: *Crassitudo* [i. e. δασύτης] *in spiritu est . . . nam omnes voces aut aspirando facimus pinguiores aut sine aspiratu pronuntiando tenuiores.*]

1456 b 33 εἰ δὲ παρὰ βαρεῖαν, ἡ ὀξεῖα, and speaks as though the only substantial difference in accent were that between acute and grave. His view of it in fact was probably very like that ascribed to the Peripatetic Athenodorus in the pseudo-Sergius, 4 p. 529 Keil *Athenodorus duas esse prosodias putavit, unam inferiorem, alteram superiorem; flexam autem* (*nam ita nostra lingua* περισπωμένην *vocamus*) *nihil aliud esse quam has duas in una syllaba.*

b 34 [ἐν] **τοῖς μετρικοῖς**: comp. infra b 38. The preposition has to be bracketed, as there is no hint of a book on metre, actual or contemplated, by Aristotle himself (comp. Bergk, Kl. Schr. 2 p. 753). He leaves the subject to the μετρικοί, just as he does in the parallel in De part. an. 2. 16, 660 a 7 ποίας δὲ ταῦτα [scil. τὰ γράμματα] καί πόσας καὶ τίνας ἔχει διαφοράς, δεῖ πυνθάνεσθαι παρὰ τῶν μετρικῶν. The theory of metre, in its primitive form, took cognizance of many matters which we should relegate to grammar or phonology. It started, like grammar, with the στοιχεῖα or elementary sounds in language (Longinus Prol. in Hephaest. p. 142 Gaisf. τοῦ περὶ μέτρων λόγου πολλοὶ πολλαχῶς ἤρξαντο, οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ στοιχείων, ὡς Φιλόξενος); and, as the passage in the De Partibus intimates (comp. Dion. Hal. 5 p. 74 R.), it dealt with the whole question of the number and nature of these elements.

συλλαβή. As here defined a συλλαβή is a combination of a mute and a 'letter with a sound', i. e. either a vowel or a semivowel (see on b 28), to make the mute audible. An instance of the first combination is ΒΑ (see Metaph. Z 17, 1041 b 13); of the second ΓΡ (comp. Metaph. N 6, 1093 a 22), where the Γ becomes audible at any rate as part of a complex 'noise'. In the further combination ΓΡΑ we have an articulate, as well as an audible, sound—a φωνὴ ἀκουστή, not a mere ἀκουστόν. Aristotle, however, does not stop to note the difference. The meaning given to συλλαβή in the Aristotelian definition is apparently the proper technical sense of the term: Dionysius Thrax p. 16 Uhlig συλλαβή ἐστι κυρίως σύλληψις συμφώνων μετὰ φωνήεντος ἢ φωνηέντων, οἷον κ̅α̅ρ̅, βοῦς· καταχρηστικῶς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐξ ἑνὸς φωνήεντος, οἷον ᾱ, η̄ (see also Charisius 2 P., and Marius Victorinus 2470–5 P.). In ordinary speech, however, the term was often used to denote the units of sound or 'syllables' (as we say) into which a word, a foot, or a verse is divisible. Plato, for intance, speaks of ΣΩ as the 'first syllable' in *Socrates* (Theaet. 203 c), and of words as 'made up of syllables' (Crat. 424 E συλλαβὰς συντιθέντες, ἐξ ὧν τά τε ὀνόματα καὶ τὰ ῥήματα συντίθενται); words also like ἐῶ and ἤια etc. were said to

be disyllables, trisyllables, etc. Aristotle has lapsed into this use of the term even in the Poetics, in 21, 1458 a 2, where the α in Πηληιάδεω is regarded as a *συλλαβὴ ἐμβεβλημένη* (see note on the passage); and it is by no means uncommon in other Aristotelian writings; see Cat. 6, 4 b 33; De interpr. 4, 16 b 31; De gen. an. 1. 18, 722 a 32; Metaph. N 6, 1093 b 1; Rhet. 3. 2, 1405 a 31 (comp. Bon. Ind. 710 b 45; and for the general history of the term Schmidt, Beiträge zur Gesch. der Grammatik p. 126). 1456 b 34

It is to be observed that Aristotle ignores the *φωναὶ συνθεταί* called diphthongs; for the ancient view of them see Blass, Aussprache[3] p. 20.

φωνὴν ἔχοντος includes the semivowel as well as the vowel (see on b 28). b 35

καὶ γὰρ τὸ ΓΡ ἄνευ τοῦ Α = *τὸ γὰρ* ΓΡ *καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ* Α. b 36

τῆς μετρικῆς: see on b 34. As the foot is made up of syllables, the theory of the *συλλαβή* belonged to metre just as much as to grammar: Aristides Quintil. 1. 20, p. 28 Jahn *ἀρχὴ μὲν οὖν ἡ τῆς μετρικῆς ὁ περὶ στοιχείων λόγος, εἶθ' ὁ περὶ συλλαβῆς, εἶθ' ὁ περὶ ποδῶν, εἶθ' οὕτως ὁ περὶ μέτρων.*—Longinus Prol. in Heph. p. 142 Gaisf. *τοῦ δὲ περὶ μέτρων λόγου πολλοὶ πολλαχῶς ἤρξαντο, οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ στοιχείων, ὡς Φιλόξενος, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ μέτρων ὅρου, ὡς Ἡλιόδωρος, ἡμεῖς δὲ Ἡφαιστίωνι κατακολουθήσομεν ἀπὸ συλλαβῆς ἀρξάμενοι.* By *τούτων τὰς διαφοράς* Aristotle probably meant not only the familiar distinction of syllables into long and short, but also the finer differences the ancient theory of rhythmic recognized in the times of syllables, when the time of the consonant or consonants in them is taken into account (v. Kühner, Gr. Gr.[3] 1. 1 p. 300). b 38

σύνδεσμος. The traditional text of this and the following section (that on the *ἄρθρον*) is confessedly corrupt. Twining finds a good deal of it unintelligible (comp. Steinthal, Gesch. der Sprachwissenschaft[2] 1 p. 263); and Vahlen, besides bracketing *ἡ φωνὴ—μέσον* in 1457 a 8–10, has to assume two lacunas, one after *συντίθεσθαι* in 1457 a 2, and another after *δηλοῖ* in 1457 a 7.

At this point Aristotle passes from the constituents of words (letters and syllables) to actual words; and he begins by noting this distinction: some words are *φωναὶ ἄσημοι*, and others *φωναὶ σημαντικαί*; these latter being the nouns and verbs in language, which have a meaning of their own and stand for something even when uttered by themselves. The *σύνδεσμοι* and *ἄρθρα*, however, are said to be *φωναὶ ἄσημοι*; i. e. they convey no meaning when

1456 b 38 uttered by themselves. If we may provisionally take them to represent in some way the little connexive words in language, the question arises as to the nature of the two kinds of connexives and the distinction Aristotle wished to draw between them. It will be observed that he describes them by reference to their position and function in the complex *φωνὴ σημαντική*, called a *λόγος* a little further on in the chapter (1457 a 23). It is necessary, therefore, to go back to his idea of *λόγος*, and consider the various forms of *λόγοι* which he either recognizes or may be presumed to have recognized. *λόγος* in the present sense of the term has no exact English equivalent, though 'speech', 'discourse', or 'phrase' is sometimes conventionally made to stand for it. According to the definition in 1457 a 23 it is a significant combination of significant words, e.g. of two (or more) nouns, or verbs (including what Aristotle would call their *πτώσεις*), or of a verb and a noun, or of a noun and a verb. A *λόγος*, in Aristotle's sense of the term, does not necessarily involve predication. The instance he gives in 1457 a 25 of a non-predicative *λόγος* is a definition, that of 'man', e.g. *ζῷον πεζὸν δίπουν*—where the combination of the three nouns is equivalent to 'man', and may replace it as one of the terms of a proposition. This form of *λόγος* is the *λόγος ὀνοματώδης* of An. post. 2. 10, 93 b 31. Under this same head we may include certain other forms of expression, e. g. *βαδίζει χαίρων* (a combination of two verbs), and *οἰκοῦσι νῆσον* (a verb + a noun). A more complex instance of the same type would be a combination like *οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι*, where the terms are combined into one by the copulative, and *οἰκοῦσι περὶ δυσμάς*, where the terms are hyphened together by the preposition[1] (comp. Hartung, Lehren der Alten über die Dichtkunst p. 284). The other form of *λόγος* is that which involves predication—the *λόγος ἀποφαντικός* of the De Interpretatione (4. 17 a 2 seqq.). If we may work out the hint in De Interpretatione 5, 17 a 20, we may divide the *λόγοι* of this description into two kinds, the simple and the composite, and take the example in 1457 a 28, *Κλέων βαδίζει*, as the type of the simple predicational *λόγος*. It is not so easy to find an Aristotelian instance of the composite predicational *λόγος*; but its nature is indicated in general terms in the passage in the De Interpretatione: it consists of two or more simple predicational *λόγοι* combined in some way or

[1] With the Stoic grammarians the prepositions were classed originally under the *σύνδεσμοι*, and afterwards distinguished from the others as *προθετικοὶ σύνδεσμοι*.

other into one single λόγος. How, then, and by means of what kinds of words is this combination effected? The De Interpretatione ignores this question. We may perhaps supply the omission, however, by reflecting for a moment on the structure of complex sentences and observing the different relations of the parts or members to the whole. In some instances the simple λόγοι ἀποφαντικοί are merely co-ordinated, and held together by copulative or similar conjunctions, as in Κλέων βαδίζει καὶ Σωκράτης κάθηται, Κλέων μὲν βαδίζει Σωκράτης δὲ κάθηται, Κλέων βαδίζει ἀλλὰ Σωκράτης κάθηται (comp. συνδέσμῳ εἷς in 1457 a 30); in others they are subordinated to one another, and form a sort of organic whole knit into one by words which indicate relation and interdependence. This last point in the theory of the λόγος would have to be recognized in any grammatical analysis of the sentence and its construction. I venture to suggest that it may have been actually present in Aristotle's mind at the time of framing his definitions of σύνδεσμος and ἄρθρον, and that it is to be found in the text, if it be permissible to restore it in some such way as this:— 1456 b 38

σύνδεσμος δέ ἐστι φωνὴ ἄσημος, ἣ οὔτε κωλύει οὔτε ποιεῖ φωνὴν μίαν σημαντικὴν ἐκ πλειόνων φωνῶν πεφυκυῖαν συντίθεσθαι [καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου], ἣν μὴ ἁρμόττει ἐν ἀρχῇ λόγου τιθέναι καθ' αὑτόν, οἷον μέν, δή, τοί, δέ. ἢ φωνὴ ἄσημος ἣ ἐκ πλειόνων μὲν φωνῶν μιᾶς σημαντικῶν δὲ ποιεῖν πέφυκε μίαν σημαντικὴν φωνήν, ⟨οἷον τὸ ἀμφί καὶ τὸ περί καὶ τὰ ἄλλα⟩. ἄρθρον δ' ἐστὶ φωνὴ ἄσημος, ἣ λόγου ἀρχὴν ἢ τέλος ἢ διορισμὸν δηλοῖ [οἷον τὸ ἀμφί καὶ τὸ περί καὶ τὰ ἄλλα. ἢ φωνὴ ἄσημος ἣ οὔτε κωλύει οὔτε ποιεῖ φωνὴν μίαν σημαντικὴν ἐκ πλειόνων φωνῶν], πεφυκυῖα τίθεσθαι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου.

The words bracketed after συντίθεσθαι in l. 2 I suppose to be a repetition in the wrong place of those after τίθεσθαι in l. 9; and the clause ἢ φωνὴ—φωνῶν in ll. 8–9 to have come in through a repetition of the beginning of the definition of σύνδεσμος in l. 1 (comp. Düntzer, Rettung d. aristotelischen Poetik p. 194). It will be seen also that the illustration οἷον τὸ ἀμφί—τὰ ἄλλα is assumed to be out of place where it stands, and is transferred to l. 6, so as to form part of the second definition of σύνδεσμος—a view which has been anticipated by Hartung. Two kinds of σύνδεσμοι, then, are recognized in the text as amended. The first is said to consist of the connexive words whose presence in a λόγος does not affect

1456 b 38 the coherence of the terms. There is no difficulty in illustrating this point; if Κλέων and βαδίζει are combinable terms, the combination of them in the proposition Κλέων βαδίζει is neither hindered nor helped by the insertion after the first word of a μέν, a δέ, a δή, or a τοί. Little words of this description are what the grammarians called 'expletives'. Though they stand at the beginning of the λόγος, they are not an integral part of it; they belong to it not *per se* (καθ' αὑτόν), but *per accidens*, and only serve to indicate a relation to some other λόγος before or after it. In contradistinction to these Aristotle recognizes a second species of σύνδεσμος (l. 4), one that is a real and constitutive part of the λόγος into which it enters. This function, as I have endeavoured to show above, in the general survey of the possible forms of λόγοι, is fulfilled by the prepositions and the copulative conjunctions. Aristotle's σύνδεσμος, therefore, whatever else it may signify, may be taken to include the preposition, the copulative conjunction, and also certain particles. The sense of the word ἄρθρον is more difficult to determine owing to the absence of examples to illustrate its meaning. The term must clearly denote a particular kind of connexive required for a particular kind of λόγος. The kind of λόγος Aristotle had in mind may perhaps be inferred from the fact that the ἄρθρον in it is said to indicate the beginning, or end, or dividing-point in its structure. Such a λόγος may be assumed to be a composite proposition, and moreover one of a more complex form than that in Κλέων βαδίζει καὶ Σωκράτης κάθηται and the like. The two constituent propositions in it are either intimately connected by being related in such a way that the one is the beginning and the other the end of the whole; or they are in some way divided or separated one from the other. With this we may compare the definition of the 'period' in Rhet. 3. 9, 1409 a 35 λέγω δὲ περίοδον λέξιν ἔχουσαν ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν αὐτὴν καθ' αὑτὴν καὶ μέγεθος εὐσύνοπτον. As a conjectural interpretation of this statement it may be suggested (1) that the ἄρθρα which mark the beginning of the proposition represent the conditional and causal conjunctions, together with the relative pronouns and adverbs; (2) that those marking the end are the final and illative conjunctions; and (3) those marking the separation or division in the proposition, the disjunctives. The kinds of proposition which involve the use of such words as these are ignored in Aristotle's logical writings, but it seems to me that he may very well have had something to say of them in an analysis like that

in the present chapter of the forms and constituents of ordinary speech. I am not unaware of the lacunas that may be found in this interpretation of the Aristotelian ἄρθρον. It must be taken for what it is worth, and with many allowances, as an attempt to recover the rough draft of an all but lost chapter of early grammar. For a discussion of the textual and other difficulties in these two sections I may refer to Vahlen's Beiträge, 3 p. 229 and 306, and Schömann's Animadversiones ad veterum grammaticorum doctrinam de articulo (Jahrb. f. class. Philol. Suppl.-Bd. V p. 5). 1456 b 38

Both σύνδεσμος and ἄρθρον were terms taken by grammar from anatomy (see on 7, 1450 b 34); the former is properly a 'ligament', and the latter a 'joint'. The language in the text as to the function of the ἄρθρον or joint-word, ἢ λόγου ἀρχὴν ἢ τέλος . . . δηλοῖ, recalls that in the passage in De anima 3. 10, 433 b 21, which describes the physical joint as the means of locomotion in the animal: τὸ δὲ κινοῦν ὀργανικῶς, ὅπου ἀρχὴ καὶ τελευτὴ τὸ αὐτό, οἷον ὁ γιγγλυμός· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ κοῖλον τὸ μὲν τελευτὴ τὸ δ' ἀρχή (διὸ τὸ μὲν ἠρεμεῖ τὸ δὲ κινεῖται), λόγῳ μὲν ἕτερα ὄντα μεγέθει δ' ἀχώριστα (comp. J. of Phil. 17 p. 64). The joint-word in grammar, therefore, would naturally imply a more structural and organic connexion than is to be found when the λόγοι are simply strung together by σύνδεσμοι. I should add that the instances of σύνδεσμοι in Rhet. 3. 5, 1407 a 20 are μέν and δή, together with γάρ, τέ, καί, and apparently ἐπεί [? ἔτι]; and that a distinction not unlike that in the text betwen the two kinds of σύνδεσμοι is implied in Probl. 16. 20, 919 a 22 ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἐνίων ἐξαιρεθέντων συνδέσμων οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ λόγος Ἑλληνικός, οἷον τὸ τέ καὶ τὸ καί, ἔνιοι δὲ οὐθὲν λυποῦσι διὰ τὸ τοῖς μὲν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι χρῆσθαι πολλάκις, εἰ ἔσται λόγος, τοῖς δὲ μή.

κωλύει, scil. ποιεῖσθαι. 1457 a 1

φωνῶν: i.e. φωνῶν σημαντικῶν. a 2

λόγου. The term is explained in a 23. Aristotle is using it without explanation, as though it were a familiar and well-understood word. Just before this (in a 1) he employed the periphrasis φωνὴ μία σημαντική in lieu of it. a 3

καθ' αὑτόν is to be taken with λόγου (comp. Top. 8. 11, 161 b 19). The λόγος as such is tacitly distinguished from the λόγος as brought into relation with some other λόγος by the insertion of a word which is no integral part of it *per se*. καθ' αὑτό is the opposite of πρὸς ἕτερον or κατὰ συμβεβηκός (Bon. Ind. 212 a 3).

διορισμός seems to mean here 'separation' or 'disjunction', a a 7

1457 a 7 metaphorical extension of the sense it has in the De Partibus: 3. 10, 672 b 14 *τοῦ διορισμοῦ χάριν ἐστὶ* (scil. *τὸ διάζωμα*) *τοῦ τε περὶ τὴν κοιλίαν τόπου καὶ τοῦ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν.*

a 9 **πεφυκυῖα τίθεσθαι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου** does not necessarily mean any more than this, that some of the *ἄρθρα* have one and others another of these three possible places in the complex form of *λόγος*. *πεφυκυῖα τίθεσθαι* implies that the rule is general and not always observed in practice.

a 10 **ὄνομα.** In this definition *συνθετή* differentiates the *ὄνομα* from the *στοιχεῖον*, *σημαντική* from the *ἄρθρον* and *σύνδεσμος*, *ἄνευ χρόνου* from the *ῥῆμα*, and what remains (*ἧς μέρος οὐδὲν κτέ.*) from the *λόγος*. In a *λόγος* (e. g. *ζῷον πεζὸν δίπουν*, or *Κλέων βαδίζει*) the parts retain their several meanings; whereas in an *ὄνομα*, if the parts happen to have a meaning, it is lost in the word into which they enter; *Θεόδωρος* for instance denotes a certain man, not a kind of gift: De interpr. 2, 16 a 19 *ὄνομα μὲν οὖν ἐστι φωνὴ σημαντικὴ κατὰ συνθήκην ἄνευ χρόνου, ἧς μηδὲν μέρος ἐστὶ σημαντικὸν κεχωρισμένον· ἐν γὰρ τῷ Κάλλιππος τὸ ἵππος οὐδὲν αὐτὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ σημαίνει, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ καλὸς ἵππος.*

The general term *ὄνομα* must be taken to include not only the nouns, but also the adjectives, the personal and demonstrative pronouns, and possibly even the article as a kind of pronoun—in fact all the declinable parts of speech except perhaps the relatives, which may have been classed among the *ἄρθρα*. A verb also apart from a subject, as a mere name for an action, may be called an *ὄνομα*, as it is for instance in 21, 1457 b 25; 22, 1458 b 20; 25, 1461 a 31; comp. De interpr. 3, 16 b 19 *αὐτὰ μὲν οὖν καθ' ἑαυτὰ λεγόμενα ὀνόματά ἐστι* [scil. *τὰ ῥήματα*] *καὶ σημαίνει τι* (*ἵστησι γὰρ ὁ λέγων τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ ὁ ἀκούσας ἠρέμησεν*), *ἀλλ' εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μὴ οὔπω σημαίνει.* It is a *ῥῆμα* proper only when actually said of a subject, as the predicate of a proposition.

a 12 **οὐ χρώμεθα**: comp. 21, 1457 a 33 *πλὴν οὐκ ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι σημαίνοντος*. The construction in the clause may be seen from Vahlen's paraphrase, *ἐν τοῖς διπλοῖς οὐ χρώμεθα τῷ μέρει ἡγούμενοι καὶ αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ σημαίνειν.* The participial *ὡς καὶ αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ σημαῖνον* is an acc. absolute like those in 3, 1448 a 37 and 26, 1462 a 10.

a 13 **τῷ Θεοδώρῳ**: i.e. 'the word *Θεόδωρος*'; comp. infra a 28 *ὁ Κλέων*, 'the word *Κλέων*'.—Plato Crat. 392 D *τὸν Ἀστυάνακτα*, 'the name Astyanax'; for the similar Latin usage v. Wilkins on Cicero De Oratore 2, 193. In the De interpr. we have the more scholastic form of expression with a nominative, *ἐν τῷ Κάλλιππος.*

τὸ δῶρον: i.e. the word *δῶρον* implied in *Θεόδωρος*. As the parallel in the De interpr. is *ἐν τῷ Κάλλιππος τὸ ἵππος οὐδὲν αὐτὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ σημαίνει*, it has been proposed to restore here *τὸ δωρος* for *τὸ δῶρον*. The two cases, however, as Düntzer reminds us, are not quite similar, since *δωρος* does not exist as a separate word, as *ἵππος* does, and there would therefore be no point in saying of it that it is without meaning (*οὐ σημαίνει*). 1457 ^{a} 13

ῥῆμα: De interpr. 3, 16^{b} 6 *ῥῆμα δέ ἐστι τὸ προσσημαῖνον χρόνον, οὗ μέρος οὐδὲν σημαίνει χωρίς, καὶ ἔστιν ἀεὶ τῶν καθ' ἑτέρου λεγομένων σημεῖον. λέγω δ' ὅτι προσσημαίνει χρόνον, οἷον ὑγίεια μὲν ὄνομα, τὸ δὲ ὑγιαίνει ῥῆμα· προσσημαίνει γὰρ τὸ νῦν ὑπάρχειν . . .* 16 *τὸ ὑγίανεν ἢ τὸ ὑγιανεῖ οὐ ῥῆμα ἀλλὰ πτώσεις ῥήματος· διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ ῥήματος, ὅτι τὸ μὲν τὸν παρόντα προσσημαίνει χρόνον, τὰ δὲ τὸν πέριξ.* In this passage (though not in De interpr. 10, 19^{b} 13) the past and future tenses of the verb are set aside as *πτώσεις*, the verb in the logical theory of predication being always in the present (comp. Mansel, Prolegomena Logica p. 273). It is to be noted that in these instances of verbs, the verb is in the third person singular of the present; the reason for this is that a proper name like *Κλέων* or *Κορίσκος* is tacitly assumed to be its subject. With Plato, it may be observed, the *ῥῆμα* includes the predicative adjective as well as the verb (v. Crat. 399 A). ^{a} 14

προσσημαίνει. Boethius, In Aristot. de Interpr. 2 p. 66 Meiser, translates this by *consignificat*, thus identifying its sense with that of the later word *συσσημαίνειν*. ^{a} 17

πτῶσις, as a term of grammar, has not yet acquired the special sense of 'case' which it has in the grammarians; and there is no equivalent for it in our modern terminology. We may perhaps translate it by 'modification' or 'mode'. Given a word, a noun or a verb, with a certain meaning, a *πτῶσις* of it embodies that meaning with some secondary idea superadded. It does not necessarily involve a difference of form; *βαδίζει*; as a question, is a *πτῶσις* of the affirmative *βαδίζει*, 'he walks', and *δῶρον* as an accusative a *πτῶσις* of *δῶρον* as a nominative. In most instances, however, a *πτῶσις* is distinguished from the original noun or verb by some difference of form, e.g. by a difference of termination. Under the general head of *πτώσεις* Aristotle includes the following species of words:—(1) the oblique cases of all nouns, as compared with the nominative, e.g. *Φίλωνος* etc. from *Φίλων* (De interpr. 2, 16^{a} 33). (2) The nominative also of common nouns; it is a *πτῶσις* through the idea of number which it suggests: thus *ἄνθρωπος* is '*a* man', and ^{a} 18

1457 a 18 ἄνθρωποι '*several* men'. (3) The forms involving a distinction of gender, e.g. οὗτος, αὕτη, τοῦτο and the like (Soph. el. 14, 173 b 27). (4) The paronymous adjectives, e.g. χαλκοῦς from χαλκός (Rhet. 3. 9, 1410 a 32), ἀνδρεῖος as compared with the substantive ἀνδρία (Rhet. 1. 7, 1364 b 36; Cat. 1, 1 a 14). (5) The comparatives and superlatives as compared with the positive adjectives, e.g. βέλτιστος from ἀγαθός (Top. 5. 7, 136 b 30). (6) The adverbs as compared with the corresponding adjectives, e.g. δικαίως from δίκαιος (Top. 1. 15, 106 b 29; 5. 7, 136 b 15). (7) The past and future tenses of the verb (De interpr. 3, 16 b 16); and presumably also the forms embodying distinctions of person, number, voice, etc. To these must be added (8) τὰ ὑποκριτικά, the modifications of sense words may acquire through differences in the mode of enunciation. This synopsis of the different uses of the term in Aristotle may be sufficient to show that πτῶσις with him is a logical rather than a philological conception, and that it is only in certain of its applications that it corresponds to our declension or inflexion or derivation. It is the sense rather than the word itself that is conceived as derivative; a πτῶσις takes its meaning, i.e. the fundamental part of it, from the primary word; and the idea of this latter is involved in any explanation we give of the πτῶσις; Φίλωνος for instance means '*of* Φίλων', and γραμματικός means '*possessing* γραμματική'—both being accordingly πτώσεις, the one of Φίλων and the other of γραμματική. With Aristotle's use of πτῶσις we may compare Varro's equally heterogeneous instances of 'declinatio': *a Terentius Terenti, ab equo equiso, ab homine homunculus, a mamma mammosae, a prudentia prudens, a pugnando et currendo pugiles et cursores* (L. L. 8, 14).

a 21 **ἄνθρωπος**: Phys. 3. 7, 207 b 8 ἄνθρωπος εἷς ἄνθρωπος καὶ οἱ πολλοί.

τὰ ὑποκριτικά: see on 19, 1456 b 10.

a 22 **ἐπίταξιν**: see on 19, 1456 b 16.

βάδιζε: to be read as βάδιζε!, i.e. as a dictatorial imperative.

a 23 **λόγος**. The definition is framed to distinguish a λόγος from an ὄνομα; see above on a 10, and comp. De interpr. 4, 16 b 26 λόγος δέ ἐστι φωνὴ σημαντικὴ κατὰ συνθήκην, ἧς τῶν μερῶν τι σημαντικόν ἐστι κεχωρισμένον, ὡς φάσις, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς κατάφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις· λέγω δέ, οἷον ἄνθρωπος σημαίνει μέν τι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτι ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν· ἀλλ' ἔσται κατάφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις, ἐάν τι προστεθῇ. The clause ἧς ἔνια μέρη καθ' αὑτὰ σημαίνει τι refers to the nouns and verbs (with their πτώσεις) as the significant parts of all λόγοι; the σύνδεσμο

and ἄρθρα are φωναὶ ἄσημοι. For the meaning of λόγος and the various forms of λόγοι see on 20, 1456 b 38 (also Bon. Ind. 433 b 48). 1457 a 23

οὐ γὰρ ἅπας, κτέ. An indirect reproof, perhaps, to Plato, who seems to speak as though a λόγος were always in the form of a proposition: Soph. 262 A οὐκοῦν ἐξ ὀνομάτων μὲν μόνων συνεχῶς λεγομένων οὐκ ἔστι ποτὲ λόγος, οὐδ᾽ αὖ ῥημάτων χωρὶς ὀνομάτων λεχθέντων. a 24

ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὁρισμός: e.g. ζῷον πεζὸν δίπουν (Top. 1. 7, 103 a 27) or ζῷον ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν (Top. 5. 2, 130 b 8). a 26

ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ ῥημάτων εἶναι λόγον. This is the λόγος ὀνοματώδης of An. post. 2. 10, 93 b 31—a combination of words that may serve as an equivalent for a name, and take the place of one as a term in a proposition (comp. De interpr. 11, 21 a 29). It may be a more or a less exact equivalent; the most exact is what Aristotle calls a definition (comp. Metaph. Z 4, 1030 a 14).

εἷς δέ ἐστι λόγος διχῶς. That a λόγος, in spite of its composite nature, has a certain unity in it is tacitly assumed in the definition in a 23 λόγος δὲ φωνὴ συνθετὴ κτέ. This unity, as the text implies, is not of the same order in all kinds of λόγοι. A definition (a λόγος without predication) is one, because the combination of terms in it signifies and stands for one thing (ἓν σημαίνει), just in the same way as a name may do. The proposition also, e.g. Κλέων βαδίζει, is one because the combination of terms describes a single act or fact (comp. De interpr. 5, 17 a 16 ὁ ἓν δηλῶν λόγος), and admits of only one assertion or denial. On the other hand in a composite λόγος consisting of two or more propositions with copulative or other coordinating conjunctions to connect them together, the formal unity of the whole is due to this conjunction of the parts, the several propositions which compose it. The Iliad is an extreme instance of such a λόγος. This point, the difference in the unity in these two kinds of λόγοι, is more than once noticed by Aristotle elsewhere in very similar terms: De interpr. 5, 17 a 8 ἔστι δὲ εἷς πρῶτος [? πρώτως] λόγος ἀποφαντικὸς κατάφασις, εἶτα ἀπόφασις· οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι [scil. λόγοι ἀποφαντικοί] πάντες συνδέσμῳ εἷς . . . ἔστι δὲ εἷς λόγος ἀποφαντικὸς ἢ ὁ ἓν δηλῶν ἢ ὁ συνδέσμῳ εἷς, πολλοὶ δὲ οἱ πολλὰ καὶ μὴ ἓν ἢ οἱ ἀσύνδετοι.—An. post. 2. 10, 93 b 35 λόγος δ᾽ εἷς ἐστι διχῶς, ὁ μὲν συνδέσμῳ, ὥσπερ ἡ Ἰλιάς, ὁ δὲ τῷ ἓν καθ᾽ ἑνὸς δηλοῦν μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.—Metaph. H 6, 1045 a 12 ὁ δ᾽ ὁρισμὸς λόγος ἐστὶν εἷς οὐ συνδέσμῳ καθάπερ ἡ Ἰλιάς, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἑνὸς εἶναι (comp. also Metaph. Z 4, 1030 b 9). a 28

1457 a 29 **ἐκ πλειόνων**, scil. λόγων.

a 31 **ἁπλοῦν . . . διπλοῦν**: see 20, 1457 a 12, and De interpr. 2, 16 a 19 (quoted above on 20, 1457 a 10). In the De Interpretatione (2, 16 a 23) the general term for a compound is *συμπεπλεγμένον ὄνομα*.

The Rhetoric has more than one reference to this chapter on the species of names: Rhet. 3. 1, 1404 a 36 *οὐχ ἅπαντα ὅσα περὶ λέξεως ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ἀκριβολογητέον ἡμῖν, ἀλλ' ὅσα περὶ τοιαύτης οἵας λέγομεν. περὶ δ' ἐκείνης εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.*—3. 2, 1404 b 5 *τῶν δ' ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων σαφῆ μὲν ποιεῖ τὰ κύρια, μὴ ταπεινὴν δὲ ἀλλὰ κεκοσμημένην τἆλλα ὀνόματα ὅσα εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.*—b 26 *ὄντων δ' ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος συνέστηκεν, τῶν δ' ὀνομάτων τοσαῦτ' ἐχόντων εἴδη ὅσα τεθεώρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιήσεως, τούτων γλώτταις μὲν καὶ διπλοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ πεποιημένοις ὀλιγάκις καὶ ὀλιγαχοῦ χρηστέον . . . τὸ δὲ κύριον καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ μεταφορὰ μόναι χρήσιμοι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ψιλῶν λόγων λέξιν.*

a 33 **ἐκ σημαίνοντος καὶ ἀσήμου.** Aristotle is probably thinking here of words like *ἀμφιλογος, περιβλέπειν, σύνδικος, ὕποπτος*, etc., compounded of a noun or verb (or a *πτῶσις* of the same) and a preposition, which is in his classification a *φωνὴ ἄσημος*.

a 35 **μεγαλειωτῶν** is all but identical with the reading in A^c, *μεγαλιωτῶν*, and simpler than Tyrwhitt's *μεγαλείων ὡς* or Vahlen's *μεγαλείων ὧν*. A *μεγαλειωτὸν ὄνομα* would be a name that has been 'made grand', an exaggerated or amplified name. Though a verb *μεγαλειοῦν* is not found in extant literature, it is a legitimate derivative from *μεγαλεῖος*, which is sometimes used of words (e.g. in Xenophon Mem. 2. 1. 34); and it is presupposed in the LXX. word *μεγαλείωμα*. After *μεγαλειωτῶν* we may supply *οἷον* = *e.g.* For similar instances of the omission of *οἷον* see 25, 1461 a 26; An. pr. 1. 4, 26 a 8; De gen. et corr. 2. 5, 332 b 14; Eth. N. 5. 8, 1133 a 7; Rhet. 3. 5, 1407 a 38; 3. 6, 1408 a 6 (etc.).

In lieu of *μεγαλιωτῶν* (or *μεγαλειωτῶν*) the Arabic version is said to imply Μασσαλιωτῶν—a reading which has met with the approval of Diels (Berlin Academy, Sitzungsb. 1888 p. 53) as well as others. An expression like *τὰ πολλὰ τῶν Μασσαλιωτῶν*, however, is certainly not free from difficulty. The general view seems to be that it is practically equivalent to *τὰ πολλὰ τῶν Μασσαλιωτικῶν*; so that Aristotle is to be credited with the statement that the majority (*τὰ πολλά*) of the proper or other names in use at Massilia were of the abnormal type described in the text. There is, as far as I know, no hint of anything of the kind in any ancient writer; and it is to my thinking too im-

probable to be believed without very distinct evidence. The recent 1457^{a} 35
translators, who accept the new reading, must have felt the difficulty, as they tone down the expression by a free rendering of *τὰ πολλά*, making the clause mean either 'like so many Massilian expressions' (Butcher), or 'wie jene massaliotischen Namen' (Gomperz). It has to be remembered also that it was hardly necessary for Aristotle to go as far as Marseilles for instances of such names. They were certainly not unknown in Athens (Wilamowitz, Aristoteles und Athen 2 p. 29); and to judge from their appearance in Plautus, they must have been common enough in the later Attic Comedy.

Ἑρμοκαϊκόξανθος: a compound of three river-names, Hermus, Caicus, and Xanthus (comp. Dindorf in HSt. s.v., and Letronne, Étude des noms propres grecs p. 62). After this the Greek text must have lost something, as the Arabic version, as translated by Margoliouth, renders the passage by *Ermocaicon Xanthus qui supplicabatur Dominum caelorum* (or *Iovem*), which Diels supposes to represent an hexameter line, *Ἑρμοκαϊκόξανθος, ἐπευξάμενος Διὶ πατρί.* I hesitate to adopt this very attractive conjecture, though it has been accepted by both Butcher and Gomperz, because the context seems to me to suggest rather a second instance of the same kind of word, a *τετραπλοῦν ὄνομα* of some sort. Some such compound as *ἐπευξιθεῶναξ*, if one may venture to invent the word, would represent the general sense of the Arabic. As these abnormal compounds were characteristic of the Dithyramb (see on 22, 1459^{a} 9), and not uncommon in Comedy, it is difficult to see why Aristotle should have had recourse to what would seem to be an epic or a mock epic for an instance of a *τριπλοῦν ὄνομα.*

ἅπαν δὲ ὄνομα κτέ. The present survey of the vocabulary of ^{b} 1
poetry may be compared with that in Isocrates 190 D *τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ποιηταῖς πολλὰ δέδονται κόσμοι· καὶ γὰρ . . . οἷόν τ' αὐτοῖς . . . δηλῶσαι μὴ μόνον τοῖς τεταγμένοις ὀνόμασιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ξένοις, τὰ δὲ καινοῖς, τὰ δὲ μεταφοραῖς, καὶ μηδὲν παραλιπεῖν ἀλλὰ πᾶσι τοῖς εἴδεσι διαποικῖλαι τὴν ποίησιν.*

κύριον. The *κύριον ὄνομα* is the established and familiar term for a thing, as distinct from the *γλῶττα*, the *μεταφορά* and the other *ξενικὰ ὀνόματα* (see on 22, 1458^{a} 22). In actual usage, however, the *κύριον ὄνομα* is more especially opposed to the metaphor. As the metaphor is an *ἀλλότριον ὄνομα* (infra ^{b} 7), the *κύριον ὄνομα* is much the same thing as the *οἰκεῖον* or 'proper' name for the thing; comp. Rhet. 3. 2, 1404^{b} 31 *τὸ δὲ κύριον καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον* [= i. e. *τὸ*

1457 b 1 οἰκεῖον] καὶ μεταφορὰ μόναι χρήσιμοι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ψιλῶν λόγων λέξιν. Hence it is that in Latin *proprie* often represents the κυρίως, and *propria nomina* the κύρια ὀνόματα of Greek writers. Horace has an attempt at a more literal translation of the latter term in A. P. 234 *Non ego inornata et dominantia nomina solum verbaque, Pisones, satyrorum scriptor amabo.* In Isocrates 190 D–E the designation for the words in common use, in contradistinction to those belonging more especially to poetry, is τὰ τεταγμένα or τὰ πολιτικὰ ὀνόματα.

b 2 **κόσμος**. The term reappears in 22, 1458 a 33. As Aristotle's explanation is lost (see on b 33), the technical sense to be attached to it is a matter of conjecture. In Isocrates 190 D (see above on b 1) the metaphor, the strange word, and the coined word are grouped together under the general head of κόσμοι; and Aristotle himself in the Rhetoric (3. 2, 1404 b 5 and 1405 a 14) uses the verb κοσμεῖν in an equally wide sense, to denote the embellishment of style by means of metaphor and other unusual forms of expression. In the present passage, however, it is clear that the term κόσμος must have a special meaning, since instead of including the γλῶττα, the μεταφορά, etc., it is expressly distinguished and made to stand apart from them. The only positive hint we have in the Poetics of the sense of the term is in 22, 1459 a 11, where it is said to be allowable not only in epic poetry, but also in oratory and in the iambic parts of Tragedy: ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἰαμβείοις διὰ τὸ ὅτι μάλιστα λέξιν μιμεῖσθαι ταῦτα ἁρμόττει τῶν ὀνομάτων ὅσοις κἂν ἐν λόγοις τις χρήσαιτο· ἔστι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα τὸ κύριον καὶ μεταφορὰ καὶ κόσμος. Aristotle is generally supposed to be referring to the *epitheton ornans*; in support of which interpretation Tyrwhitt and others point to the use of κόσμος in Rhet. 3. 7, 1408 a 13 μηδ' ἐπὶ τῷ εὐτελεῖ ὀνόματι ἐπῇ κόσμος· εἰ δὲ μή, κωμῳδία φαίνεται, οἷον ποιεῖ Κλεοφῶν· ὁμοίως γὰρ ἔνια ἔλεγε καὶ εἰ εἴπειεν ἂν πότνια συκῆ. This passage in the Rhetoric, however, does not justify this view. πότνια is regarded there as a κόσμος, not because it is a certain kind of epithet, but because it is a γλῶττα (v. on b 4), and therefore one of the unusual words which according to the Rhetoric (3. 2, 1404 b 5) serve to embellish the style. An *epitheton ornans* need not be of this kind; in γάλα λευκόν, for instance, the epithet is a κύριον ὄνομα. As the κόσμος, according to the classification in the text, is a special kind of word, distinguished from the κύριον ὄνομα on the one side and the γλῶττα, μεταφορά, etc., on the other, we may perhaps suppose it to be the ornamental synonym, a word,

for example, like Πηλείδης for Achilles, Ἥφαιστος for fire, ὄλεθρος for one who causes destruction—the kind of word which in the ancient classification of tropes came under the heads of synecdoche, antonomasia, and metonymia (comp. Volkmann, Rhetorik der Gr. u. Röm.[2] p. 421–5). If Aristotle's κόσμος does not include such synonyms, he has ignored what he elsewhere (Rhet. 3. 2, 1404 b 39) knows to be an important element in the poetic vocabulary. Cicero De Oratore 3. 167 distinguishes between the 'coined' word, *factum verbum* (Aristotle's πεποιημένον ὄνομα), the 'transferred' word, *translatum verbum* (i. e. μεταφορά), and the 'ornamental equivalent', *ornandi causa proprium proprio commutatum*; this last being apparently identical with the κόσμος of the Poetics. We must not forget that Aristotle recognizes some words as being more beautiful than others: Rhet. 3. 2, 1405 b 6 καὶ ἀπὸ καλῶν [scil. δεῖ μεταφέρειν]· κάλλος δὲ ὀνόματος τὸ μέν, ὥσπερ Λικύμνιος λέγει, ἐν τοῖς ψόφοις ἢ τῷ σημαινομένῳ [i. e. either in its sound or in its associations], καὶ αἶσχος δὲ ὡσαύτως—with which we may compare the definition of Theophrastus (ap. Demetr. De eloc. 173), κάλλος ὀνόματός ἐστι τὸ πρὸς τὴν ἀκοὴν ἢ πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν ἡδὺ ἢ τὸ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔντιμον (v. Rabe, De Theophrasti libris περὶ λέξεως p. 44). It would be strange if this very obvious artifice of poetical expression were overlooked by Aristotle in a book like the Poetics. 1457 b 2

γλῶτταν. The term is sufficiently general to include foreign, dialectical, and also obsolete words—all words (or senses) in fact which require explanation, because outside the limits of ordinary Attic Greek (comp. Rhet. 3. 1, 1404 a 33 τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀφείκασιν [i. e. the tragedians] ὅσα παρὰ τὴν διάλεκτόν ἐστιν). For instances in the Poetics see 22, 1458 b 21 and 25, 1461 a 10; others are to be found in Rhet. 3. 3, 1406 a 7, where the use of γλῶτται in prose is said to be a frigid affectation: μία δὲ [scil. αἰτία ψυχρότητος] τὸ χρῆσθαι γλώτταις, οἷον Λυκόφρων Ξέρξην πέλωρον ἄνδρα, καὶ Σκίρων σίννις ἀνήρ, καὶ Ἀλκιδάμας ἄθυρμα τῇ ποιήσει, καὶ τὴν τῆς φύσεως ἀτασθαλίαν, καὶ ἀκράτῳ τῆς διανοίας ὀργῇ τεθηγμένον. b 4

μὴ τοῖς αὐτοῖς δέ: De caelo 1. 3, 269 b 26 ἀνάγκη δὲ πᾶν τὸ φερόμενον ἢ κάτω ἢ ἄνω ἢ κουφότητ' ἔχειν ἢ βάρος ἢ ἄμφω, μὴ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ δέ. b 5

σίγυνον. The gloss in Hesychius is σίγυννοι· τὰ ξυστὰ δόρατα, ἢ τοὺς ὁλοσιδήρους ἄκοντας (comp. Schol. Plat. Amat. p. 87 R. and Apoll. Rh. 2. 99). The word exists in a variety of forms (HSt. s. v. σιβύνη). That it belonged to the Cyprian dialect is said also b 6

1457 b 6 by Herodotus 5. 9 *σιγύννας δ' ὦν καλέουσι Λίγυες . . . τοὺς καπήλους, Κύπριοι δὲ τὰ δόρατα*, and by Schol. Apoll. Rh. 2. 99 *σιγύννους δὲ καλοῦσιν οἱ Κύπριοι τὰ ἀκόντια.* I suspect we should restore *σίγυνος* in the present passage, as there seems to be no trace elsewhere of a neuter form. Herwerden also (Lex. gr. suppl.) tacitly assumes *σίγυννος* as the nominative in Aristotle.

μεταφορά. *μεταφέρειν*, said of a word, means to transfer it from its proper object to another more or less like that (v. 22, 1459 a 8 and Bon. Ind. 462 a 1). The substantive *μεταφορά* has two meanings, (1) the abstract sense of transference (e. g. in the present passage, and infra b 30), and (2) the concrete sense of the word in its transferred or metaphorical application (e. g. supra b 1; 22, 1458 a 22, 25, 33, etc.).

Metaphor, according to Aristotle, consists in transferring a word from the object to which it is appropriate to another kind of object more or less like it; comp. 22, 1459 a 8, and Top. 6. 2, 140 a 9 *ἡ μεταφορὰ ποιεῖ πως γνώριμον τὸ σημαινόμενον διὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα· πάντες γὰρ οἱ μεταφέροντες κατά τινα ὁμοιότητα μεταφέρουσιν.* Four kinds of similarity are noted in the text, that between genus and species, that between species and genus, that between species and species, and that between a thing and its analogue—where there is a similarity of relations. The present classification of metaphors is assumed in Rhet. 3. 2, 1405 a 3 and 3. 10, 1410 b 36.

b 9 **λέγω δέ**, scil. *ἐπιφοράν*, or *μεταφοράν*.

b 10 **νηῦς** *κτέ.*: Od. 1, 185 and 24, 308.

b 11 **ἑστάναι τι**: comp. infra b 16 *ἀφελεῖν τι.* In the present passage, however, the indefinite *τι* is the subject of the infinitive, in the same way for instance as in Phys. 5. 1, 224 a 23 *τῷ τούτου τι μεταβάλλειν* (intr.), and in Rhet. 2. 8, 1386 a 12, 13. It is just as much the subject as *τοῦτο* is in Eth. N. 3. 7, 1114 b 11 *τὸ καλῶς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι ἡ τελεία καὶ ἀληθινὴ ἂν εἴη εὐφυΐα.* Compare also Metaph. Θ 4, 1047 b 13 *τὸ γάρ σε ἑστάναι νῦν ψεῦδος μέν, οὐκ ἀδύνατον δέ.* The traditional rendering of *ἑστάναι τι* is 'a kind of standing' (*stare aliquod*, or *stare quoddam* in the old versions), but it has not the sanction of Tyrwhitt and Hermann, who translate *ἑστάναι τι* simply by *stare*; which shows that they were not insensible to the grammatical objection against making the *τι* qualify an infinitive. See infra on b 16 (*ἀφελεῖν τι*).

ἦ δὴ μυρί' Ὀδυσσεὺς *κτέ.*: Il. 2, 272.

b 13 **ἀπ' εἴδους**: Rhet. 3. 11, 1413 a 14 *καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι μεταφοραὶ ἀπ' εἴδους ἐπ' εἶδός εἰσιν· οἷον ἄν τις ὡς ἀγαθὸν πεισόμενος αὐτὸς ἐπαγά-*

γηται εἶτα βλαβῇ, ὡς ὁ Καρπάθιός φησι τὸν λαγώ. ἄμφω γὰρ τὸ 1457 b 13
εἰρημένον πεπόνθασιν. See Rhet. 3. 10, 1410 b 14 and 11, 1411 b 26 for other instances of this description.

The two quotations in the text, which have been supposed to be fragments either of some epic poet (Kinkel, EGF. p. 72) or of a parodist (Brandt, Parod. gr. rel. p. 112), were probably both of them from the Καθαρμοί of Empedocles. The second, τεμὼν ἀτειρέι χαλκῷ, is, as Vahlen has pointed out, identical with part of the Empedoclean line (fr. 143 Diels), preserved by Theo Smyrnaeus: Arithm. p. 20 Gelder (=p. 15 Hiller) ἡ τῶν πολιτικῶν [Πλατωνικῶν Hiller] λόγων παράδοσις τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἔχει καθαρμόν τινα . . . ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς κρηνάων ἄπο πέντ' ἀνιμῶντά φησιν ἀτειρέι χαλκῷ δεῖν ἀπορρύπτεσθαι, ὁ δὲ Πλάτων ἀπὸ πέντε μαθημάτων δεῖν φησι ποιεῖσθαι τὴν κάθαρσιν. The exact form of the verse of Empedocles is perhaps irrecoverable, but it is not difficult to see that Theo's ἀνιμῶντα is a prosaic substitute for the τεμὼν preserved by Aristotle (comp. Diels, Hermes 15, 173). ἀτειρής—a favourite epithet with Empedocles (v. Diels, Index p. 232)—is a reminiscence of Homer. The same may be said also of χαλκός, if it meant, as it probably did in Empedocles (v. Bullialdus ad loc. p. 128 ed. Gelder), a brazen urn, such as was used in certain rites. Aristotle elsewhere refers to Empedocles in a way which implies that his poems might be assumed to be familiar to every one (v. on b 24). As he regards him as a master of metaphor (μεταφορικός fr. 70; see on 1, 1447 b 18), there is a special propriety in his quoting instances of metaphor from the writings of Empedocles.

ἀφελεῖν τι. The recent interpreters seem to agree in supposing b 16
this to mean 'a kind of removing' (*auferre aliquod* in Lat.), though a very different view was taken of it by Victorius, Heinsius, Goulston, Tyrwhitt, Hermann, and Ritter, who represent it by *auferre aliquid* or *auferre quiddam*. The now usual rendering implies that the infinitive is treated as an ordinary substantive, with the indefinite pronoun attached to it in the same way as in ἡδονή τις, γένεσίς τις, and the like. There is no recorded instance of this construction in classical Greek. In the parallels in the Sophistici Elenchi (22, 178 a 12 sqq.) the τι in ποιεῖν τι, πάσχειν τι, and αἰσθάνεσθαί τι is assuredly (as Pacius saw) the object after these verbs. Aristotle's assumption is that a generic may be supplanted by a specific term, when it comes to be applied to a special kind of object. Thus ἑστάναι, said of a ship, is

1457 b 16 supplanted by ὁρμεῖν, and ἀφελεῖν, said of water, by ἀρύσαι. If he had had the instance cited in b 27 before him here, he might very well have said τὸ σπείρειν ἀφιέναι τί ἐστι—where the τι would have represented the accusative, τὸν καρπόν, of the later passage.

τῷ δὲ ἀνάλογον (comp. Metaph. I 4, 1070 b 17) replaces the κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον in b 9, ἐπιφοράν being again understood. Analogy or proportion is thus defined in Eth. N. 5. 5. 1131 a 31, ἡ ἀναλογία ἰσότης ἐστὶ λόγων καὶ ἐν τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις. In the statement in the text the general form of analogy, B : A :: D : C, is illustrated by an example:—φιάλη (B) : Διόνυσος (A) :: ἀσπίς (D) : Ἄρης (C). Metaphor consists in giving the φιάλη (B) the name belonging to its analogue (D), viz. ἀσπίς, or vice versa. This transference of a name, as Aristotle proceeds to tell us (καὶ ἐνίοτε προστιθέασιν, b 19), is sometimes softened by an explanatory addition to the word in its new application. The addition may be either (1) positive or (2) negative. Thus instead of simply speaking of the shield (D) as a cup (B), we may (1) add the term to which the shield is properly related (C), i. e. Ares, and thus call the shield the 'cup *of Ares*' (B+C); or (2) we may add a negative epithet, to show that the word is used in a non-natural sense, and describe the shield as 'a cup *that holds no wine*' (φιάλη ἄοινος). A string of metaphors from analogy is quoted in Rhet. 3. 10, 1410 b 36 τῶν δὲ μεταφορῶν τεττάρων οὐσῶν εὐδοκιμοῦσι μάλιστα αἱ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, ὥσπερ Περικλῆς ἔφη τὴν νεότητα τὴν ἀπολομένην ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ οὕτως ἠφανίσθαι ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ὥσπερ εἴ τις τὸ ἔαρ ἐκ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ ἐξέλοι κτέ. The use of such metaphors, as serving for instance to give life to a description of things inanimate, is considered at length in Rhet. 3. 11; comp. esp. 3. 11, 1411 b 32 ἐν πᾶσι δὲ τῷ ἐνέργειαν ποιεῖν εὐδοκιμεῖ οἷον ἐν τοῖσδε, "αὖτις ἐπὶ δάπεδόνδε κυλίνδετο λᾶας ἀναιδής", καὶ "ἔπτατ' ὀιστός", . . . καὶ "αἰχμὴ δὲ στέρνοιο διέσσυτο μαιμώωσα". ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις διὰ τὸ ἔμψυχα εἶναι ἐνεργοῦντα φαίνεται· τὸ ἀναισχυντεῖν γὰρ καὶ μαιμᾶν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐνέργεια. ταῦτα δὲ προσῆψε διὰ τῆς κατ' ἀναλογίαν μεταφορᾶς· ὡς γὰρ ὁ λίθος πρὸς τὸν Σίσυφον, ὁ ἀναισχυντῶν πρὸς τὸν ἀναισχυντούμενον.

b 18 **ἐρεῖ**: comp. infra b 21, 23, and εἴρηκεν and λέγει in the context (b 15, 20). The subject, if one must be supplied, is 'the poet', just as in the parallels in the Topics it would be 'the disputant'.

b 19 **προστιθέασιν.** Instead of the metaphor pure and simple, i. e. 'cup' for shield, they add on to it the term to which the proper word (i. e. shield) supplanted by the metaphor (i. e. cup), is relative. The shield being relative to Ares, the metaphor may be softened

by describing it as 'the cup *of Ares*'. In the Greek here ἀνθ' οὗ λέγει = τὸ ἀνθ' οὗ λέγει τὴν μεταφοράν, 'the original term supplanted by the metaphor'; and it has to be taken as the subject of the ἐστί in πρὸς ὅ ἐστι; the clause, therefore, might have been thus given: προστιθέασιν τὸ πρὸς ὅ ἐστι τὸ ἀνθ' οὗ λέγει τὴν μεταφοράν; comp. Castelvetro's rendering (in his Basel edition), 'aggiungono la cosa a che ha riguardo quello, in iscambio di che dice'; and Tyrwhitt's, 'adjiciunt illud, ad quod relativum est id, pro quo translatum dicit.' The distinction here described, between the metaphor with a qualifying addition (positive or negative) and the metaphor without it, is recognized in Rhet. 3. 11, 1412 b 32 αἱ εἰκόνες . . . τρόπον τινὰ μεταφοραί· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐκ δυοῖν λέγονται, ὥσπερ ἡ ἀνάλογον μεταφορά· οἷον ἡ ἀσπίς, φαμέν, ἐστὶ φιάλη Ἄρεως καὶ ⟨τὸ⟩ τόξον φόρμιγξ ἄχορδος. οὕτω μὲν οὖν λέγουσιν οὐχ ἁπλοῦν, τὸ δ' εἰπεῖν τὸ τόξον φόρμιγγα ἢ τὴν ἀσπίδα φιάλην ἁπλοῦν. For the singular λέγει v. supra on ἐρεῖ, b 18. For the difference of number in προστιθέασιν comp. 4, 1448 b 17; 26, 1461 b 30; Eth. N. 5. 8, 1132 b 34 ἢ γὰρ τὸ κακῶς ζητοῦσιν· εἰ δὲ μή, δουλεία δοκεῖ εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἀντιποιήσει (see Vahlen on 26, 1461 b 30, and Kühner, Gr. Gr.[3] 2, 1 p. 87). 1457 b 19

ἐρεῖ τοίνυν κτέ.: Rhet. 3. 4, 1407 a 14 (Roemer) ἀεὶ δὲ δεῖ τὴν μεταφορὰν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάλογον ἀνταποδιδόναι καὶ ἐπὶ θάτερα [καὶ ἐπὶ] τῶν ὁμογενῶν· οἷον εἰ ἡ φιάλη ἀσπὶς Διονύσου, καὶ τὴν ἀσπίδα ἁρμόττει λέγεσθαι φιάλην Ἄρεως. φιάλη Ἄρεως was the bold metaphor of the dithyrambic poet Timotheus (fr. 16 Bergk = 22 Wilamowitz). The idea was doubtless suggested by the similarity of shape between a shield and the φιάλη which Dionysus sometimes had in his hand in ancient art. b 21

ἢ ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς. The actual words of Empedocles, which Aristotle supposes us to know, are not to be found among his extant fragments; all that can be said of them is that they must have been something like γῆρας ἡμέρας but different from that in point of phraseology. The metaphor in Emped. 20. 5 Diels, περὶ ῥηγμῖνι βίοιο, is not sufficiently like this to be what Aristotle had in mind. This allusive way of referring to something supposed to be known to the reader is not uncommon in Aristotle; see 17, 1455 b 9 (εἶθ' ὡς Εὐριπίδης), 25, 1460 b 36 (ἔτυχεν ὥσπερ Ξενοφάνει); comp. Metaph. Γ 5, 1010 a 5 οὕτω γὰρ ἁρμόττει μᾶλλον εἰπεῖν ἢ ὥσπερ Ἐπίχαρμος εἰς Ξενοφάνην. b 24

ἑσπέραν βίου: Alexis fr. 228 Kock ἤδη γὰρ ὁ βίος οὑμὸς ἑσπέραν ἄγει.

1457 b 25 **δυσμὰς βίου**: Plato Laws 6, 770 A ἐν δυσμαῖς τοῦ βίου.

ὄνομα κείμενον, an existing or established name, as in Top. 6. 2, 140 a 3 ἔτι εἰ μὴ κειμένοις ὀνόμασι χρῆται, οἷον Πλάτων ὀφρυόσκιον τὸν ὀφθαλμόν, ἢ τὸ φαλάγγιον σηψιδακές, ἢ τὸν μυελὸν ὀστεογενές· πᾶν γὰρ ἀσαφὲς τὸ μὴ εἰωθός; comp. also Top. 2. 1, 109 a 28 εἰσὶ διτταί [scil. καὶ ἁμαρτίαι], ἢ τῷ ψεύδεσθαι ἢ τῷ παραβαίνειν τὴν κειμένην λέξιν . . . οἱ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις ὀνόμασι τὰ πράγματα προσαγορεύοντες, οἷον τὴν πλάτανον ἄνθρωπον, παραβαίνουσι τὴν κειμένην ὀνομασίαν (comp. Bon. Ind. 380 b 31).

Metaphor is often a way of supplying the deficiencies of ordinary language (Meteor. 4. 3, 380 a 18, b 28; Rhet. 3. 2, 1405 a 36; Quintilian 8. 6, 5, 18). In the present passage Aristotle reminds us that, if one of the terms in an analogy has no special name of its own, it may still be described in just the same way as in the preceding instances (ὁμοίως λεχθήσεται), i. e. by a metaphor softened or explained by the mention of that to which the nameless thing or act is relative. Thus the sowing (B) of seed (A) on the part of the husbandman is analogous to the scattering (D) abroad of light or flame (C) on the part of the sun. This act of the sun has no special name; but we may metaphorically call it 'sowing' (B), and then qualify the metaphor by adding the term to which the act (D) itself is relative, viz. 'flame' (C), and speak of the sun as 'sowing *flame*'—σπείρων φλόγα (B + C). σπείρων φλόγα is a qualified metaphor on exactly the same lines as φιάλη Ἄρεως (see on b 16); the only difference is that in the one case there is an ὄνομα κείμενον for the thing meant (viz. ἀσπίς), whereas in the other such a name does not exist in actual language.

b 27 **ἐπὶ τοῦ ἡλίου ἀνώνυμον**: for the preposition, comp. Pol. 3. 1, 1275 a 30 ἀνώνυμον τὸ κοινὸν ἐπὶ δικαστοῦ καὶ ἐκκλησιαστοῦ. Aristotle's use of ἀνώνυμος has been already considered (on 1, 1447 b 9).

b 28 **πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον.** Aristotle, unconsciously passing from one sense of ἥλιος to another, is now using it as the prosaic equivalent for the word φλόξ in the poetical quotation in the next line, i. e. in the sense of sunshine or sunlight, the meaning ἥλιος has in Herodotus 8. 23 ἅμα ἡλίῳ σκιδναμένῳ πᾶσα ἡ στρατιὴ ἐπέπλεε ἀλὴς ἐπὶ τὸ Ἀρτεμίσιον, and in several well-known expressions.

b 29 **πρὸς τὸν καρπόν.** Castelvetro's πρὸς τὸν ⟨ἀφιέντα τὸν⟩ καρπόν, which has been accepted by several editors, rests on the assumption that the analogy in Aristotle's mind was simply that between sowing (B) on the part of the husbandman (A), and the nameless

act, the emission of light (D), on the part of the sun (C). In that case the epithet *θεοκτίσταν* in the quotation must be taken to represent the addition required to soften the metaphor. 1457 b 29

διὸ εἴρηται: comp. *ὅθεν πεποίηται* and *ὅθεν εἴρηται* in 25, 1461 a 28, 29. Quotations similarly introduced will be found in Rhet. 2. 9, 1387 a 33, and in 2. 10, 1388 a 7, 15. That in the text was perhaps from a tragedy (Nauck, TGF.[2] p. 856).

ἔστι δὲ τῷ τρόπῳ τούτῳ κτέ.: see above on b 16. b 30

προσαγορεύσαντα τὸ ἀλλότριον, scil. *ὄνομα*, as in Pol. 4. 7, b 31
1293 a 39 *πέμπτη δ' ἐστὶν* [scil. *πολιτεία*] *ἣ προσαγορεύεται τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα πασῶν.* The more usual construction in Aristotle is *προσαγορεύειν ὀνόματι.* In saying *προσαγορεύσαντα τὸ ἀλλότριον ἀποφῆσαι τῶν οἰκείων τι* he seems to have fallen into a false antithesis. *φιάλη*, in the illustration, is *ἀλλότριον* in relation to the shield, and *ἄοινος* negatives something *οἰκεῖον* in relation to a cup. Words like *ἄοινος* come under the general designation of *στερήσεις* (Bon. Ind. 699 b 42). The free use of them in the metaphors of poetry is noted in Rhet. 3. 6, 1408 a 6 *ὅθεν καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα οἱ ποιηταὶ φέρουσι, τὸ ἄχορδον καὶ τὸ ἄλυρον μέλος· ἐκ τῶν στερήσεων γὰρ ἐπιφέρουσιν. εὐδοκιμεῖ γὰρ τοῦτο ἐν ταῖς μεταφοραῖς λεγόμενον ταῖς ἀνάλογον, οἷον τὸ φάναι τὴν σάλπιγγα εἶναι μέλος ἄλυρον.* The instance in Rhet. 3. 11, 1413 a 1 is *φόρμιγξ ἄχορδος*, a way of describing a bow.

πεποιημένον. A *πεποιημένον ὄνομα* is a word coined by the b 33
poet for the occasion, and in this respect unlike the words hitherto considered (the *κύριον ὄνομα*, the *γλῶττα*, and the *μεταφορά*), which are parts of an already existing vocabulary. Such coining of new words was termed *ὀνοματοποιία* (Volkmann, Rhetorik[2] p. 425).

καλούμενον: comp. 21, 1458 a 6 *ὀνομαζομένου.*

τίθεται. For the middle comp. H.A. 7. 12, 588 a 9 *διὸ καὶ τὰ* b 34
ὀνόματα τότε τίθενται, ὡς πιστεύοντες ἤδη μᾶλλον τῇ σωτηρίᾳ.— Rhet. 3. 13, 1414 b 15: *δεῖ δὲ εἶδός τι λέγοντα καὶ διαφορὰν ὄνομα τίθεσθαι.*

δοκεῖ γὰρ ἔνια εἶναι τοιαῦτα is a parenthesis giving a reason for the instances that come after it; comp. 25, 1460 b 24, and the note on Eth. N. 5. 1, 1129 a 29 in my Textual Criticism of the Nic. Ethics p. 43; also Kühner, Gr. Gr.[3] 2 p. 853.

ἐρνύγας, scil. *καλεῖ* or *λέγει*, to be understood from *τίθεται* in the b 35
preceding line; comp. Top. 6. 2, 140 a 3 (quoted on b 25), Rhet. 3. 3, 1406 a 7 (quoted on b 4), and Eth. N. 6. 7, 1141 a 9 *τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ἔν τε ταῖς τέχναις τοῖς ἀκριβεστάτοις τὰς τέχνας ἀποδί-*

1457 b 35 δομεν, οἷον Φειδίαν λιθουργὸν σοφὸν καὶ Πολύκλειτον ἀνδριαντοποιόν [scil. λέγομεν].

We do not know where Aristotle found the word, and there is no evidence for the form of the nom. sing.; the correction of Victorius, ἔρνυγας, assumes it to have been ἔρνυξ, like ἄντυξ; but it is just as likely that it was ἐρνύγη. An explanation of the word survives in Hesychius: ἔρνυτας [sic]· ἔρνη. βλαστήματα. κλάδοι. The form in Hesychius, with a τ instead of a γ, has been defended by Meineke as the acc. pl. of a Cretan word ἔρνυς (= ἔρνος) supposed to be implied in Ἐπιρνύτιος, a Cretan name for Zeus according to Hesychius s. v. (see note in M. Schmidt's ed.). Aristotle's view of it, however, is that it is a coined word, not a γλῶττα as a Cretan word would be; it is to be remembered too that he shows himself elsewhere (25, 1461 a 14) not wholly unfamiliar with the Cretan dialect.

ἀρητῆρα. The reference is no doubt to the use of the word in Il. 1. 11 οὕνεκα τὸν Χρύσην ἠτίμασεν ἀρητῆρα. Hesychius has the same explanation: ἀρητῆρα· ἱερέα.

ἐπεκτεταμένον κτέ. The three kinds of word remaining for consideration are abnormal only in form. As they are substantially the same as the usual words, they are said to be intelligible to all (22, 1458 b 4), i.e. they do not require explanation as a γλῶττα might do. The ἐπεκτεταμένον ὄνομα is the ordinary word lengthened out in one or other of two ways, either through the lengthening of a syllable normally short, or through the insertion of an extra syllable. Aristotle's standard being Attic, he regards πόληος for instance as a lengthened form of πόλεως. ἐπεκτείνειν has this same sense in Metaph. Δ 4, 1014 b 17 εἴ τις ἐπεκτείνας λέγοι τὸ υ (in the word φύσις).

1458 a 4 Πηλείδου. The reading of A^c, Πηλέος, is retained by Vahlen, who marks a lacuna after the word. M. Schmidt fills up the assumed gap by the following restoration: τὸ Πηλέος ⟨Πηλῆος καὶ τὸ Πηλείδου⟩ Πηληιάδεω. It is quite as easy, however, to suppose Πηλέος to have got in by assimilation to the preceding πόλεως (or πόλεος, as it is in A^c); and it must be admitted that a second instance of this sort of lengthening is hardly wanted. As regards Πηληιάδεω for Πηλείδου, Aristotle's view apparently is that the -ά- in it is epenthetic, a συλλαβὴ ἐμβεβλημένη (v. on 20, 1456 b 34). Its other deviations from the normal word (-ηι- = -ει-, and -εω = -ου) would be, according to ancient theory, instances of

διαίρεσις, 'resolution', with a lengthening of vowels in the resolved diphthongs. 1458 a 4

ἀφῃρημένον. As the *ἀφῃρημένον* is the opposite of the *ἐπεκτεταμένον ὄνομα* (v. supra a 1), we may take the term to include (1) a word with a shortened vowel, and (2) a word shortened by the omission of a syllable, whether in the beginning, middle, or end of it, i. e. a word which in the terminology of the grammarians has suffered *ἀφαίρεσις, συγκοπή*, or *ἀποκοπή*. Aristotle's examples, however, *κρῖ, δῶ, ὄψ*, are all instances of *ἀποκοπή*—the term he himself uses with reference to this class of words in 22, 1458 b 2; comp. Strabo's (364 Cas.) explanation of *Μέσση* in Il. 2. 582: *ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ κατ' ἀποκοπὴν δέχονται τὴν Μεσσήνην . . . παραδείγμασι δὲ χρῶνται τοῦ μὲν ποιητοῦ τῷ κρῖ καὶ δῶ καὶ μάψ, καὶ ἔτι 'ἥρως δ' Αὐτομέδων τε καὶ Ἄλκιμος' ἀντὶ τοῦ Ἀλκιμέδων . . . παρ' Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ δὲ 'μία γίνεται ἀμφοτέρων ὄψ', ἡ ὄψις.* It is clear that Aristotle's *ἀφῃρημένον ὄνομα* covers a wider ground than the *ἀφαίρεσις* of the grammarians, and that it must include their *ἀποκοπή* and *συγκοπή*. In the preliminary statement in 21, 1457 b 2 the shortened word is termed the *ὑφῃρημένον*, not the *ἀφῃρημένον ὄνομα*. In the interests of uniformity—which one can hardly suppose Aristotle to have ignored in a matter so technical as this—one must either read *ἀφῃρημένον* in 21, 1457 b 2 (with Spengel), or restore *ὑφῃρημένον* throughout the present section. Some of the grammarians seem to have used *ὑφαίρεσις* (v. HSt. s. v.) for the dropping of a letter in the middle of a word.

μία γίνεται ἀμφοτέρων ὄψ: Empedocles fr. 88 Diels. The reading of the MS. *οησ* (see on 18, 1456 a 2) must represent *ὄψις*, a gloss on *ὄψ* (comp. Strabo 364, quoted above on a 4). a 5

ἐξηλλαγμένον. The 'changed' word is in regard to some one part of it the invention of the poet. To that extent, therefore, it has a certain affinity with the 'coined' word, the *πεποιημένον ὄνομα* (21, 1457 b 33).

δεξιτερὸν κατὰ μαζόν: Il. 5. 393 (comp. Plutarch Qu. conv. 5. 4, p. 677 D, and Athenaeus 423 E). a 7

αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν ὀνομάτων κτέ. Up to this point names have been viewed in reference to their origin, sense, or form. Apart from these aspects, however, they may also be classified according to their gender, and distinguished as masculine, feminine, and neuter. This classification of names according to gender will be seen to be founded on the terminations of the nominatives in Attic. The primary distinction between masculine and feminine termi- a 8

1458 a 8 nations seems to have been generalized from the names of objects in which there is a visible distinction of sex, and more especially from the names of men and women (comp. Aristoph. Nub. 682). Thus nouns ending in the consonants N, P, Σ, Ψ, Ξ are regarded as normally masculine, because names like *Δίων*, *Νέστωρ*, *Πάρις*, *Πέλοψ*, *Κόραξ*, are names of males; those ending in the vowels H, Ω, and A (long or short) are normally feminine, because *Ἑλένη*, *Κλειώ*, *Ἥρα*, *Μοῦσα* are names of females. The names of sexless things (the neuters, as we call them) Aristotle terms *τὰ μεταξύ*, because as a class these words occupy an ambiguous position, their final letters being sometimes those of the masculines and sometimes those of the feminines. Thus *δένδρον*, *ἦτορ*, *τεῖχος*, as ending in the consonants N, P, Σ, have what Aristotle regards as masculine terminations; whereas *κάρα*, *τέρμα*, etc., have feminine ones; the other neuters also, *μέλι*, *γόνυ*, etc., as ending in vowels, show a certain affinity with the feminines. This seems to be the rationale of the present scheme of genders; and it is in essentials the same as that of the grammarians, though theirs no doubt is both fuller and more systematic, and leaves fewer facts to be treated as anomalies or exceptions (comp. Dionysius Thrax p. 15 Uhlig). Aristotle's classification is based on that of Protagoras, who distinguished nouns into masculine, feminine, and *σκεύη* (Rhet. 3. 5, 1407 b 7 *Πρωταγόρας τὰ γένη τῶν ὀνομάτων διῄρει, ἄρρενα καὶ θήλεα καὶ σκεύη*)—the last of the three terms meaning with him not 'things' but 'names of things', as it does also in Aristotle, in Soph. el. 14, 173 b 39 *καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν θηλέων ὀνομάτων ὡσαύτως, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λεγομένων μὲν σκευῶν ἐχόντων δὲ θηλείας ἢ ἄρρενος κλῆσιν*. In Soph. el. 14, 173 b 19 we are told that Protagoras said it was a solecism to make *μῆνις* and *πήληξ* feminine, evidently because he thought Σ and Ξ to be normally masculine terminations, just as Aristotle does. Aristophanes, Nub. 658, ridicules this new *ὀρθοέπεια* of Protagoras in the matter of gender. Stilpo is said to have disputed the propriety of speaking of Athene as a *θεός*: *μὴ γὰρ εἶναι αὐτὴν θεὸν ἀλλὰ θεάν· θεοὺς δὲ εἶναι τοὺς ἄρρενας* (Diog. Laert. 2. 116).

a 9 **ὅσα τελευτᾷ εἰς τὸ Ν καὶ Ρ ⟨καὶ Σ⟩.** This may seem an overstatement, as there are neuters which have these endings (see a 17). The explanation is to be found in Aristotle's view of the neuters: he does not conceive them as having terminations peculiar to themselves, but as holding an intermediate position between the two main classes, some of them having a masculine and others a feminine termination.

ἐκ τῶν φωνηέντων is equivalent to a partitive genitive (comp. 1458 ª 11
Pol. 5. 1, 1302 ª 4; Rhet. 1. 9, 1367 ª 36; 10, 1369 ᵇ 7). Van Cleef, Index Antiphonteus p. 58, has noted several instances of this use of ἐκ in Antiphon.

τῶν ἐπεκτεινομένων εἰς Α, 'in A among the vowels capable of ª 12
being lengthened'. The remaining dichronous vowels (see on 20, 1456 ᵇ 32), I and Y, are said a little further on to be found in the terminations of neuters (ª 15).

ἴσα . . . πλήθη. πλήθη is 'numbers', as the plural of πλῆθος, *numerus* or *summa*. It is hardly necessary, therefore, to restore πλήθει from certain of the apographs.

οὐδὲ εἰς φωνῆεν βραχύ. It is to be remembered that there is no ª 15
Greek noun ending in E or O. A neuter pronoun, like τοῦτο or τοιοῦτο (comp. Herodian 2 p. 764 Lentz), would be in Aristotle's classification (see on 20, 1457 ª 18) not an ὄνομα proper but a πτῶσις ὀνόματος.

τρία. No mention is made here of κίκι, which Plato had used in Tim. 60 A. This and sundry other words of the same order (see Lobeck, Phryn. p. 288) may perhaps have been in Aristotle's view not sufficiently naturalized to require recognition.

πέντε. The old editions (with some few of the apographs) ª 16
explain this by adding τὸ πῶυ τὸ νᾶπυ τὸ γόνυ τὸ δόρυ τὸ ἄστυ after πέντε. The nouns ending in Y are certainly more than five in number (comp. Herodian 1 p. 354 Lentz). We may perhaps suppose Aristotle to have arrived at this number by ignoring words like γλάφυ, δάκρυ, μέθυ, μῶλυ, φῖτυ as antiquated, and taking account only of those which formed part of the existing Attic vocabulary.

τὰ δὲ μεταξύ: see above on ª 8. Our word 'neuters', which represents the οὐδέτερα of the grammarians, points to the difference between the neuters and the masculines and feminines; Aristotle's τὰ μεταξύ to their resemblance; they are said to occupy an intermediate position, because in their terminations some of them resemble the masculine and others the feminine nouns; they have in fact no distinctive terminations of their own.

εἰς ταῦτα καὶ Ν ⟨καὶ Ρ⟩ καὶ Σ. The text, as thus amended, acknowledges the neuters ending in P (ὕδωρ, ἧπαρ, etc.); but it apparently says nothing of those ending in A (κῦμα, ποίημα, κάρα, etc.). It has been proposed accordingly to insert καὶ Α after ταῦτα, so as to complete the list of neuter endings (comp. Herodian 2 p. 646 Lentz τελικὰ οὐδετέρων ὀνομάτων ἕξ, ᾱ, ῑ, ῡ, ρ̄, ς̄, ῡ).

1458 a 16 It is just possible to keep to the traditional text here, by supposing that in a statement so loosely drafted as this *ταῦτα* was meant to recall not only the two vowels (I and Υ) just considered, but also A, which has been described in the preceding context (a 12) as one of the *ἐπεκτεινόμενα* or dichronous vowels. In that case *ταῦτα* will stand allusively for *τὰ ἐπεκτεινόμενα*, and include A as well as I and Υ.

a 18 **λέξεως**: 6, 1450 b 13 *λέγω δὲ . . . λέξιν εἶναι τὴν διὰ τῆς ὀνομασίας ἑρμηνείαν.* In this chapter Aristotle does not deal with style in general, but only with the portion of it which relates to the choice of words, the *ἐκλογὴ ὀνομάτων* of the grammarians; his aim is to describe the poetic vocabulary, and determine the limits to the use of exceptional words and expressions in poetry. This chapter is referred to in Rhet. 3. 1, 1404 a 28, where the language of oratory is contrasted with that of poetry: *ἑτέρα λόγου καὶ ποιήσεως λέξις ἐστίν. δηλοῖ δὲ τὸ συμβαῖνον· οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ τὰς τραγῳδίας ποιοῦντες ἔτι χρῶνται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ καὶ ἐκ τῶν τετραμέτρων εἰς τὸ ἰαμβεῖον μετέβησαν διὰ τὸ τῷ λόγῳ τοῦτο τῶν μέτρων ὁμοιότατον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων, οὕτω καὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀφείκασιν ὅσα παρὰ τὴν διάλεκτόν ἐστιν, οἷς δ' οἱ πρῶτον ἐκόσμουν, καὶ ἔτι νῦν οἱ τὰ ἑξάμετρα ποιοῦντες, ἀφείκασιν· διὸ γελοῖον μιμεῖσθαι τούτους οἳ αὐτοὶ οὐκέτι χρῶνται ἐκείνῳ τῷ τρόπῳ. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι οὐχ ἅπαντα ὅσα περὶ λέξεως ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, ἀκριβολογητέον ἡμῖν, ἀλλ' ὅσα περὶ τοιαύτης οἵας λέγομεν. περὶ δ' ἐκείνης εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.*

λέξεως ἀρετὴ κτέ.: Rhet. 3. 2, 1404 b 1 *ὡρίσθω λέξεως ἀρετὴ σαφῆ εἶναι (σημεῖον γὰρ ὅτι ὁ λόγος, ἐὰν μὴ δηλοῖ, οὐ ποιήσει τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον), καὶ μήτε ταπεινὴν μήτε ὑπὲρ τὸ ἀξίωμα ἀλλὰ πρέπουσαν· ἡ γὰρ ποιητικὴ ἴσως οὐ ταπεινή, ἀλλ' οὐ πρέπουσα λόγῳ. τῶν δ' ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων σαφῆ μὲν ποιεῖ τὰ κύρια, μὴ ταπεινὴν δὲ ἀλλὰ κεκοσμημένην τἆλλα ὀνόματα ὅσα εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς· τὸ γὰρ ἐξαλλάξαι ποιεῖ φαίνεσθαι σεμνοτέραν.*

a 20 **ταπεινή.** For *ταπεινή* as the opposite of *σεμνή* (a 21) comp. Rhet. 3. 2, 1404 b 3, 8, Isocrates 35 c, and the antithesis between *τὸ ταπεινόν* and *τὸ μεγαλοπρεπές* in Rhet. ad Alex. 3, 1423 a 31. Dionysius Hal. 5 p. 15 R. finds an instance of meanness of diction even in Homer, in the language in Od. 16. 1–16: *διὰ γὰρ τῶν εὐτελεστάτων τε καὶ ταπεινοτάτων ὀνομάτων πέπλεκται πᾶσα ἡ λέξις, οἷς ἂν καὶ γεωργὸς καὶ θαλαττουργὸς καὶ χειροτέχνης καὶ πᾶς ὁ μηδεμίαν ὤραν τοῦ λέγειν εὖ ποιούμενος ἐξ ἑτοίμου λαβὼν ἐχρήσατο. λυθέντος γοῦν τοῦ μέτρου φαῦλα φανήσεται τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἄζηλα· οὔτε γὰρ μεταφοραί τινες ἐν αὐτοῖς εὐγενεῖς ἔνεισιν οὔτε ὑπαλλαγαὶ*

οὔτε καταχρήσεις οὔτε ἄλλη τροπικὴ διάλεκτος οὐδεμία, οὐδὲ δὴ γλῶτται πολλαί τινες οὐδὲ ξένα ἢ πεποιημένα ὀνόματα. 1458 a 20

Κλεοφῶντος: see on 2, 1448 a 12.

Σθενέλου. This Sthenelus is presumably the tragic poet mentioned more than once by Aristophanes (Vesp. 1313 and fr. 151 Kock). It is doubtful whether a single line of his has come down to us (Nauck, TGF.² p. 762). a 21

ἐξαλλάττουσα τὸ ἰδιωτικόν: Rhet. 3. 3, 1406 a 15 *ἐξαλλάττει γὰρ τὸ εἰωθός* [scil. *τὰ ἐπίθετα*], *καὶ ξενικὴν ποιεῖ τὴν λέξιν.* It will be observed that Aristotle is now using *ἐξαλλάττειν* in a large sense, to denote all possible deviations from the ordinary forms of expression (*πᾶν τὸ παρὰ τὸ κύριον*, a 23), instead of restricting it to the kind of deviation presented in the *ἐξηλλαγμένον ὄνομα* (21, 1458 a 6).

τὸ ἰδιωτικόν = *τὸ εἰωθός* or *τὸ κύριον*; but the point of view is not quite the same. *τὸ ἰδιωτικόν* is the language of the ordinary man, the prosaic as opposed to the poetic mode of expression; the antithesis of *ἰδιώτης* and *ποιητής* is already in Plato (Phaedr. 258 D, Symp. 178 B, Laws 890 A). Isocrates 203 D has *ἰδιωτικὰ ὀνόματα*, but in a different sense.

ξενικοῖς. In Plato (e. g. in Crat. 401 B, 417 C) a *ξενικὸν ὄνομα* is a non-Attic word or form, what Aristotle calls a *γλῶττα* (see on 21, 1457 b 4); Isocrates 190 D (quoted above on 21, 1457 b 1) uses *ξένα ὀνόματα* in the same sense. Aristotle's *ξενικὰ ὀνόματα*, however, is a wider term; it comprises all the various deviations from the usual form of expression (*πᾶν τὸ παρὰ τὸ κύριον* a 23)—the *μεταφορά*, the *ἐπεκτεταμένον ὄνομα*, etc., as well as the *γλῶττα*. In the Rhetoric also *τὸ ξενικόν* is the general opposite of *τὸ εἰωθός*: Rhet. 3. 3, 1406 a 15 *ἐξαλλάττει τὸ εἰωθός, καὶ ξενικὴν ποιεῖ τὴν λέξιν.*—3. 12, 1414 a 26 *τὸ εἰωθὸς καὶ ξενικόν.* The attraction such unfamiliar words have for us is explained in Rhet. 3. 2, 1404 b 8: *τὸ ἐξαλλάξαι ποιεῖ φαίνεσθαι σεμνοτέραν* [scil. *τὴν λέξιν*]· *ὥσπερ γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς ξένους οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ πρὸς τοὺς πολίτας, τὸ αὐτὸ πάσχουσι καὶ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν. διὸ δεῖ ποιεῖν ξένην τὴν διάλεκτον· θαυμασταὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀπόντων εἰσίν, ἡδὺ δὲ τὸ θαυμαστόν.* a 22

ἅπαντα τοιαῦτα is an exaggeration, like *ἁπάντων* in 1, 1447 b 22. All that Aristotle really means is that too much metaphor, or an undue proportion of strange words makes the sentence an enigma or a 'barbarism'. *τοιαῦτα* = *ξενικά*, or *ἐκ ξενικῶν.* a 24

This passage is quoted in a fragment attributed to Longinus (Rhet. Gr. 1, 325 Spengel): *ὅτι ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης τοὺς πάντα μεταφέροντας αἰνίγματα γράφειν ἔλεγεν.*

1458 a 25 **μὲν οὖν** 'saepe usurpatur ubi notio modo pronunciata amplius explicatur', Bon. Ind. 540 b 42; comp. 14, 1453 b 32, and Vahlen's note on the present passage.

αἴνιγμα. The puzzle in a riddle Aristotle explains as arising from the presence of metaphors, i. e. of words used in a transferred sense. The element of metaphors in riddles is noted again in Rhet. 3. 2, 1405 b 4 *καὶ ὅλως ἐκ τῶν εὖ ᾐνιγμένων ἔστι μεταφορὰς λαβεῖν ἐπιεικεῖς (μεταφοραὶ γάρ αἰνίττονται), ὥστε δῆλον* [*? δηλοῦν*] *ὅτι εὖ μετενήνεκται.*—3. 11, 1412 a 24 *καὶ τὰ εὖ ᾐνιγμένα διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἡδέα· μάθησις γάρ· καὶ λέγεται μεταφορά* [*? μεταφορᾷ*]. Quintilian also (8. 6, 14) speaks of the riddle-like effect of too much metaphor: *Ut modicus autem atque opportunus eius usus illustrat orationem, ita frequens et obscurat et taedio complet, continuus vero in allegorias et aenigmata exit.*

a 26 **τε γάρ** is practically no more than *γάρ* in this and many other Aristotelian passages (comp. Bon. Ind. 750 a 5, and Kühner, Gr. Gr.[3] 2. 2 p. 244).

ἰδέα: equivalent here to *οὐσία* (see Waitz, Org. 2 p. 406).

a 28 **τῶν ὀνομάτων.** *ὄνομα* has been used before this as a generic term including the metaphor, etc., as well as what Aristotle calls the *κύριον ὄνομα* (see 21, 1457 b 1). When opposed, however, to the metaphor, as in the present passage, it may easily mean *the* name (as we say) for the thing, i. e. its proper name, its *κύριον ὄνομα.* It recurs in this more specific sense in 22, 1458 b 2 and b 16. It is not so absolutely necessary, therefore, to adopt the emendation of Heinsius, *τῶν ⟨κυρίων⟩ ὀνομάτων*, or the reading which the Arabic Version is believed to imply, *τῶν ⟨ἄλλων⟩ ὀνομάτων.* For other instances of the same use of general terms in a restricted sense see on 1, 1447 a 29 (*ἢ τοῖς μέτροις*).

a 29 **κατὰ δὲ τὴν μεταφορῶν**, scil. *σύνθεσιν.* The correction *μεταφορῶν* seems to be required not only by the form of the antithesis, *κατὰ τὴν τῶν ὀνομάτων σύνθεσιν*, in the preceding line, but also by the meaning. It is the combination of metaphors that produces the sense of impossibility (comp. *ἀδύνατα συνάψαι* a 27) which is of the essence of an *αἴνιγμα.*

ἄνδρ' εἶδον *κτέ.*: a line traditionally ascribed to Cleobulina, fr. 1 Bergk. The riddle is partially explained in Rhet. 3. 2, 1405 a 35 *οὐ πόρρωθεν δεῖ ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ τῶν ὁμοειδῶν μεταφέρειν τὰ ἀνώνυμα* [*⟨ἐπὶ⟩ τὰ ἀνώνυμα ?*] *ὠνομασμένως, ὃ λεχθὲν δῆλόν ἐστιν ὅτι συγγενές, οἷον ἐν τῷ αἰνίγματι τῷ εὐδοκιμοῦντι "ἄνδρ' εἶδον πυρὶ χαλκὸν ἐπ' ἀνέρι κολλήσαντα". ἀνώνυμον γὰρ τὸ πάθος, ἔστι δ' ἄμφω*

πρόσθεσίς τις· κόλλησιν τοίνυν εἶπε τὴν τῆς σικύας προσβολήν. 1458 [a] 29
χαλκός, as a name for what we conventionally call a 'cupping-glass', is a metaphor derived from the material of which the instrument was often made in antiquity. Celsus 2. 11 has a description of the brazen cupping-glass and its mode of action: *Aenea* [scil. *cucurbitula*] *altera parte patet, altera clausa est . . . in aeneam linamentum ardens conicitur, ac sic os eius corpori aptatur imprimiturque donec inhaereat . . . ubi inhaesit, si concisa ante scalpello cutis est, sanguinem extrahit; si integra est, spiritum* (comp. Aristot. Probl. 9. 9–12, 890 [b] 7–37; Mayor on Juv. 14. 58; and the monograph of K. P. I. Lampros, *Περὶ σικυῶν καὶ σικυάσεως*, Athens 1895).

κολλήσαντα: a metaphor *ἀπ' εἴδους ἐπὶ εἶδος* (see 21, 1457 [b] 13). [a] 30
For the tense of the participle see Goodwin, Syntax of Greek Moods and Tenses § 148.

ἐκ τῶν γλωττῶν βαρβαρισμός: a mere repetition of the *ἐὰν δὲ ἐκ γλωττῶν βαρβαρισμός* in [a] 25, and brought in also without syntactical connexion with the context. The words may be the residue of a longer statement now lost, or a stop-gap to disguise a lacuna, or a rough note by Aristotle himself to indicate a point to be worked out at length at some future time.

βαρβαρισμός is the opposite of *ἑλληνισμός*. *ἑλληνίζειν* in Aristotle (v. Bon. Ind. 238 [b] 53) means to speak Greek like a native, i.e. correctly, and *βαρβαρίζειν* to speak it like a foreigner, whether through the use of 'strange words' (*γλῶτται*), or through that of strange or unauthorized forms of words. That *βαρβαρίζειν* had this wide sense is clear from the explanation of *σολοικίζειν* ('to speak incorrectly') in Soph. el. 3, 165 [b] 20 *τέταρτον δὲ σολοικίζειν ποιεῖν, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ποιῆσαι τῇ λέξει βαρβαρίζειν, ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον* (comp. Bon. Ind. 688 [a] 54). In later theory, however, 'barbarism' denotes more especially a faulty use of particular words, and 'solecism' a fault of construction or syntax: Sextus Emp. Adv. math. 1. 210 *βαρβαρισμός ἐστι παράπτωσις ἐν ἁπλῇ λέξει παρὰ τὴν κοινὴν συνήθειαν, καὶ σολοικισμός ἐστι παράπτωσις ἀσυνήθης κατὰ τὴν ὅλην σύνταξιν καὶ ἀνακόλουθος* (v. Volkmann, Rhetorik[2] p. 396). Quintilian (1. 5, 8) distinguishes three senses of 'barbarismus' in Latin: *Barbarismum pluribus modis accipimus: unum gente* [? *genus*], *quale fit si quis Afrum vel Hispanum latinae orationi nomen inserat . . . alterum genus barbarismi accipimus quod fit animi natura . . . tertium est illud vitium barbarismi cuius exempla vulgo sunt plurima, sibi etiam*

1458 a 30 *quisque fingere potest, ut verbo cui libebit adiciat litteram syllabamve vel detrahat, aut etiam aliam pro alia aut eandem alio quam rectum est loco ponat.*

a 31 **δεῖ ἄρα κεκρᾶσθαί πως τούτοις**, scil. *τὴν λέξιν*; the language of poetry should have some admixture of unusual words or forms in it. Similarly in the Rhetoric a certain combination of familiar and unfamiliar words is said to be an element of pleasure in a speech: Rhet. 3. 12, 1414 a 25 *καὶ τὸ ἡδεῖαν* [scil. *τὴν λέξιν εἶναι*] *τὰ εἰρημένα ποιήσει ἂν εὖ μιχθῇ, τὸ εἰωθὸς καὶ ξενικόν.* In the text *τούτοις* refers back to the *ξενικά* in a 22; all from *ἀλλ' ἄν τις* in a 23 to *βαρβαρισμός* in a 31 is digression. For the qualifying *πως* in this connexion comp. Probl. 30. 1, 954 b 27 *ἐὰν δέ πως κραθῶσι.*

τὸ μὲν γὰρ μὴ ἰδιωτικὸν ποιήσει, scil. *ταῦτα*, i.e. *τὰ ξενικά*. The *οἷον* prefixed to the list of *ξενικά* which follows is the appositional and explanatory *οἷον*, *nempe* or *scilicet* (comp. Bon. Ind. 502 a 7). There is a reference to this place in Rhet. 3. 2, 1404 b 5: *τῶν δ' ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων σαφῆ μὲν ποιεῖ τὰ κύρια, μὴ ταπεινὴν δὲ ἀλλὰ κεκοσμημένην τἆλλα ὀνόματα ὅσα εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.*

a 34 **εἴδη**, scil. *ὀνομάτων*.

οὐκ ἐλάχιστον δὲ μέρος συμβάλλεται: Isocrates 156 B *οὐ γὰρ ἐλάχιστον μέρος τὰ γένη ταῦτα συμβάλλεται πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν.*—Hippocrates 1 p. 525 K. *οὐκ ἐλάχιστον μέρος συμβάλλεται ἀστρονομίη ἐς ἰητρικήν.*

b 1 **συμβάλλεται.** The singular verb may be explained by supposing the real subject to be *τὰ ἐπεκτεταμένα καὶ ἀποκεκομμένα καὶ ἐξηλλαγμένα ὀνόματα* rather than the various processes they exemplify. Other instances of a singular verb with several subjects in the plural will be found in Kühner, Gr. Gr.[3] 2. 1 p. 81. The anomaly in the present instance is not so harsh as it might have been, as the verb precedes its subjects, and is also at some distance from them: it may be illustrated also by the common use of *ἔστι*, *ἦν*, and *γίγνεται* followed by a plural subject (see Kühner, Gr. Gr.[3] 2. 1 p. 68). Vahlen quotes a similar construction with *δοκεῖ* in H. A. 4. 9, 536 a 17 *δοκεῖ δὲ . . . ὥσπερ λύχνοι φαίνεσθαι οἱ ὀφθαλμοί.*

b 5 **ὥστε οὐκ ὀρθῶς ψέγουσιν κτέ.** In this long digression, which extends to *ἐκεῖνος δὲ τοῦτο ἠγνόει* in 1459 a 4, Aristotle insists on the literary value and effect of the various poetical forms of expression, and defends their use by the poets. He first answers the critics of the epic (b 7–31), and then those of the tragic diction (b 31–1459 a 4).

b 7 **τὸν ποιητήν**, the poet, whoever he may be. It is evident, how-

ever, that Aristotle is mainly concerned with Homer (comp. Bon. 1458 ^{b} 7 Ind. 609 ^{b} 57); the licences he considers are all epic licences; and the instances quoted in ^{b} 9–10 were presumably meant to caricature the Homeric hexameter. It was generally admitted that Homer was ready enough *metri gratia* to take great liberties with language (see Ludwich, Aristarchs Homerische Textkritik 2 p. 127; Schulze, Qu. epicae p. 3). Throughout this chapter Aristotle is thinking quite as much of the epic poet as of the tragedian, though his theory of the Epic is still to come (in 23–24).

Εὐκλείδης ὁ ἀρχαῖος. Nothing further is known of him. As a surmise, which must be taken for what it is worth, I would suggest that he may possibly be the Euclid who was Archon in the year 403, when the reformed alphabet was officially adopted at Athens. At that moment considerable attention seems to have been devoted to questions of phonetics (see on 20, 1456 ^{b} 31); and the anomalies and licences of Homeric metre may very well have been one of the facts to which the reforming party pointed in proof of the need of a fuller alphabet.

ὡς ῥᾴδιον ποιεῖν = ὡς ῥᾴδιον ὂν ποιεῖν. For the omission of ὄν see Goodwin, Syntax of Greek Moods and Tenses 875. 1.

ἐκτείνειν. From the definition of the ἐπεκτεταμένον ὄνομα in 21, ^{b} 8
1457 ^{b} 35 it is clear that Aristotle is referring not only to the lengthening of a short vowel but also to the insertion of an extra syllable in a word.

ἰαμβοποιήσας ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ λέξει. The sense of these words and ^{b} 9
their connexion with the lines which follow have been a difficulty with the interpreters from the days of Victorius, who gives up the passage in despair. Goulston renders them by 'qui etiam in ipsa oratione soluta iambica confecit'; Tyrwhitt by 'in ipsa oratione soluta cavillo facto'; M. Schmidt by 'ihr Verfahren in seinem eignen Ausdruck persiflirte'; Ueberweg by 'er legt den Spott in die Redeform selbst (durch Sylbenverlängerung) hinein'. Vahlen's interpretation (which is practically the same as Tyrwhitt's) is 'iambum sive carmen probrosum et cavillatorium faciens mero sermone pedestri (*in purer prosa*)'. It is not so easy to see how ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ λέξει can mean the same thing as ἐν ψιλῇ λέξει; nor is ἰαμβοποιήσας quite the same thing as ἴαμβον ποιήσας. Perhaps the simplest solution of the difficulty is to transpose ἰαμβοποιήσας, placing it after ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ λέξει, and then take the two lines of parody which follow as its object. ἰαμβοποιεῖν τι may very well mean to 'write, or say, something as an ἰαμβοποιός' (i. e. as a

1458 b 9 caricaturist), just in the same way as *δραματοποιεῖν τι* means to 'describe as a *δραματοποιός*' (4, 1448 b 37), and *λογοποιεῖν τι* to 'describe as a *λογοποιός*'.

Ἐπιχάρην κτέ. This and the next quotation are given as specimens of prose which by a liberal use of epic licences may be made to read as verse. By the artifice of lengthening two short syllables Ἐπιχάρην εἶδον κτέ. becomes an hexameter—the lengthening required with Ἐπιχάρην being like that in *ἐπίτονος* in Od. 12. 423. *βαδίζειν*, it may be observed, is not an epic word. How the second instance was to be read as a verse is not equally clear, the text here being obviously corrupt. If we may suppose *ἐλλέβορον* to be a scribal error for *ἐλλεβόρου*, the parodist may have proposed to read this as *ἐλλεβόροιο*.

Μαραθῶνάδε. The accentuation in A^c (Μαραθῶνα δὲ) is in accordance with the rule of Apollonius and Herodian (La Roche, Homerische Textkritik p. 221).

b 11 **φαίνεσθαί πως χρώμενον**: De gen. et corr. 1. 10, 328 b 10 *φαίνεται γάρ πως καὶ μικτὰ ἠρέμα.* A visible use of these artifices is one thing and a discreet use of them (*τὸ μέτριον*, b 12) another. For the antithesis comp. Pol. 5. 11, 1314 b 28 *περί τε τὰς ἀπολαύσεις τὰς σωματικὰς* [scil. *δεῖ*] *τοὐναντίον ποιεῖν ἢ νῦν τινὲς τῶν τυράννων ποιοῦσιν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον εὐθὺς ἕωθεν τοῦτο δρῶσιν καὶ συνεχῶς πολλὰς ἡμέρας, ἀλλὰ καὶ φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἄλλοις βούλονται τοῦτο πράττοντες, ἵν' ὡς εὐδαίμονας καὶ μακαρίους θαυμάσωσιν· ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μὲν μετριάζειν τοῖς τοιούτοις, εἰ δὲ μή, τό γε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἄλλοις διαφεύγειν.* In the Rhetoric Aristotle lays down the same rule for oratory: the orator must use all the arts of language, but with discretion, so as not to allow his use of them to become too apparent: Rhet. 3. 2, 1404 b 18 *διὸ δεῖ λανθάνειν ποιοῦντας, καὶ μὴ δοκεῖν λέγειν πεπλασμένως ἀλλὰ πεφυκότως* (comp. also 3. 7, 1408 b 4).

τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ, scil. *τῆς διαλέκτου*; comp. *οἱ ἐπιτιμῶντες τῷ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ τῆς διαλέκτου* in b 6, and *τῷ τρόπῳ τούτῳ τῆς μεταφορᾶς χρῆσθαι* in 21, 1457 b 30. Vahlen, who supplies *ἐπεκτάσεσι* after *χρώμενον*, takes *τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ* as equivalent to *τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον*.

b 12 **τὸ δὲ μέτριον.** If the traditional reading, *τὸ δὲ μέτρον*, be retained, we have to understand *μέτρον* in the sense of 'measure' or 'limit'. The objection to this interpretation is that *μέτρον* has the sense of 'metre' in the immediate context (b 16), and that any other sense would be somewhat confusing in a passage dealing with 'metrical' licences. *τὸ μέτριον*, on the other hand, is certified

by more than one parallel in the Rhetoric: Rhet. 3. 2, 1405 b 32 εὐλαβεῖσθαι δὲ δεῖ καὶ παρατηρεῖν ἐν ἀμφοῖν τὸ μέτριον.—3. 3, 1406 a 16 ἀλλὰ δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι τοῦ μετρίου, ἐπεὶ μεῖζον ποιεῖ κακὸν τοῦ εἰκῇ λέγειν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει τὸ εὖ, ἡ δὲ τὸ κακῶς. διὸ τὰ Ἀλκιδάμαντος ψυχρὰ φαίνεται· οὐ γὰρ ἡδύσματι χρῆται ἀλλ' ὡς ἐδέσματι τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις, οὕτω πυκνοῖς καὶ μείζοσι καὶ ἐπιδήλοις. In another passage, Rhet. 2. 14, 1390 b 8 ὅσα δ' ὑπερβάλλουσιν ἢ ἐλλείπουσι, τούτων τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ ἁρμόττον, we find Aristotle passing from the idea of τὸ μέτριον to that of τὸ ἁρμόττον just as he does here in the context (b 15). 1458 b 12

κοινὸν ἁπάντων ἐστὶ τῶν μερῶν: Rhet. 3. 7, 1408 a 36 τὸ δ' εὐκαίρως ἢ μὴ εὐκαίρως χρῆσθαι κοινὸν ἁπάντων τῶν εἰδῶν ἐστιν.

ἀπρεπῶς. In the Rhetoric an unsuitable metaphor is said to be one of the faults which make the style of an orator 'frigid': Rhet. 3. 3, 1406 b 5 τὸ ψυχρὸν ἐν ταῖς μεταφοραῖς γίνεται· εἰσὶ γὰρ καὶ μεταφοραὶ ἀπρεπεῖς αἱ μὲν διὰ τὸ γελοῖον (χρῶνται γὰρ καὶ οἱ κωμῳδοποιοὶ μεταφοραῖς) αἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ σεμνὸν ἄγαν καὶ τραγικόν. b 14

ἐπίτηδες ἐπὶ τὰ γελοῖα. ἐπὶ τὰ γελοῖα, which has been bracketed (by Gomperz), seems to be wanted to keep up the parallelism with what is said in b 5 sqq. on the subject of the epic licences, which Euclid had parodied and turned to ridicule. Aristotle's reply to Euclid is that it is quite possible to misuse metaphors, etc., for the same purpose, ἐπὶ τὰ γελοῖα (comp. Rhet. 3. 3, 1406 b 5, quoted above). The comparative ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιότερα would be more in accordance with usage (comp. Stallb. on Plato Symp. 214 E).

τὸ δὲ ἁρμοττόντως. This is considered (1) in reference to these epic licences (ἐπέκτασις, ἀποκοπή, ἐξαλλαγή), and (2) in reference to the use of metaphor, etc. (b 17). b 15

ὅσον διαφέρει: Isocrates 87 C καίτοι μ' οὐ λέληθεν ὅσον διαφέρουσι τῶν λόγων εἰς τὸ πείθειν οἱ λεγόμενοι τῶν ἀναγιγνωσκομένων.

ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπῶν θεωρείσθω: because these metrical licences are so marked a feature in the epic diction (see on b 7). The proof here is not unlike that by which Isocrates 191 A shows the literary value of metre: οἱ μὲν μετὰ μέτρων καὶ ῥυθμῶν ἅπαντα ποιοῦσιν, οἱ δ' οὐδενὸς τούτων κοινωνοῦσιν· ἃ τοσαύτην ἔχει χάριν, ὥστ' ἂν καὶ τῇ λέξει καὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν ἔχῃ κακῶς, ὅμως αὐταῖς ταῖς εὐρυθμίαις καὶ ταῖς συμμετρίαις ψυχαγωγοῦσι τοὺς ἀκούοντας. γνοίη δ' ἄν τις ἐκεῖθεν τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν· ἢν γάρ τις τῶν ποιημάτων τῶν εὐδοκιμούντων τὰ μὲν ὀνόματα καὶ τὰς διανοίας καταλίπῃ, τὸ δὲ μέτρον διαλύσῃ, φανήσεται πολὺ καταδεέστερα τῆς δόξης ἧς νῦν ἔχομεν περὶ αὐτῶν. b 16

1458 b 16 **τῶν ὀνομάτων**: i. e. the normal words, the words themselves, as distinct from the *ἐπεκτάσεις*, etc., of them (see above on a 28).

b 18 **ἰδεῶν.** For *ἰδέα* = *εἶδος*, 'species', see Waitz, Org. 2 p. 416, and Bon. Ind. 338 b 34. In De caelo 1. 7 Aristotle says, within the space of a few lines, *πεπερασμένων εἰδῶν* (274 a 32) and *ἰδέας πεπερασμένας* (b 2) without perceptible difference of meaning.

b 20 **ἓν δὲ μόνον ὄνομα.** A verb taken by itself, i. e. apart from a subject, may be termed an *ὄνομα* (see on 20, 1457 a 10).

b 21 **κυρίου εἰωθότος.** Though *κύριον* and *εἰωθὸς ὄνομα* are often used as synonyms, there is a certain difference between them, as the *εἰωθὸς ὄνομα* may be a metaphor. *ἐσθίει* in the line of Aeschylus (b 23) is the word in general use (*τὸ εἰωθός*), but it is a metaphor, and therefore not a *κύριον ὄνομα* (see on 21, 1457 b 1) in the stricter sense of the term. By comparison with *θοινᾶται*, however, it is the *κύριον ὄνομα*. Aristotle gets out of the difficulty by terming it the *κύριον εἰωθός*, the usual *κύριον*, because it has by custom and use come to be treated as a *κύριον ὄνομα*, and is no longer felt to be a metaphor.

b 22 **εὐτελές.** The epithet is applied to a certain kind of word in Rhet. 3. 7, 1408 a 13 (see on *κόσμος*, 21, 1457 b 2), and in the passage from Dionysius quoted above on a 20.

Αἰσχύλος: Nauck, TGF.[2] p. 81 and 618.

b 24 **θοινᾶται**, which is not uncommon in poetry, is regarded by Aristotle as a *γλῶττα* (see on 21, 1457 b 4). It is explained in Hesychius, *θοινᾶται· εὐωχεῖται.*

b 25 **νῦν δέ μ' ἐὼν κτέ.**: Od. 9. 515 *νῦν δέ μ' ἐὼν ὀλίγος τε καὶ οὐτιδανὸς καὶ ἄκικυς.*

ἀεικής. The traditional text of the Poetics has *ἀειδής*, and that of Homer *ἄκικυς*—with an ancient variant, however, *ἀεικής*. The restoration of *ἀεικής* in the quotation, as the reading which Aristotle must have had before him, is believed to be confirmed by the Arabic Version. *ἀειδής* is open to two objections: (1) it is the word actually used in b 27 in Aristotle's metaphrasis of the Homeric line; (2) it is also a late word, and in the sense which it seems to bear here, that of 'unsightly' or 'ugly' (= *δυσειδής*), not to be found in pre-Aristotelian Greek. On the other hand, if the old poetical word *ἀεικής* had to be interpreted as an epithet of a person, *ἀειδής* in its later sense might very well be chosen to represent it.

b 29 **δίφρον ἀεικέλιον κτέ.**: Od. 20. 259. Several of the manuscripts of the Odyssey read *παραθείς* in lieu of *καταθείς*.

ἠιόνες βοόωσιν: Il. 17. 265. 1458 b 31

κράζουσιν: comp. Demosthenes 18. 132 *βοῶν ὁ βάσκανος οὗτος καὶ κεκραγώς.*

Ἀριφράδης is perhaps the Ariphrades whose name occurs in Aristophanes, and who is said to have been a *κιθαρῳδός* by profession (Bergk, De rel. com. Att. p. 232). It is not necessary to suppose him to have given expression to this criticism in a book.

τοὺς τραγῳδούς: i. e. the tragic actors, who are made responsible b 32 for what the poet puts into their mouth. It will be observed that the expressions singled out for censure are taken apparently from the dialogue of Tragedy; there would have been no point in saying that the language of the choral part was *παρὰ τὴν διάλεκτον.* A similar use of the word *τραγῳδοί* is found, a few years after Aristotle's time, in Diphilus, fr. 30 Kock *ὦ τόνδ' ἐποπτεύουσα καὶ κεκτημένη Βραυρῶνος ἱεροῦ θεοφιλέστατον τόπον, Λητοῦς Διός τε τοξόδαμνε παρθένε, ὡς οἱ τραγῳδοί φασιν, οἷς ἐξουσία ἔστιν λέγειν ἅπαντα καὶ ποιεῖν μόνοις.*

τῇ διαλέκτῳ, the spoken, as distinct from the written language. *διάλεκτος* has the same sense in 4, 1449 a 26 *πλεῖστα γὰρ ἰαμβεῖα λέγομεν ἐν τῇ διαλέκτῳ τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους,* and in Rhet. 3. 1, 1404 a 33 *τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀφείκασιν ὅσα παρὰ τὴν διάλεκτόν ἐστιν.* The ordinary meaning of the term in Aristotle is either 'speech' (i. e. articulate language) or 'mode of speech'.

ἐγὼ δέ νιν: Sophocles O. C. 986. The rest of the instances in b 34 the text were no doubt taken from existing plays (v. Nauck, TGF.[2] p. 856).

ἑκάστῳ τῶν εἰρημένων: the *ἐπεκτάσεις, ἀποκοπαί,* and *ἐξαλλαγαὶ* 1459 a 4 *τῶν ὀνομάτων* mentioned in 1458 b 2 before the digression (1458 b 5 — *ἠγνόει* 1459 a 4).

καὶ διπλοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ γλώτταις is a sort of afterthought. a 5 Aristotle remembers that, as artifices of poetic expression, these are in just the same position as the forms of language he has been considering, and admit of the same justification.

πολὺ δὲ μέγιστον. In the Rhetoric metaphor is shown to hold an equally important place in the diction of oratory (Rhet. 3. 2, 1404 b 32 sqq.).

μεταφορικόν: comp. the eulogy of Empedocles as a master of a 6 poetic expression in fr. 70 (Teubn.) from the dialogue *περὶ ποιητῶν*: *καὶ Ὁμηρικὸς ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ δεινὸς περὶ τὴν φράσιν γέγονε, μεταφορικός τ' ὢν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς περὶ ποιητικὴν ἐπιτεύγμασι χρώμενος.*

1459^a 6 With this use of *μεταφορικός*, i.e. as applied to a person, Vahlen compares that of *ἐνθυμηματικός* in Rhet. 1. 1, 1354^b 22, etc., and of *συλλογιστικός* in Top. 8. 14, 163^b 30.

^{a} 7 **εὐφυΐας τε σημεῖον.** *εὐφυΐα* means a gift of nature, i.e. an aptitude not to be acquired by education or study; see on 17, 1455^a 32, and comp. Eth. N. 3. 7, 1114^b 6 *φῦναι δεῖ ὥσπερ ὄψιν ἔχοντα ᾗ κρινεῖ καλῶς καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἀγαθὸν αἱρήσεται. καὶ ἔστιν εὐφυής, ᾧ τοῦτο καλῶς πέφυκεν. τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον καὶ ὃ παρ' ἑτέρου μὴ οἷόν τε λαβεῖν μηδὲ μαθεῖν, ἀλλ' οἷον ἔφυ τοιοῦτον ἕξει, καὶ τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ καλῶς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι ἡ τελεία καὶ ἀληθινὴ ἂν εἴη εὐφυΐα.* The originality shown in metaphor is noted also in Rhet. 3. 2, 1405^a 9 *καὶ λαβεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτὴν παρ' ἄλλου.* This power, according to Aristotle, depends on a rapid and intuitive perception of similarity in difference, i.e. of the resemblances between things not obviously alike; comp. Rhet. 3. 11, 1412^a 10; *δεῖ δὲ μεταφέρειν . . . ἀπὸ οἰκείων καὶ μὴ φανερῶν, οἷον καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ τὸ ⟨τὸ⟩ ὅμοιον καὶ ἐν πολὺ διέχουσι θεωρεῖν εὐστόχου.* For the kinds of similarity underlying metaphors see 21, 1457^b 7.

εὖ μεταφέρειν. Aristotle is apparently setting aside far-fetched metaphors (Rhet. 3. 2, 1405^a 35; 3. 3, 1406^b 8), in which the underlying resemblance is not so real and clear as it should be.

^{a} 8 **τὸ τὸ ὅμοιον θεωρεῖν.** For other instances of concurrence of identical forms of the article see Soph. el. 13, 173^b 15; Meteor. 1. 3, 341^a 30; De resp. 2, 471^a 7; Metaph. N 2, 1089^a 14.

τῶν δ' ὀνομάτων κτέ. A very similar distinction is made in Rhet. 3. 3, 1406^b 1: *χρησιμωτάτη ἡ διπλῆ λέξις τοῖς διθυραμβοποιοῖς· οὗτοι γὰρ ψοφώδεις· αἱ δὲ γλῶτται τοῖς ἐποποιοῖς· σεμνὸν γὰρ καὶ αὔθαδες· ἡ μεταφορὰ δὲ τοῖς ἰαμβείοις· τούτοις γὰρ νῦν χρῶνται.*

^{a} 9 **τοῖς διθυράμβοις**: comp. the fr. of Philodemus published by Gomperz (Vienna Academy, Sitzungsberichte 123 p. 66): *τὸ μακροσύνθετον ἀνιᾶν μὲν ἐν τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ ἢ τοῖς ἔπεσι . . . ἄλυπον δ' ἐν τῷ διθυράμβῳ.*—Demetrius De eloc. 91 *ληπτέον δὲ καὶ τὰ σύνθετα ὀνόματα, οὐ τὰ διθυραμβικῶς συγκείμενα, οἷον θεοτεράτους πλάνας, οὐδὲ ἄστρων δορύπυρον στρατόν, ἀλλ' ἐοικότα τοῖς ὑπὸ τῆς συνηθείας συγκειμένοις.*

^{a} 10 **τοῖς ἡρωικοῖς**: comp. 23, 1459^b 34.

τοῖς ἰαμβείοις: i.e. the tragic dialogue (v. 4, 1449^a 24).

^{a} 12 **λέξιν μιμεῖσθαι.** Instead of its usual sense of diction or language, *λέξις* in this passage must mean (like *διάλεκτος* in 1458^b 32) the spoken as distinct from the literary language. The present statement, therefore, is in harmony with that in

Rhet. 3. 1, 1404 a 33, where Tragedy is said to have learnt to reject words outside the ordinary spoken language (ὅσα παρὰ τὴν διάλεκτόν ἐστιν). With this use of λέξις we may compare that of λέξις, λεκτικὸν μέτρον, and λεκτικὴ ἁρμονία in 4, 1449 a 23–8; and also that of λόγος in Rhet. 3. 1, 1404 a 30 ἐκ τῶν τετραμέτρων εἰς τὸ ἰαμβεῖον μετέβησαν διὰ τὸ τῷ λόγῳ τοῦτο τῶν μέτρων ὁμοιότατον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων. Goulston renders λέξις here by *vulgaris sermo*; Bonitz (Ind. 427 b 31) by *sermo pedestris*, on the assumption that it stands for ψιλὴ λέξις, as it no doubt sometimes does. In 4, 1449 a 23 λέξις is the opposite of 'song'. 1459 a 12

ἐν λόγοις has been taken to mean 'in common speech, or conversation' ('in familiari colloquio', Goulston), 'in prose' ('oratio pedestris', Bon. Ind. 433 b 20), and 'in speeches' ('in orationibus', Tyrwhitt). Though it is not always possible to determine the exact meaning of a word like λόγος (v. on 4, 1449 a 17), the balance of probability is rather in favour of Tyrwhitt's 'in orationibus'. Aristotle's meaning would seem to be this, that the tragic dialogue (ἐν ἰαμβείοις) is limited to the same species of words as oratory (ἐν λόγοις)—those found in the language of common life (λέξις), viz. the κύριον, the μεταφορά, and the κόσμος. The appropriateness of the κύριον and μεταφορά for oratory is distinctly affirmed in the Rhetoric, and for the same reason, that they are in common use: Rhet. 3. 2, 1404 b 31 τὸ δὲ κύριον καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ μεταφορὰ μόναι χρήσιμοι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ψιλῶν λόγων λέξιν· σημεῖον δέ, ὅτι τούτοις μόνοις πάντες χρῶνται, πάντες γὰρ μεταφοραῖς διαλέγονται καὶ τοῖς οἰκείοις καὶ τοῖς κυρίοις (comp. Isocrates 190 E). The reference in the text to the language of 'speeches' may serve to remind us of the fact that even in Aristotle's time the theory of literary prose was still studied mainly in connexion with oratory, and as part of the art of Rhetoric. According to the canon here laid down by Aristotle, the highly-coloured diction of Aeschylus would be inappropriate in Tragedy; and he tells us elsewhere that it was eschewed by the dramatists of his time: Rhet. 3. 1, 1404 a 33 τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀφείκασιν [i. e. the tragedians] ὅσα παρὰ τὴν διάλεκτόν ἐστιν, οἷς δ' οἱ πρῶτον ἐκόσμουν . . . ἀφείκασιν. From the days of Euripides in fact (comp. Aristoph. Ran. 939) the language of Tragedy had been approximating to that of ordinary life; and in Aristotle's age there was probably no very serious difference between it and that of the Comedy of the period. a 13

κόσμος: see on 21, 1457 b 2. The parallel in the Rhetoric (3. 2, 1404 b 31, quoted above) ignores the κόσμος. a 14

1459 a 15 **τῆς ἐν τῷ πράττειν μιμήσεως.** A tragedy is something to be acted, an epic something to be recited or read. This makes a fundamental distinction between them, though Aristotle admits that as a work of literature a tragedy is quite possible without performance on a stage (6, 1450 b 18; 26, 1462 a 12, 17).

a 17 **περὶ δὲ τῆς διηγηματικῆς** *κτέ.* The natural division in the matter of this and the next chapter would be at 24, 1459 b 17, so as to make *διαφέρει δὲ* the beginning of the second half of the discussion. Throughout these two chapters Aristotle has Homer constantly in view; if he mentions other epic writings, it is only to show their artistic inferiority to the Iliad and Odyssey. The general intention of the present statement is to bring the Epic under the rules of construction laid down for Tragedy. Though the enumeration of the points of agreement and difference between the two is so much longer than that in 5, 1449 b 9–20, it ignores one characteristic of the Epic, its being a *μίμησις σπουδαίων*—on which no little stress was laid in the earlier chapters (3, 1448 a 26; 4, 1448 b 38 sqq.). Taking this for granted, it would seem, Aristotle proceeds to insist (1) that a good epic must conform to the tragic rule of Unity of story (1459 a 18–b 7); (2) that epic poetry divides into the same species as Tragedy (1459 b 8–10); and (3) that it involves the same literary elements (1459 b 10–17). After this he passes on to its points of difference, its length (b 17–31), its metre (b 31–1460 a 4), its form (a 5–11), and its greater tolerance of *ἄλογα* (a 11–b 5). A valuable discussion on Aristotle's theory of the Epic will be found in Schoemann's Opuscula (3 p. 30). For traces of Aristotelian ideas in later Greek writers see Adam, Die Aristotelische Theorie vom Epos (Wiesbaden 1889).

περὶ δὲ τῆς διηγηματικῆς. *περί* = 'as for', or 'as regards' (comp. Metaph. H 6, 1045 a 7).

διηγηματικῆς, scil. *μιμήσεως*, understood from a 15 (comp. 24, 1459 b 33, and the note on 1, 1447 a 27 *αἱ τῶν ὀρχηστῶν*). The *καί* that follows is the appositional *καί* (= i. e.), which is so common in Aristotle.

ἐν μέτρῳ μιμητικῆς may be compared with 6, 1449 b 21 *τῆς ἐν ἑξαμέτροις μιμητικῆς*. *ἐν μέτρῳ*, 'in verse (= *ἐν λόγῳ ἐμμέτρῳ*), is the opposite of *ἐν τῷ πράττειν*, just as in the definition of Tragedy in 6, 1449 b 26 *δι' ἀπαγγελίας* (scil. *μιμουμένων*) is the opposite of *δρώντων*.

a 18 **συνιστάναι δραματικούς.** A predicative adjective after *συνιστάναι*

is found also in 24, 1459^{b} 14, 1460^{a} 34, and in Plato Phaedr. 268 D *τὴν τούτων σύστασιν πρέπουσαν ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ συνισταμένην*. For the construction *συνιστάναι περὶ μίαν πρᾶξιν* comp. 8, 1451^{a} 28 *περὶ μίαν πρᾶξιν οἵαν λέγομεν τὴν Ὀδύσσειαν συνέστησεν*. *δραματικούς*, which means properly 'such as is required for a drama' (comp. 4, 1448^{b} 35), is explained by what follows (*καὶ περὶ μίαν πρᾶξιν κτέ.*) as referring more especially to the Unity of the dramatic story. Aristotle now definitely applies to the Epic the rule of Unity laid down for Tragedy in chaps. 7–8; its applicability, however, has already been assumed in the digression on the Epic in 8, 1451^{a} 19–29. 1459^{a} 18

ὥσπερ ζῷον ἓν ὅλον. If it is permissible to restore *ὅλον ⟨ὄν⟩* here, the expression will be equivalent to *οὖσα ἓν ὅλον ὥσπερ ζῷον* (see Bernhardy, Syntax p. 337, and Riddell, Digest of Idioms § 202 b). For the meaning of *ζῷον* see on 7, 1450^{b} 34. ^{a} 20

καὶ μὴ ὁμοίας ἱστορίας τὰς συνήθεις θεῖναι is another instance of parallelismus antitheticus; it is the negative complement of the precept in ^{a} 18 *δεῖ τοὺς μύθους συνιστάναι δραματικούς*, the construction being *δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς μύθους . . . συνιστάναι δραματικοὺς . . . καὶ μὴ ὁμοίας* [scil. *αὐτοῖς*] *ἱστορίας τὰς συνήθεις θεῖναι*. For the position of *δῆλον* comp. De sensu 3, 440^{b} 14 *ὅτι ἀνάγκη μιγνυμένων καὶ τὰς χρόας μίγνυσθαι, δῆλον, καὶ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν εἶναι κυρίαν τοῦ πολλὰς εἶναι χρόας*. *ὁμοίας θεῖναι* may very well mean 'to regard as like them' (comp. Bon. Ind. 761^{a} 27). According to this view of the text, the general sense of the passage is shortly this: Epic stories should be in structure like those of Tragedy (*δραματικούς*), and not, as is so often supposed (see 8, 1451^{a} 21 and 9, 1451^{b} 4), like the records of ordinary history. This latter point, however, Aristotle puts in a somewhat different form, 'One must not assume our ordinary histories to be like them'; he inverts the order of the terms, in fact, as he sometimes does in comparisons introduced by *ὅμοιος* (see Vahlen ad loc., and my Textual Criticism of the Nic. Ethics p. 63). The reading *εἶναι*, which I have altered into *θεῖναι*[1] (on the assumption that ΕΙΝΑΙ represents ΘΙΝΑΙ), makes him say that our ordinary histories should not be like tragedies or epics, as though there were something in the practice of the historians that he wished to set right. The absurdity of such a notion was felt by one of the Renaissance correctors and by Dacier; but the correction they proposed, *καὶ μὴ ὁμοίας ἱστορίαις τὰς συνθέσεις εἶναι*, is to my mind too artificial, and ^{a} 21

[1] The same correction was made by Francken in Lysias 10, 18.

1459 a 21 too great a departure from the reading of the MS., to deserve a place in the text. In saying *ἱστορίας τὰς συνήθεις* Aristotle seems to be aware of there being exceptions to the rule. We have been told in 9, 1451 b 30 that a poetical subject may sometimes be found in history.

a 23 **ἑνὸς χρόνου**: comp. b 1 *περὶ ἕνα χρόνον*. Aristotle's conception of a history is that it is a sort of chronicle (see on 9, 1451 a 36) recording all the various occurrences within a certain period of time, however loose and separate they may have been in themselves. As an instance of such a disconnected event he cites Gelo's defeat of the Carthaginians in 480; it happened about the same time—Herodotus 7, 166 says on the same day—as the Battle of Salamis, but it obviously had no connexion with that battle, or with the issue of the Persian War. And the same would have to be said, if it had taken place just before or after Salamis (*ἐν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς χρόνοις* a 27). In this way Aristotle reasserts the point on which he has insisted in the earlier chapters (8, 1451 a 27; 10, 1452 a 20), that two events may come in succession without forming part of one single action.

a 25 **ἐν Σαλαμῖνι**: Rhet. 2. 22, 1396 a 12 *τὴν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχίαν*. Comp. Thuc. 1. 57, Isocr. 112 A, Aeschines in Ctes. 222 for this use of the preposition.

a 29 **τοῦτο δρῶσι** = *ὁμοίας ἱστορίας τὰς συνήθεις τιθέασι* (v. a 21).

a 30 **ἤδη**: 8, 1451 a 23 sqq.

a 33 **εὐσύνοπτος**: see on 7, 1451 a 4.

a 34 **ἢ τῷ μεγέθει μετριάζοντα κτέ.** Vahlen supposes *ἔδει* or *ἀναγκαῖον ἦν εἶναι* to be understood from the *ἔμελλεν ἔσεσθαι* in the preceding clause. The sense of the passage is clear enough: The Trojan War was a real whole in itself (*ἔχοντα ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος* = *ὅλον*; v. 7, 1450 b 26); but Homer declined to deal with it in its entirety (*ποιεῖν ὅλον*), through a feeling apparently that it was too long for his purpose (*λίαν μέγας*; comp. 7, 1451 a 5), or if not too long (*τῷ μεγέθει μετριάζοντα*), too full of matter through the variety of incident in it (*καταπεπλεγμένον τῇ ποικιλίᾳ*). The explanation of the grammatical difficulty may perhaps be that Aristotle has lapsed into obliqua oratio. *λίαν γὰρ ἂν μέγας κτέ.* is virtually oratio obliqua, like the clause of explanation in 3, 1448 a 33.

μετριάζοντα is intransitive, as it generally is in Aristotle (Bon. Ind. 463 b 23). For the dative with it comp. Pol. 5. 11, 1314 b 33 *μετριάζειν τοῖς τοιούτοις*.

a 35 **ἓν μέρος ἀπολαβὼν**: comp. Bon. Ind. 82 b 49, and Plato Rep.

392 E οὐ κατὰ ὅλον ἀλλ' ἀπολαβὼν μέρος τι πειράσομαί σοι ἐν τούτῳ δηλῶσαι ὃ βούλομαι. By this ἓν μέρος in the history of the Trojan War Aristotle means the 'Wrath of Achilles' and its consequences; see Adam l. c. p. 43. 1459 a 35

αὐτῶν = τῶν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ πραγμάτων, a construction κατὰ σύνεσιν such as we often find with pronouns (comp. 13, 1453 a 24, 23, 1459 a 29, and Kühner, Gr. Gr.^{3} 2. 1, p. 54). Vahlen quotes Eth. N. 4. 1, 1120 a 2 δοκεῖ δ' ἀπώλειά τις αὐτοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἡ τῆς οὐσίας φθορά, ὡς τοῦ ζῆν διὰ τούτων [= τῶν χρημάτων, implied in τῆς οὐσίας] ὄντος.

διαλαμβάνει: comp. Dionysius Hal. 5 p. 543 R. τὸ διαλαμ- a 37
βάνεσθαι τὴν ὁμοείδειαν ἰδίαις μεταβολαῖς καὶ ξένοις ἐπεισοδίοις. The proper meaning of the word is to 'break the continuity of' a thing, as in Phys. 4. 6, 213 a 32 οὐκ ἔστι διάστημα . . . ὃ διαλαμβάνει τὸ πᾶν σῶμα ὥστε εἶναι μὴ συνεχές. Its present meaning, that of to 'break the uniformity of', or 'diversify', is found also in Plato Phaed. 110 B γῆ . . . χρώμασι διειλημμένη. Closely allied to this is the sense in Pol. 7. 12, 1331 a 20 τὰ δὲ τείχη διειλῆφθαι φυλακτηρίοις καὶ πύργοις—where it denotes to 'break the line of' the walls, not the walls themselves.

The use of episodes as giving an element of variety in the Epic is noted again in 24, 1459 b 30. An echo of Aristotle's approval of Homer's episodes survives in Eustathius on Il. 3. 230, p. 409, 20 R.: οὕτως εὐμηχάνως Ὅμηρος τὰς ἔξω τε [? ἔξωθεν] τοῦ νῦν καιροῦ ἱστορίας ἐπεισοδιάζει τῇ ποιήσει καὶ ταῖς μεθόδοις αὐτὴν καταποικίλλει τῶν ἀφηγήσεων, and in the Schol. on Od. 1. 284: τῆς Ὀδυσσείας οὐκ ἐχούσης ἐξ αὐτῆς ποικιλίαν ἱκανὴν τὸν Τηλέμαχον ἐξελθεῖν εἰς Σπάρτην καὶ Πύλον ποιεῖ, ὅπως ἂν τῶν Ἰλιακῶν ἐν παρεκβάσεσι πολλὰ λεχθείη διά τε τοῦ Νέστορος καὶ τοῦ Μενελάου (comp. the second Schol. ad loc.: ὑπόθεσιν αὐτὴν [scil. τὴν ἀποδημίαν Τηλεμάχου] πεποίηκεν ὁ ποιητὴς ποικιλίας λόγων καὶ ἐξαλλαγῆς ἰδεῶν, ἵνα μὴ μονότροπος ᾖ τῆς ποιήσεως ὁ τρόπος).

περὶ ἕνα ποιοῦσι κτέ.: i. e. they write just like chroniclers (comp. a 23) or biographers (comp. 8, 1451 a 21). In some of the inferior epics, however, there is, says Aristotle, a certain Unity of story; but it is not of the right kind (comp. 8, 1451 a 28 περὶ μίαν πρᾶξιν οἵαν λέγομεν), as the action there consists of a plurality of parts (πολυμερῆ), each of them easily detached from the rest of the work. The consequence is that several tragedies may be made out of a single epic of this type; whereas the Iliad or Odyssey does not supply materials for more than one or two. This

1459 a 37 emphatic assertion of the Unity of action in the Homeric epic, and of its affinity in this respect to Tragedy, is not quite in harmony with what we read elsewhere in the Poetics. In 18, 1456 a 13 the story of the Iliad is said to be a *πολύμυθον σύστημα*, one with a plurality of stories in it, and therefore incapable of being successfully dramatized in one single tragedy. And in 26, 1462 b 8 we are expressly told that the action in the Iliad and Odyssey is made up of several actions (*ἐκ πλειόνων πράξεων*) and of many parts (*ἔχει πολλὰ τοιαῦτα μέρη*); in other words, it is conceived to be a *μία πρᾶξις πολυμερής*, and not so unlike that of the inferior epics as is assumed in the present passage.

b 1 **μίαν πρᾶξιν** = *περὶ μίαν πρᾶξιν* (comp. 8, 1451 a 28).

ὁ τὰ Κύπρια ποιήσας: Herodotus 2. 117 *δηλοῖ ὅτι οὐκ Ὁμήρου τὰ Κύπρια ἔπεά ἐστι ἀλλ' ἄλλου τινός*.—Athenaeus 334 B *ὁ τὰ Κύπρια ποιήσας ἔπη, εἴτε Κύπριός τίς ἐστιν ἢ Στασῖνος ἢ ὅστις δή ποτε χαίρει ὀνομαζόμενος*. For the ancient ideas as to the authorship of the *Κύπρια* see Welcker, Ep. Cycl. 1 p. 279 (comp. Wilamowitz, Phil. Untersuch. 7 p. 337).

b 2 **τὴν μικρὰν Ἰλιάδα** = *ὁ τὴν μικρὰν Ἰλιάδα* (comp. Bon. Ind. 109 b 48). The book is treated as anonymous even by Pausanias (3. 26, 7 and 10. 26, 2) and by several of the grammarians who quote from it (comp. Wilamowitz l.c. p. 341).

b 3 **Ἰλιάδος**, 'a poem like the Iliad' (see on 4, 1448 b 38).

b 4 **ἢ δύο μόναι.** The reference here is apparently rather to the Odyssey with its *διπλῆ σύστασις* (13, 1453 a 31); the double story would supply a subject for two tragedies, one dealing more especially with the fortunes of Ulysses, and the other with those of the Suitors.

ἐκ δὲ Κυπρίων πολλαί. Welcker, Gr. Trag. p. 873, gives a list of the plays supposed to be based on stories in the *Κύπρια*. An abstract of the poem survives in the Chrestomathy of Proclus (Kinkel, EGF. 1 p. 16).

τῆς μικρᾶς Ἰλιάδος πλέον ὀκτώ. The names in Aristotle's list of possible tragedies are sufficient indication of the ground covered by the *Μικρὰ Ἰλιάς* as he knew it; it is clear that the poem must have taken up the story of the war at the death of Achilles, and carried it down to the departure of the Greeks after the sack of Troy. The Fragments also show that it must have included the last scenes of the war and the division of the spoils. Some difficulty may perhaps be felt from the fact that the abstract in Proclus (Kinkel l. c. p. 36) makes the Little Iliad end somewhat

abruptly with the admission of the Wooden Horse within the walls, 1459 b 4 and that, to complete the record of the war, he subjoins an abstract of what he regards as a distinct poem, an Ἰλίου πέρσις sometimes ascribed to Arctinus. In all probability this Ἰλίου πέρσις was only the concluding part of the Little Iliad under another name (comp. Wilamowitz l. c. p. 350).

ὅπλων κρίσις: Proclus l. c. *ἡ τῶν ὅπλων κρίσις γίνεται καὶ* b 5 *Ὀδυσσεὺς κατὰ βούλησιν Ἀθηνᾶς λαμβάνει, Αἴας δ' ἐμμανὴς γενόμενος τήν τε λείαν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν λυμαίνεται καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἀναιρεῖ.* Besides the existing Ajax of Sophocles, there was a *ὅπλων κρίσις* by Aeschylus (Nauck, TGF.[2] p. 57), based presumably on this section of the Little Iliad.

Φιλοκτήτης: Proclus l. c. *μετὰ ταῦτα Ὀδυσσεὺς λοχήσας Ἕλενον λαμβάνει, καὶ χρήσαντος περὶ τῆς ἁλώσεως τούτου Διομήδης ἐκ Λήμνου Φιλοκτήτην ἀνάγει· ἰαθεὶς δὲ οὗτος ὑπὸ Μαχάονος καὶ μονομαχήσας Ἀλεξάνδρῳ κτείνει.* Several lost plays are recorded as bearing this title (Nauck l. c. p. 968; Welcker, Kl. Schr. 4, p. 180); and we still have the Philoctetes of Sophocles.

Νεοπτόλεμος, Εὐρύπυλος: Proclus l. c. *καὶ Νεοπτόλεμον Ὀδυσσεὺς* b 6 *ἐκ Σκύρου ἀγαγὼν τὰ ὅπλα δίδωσι τὰ τοῦ πατρός· καὶ Ἀχιλλεὺς αὐτῷ φαντάζεται. Εὐρύπυλος δὲ ὁ Τηλέφου ἐπίκουρος τοῖς Τρωσὶ παραγίνεται, καὶ ἀριστεύοντα αὐτὸν ἀποκτείνει Νεοπτόλεμος.* A *Νεοπτόλεμος* is mentioned in Suidas' list of the plays of Nicomachus (v. Welcker, Gr. Trag. p. 1015, and Kayser, Hist. Trag. Gr. p. 316). There is no record of *Εὐρύπυλος* as the title of a tragedy.

πτωχεία, Λάκαιναι: Proclus l. c. *Ὀδυσσεύς τε αἰκισάμενος ἑαυτὸν κατάσκοπος εἰς Ἴλιον παραγίνεται καὶ ἀναγνωρισθεὶς ὑφ' Ἑλένης περὶ τῆς ἁλώσεως τῆς πόλεως συντίθεται, κτείνας τέ τινας τῶν Τρώων ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς ἀφικνεῖται. καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα σὺν Διομήδει τὸ Παλλάδιον ἐκκομίζει ἐκ τῆς Ἰλίου.* The story of Ulysses entering Troy in the guise of a beggar is briefly told in Od. 4. 247 *ἄλλῳ δ' αὐτὸν φωτὶ κατακρύπτων ἤισκε δέκτῃ, ὃς οὐδὲν τοῖος ἔην ἐπὶ νηυσὶν Ἀχαιῶν. τῷ ἴκελος κατέδυ Τρώων πόλιν κτέ.*; and referred to in Eurip. Rhes. 503 *ἤδη δ' ἀγύρτης πτωχικὴν ἔχων στολὴν εἰσῆλθε πύργους* (comp. Plautus Bacch. 936). There is no tradition of *πτωχεία* as the title of a tragedy. *Λάκαιναι* was the name of a play of Sophocles (Nauck, TGF.[2] p. 210), turning apparently on the carrying off of the Palladium, with which Helen seems to have been associated in some form of the legend (v. Roscher's Lexicon 1, 1944); the title was no doubt taken from the chorus of Laconian women, whom we may suppose to have been brought in as Helen's handmaids.

1459^b 6 **Ἰλίου πέρσις**: one play certainly is mentioned as having this title, the *Ἰλίου πέρσις* of Iophon. There was also a *Πέρσις ἢ Πολυξένη* attributed to Nicomachus, and a *Πέρσις* attributed to Cleophon (comp. Meineke, Hist. Com. Gr. p. 497).

^{b} 7 **ἀπόπλους** may very well have been the title of a play, but if it was, no record has come down to us of one so named. The closing scene of the war, the division of the spoils and the fate of the Trojan captives, was naturally fitted for Tragedy, as one may see from the abstract in Proclus of the final section of the *Ἰλίου πέρσις*: *ἔπειτα ἐμπρήσαντες τὴν πόλιν Πολυξένην σφαγιάζουσιν ἐπὶ τὸν τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως τάφον. καὶ Ὀδυσσέως Ἀστυάνακτα ἀνελόντος Νεοπτόλεμος Ἀνδρομάχην γέρας λαμβάνει* [comp. *Μικρὰ Ἰλ.* fr. 18]· *καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ λάφυρα διανέμονται. Δημοφῶν δὲ καὶ Ἀκάμας Αἴθραν εὑρόντες ἄγουσι μεθ' ἑαυτῶν* [comp. *Μικρὰ Ἰλ.* fr. 17]. *ἔπειτα ἀποπλέουσιν οἱ Ἕλληνες.* Welcker (Gr. Trag. p. 179) suggests that *ἀπόπλους* may possibly have been an alternative title for the Polyxena of Sophocles (Nauck, TGF.[2] p. 245), the scene of which, as we know from Strabo (10, 470 *Σοφοκλῆς ποιήσας τὸν Μενέλαον ἐκ τῆς Τροίας ἀπαίρειν σπεύδοντα ἐν τῇ Πολυξένῃ*), was placed at the time of the departure of the Greek host. Whether we accept this suggestion or not, it seems pretty clear from the position of the title in Aristotle's list that the *ἀπόπλους* must have related to the concluding act of the war, and not (as Vahlen thinks) to the withdrawal of the Greek fleet to Tenedos before the treachery of Sinon.

καὶ Σίνων καὶ Τρῳάδες. Having thus run over the eight sections of the *Μικρὰ Ἰλιάς* and mentioned a tragedy, actual or possible, in connexion with each, Aristotle appends two additional names to show how easily the list might be enlarged. The first is a *Σίνων*—the name of a play of Sophocles (Nauck, TGF.[2] p. 251); the second a *Τρῳάδες*—the name of a still extant play of Euripides. A *Σίνων* proves the possibility of more than one tragedy on the seventh section of the poem; and a *Τρῳάδες* proves the same of the eighth. One can hardly doubt that Aristotle means the existing play of Euripides, the scene of which is placed at the time of the *ἀπόπλους* or departure from Troy (comp. Troad. 18 *πολὺς δὲ χρυσὸς Φρύγιά τε σκυλεύματα πρὸς ναῦς Ἀχαιῶν πέμπεται· μένουσι δὲ πρύμνηθεν οὖρον, ὡς δεκασπόρῳ χρόνῳ ἀλόχους τε καὶ τέκν' εἰσίδωσιν ἄσμενοι*).

ἔτι δὲ τὰ εἴδη *κτέ.* As a further point of resemblance Aristotle observes that epic poetry divides into the same species as Tragedy; and he illustrates this in ^{b} 14 by noting the difference between the

Iliad and Odyssey. This statement about the four species is not 1459 ^{b} 7 quite consistent with that in 18, 1455 ^{b} 32 (where see note); as there was no such thing as a 'spectacular' epic, Aristotle makes out the parallelism by recognizing the *ἁπλῆ ἐποποιία* as a distinct species of epic. The difficulty here is like that in *τοσαῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ μέρη ἐλέχθη* in 18, 1455 ^{b} 32 (where see note); we have to admit that Aristotle has been carried away for the moment by his desire to find coincidences and correspondences.

δεῖ ἔχειν, 'must necessarily have', 'in the nature of things has', ^{b} 8 or 'involves'. *ἔχειν* stands in a certain antithesis to *κέχρηται* in ^{b} 12 (comp. 6, 1450 ^{a} 13); epic poetry has in it these various possibilities; and they are all to be seen in actual use in Homer.

ἁπλῆν, scil. *δεῖ εἶναι*. *δεῖ* is easily supplied from what precedes, ^{b} 9 just as it is in 15, 1454 ^{b} 13 (where *ποιεῖν* = *δεῖ ποιεῖν*), and in Rhet. 3, 14, 1414 ^{b} 26 (where *ἐκδοῦναι* = *δεῖ ἐκδοῦναι*: comp. Bon. Ind. 146 ^{a} 50). The ellipse of *εἶναι* may perhaps seem more difficult to explain; it is, however, occasionally found in Aristotle not only after *δεῖ* (comp. 25, 1460 ^{b} 34, and Bon. Ind. 239 ^{a} 16), but also in other constructions, as Vahlen shows in his note on this passage. A very strong instance of the omission of *εἶναι* is that in Eth. N. 7. 14, 1153 ^{b} 2 *ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς κακόν, ἡ δὲ τῷ πῇ ἐμποδιστική* [scil. *εἶναι*].

καὶ τὰ μέρη κτέ. This has been assumed from the first (see 5, 1449 ^{b} 16), and needs no demonstration. Aristotle, however, avails himself of the opportunity to add that a good epic, just as much as a tragedy, requires not only a story but also a powerful story, one with elements of surprise and suffering in it; and that the language and thought in it also demand the same care as in Tragedy. After this, reverting to the four *μέρη* indicated in ^{b} 10, he reminds us that they are all to be found in perfection in Homer (*οἷς ἅπασιν Ὅμηρος κέχρηται*, ^{b} 12): (1) as regards the *μῦθος*, the Iliad is a story of suffering (*παθητικόν*), and the Odyssey a story of surprises (*πεπλεγμένον*); (2) as regards the element of *ἦθος*, the Odyssey is full of character (*ἠθική*); while as regards (3) the *λέξις* and (4) the *διάνοια*, Homer's two poems confessedly surpass everything of the kind in these matters.

καὶ γὰρ περιπετειῶν δεῖ καὶ ἀναγνωρίσεων, as is the case with ^{b} 10 the complex tragedy (comp. 10, 1452 ^{a} 16; 13, 1452 ^{b} 31).

ἔτι τὰς διανοίας καὶ τὴν λέξιν ἔχειν καλῶς. Aristotle adds as an ^{b} 11 afterthought (*ἔτι*) that a good epic requires not only an effective story, but also effective language. In the speeches in an epic the

1459 b 11 same rhetorical art is wanted as in a play (τὰς διανοίας ἔχειν καλῶς); and the diction, both in the speeches and elsewhere (comp. 24, 1460 b 3), demands the same care and elaboration (τὴν λέξιν ἔχειν καλῶς). It may perhaps be thought that Aristotle was logically bound to recognize the element of ἦθος also, so as to remind us in some way or other of the rules laid down in chap. 15 as equally applicable to the ἤθη in a good epic. To supply the supposed omission Bursian wished to restore in the text ἔτι ⟨τὰ ἤθη καὶ⟩ τὰς διανοίας καὶ τὴν λέξιν ἔχειν καλῶς. The difficulty arises from a misconception of the clause beginning καὶ γὰρ περιπετειῶν δεῖ καὶ ἀναγνωρίσεων καὶ παθημάτων, which is taken as a proof of the existence of the four μέρη in an epic—a point which hardly needed demonstration (see 5, 1449 b 16). The real purpose of the clause is to make us see the possibility of a πεπλεγμένη and a παθητικὴ ἐποποιία, as assumed in b 9. A similar explanation of the ἠθικὴ ἐποποιία is not equally necessary (see on 18, 1455 b 34); and if it were, it would require a fuller statement than is supplied by Bursian's insertion.

b 13 **πρῶτος καὶ ἱκανῶς.** For the combination of adj. and adv. comp. 24, 1460 a 9 ὀλίγα καὶ ὀλιγάκις.—Eth. N. 8. 1, 1155 a 8 μάλιστα καὶ ἐπαινετωτάτη.—Hippocrates 1 p. 557 K. ὀλιγάκις καὶ ἀσθενέα.—Isocrates 36 D ἑκόντας καὶ προθύμως.

καὶ γὰρ καὶ τῶν ποιημάτων ἑκάτερον: a reminiscence perhaps of Plato Hipp. min. 363 B ἑκάτερον γὰρ τῶν ποιημάτων τὸ μὲν εἰς Ὀδυσσέα ἔφη πεποιῆσθαι τὸ δ' εἰς Ἀχιλλέα. It will be observed that Aristotle does not find every perfection in one poem; in his view the Iliad is παθητικόν, without being πεπλεγμένον or especially ἠθικόν, and the Odyssey πεπλεγμένον and ἠθικόν, without being especially παθητικόν. καὶ γὰρ καί = 'etenim et'.

b 15 **ἀναγνώρισις γὰρ διόλου.** 'Agnoscitur Telemachus ab Nestore, a Menelao, ab Helena. Agnoscitur Ulysses a Cyclope, a Phaeacibus, ab Euryclea, a subulcis, a Telemacho, a procis, a Penelope, denique a patre' (Hermann).

ἠθική: a characteristic noted by Longinus 9. 15 as showing the Odyssey to have been the work of Homer's later years: προσιστορείσθω τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ὀδύσσειαν, ὅπως ᾖ σοι γνώριμον ὡς ἡ ἀπακμὴ τοῦ πάθους ἐν τοῖς μεγάλοις συγγραφεῦσι καὶ ποιηταῖς εἰς ἦθος ἐκλύεται. τοιαῦτα γάρ που τὰ περὶ τὴν τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως ἠθικῶς αὐτῷ βιολογούμενα οἰκίαν, οἱονεὶ κωμῳδία τίς ἐστιν ἠθολογουμένη. For the change of gender (παθητικόν . . . ἠθική) comp. Eth. N. 4. 3, 1121 b 13 ἡ δ' ἀνελευθερία ἀνίατός τ' ἐστὶν . . . καὶ συμφυέστερον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

πρὸς γὰρ τούτοις κτέ. Aristotle now passes on from the con- 1459 b 16
struction (comp. b 14 *συνέστηκεν*) to the literary execution of the two Homeric poems. We should expect here *καὶ πρὸς τούτοις κτέ.*, to correspond with the preceding *καὶ τῶν ποιημάτων κτέ.* The clause is apparently a reason for something which, though unsaid, was present in Aristotle's mind—something like *καὶ ἄλλα ἔχει ἀγαθά.* Another instance of the same type is in 24, 1460 b 4 (comp. Bon. Ind. 146 b 15, and Waitz, Org. 2 p. 470).

λέξει. The graphic vigour of Homer's metaphors, for instance, is recognized in Rhet. 3. 11, 1411 b 31.

καὶ διανοίᾳ refers more especially to the rhetorical skill in the speeches in Homer. Cicero says of him that he is *ornatus in dicendo ac plane orator* (Brutus 40); Quintilian also (10. 46) eulogizes his mastery over all the arts of rhetoric.

πάντα ὑπερβέβληκεν: the subject is not 'Homer' (as is generally assumed) but 'these two poems', understood from *τῶν ποιημάτων ἑκάτερον* in b 14. There is no need, therefore, to restore *πάντας* (from sundry apographs), or to take *πάντα* as practically equivalent to *πάντας*.

διαφέρει: comp, 5, 1449 b 11. b 17

συστάσεως, scil. *τῶν πραγμάτων*.

ὁ εἰρημένος, in 7, 1451 a 3. The epic story must be *εὐσύνοπτος* b 19
(comp. 23, 1459 a 33), and not of a length which would make it impossible for the mind to take it in in its entirety; it must be a whole but not too long a whole. This condition, Aristotle adds, will be fulfilled (*εἴη δ' ἂν τοῦτο*), if one's epic is of about the length of a trilogy, and thus considerably shorter than the Iliad and Odyssey. Here again he shows himself mindful of the practical purpose of his treatise; he evidently thinks that an epic on the old Homeric scale of length would prove too great a strain on the memory and attention of the literary public of his own time. Apollonius Rhodius may have been mindful of Aristotle's view when he limited his Argonautica to four Books.

εἴη δ' ἂν τοῦτο: Top. 8. 1, 156 a 9 *εἴη δ' ἂν τοῦτο, εἴ τις μὴ μόνον* b 20
τὰς ἀναγκαίας [scil. *προτάσεις*] *ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν πρὸς ταύτας χρησίμων τινὰ συλλογίζοιτο* (comp. also An. post. 2. 13, 97 b 33; Rhet. 3. 8, 1408 b 31).

πρὸς δὲ τὸ πλῆθος τραγῳδιῶν κτέ. 'Res ipsa unius poetae b 21
tragoedias una trilogia comprehensas intelligi postulat. Haec interpretatio quum mensurarum aptam comparationem continet, tum alia etiam ratione ad epicae poeseos naturam accommodata

1459 b 21 est. Eo facilius enim tres unius poetae tragoediae coniungi potuerunt, quod his trilogiis saepe perpetuitas quaedam argumenti continebatur, cuius illustre exemplum in superstitibus fabulis habemus Aeschyli Oresteam, e deperditis novimus Philoclis Pandionidem . . . et Aeschyli Lycurgiam' (Hermann). On this subject see Haigh, Attic Theatre[3] p. 13.

b 25 **τὸ ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς** *κτέ.* An indirect recognition of the Unity of Place as a fact in normal Greek Tragedy. Only one part of the story, that immediately connected with one single place (represented by the stage) and one set of persons (represented by the actors), can be told in a play; whereas an epic may include incidents occurring at one and the same time in other places and in connexion with other personages.

b 27 **ἔστι πολλὰ μέρη ἅμα ποιεῖν περαινόμενα** corresponds with *διὰ τὸ . . . μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι κτέ.* in b 23.

b 28 **ὄγκος** = weight, as suggestive of dignity or importance (comp. on *μέγεθος*, 4, 1449 a 19). A little further on (b 35) the adj. *ὀγκώδης* is applied to the hexameter, as a weighty or impressive metre. In Rhet. 3. 6, 1407 b 26 Aristotle—without defining the term—has a discussion on 'weightiness' of style (*ὄγκος τῆς λέξεως*) and the kind of language which produces that effect.

ὥστε τοῦτ᾽ ἔχει τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἰς μεγαλοπρέπειαν *κτέ.* The advantage its length gives the Epic over Tragedy is twofold, (1) greater grandeur of scale, and (2) greater variety of incident. If we bracket the article before it, *ἀγαθόν* becomes a quasi-predicate, as in Rhet. 2. 20, 1394 a 2 *καὶ ἔχουσιν ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο, ὅτι πράγματα μὲν εὑρεῖν ὅμοια γεγενημένα χαλεπόν, λόγους δὲ ῥᾷον.* *ἀγαθόν* in the sense of 'an advantage' occurs in Rhet. 1. 2, 1356 b 18 *ἑκάτερον ἔχει ἀγαθὸν τὸ εἶδος τῆς ῥητορικῆς.* For the preposition comp. Plato Rep. 462 A *τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν . . . εἰς πόλεως κατασκευήν.*—Xenophon Cyr. 2. 1. 27 *ἀγαθὸν . . . εἰς τὸ μὴ ταράττεσθαι.*

b 29 **τὸ μεταβάλλειν** = *εἰς τὸ μεταβάλλειν. μεταβάλλειν*, being followed by *ἐπεισοδιοῦν*, is probably transitive, 'to produce a change of mind or mood' in the hearer, as it is for instance in Probl. 30. 1, 953 a 39 *ἴδοι δ᾽ ἄν τις ὅτι παντοδαποὺς ἀπεργάζεται* [scil. *ὁ οἶνος*], *θεωρῶν ὡς μεταβάλλει τοὺς πίνοντας.* The sense may be illustrated by the use of the verb in Pol. 8. 5, 1340 a 22 (where it is intransitive), *μεταβάλλομεν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀκροώμενοι τοιούτων* [i. e. certain rhythms and airs]—which is explained by what follows (a 40), *ἡ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν διέστηκε φύσις ὥστε ἀκούοντας ἄλλως διατίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον πρὸς ἑκάστην αὐτῶν.*

ἐπεισοδιοῦν, scil. τὴν ποίησιν; comp. 23, 1459^{a} 36, and note on 17, 1455^{b} 1. 1459^{b} 30

ἀνομοίοις ἐπεισοδίοις. The episodes supply an element of variety breaking the monotony of the story. *ἀνομοίοις* means 'dissimilar', 'unlike one another', as in the formula *πολλὰ καὶ ἀνόμοια* in H. A. 4. 1, 523^{b} 12 (comp. Plato Tim. 83 c), and in Phys. 3. 5, 205^{a} 19 *εἰ δ' ἀνόμοιον τὸ πᾶν, ἀνόμοιοι καὶ οἱ τόποι.*—Pol. 3. 4, 1277^{a} 5 *ἐξ ἀνομοίων ἡ πόλις.*

τὸ γὰρ ὅμοιον κτέ. The necessity of change is explained in Rhet. 1. 11, 1371^{a} 25: *τὸ μεταβάλλειν ἡδύ· εἰς φύσιν γὰρ γίνεται μεταβάλλειν· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ* [= *τὸ ὅμοιον*] *ἀεὶ ὑπερβολὴν ποιεῖ τῆς καθεστώσης ἕξεως. ὅθεν εἴρηται "μεταβολὴ πάντων γλυκύ".* Comp. also Cicero De Inv. 1. 41 *Variare autem orationem magno opere oportebit; nam omnibus in rebus similitudo est satietatis mater.*

ἀπὸ τῆς πείρας ἥρμοκεν. The iambic is said to have become established in Tragedy in the same way (see 4, 1449^{a} 24). Similarly in Pol. 8. 6, 1341^{a} 37 experience is said to have led to the rejection of the flute as part of a liberal education: *ὕστερον δ' ἀπεδοκιμάσθη* [scil. *ἡ αὔλησις*] *διὰ τῆς πείρας αὐτῆς, βέλτιον δυναμένων κρίνειν τὸ πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν συντεῖνον.* ^{b} 32

διηγητικὴν. The editors prefer the reading of sundry apographs, *διηγηματικήν*, the form which appears in the context, ^{b} 36, and in 23, 1459^{a} 17. There is no reason, however, why Aristotle should not say *διηγητικὴ μίμησις*, as *διηγητικός* is certainly a good Aristotelian word (v. Eth. N. 3. 13, 1117^{b} 34). He shows perhaps too little regard for uniformity in such matters. Thus we find him speaking in ^{b} 34 of the *ἡρωικόν*, and a few lines further on (1460^{a} 3) of the *ἡρῷον μέτρον*; and in the Rhetoric *ξένος* and *ξενικός* are both used of language without perceptible difference of meaning (v. Bon. Ind. 493^{a} 45, ^{b} 24). ^{b} 33

στασιμώτατον: comp. Pol. 8. 5, 1340^{b} 9 (quoted on 1460^{a} 1), and 8. 7, 1342^{b} 13 *περὶ δὲ τῆς δωριστὶ πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν ὡς στασιμωτάτης οὔσης.* ^{b} 34

γλώττας καὶ μεταφορὰς δέχεται μάλιστα: comp. 22, 1459^{a} 9. ^{b} 35

περιττὴ γὰρ καὶ * * ἡ διηγηματικὴ μίμησις τῶν ἄλλων. Before *ἡ διηγηματικὴ* some such word as *ταύτῃ* or *ταύταις* seems to have dropped out; the point apparently is this, that epic goes beyond all other kinds of poetry (*περιττὴ τῶν ἄλλων*) not only, as has been already shown, in the matter of length, but also in the admission of *γλῶτται* and *μεταφοραί*; the clause, therefore, as emended, comes in naturally enough to confirm the preceding statement, *γλώττας* ^{b} 36

1459 b 36 *καὶ μεταφορὰς δέχεται μάλιστα.* Vahlen acquiesces in the traditional text, and explains it thus: 'non recipit *διηγηματικὴ μίμησις* aliud metrum quam heroicum: nam heroicum est metrum gravissimum ac ponderosum maxime, eximia autem etiam narrativa imitatio prae ceteris'. It seems to me that this explanation, besides assuming *περιττὴ γάρ* to stand for *περιττὴ δέ*, hardly does justice to the *καί* before *ἡ διηγηματική*. For the gen. *τῶν ἄλλων*, due to the comparative sense of *περιττή* (v. Kühner, Gr. Gr.[3] 2. 1, p. 391), comp. Xenophon Cyr. 8. 2. 21 *τῶν ἀρκούντων περιττά.*—Hiero 1. 19 *περιττὰ τῶν ἱκανῶν.*—Antiphon Tetral 2. 4. 6 *περισσὸν τούτων.*

1460 a 1 **κινητικά**, as opposed to the hexameter, which has just been said to be *στασιμώτατον.* The antithesis is like that in Pol. 8. 5, 1340 b 9 *οἱ μὲν γὰρ* [scil. *τῶν ῥυθμῶν*] *ἦθος ἔχουσι στασιμώτερον οἱ δὲ κινητικόν, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν φορτικωτέρας ἔχουσι τὰς κινήσεις οἱ δὲ ἐλευθεριωτέρας.*

ὀρχηστικόν: see on 4, 1449 a 23.

πρακτικόν. This is what Horace meant when speaking of the iambic as *natum rebus agendis* (A. P. 82). The word has the same sense in the classification of tunes in Pol. 8. 7, 1341 b 32: *τὴν διαίρεσιν ἀποδεχόμεθα τῶν μελῶν ὡς διαιροῦσί τινες τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, τὰ μὲν ἠθικὰ τὰ δὲ πρακτικὰ τὰ δ' ἐνθουσιαστικὰ τιθέντες.* For the meaning of *πρακτικός* in this connexion see on 4, 1449 a 23.

ἔτι δὲ ἀτοπώτερον carries on the idea of *ἀπρεπὲς ἂν φαίνοιτο* in 1459 b 34.

a 2 **Χαιρήμων**: see on 1, 1447 b 21.

a 3 **ὥσπερ εἴπομεν**: in 4, 1449 a 24.

a 4 **αὐτῇ** = *μακρᾷ συστάσει.*

a 5 **Ὅμηρος.** In 5, 1449 b 11 and 6, 1449 b 26 the narrative form (*ἀπαγγελία*) was noted as one of differences between the Epic and Tragedy; and it has been also assumed in this discussion on the Epic, in 23, 1459 a 17. Aristotle now passes on to this, but without any formal introduction or hint as to the connexion in his statement. His aim apparently is to show that, although narrative is an element in every epic, it is reduced to a minimum in the best Epic, that of Homer; so that this point of difference is not so serious as might be supposed. The semi-dramatic character of Homer's mode of statement is directly or indirectly recognized in 3, 1448 a 21, and in 4, 1448 b 37 (see note on the passage). In his reference to the practice of the 'other poets' (*οἱ μὲν οὖν*

ἄλλοι, a 8) Aristotle must be supposed to mean 'not only the more 1460 a 5
recent epic writers, like Antimachus and Choerilus, but also the immediate continuators of Homer, the Cyclic poets' (Bergk, Gr. Litt. 1 p. 830).

ὃ δεῖ ποιεῖν αὐτόν. *αὐτόν* is emphatic, as in Top. 8. 2, 157 a 29 a 6
πειρατέον ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων ὀνοματοποιεῖν αὐτόν.—Pol. 8. 5, 1339 a 42 *ταῦτα γὰρ τί δεῖ μανθάνειν αὐτούς;*

ἀγωνίζονται: see on 6, 1450 b 18. a 9

μιμοῦνται: see on 1, 1447 a 16.

ὀλίγα καὶ ὀλιγάκις: De gen. an. 1. 19, 727 b 28 *ὀλίγαις καὶ ὀλιγάκις συμβαίνει.*—3. 5, 756 a 17 *ὀλίγα δὲ καὶ ὀλιγάκις.*—Eth. N. 7. 11, 1151 b 30 *ἐν ὀλίγοις καὶ ὀλιγάκις* (v. Bon. Ind. 503 a 37).—Plato Rep. 491 B *ὀλιγάκις ἐν ἀνθρώποις φύεσθαι καὶ ὀλίγας.* For instances of other combinations of the same kind see on 24, 1459 b 13.

εἰσάγει: a metaphor from the stage, as may be seen from the a 10
Platonic use of the word (v. Ast, Lex. s. v.). In Rhet. 3. 16, 1417 b 7 and 3. 17, 1418 a 32 it denotes the introduction of a person into a speech.

ἦθος: see on 15, 1454 a 23. a 11

οὐδέν' ἀήθη ἀλλ' ἔχοντα ἤθη: an instance of parallelismus antitheticus not unlike that in Plato Phaedr. 277 A *καὶ οὐχὶ ἄκαρποι ἀλλ' ἔχοντες σπέρμα.* With *ἔχοντα* the affirmative *ἕκαστον* has to be supplied (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr.[3] 2. 2 p. 567). *ἤθη*, as used here in the plural of an individual, means 'points' or 'traits of character', as we say, 'characteristics'. It has the same sense in Plato Rep. 402 D *ὅτου ἂν ξυμπίπτῃ ἔν τε τῇ ψυχῇ καλὰ ἤθη ἐνόντα καὶ ἐν τῷ εἴδει ὁμολογοῦντα ἐκείνοις . . . τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη κάλλιστον θέαμα.*

δεῖ μὲν οὖν. *μὲν οὖν* marks a transition to a new point (Bon. Ind. 540 b 58). A fourth difference in epic poetry as compared with Tragedy is its great tolerance of *ἄλογα*; it can admit improbabilities which on the stage, where everything is actually seen, would ruin the success of a tragedy. This gives it a distinct advantage over Tragedy, as the 'improbable' is an element in the 'marvellous' (*τὸ θαυμαστόν*), and the marvellous is a cause of pleasure to us (*ἡδύ*). It will be observed that pleasure is once more posited as the immediate end of poetry.

ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις: as has been assumed in 9, 1452 a 4 and 14, 1454 a 4.

τὸ θαυμαστόν: see on 9, 1452 a 4. a 12

τὸ ἄλογον: see on 15, 1454 b 6. a 13

1460 a 14 **διὰ τὸ μὴ ὁρᾶν**: comp. 17, 1455 a 27.

τὰ περὶ τὴν Ἕκτορος δίωξιν is explained by the participial clause in apposition (comp. Bernhardy, Syntax p. 472); the reference is to the statement in Il. 22. 205 *λαοῖσιν δ' ἀνένευε καρήατι δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς, οὐδ' ἔα ἱέμεναι ἐπὶ Ἕκτορι πικρὰ βέλεμνα.* Aristotle reverts to this incident in 25, 1460 b 26, where he suggests an explanation to save the credit of Homer. An echo of the criticism in the text survives in Schol. Ven. B on Il. 22. 205, Μεγακλείδης [v. Schrader, Porphyr. Q. H. in Il. p. 414] *πλάσμα εἶναί φησι τοῦτο τὸ μονομάχιον· πῶς γὰρ τοσαύτας μυριάδας νεύματι Ἀχιλλεὺς ἀπέστρεφεν;*

a 17 **τὸ δὲ θαυμαστὸν ἡδύ**: Rhet. 3. 2, 1404 b 10 *διὸ δεῖ ποιεῖν ξένην τὴν διάλεκτον· θαυμασταὶ γὰρ* [scil. *οἱ ἄνθρωποι*] *τῶν ἀπόντων εἰσίν, ἡδὺ δὲ τὸ θαυμαστόν.* A reason is given in Rhet. 1. 11, 1371 a 31: *καὶ τὸ μανθάνειν καὶ τὸ θαυμάζειν ἡδὺ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ· ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ θαυμάζειν τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν μαθεῖν ἐστιν, ὥστε τὸ θαυμαστὸν ἐπιθυμητόν, ἐν δὲ τῷ μανθάνειν εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καθίστασθαι.*

a 18 **προστιθέντες**, 'with additions'; the same absolute use of the word is found in 26, 1461 b 30 (*προσθῇ*).

δεδίδαχεν *κτέ.* Another of Homer's merits is said to be his mastery of the artistic lie—one that has something true superadded to make it seem credible. In illustration of this Aristotle points to the story in Od. 19. 164–248; where Ulysses astutely adds certain particulars (203–248), which Penelope knows to be true, and which beguile her into accepting the first part of his story as true. The connexion between this and the preceding section (a 11–18) is left unexplained, and it is certainly far from being obvious. If one may imagine the association of ideas in Aristotle's mind, it may perhaps have been something like this, that *τὸ θαυμαστόν* is a truth with a *πρόσθεσις* of falsehood, and the lie artistic (*ψευδῆ λέγειν ὡς δεῖ*) a falsehood with a *πρόσθεσις* of truth; so that the one is as it were the converse of the other.

a 20 **ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο παραλογισμός**, 'i. e. the use of paralogism'. *παραλογισμός* is like *παραλογίζεσθαι* (v. infra on a 25) an ambiguous term; it may mean either a fallacious argument (*ψευδὴς συλλογισμός*) or a deception caused by such an argument (*ἀπάτη διὰ ψευδοῦς συλλογισμοῦ*)—this latter being apparently its sense in the present passage, where it comes in to explain *ψευδῆ λέγειν ὡς δεῖ.* The distinction, however, is probably clearer to us than it was to Aristotle himself. The general assumption in his logical writings is that an argument is addressed to some one—to a hearer who

has to be convinced or refuted; a fallacious argument is not only 1460 a 20
logically incorrect but also calculated to mislead the hearer who fails to see the fallacy in it.

οἴονται γὰρ ἄνθρωποι. The artifice depends for its success on a natural weakness of the human intellect, our readiness to infer the presence of the thing from the presence of a 'sign' of it, or the truth of the antecedent from the truth of the consequent. The 'fallacia consequentis' is considered at length in Soph. el. 5, 167 b 1: *ὁ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἑπόμενον ἔλεγχος διὰ τὸ οἴεσθαι ἀντιστρέφειν τὴν ἀκολούθησιν. ὅταν γὰρ τοῦδε ὄντος ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοδὶ ᾖ, καὶ τοῦδε ὄντος οἴονται καὶ θάτερον εἶναι ἐξ ἀνάγκης· ὅθεν καὶ αἱ περὶ τὴν δόξαν ἐκ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀπάται γίνονται. πολλάκις γὰρ τὴν χολὴν μέλι ὑπέλαβον διὰ τὸ ἕπεσθαι τὸ ξανθὸν χρῶμα τῷ μέλιτι· καὶ ἐπεὶ συμβαίνει τὴν γῆν ὕσαντος γίνεσθαι διάβροχον, κἂν ᾖ διάβροχος, ὑπολαμβάνομεν ὗσαι· τὸ δ' οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον. ἔν τε τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς αἱ κατὰ τὸ σημεῖον ἀποδείξεις ἐκ τῶν ἑπομένων εἰσίν. βουλόμενοι γὰρ δεῖξαι ὅτι μοιχός, τὸ ἑπόμενον ἔλαβον ὅτι καλλωπιστὴς ἢ ὅτι νύκτωρ ὁρᾶται πλανώμενος. πολλοῖς δὲ ταῦτα μὲν ὑπάρχει, τὸ δὲ κατηγορούμενον οὐχ ὑπάρχει.* It is recognized as one of the arts of rhetoric in Rhet. 2. 19, 1392 b 16, and more fully in 2. 24, 1401 b 9, 20.

ἄνθρωποι or ⟨*οἱ*⟩ *ἄνθρωποι* seems to be required here; comp. the parallels in 1, 1447 b 13; Phys. 4. 6, 213 a 23, 27; Metaph. A 2, 982 b 12; Rhet. 1. 1, 1355 a 15, and 3. 2, 1404 b 9.

τοῦτο δέ ἐστι ψεῦδος. *τοῦτο* has been taken to refer to *τὸ πρότερον*, a 22
the antecedent, which, though not true, we imagine to be true. But it probably refers rather to the mode of argument, which is 'false', i.e. logically incorrect; comp. An. pr. 1. 17, 37 a 2; 1. 46, 52 b 28; Rhet. 2. 23, 1400 b 2.

πρῶτον = *πρότερον*. Vahlen illustrates this from Top. 3. 5, a 23
119 a 22. For instances in other writers see Sauppe's Lexil. Xenophont. p. 112 and HSt. s. v.

προσθεῖναι, scil. *τοῦτο τῷ ψεύδει*, i. e. to provide the lie with a 24
a *πρόσθεσις* of truth, in order to beguile the hearer into accepting it as true.

παραλογίζεται ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή: i. e. we on our side are quite ready a 25
to draw the false inference, which a lie of this kind is calculated to suggest. *παραλογίζεσθαι* has a noteworthy diversity of senses in Aristotle, sometimes meaning to draw a false inference, sometimes (with an acc. pers.) to deceive or beguile by a fallacy, and sometimes (as a passive) to be so deceived or beguiled (comp. Bon. Ind. 565 a 11); and it is not always easy to see the sense intended. In

1460 ^{a} 25 the present passage the word must have the first of these three senses, as the emphasis on the pronoun in *ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή* points to something that we ourselves are supposed to do: we on our side, knowing the truth of the consequent (*διὰ τὸ τοῦτο εἰδέναι ἀληθὲς ὄν*), are ready enough, owing to a natural infirmity of the human mind, to infer the truth of the antecedent; which is what the skilful deceiver wants us to do.

^{a} 26 **παράδειγμα δὲ τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν Νίπτρων** is a note more fitted for the rough draft of a lecture than for a book (see on 15, 1454 ^{b} 14 and 22, 1458 ^{a} 30). The quotation or explanation is left to be supplied afterwards. How it might have come in may be seen from the parallels in Rhet. 2. 23, 1399 ^{a} 7 *παράδειγμα ἐκ τοῦ Σωκράτους τοῦ Θεοδέκτου· "εἰς ποῖον ἱερὸν ἠσέβηκεν; τίνας θεῶν οὐ τετίμηκεν ὧν ἡ πόλις νομίζει;"* and Rhet. 3. 16, 1417 ^{a} 29 *παράδειγμα τὸ ἐκ τῆς Ἀντιγόνης, ὅτι μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ ἐκήδετο ἢ ἀνδρὸς ἢ τέκνων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἂν γενέσθαι ἀπολόμενα, "μητρὸς δ' ἐν Ἅιδου καὶ πατρὸς βεβηκότων οὐκ ἔστ' ἀδελφὸς ὅστις ἂν βλάστοι ποτέ"*.

ἐκ τῶν Νίπτρων: Od. 19. 164–260 (see on 16, 1454 ^{b} 30). Penelope was the victim of a 'fallacia consequentis', as her only reason for accepting Ulysses' statement in 164–200 as true was her recognition of the truth of that in 220–248.

προαιρεῖσθαί τε δεῖ κτέ. Aristotle returns to *τὸ ἄλογον* (^{a} 13–17) and its general inadmissibility in the Drama. The illustrations in ^{a} 30–32 show him to be now thinking only of Tragedy; the rule here laid down is a restatement of one already formulated for Tragedy (15, 1454 ^{b} 6); and the distinction between *ἔξω τοῦ μυθεύματος* and *ἐν τῷ δράματι* has no immediate relation to the technique of the Epic.

^{a} 27 **ἀδύνατα εἰκότα κτέ.** According to 9, 1451 ^{a} 38 the subject of the poetic story should be something that is possible as being either probable or necessary, *τὰ δυνατὰ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον*. In the present passage Aristotle considers two inferior kinds of subject, one that is *εἰκός* without being *δυνατόν* (*ἀδύνατα εἰκότα*), and one that is *δυνατόν* without being *εἰκός* (*δυνατὰ ἀπίθανα*). The former, he says, is poetically preferable to the latter; poetry demands not so much truth as a passable semblance of truth (comp. 25, 1461 ^{b} 11).

λόγους: i. e. the *μῦθοι* or stories embodied in the play or poem (see on 4, 1449 ^{a} 17). *τοὺς λόγους*, which is the subject of *ἔχειν* in ^{a} 29, is apparently the subject of *συνίστασθαι* also. *συνίστασθαι*, though a middle in ^{a} 34 (comp. 6, 1450 ^{a} 37), must be a passive

here, as it certainly is in 26, 1462^a 16 (see on 1, 1447^a 9). The same rule has already appeared in a slightly different form in 15, 1454^b 6. 1460^a 27

ἔξω τοῦ μυθεύματος: see on 14, 1453^b 32. ^{a} 29

Οἰδίπους. The article seems to have dropped out before the name (see on 4, 1448^b 38). ἔχει has to be supplied from the ἔχειν in the preceding line. ^{a} 30

τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι, scil. *τὸν Οἰδίπουν*, just as in 16, 1455^a 19 *βούλεσθαι* means *βούλεσθαι τὴν Ἰφιγένειαν*, the names being understood from the titles of the plays. In some instances, however (16, 1455^a 1, ^{a} 3, ^{a} 10), the personages referred to are not indicated even in this indirect way. The fact of Oedipus remaining for years in ignorance of the circumstances of the death of Laius is an improbability in the O. T.; but in Aristotle's view it is not so serious a fault as it might seem, since it is all anterior to the action, and outside the play itself.

ἐν Ἠλέκτρᾳ: Sophocles El. 660 sqq. The precise fault Aristotle saw in the story is not quite clear; as the stress, however, seems to be on *τὰ Πύθια*, the probability is that it was the anachronism in the reference to the Pythian games; the fault is noted by the Scholiast on El. 682 (*οὔπω ἦν ἐπὶ Ὀρέστου ὁ Πυθικὸς ἀγών*: comp. Schol. on El. 47, 49), who may be assumed to be reproducing a traditional criticism. The alternative is to suppose the absurdity to consist in Clytaemnestra having to learn the news for the first time from the *παιδαγωγός*: 'an credibile est nullum Argivum hominem ludis interfuisse, qui spectare Orestae exitium posset; cum ex universa Graecia eo fieret concursus?' (Robortello). ^{a} 31

ἐν Μυσοῖς: probably in the *Μυσοί* of Aeschylus (Nauck, TGF.^{2} p. 47). The personage described as *ἄφωνος ἐκ Τεγέας εἰς τὴν Μυσίαν ἥκων* was no doubt Telephus, a favourite subject for Tragedy (comp. 13, 1453^a 21). His long-maintained silence, which was an element of improbability in the play, passed into a proverb in the later Comedy: Amphis fr. 30, 6 Kock *ἔκυψεν ὥσπερ Τήλεφος πρῶτον σιωπῇ—καὶ δικαίως τοῦτό γε· ἅπαντες ἀνδροφόνοι γάρ εἰσιν ἑνὶ λόγῳ*.—Alexis fr. 178 K. *δειπνεῖ δ' ἄφωνος Τήλεφος, νεύων μόνον πρὸς τοὺς ἐπερωτῶντάς τι*. ^{a} 32

συνίστασθαι, which seems to have the same subject as *θῇ* in *ἂν δὲ θῇ*, must be a middle here (see on ^{a} 27). ^{a} 34

ἂν δὲ θῇ, scil. *τοιοῦτον μῦθον ὁ ποιητής*, or perhaps (as Bon. Ind. 751^a 25 suggests) *τὸ ἄλογον ἐν τῇ συστάσει τοῦ μύθου*. The usual

1460 a 34 punctuation of this passage is *ἂν δὲ θῇ, καὶ φαίνηται εὐλογωτέρως, ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ ἄτοπον*, which Tyrwhitt, with the old reading *εὐλογώτερον* before him, supposes to mean 'sin constituat quis et rationi consentaneum magis videatur, admittere etiam aliquid absurdi' [*scil.* oportet]. Vahlen, who takes the same view, thinks that *εὐλογωτέρως* may stand for *εὐλογωτέρως ἔχειν* (comp. Bon. Ind. 306 a 16), that *δεῖ* may be supplied with *ἐνδέχεσθαι* from the context (a 34), and also that *ἐνδέχεσθαι* may mean 'admittere', like *δέχεσθαι* or *ἀποδέχεσθαι*. With the amended punctuation the following will be the general drift of the passage: having just declared a certain procedure to be wrong (*ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὐ δεῖ συνίστασθαι τοιούτους*), Aristotle adds that in a certain case—*ἂν δὲ θῇ καὶ φαίνηται εὐλογωτέρως ἐνδέχεσθαι*—it is not only wrong but also absurd (*καὶ ἄτοπον*). With *ἐνδέχεσθαι* we may supply *θεῖναι*, from *ἂν δὲ θῇ*; comp. 25, 1461 a 34 *ποσαχῶς ἐνδέχεται* (where *σημαίνειν* is understood from the preceding *ποσαχῶς ἂν σημαίνοι*), and An. pr. I. 15, 34 a 34 *ὑπαρχέτω τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Β, τὸ δὲ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ ἐνδεχέσθω* (where *ἐνδεχέσθω* = *ἐνδεχέσθω ὑπάρχειν*). For the use of *ἄτοπον* comp. De div. per somn. I, 462 b 20 *τό τε γὰρ θεὸν εἶναι τὸν πέμποντα* [scil. *τὰ ἐνύπνια*], *πρὸς τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀλογίᾳ, καὶ τὸ μὴ τοῖς βελτίστοις καὶ φρονιμωνάτοις ἀλλὰ τοῖς τυχοῦσι πέμπειν ἄτοπον.*

a 35 **ἐν Ὀδυσσείᾳ.** In Od. 13. 116 sqq. Ulysses is said to have slept on even when the Phaeacians were setting him ashore. Porphyry ad loc. (p. 115 Schrader) recognizes the difficulty in the story, and quotes the explanation of Heraclides Ponticus: *τὴν τῶν Φαιάκων ἀτοπίαν, καθ' ἣν τὸν Ὀδυσσέα καθεύδοντα μὴ διυπνίσαντες εἰς τὴν γῆν κατέθεντο, τοῦ τε Ὀδυσσέως τὸν ἄκαιρον ὕπνον διαλύειν πειρώμενος ὁ Ποντικὸς Ἡρακλείδης φησὶν ἀτόπους εἶναι τοὺς ἐξ ὧν εἴρηκεν ὁ ποιητὴς μὴ στοχαζομένους περὶ τοῦ παντὸς τρόπου τῶν Φαιάκων κτέ.*

b 2 **ἀφανίζει**: see Bon. Ind. 127 a 1. The sense is that the attractiveness of the accessories (*ἡδύνων*; see on 6, 1449 b 25) disguises the inherent absurdity of the situation.

b 3 **ἐν τοῖς ἀργοῖς μέρεσι.** The meaning of these words has been supposed to be explained by what follows, *καὶ μήτε ἠθικοῖς μήτε διανοητικοῖς*; comp. Goulston's version of the clause, 'in partibus fabulae ignavis, iis scilicet quae neque moratae sunt neque sententiis munitae'. The sense, however, may very well be, 'in the parts in which there is no movement, and no ethical or rhetorical interest,' i. e. in the purely descriptive parts. For the form of the statement comp. Rhet. 3. 2, 1404 b 2 *σαφῆ . . . καὶ μήτε ταπεινὴν μήτε ὑπὲρ τὸ ἀξίωμα.*

Περὶ δὲ προβλημάτων κτέ. On the matter in this chapter see M. Carrol, 'Aristotle's Poetics c. xxv. in the light of the Homeric Scholia' (Baltimore 1895). It is added as a sort of Appendix, in recognition of the fact that a poem, when once before the world, may be exposed to criticism. A 'Problem' was originally a question propounded for discussion, whether in schools or in social gatherings such as Plato supposes in his dialogues. The general logic of such discussions is examined and reduced to formula in the Topics; but Aristotle takes no account in the Topics of the particular kind of Problem with which he is now dealing, the literary or critical Problem. This kind of question turns on some difficulty in a poem, which an adverse critic will censure as a mistake. By an analysis of the postulates and conditions of poetry Aristotle is able to determine and classify not only the various possible grounds of censure (*ἐπιτίμησις*), but also the various possible lines of defence, by indicating the solution (*λύσις*) or solutions applicable to each kind of objection. In illustrating the methods of defence he takes his instances mainly from the Homeric poems. Homer had long been a mark for criticism. Every kind of defect had been discovered in his two poems, offences against morality, absurdities, contradictions and other faults of construction, and even errors of language; the result being that Aristotle's contemporary Zoilus, the 'Homeromastix', was able to write a regular treatise (of considerable magnitude, it would seem) *κατὰ τῆς τοῦ Ὁμήρου ποιήσεως*, on the manifold faults in Homer. The position of Aristotle himself in this controversy is clear: he is on the side of the apologists, and an opponent of the kind of criticism represented by Zoilus. He is ready to meet the critics on their own ground with an answer of some sort or description for almost every difficulty they can start. The fragments of his *ἀπορήματα Ὁμηρικά*, a systematic work on this subject (fr. 142–178 Teubn.), exhibit the same tendency, and reveal him as a master of all the arts of critical casuistry. 1460 b 6

ὧδ᾽ ἂν θεωροῦσι γένοιτ᾽ ἂν φανερόν. For other Aristotelian instances of this repetition of *ἄν* see Bon. Ind. 41 a 60. b 7

ἐπεὶ γάρ ἐστι κτέ. Aristotle prepares us for the various kinds of *λύσεις* by laying down a series of postulates, which may supply the defence with arguments to meet the attacks of the critics. In the first place, he tells us, as the poet is an imitator in much the same way as a painter is that, one must remember that his imitation or picture of things may be either of things as they are (or were), or b 8

1460 b 8 of things as they should be, or of things as they are said or supposed to be. Secondly, as an imitator in language, the poet has by custom more liberty in the use of words than is allowed to a prose writer. Thirdly, if the technical correctness of his description of a thing is questioned, it is to be remembered that poetry, as a distinct art, has a correctness of its own, and that the right in poetry is not the same thing as the right in other arts or sciences, in politics for instance. At the same time, as the matter of poetry brings it into relation with other arts and sciences, their standard of correctness cannot be ignored in poetry. An offence, however, against their rule of correctness may often be condoned; and in certain cases it even admits of justification (b 24), if it is seen to conduce to the poetical effect.

ζωγράφος ἢ τις ἄλλος εἰκονοποιός: see on 2, 1448 a 5. The term *εἰκονοποιός* comprises the sculptor as well as the painter of portraits.

b 10 **οἷα ἦν ἢ ἔστιν.** In chap. 2 Aristotle was speaking of persons only. In the present passage he uses the neuter in order to include the poetic descriptions of things and acts. The order of the words *ἦν ἢ ἔστιν* is intentional, stories of the past being regarded as the normal subjects of both epic poetry and Tragedy (see on 2, 1448 a 18). It may be observed that in 1461 a 2 Aristotle avails himself of the distinction implied in *οἷα ἦν ἢ ἔστιν*, and suggests that a certain incident, which had been criticized in Homer, may have been probable enough in Homeric times.

οἷά φασιν καὶ δοκεῖ, scil. *εἶναι* (which covers the ground of both *ἦν* and *ἔστιν*). The difference between the two things (*οἷά φασιν*, *οἷα δοκεῖ*), so far as there is one, is like that between *τὰ λεγόμενα* and *τὰ δοκοῦντα*—'what people usually say', and 'what people usually think, or suppose'.

b 11 **οἷα εἶναι δεῖ**: comp. b 34.

λέξει ἢ καὶ γλώτταις κτέ. *λέξις* is properly a generic term, including the metaphor, the strange word, etc. Here, however, Aristotle adds *ἢ καὶ γλώτταις κτέ.*, in order to remind us of the fact that these various unusual forms of expression are a recognized part of the poetic vocabulary. The practical effect of the addition is to modify the sense of *λέξει*, and make it stand for *κυρίᾳ λέξει*, just as in 1, 1447 a 29 (v. ad loc.) the addition of *ἢ τοῖς μέτροις* has a reflex influence on the preceding word *λόγοις*, limiting it for the moment to the sense of 'prose'. The generic word *ὄνομα* likewise is occasionally used in a context which gives it the more

specific sense of *κύριον ὄνομα* (see on 22, 1458 a 28). It is hardly 1460 b 11
necessary, therefore, to restore ⟨*κυρίᾳ*⟩ *λέξει* with Heinsius, or *λέξει* ⟨*ἢ κυρίᾳ*⟩ with Twining, or *λέξει* ⟨*ἢ κυρίοις ὀνόμασιν*⟩ with Vahlen.

πάθη τῆς λέξεως: i.e. the modifications seen in the *ἐπεκτεταμένον* the *ὑφῃρημένον*, and the *ἐξηλλαγμένον ὄνομα* (21, 1458 a 1), b 12
which, though substantially identical with the ordinary words (22, 1458 b 4), are distinguished from them through some deviation of form. The term *πάθος* is used in this same sense by Theophrastus in a fragment of his *Περὶ λέξεως* (Rabe, De Theophrasti libris *περὶ λέξεως* p. 6): *τίς ἡ κυρία λέξις, τίς δ' ἡ μεταφορική; καὶ τίνα τὰ πάθη αὐτῆς, οἷον τί ἀποκοπή, τί συγκοπή, τί ἀφαίρεσις;*

δίδομεν γὰρ ταῦτα: a recognition of what were afterwards known b 13
as poetic licences. Aristotle has already shown their use and legitimacy in poetry (22, 1458 a 34).

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις *κτέ.* The kind of criticism Aristotle has in mind is one sufficiently familiar to us moderns; we know that a picture, for instance, is often censured for errors of anatomy, and a novel for errors of history or archaeology. In Aristotle's view technical accuracy in such points, though desirable (b 27), is neither the one thing nor the first thing needful in a poem. Poetry, as a distinct art, has an end, a procedure, and a correctness of its own; and it is thus quite possible for a description in a poem to be poetically right, even though it may be wrong in some technical detail.

τῆς πολιτικῆς. *Πολιτική*, as the art which deals with human life b 14
and conduct, might easily seem to stand in a very intimate relation to poetry, which has to depict human life and conduct (comp. 6, 1450 a 16 *μίμησις πράξεως καὶ βίου*); and as a matter of history the connexion between the two arts was posited in the common notion of the older poets being authorities on all questions of *πολιτική*, and the great teachers of moral and political wisdom (comp. Plato Rep. 598 D, 606 E; also Dümmler, Kl. Schriften I p. 30). It is not without reason, therefore, that Aristotle takes *πολιτική* as his instance here, and emphasizes the distinction between the 'political' and the 'poetical' standard of right.

It may perhaps be thought that in affirming this distinction Aristotle anticipates the idea of 'Art for Art', and regards poetry as raised above the limitations imposed on all ordinary human activities by social or moral law. Such a notion would ill accord with what we read elsewhere in the Poetics. In Aristotle's view

1460 b 14 a deviation in poetry from the ethically right is, just like one from probability or truth, an exceptional procedure, and to be condoned only when it is seen to be necessary for the ultimate poetical effect. The tragic hero, if one is to feel pity for him in his misfortunes, should be a good man—either better than, or at least as good as, the average of mankind. The secondary personages too should be each good in their way, unless the plot happens to require a character of a lower type; in which case his baseness should be no more than is wanted for the evolution of the story. Even Comedy, as Aristotle conceives it, has its ethical limitations: the comic personage, though by hypothesis worse than the average man, is worse only up to a certain point; his faults of character or conduct being such as may be laughed at, i.e. they do not excite anger or abhorrence in the normally minded spectator in the theatre. The tacit assumption throughout the Poetics is that the theatrical public is on the whole normal in its moral instincts and sympathies, and that the poet should never lose sight of the fact. Readers of the Nicomachean Ethics will remember that in the Aristotelian hierarchy of arts all the other arts are regarded as subordinate to *πολιτική*, the supreme art, which deals with the whole social and moral order of the State, and that there is no hint of the so-called 'aesthetic' arts being outside its purview and control.

b 15 **αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς ποιητικῆς διττὴ ἁμαρτία.** The argument may be thus restated: There is always a twofold possibility of error in the poet's *μίμησις* or description of things. (1) Starting with a correct idea of the object to be described, he may fail to express his own meaning; in which case his art as a poet (or *μιμητής*) is at fault, and his faulty description is a sign of artistic or literary incapacity. (2) On the other hand the error may be simply due to his starting with an erroneous idea of the object; in which case it arises not from lack of descriptive power on his part, but from insufficient knowledge of something outside poetry, and it is thus in the accidents rather than the essentials of the poetic art. Vahlen quotes Soph. el. 33, 182 b 33 *ἀπορία δ' ἐστὶ διττή, ἡ μὲν ἐν τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς . . . ἡ δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς*, to show that an article is not wanted before *ἁμαρτία*.

b 17 **ἀδυναμίαν**: comp. 16, 1454 b 21 *δι' ἀπορίαν*. *δι' ἀδυναμίαν* is practically equivalent to *δι' ἀτεχνίαν*, through lack of artistic power—art being with Aristotle a kind of *δύναμις* or power (v. Bon. Ind. 207 b 6).

εἰ δὲ τῷ προελέσθαι κτέ. I have not been able to follow Vahlen in his general view of this passage, which in his edition reads thus:— 1460 b 18

εἰ δὲ τὸ προελέσθαι μὴ ὀρθῶς ἀλλὰ τὸν ἵππον ⟨ἅμ'⟩ ἄμφω τὰ δεξιὰ προβεβληκότα ἢ τὸ καθ' ἑκάστην τέχνην ἁμάρτημα οἷον τὸ κατ' ἰατρικὴν ἢ ἄλλην τέχνην [ἢ ἀδύνατα πεποίηται] ὁποιανοῦν, οὐ καθ' ἑαυτήν.

This reading requires us to take *μὴ ὀρθῶς* as standing for *μὴ ὀρθῶς εἶχεν*, and *ἀλλὰ τὸν ἵππον κτέ.* as a short way of saying *ἀλλὰ προείλετο μιμήσασθαι οἷον τὸν ἵππον κτέ.* It is, however, much simpler to suppose that *μὴ ὀρθῶς* = *μὴ ὀρθῶς μιμήσασθαι*, and to take *ἀλλὰ τὸν ἵππον κτέ.* (scil. *μιμήσασθαι*) as a concrete instance of the opposite of *ὀρθῶς μιμήσασθαι.* The insertion also of *ἅμα* before *ἄμφω τὰ δεξιὰ προβεβληκότα* is unnecessary; these words (as the tense of the participle is enough to show) suggest a picture; and the fault in the picture consists in the horse in motion being depicted with *both* right legs thrown forward, instead of only one of them. As regards the clause *ἢ ἀδύνατα πεποίηται*, which Vahlen (after Düntzer) excises as a dittographia of the *ἀδύνατα πεποίηται* in b 23, it seems to me that the words are wanted for two reasons, (1) to enable us to supply *πεποίηται* after *τὸ καθ' ἑκάστην τέχνην ἁμάρτημα*, and (2) to give the statement the requisite breadth. The error in the poet's picture or description (comp. *πεποίηται*) may be in matters which come under the cognizance of some special art or science (*τὸ καθ' ἑκάστην τέχνην ἁμάρτημα*), but it may also be in matters of a less distinctly technical nature. Aristotle adds *ἢ ἀδύνατα πεποίηται ὁποῖ' ἂν οὖν* in order to include this latter kind of error. The instance of it in the context (b 26) is the absurdity (comp. 24, 1460 a 15), or rather the offence against common sense, in the Pursuit of Hector in the Iliad. That given in b 31 of the other form of error is a mistake in natural history, i. e. in a matter of technical knowledge. The distinction, therefore, between the two kinds of error is a very real one, at any rate in controversy (v. on 25, 1461 b 24).

τὸν ἵππον ἄμφω τὰ δεξιὰ προβεβληκότα, scil. *μιμήσασθαι.* In Aristotle's view this is a mistake in natural history, and inconsistent with the general law of the diagonal movement of the legs of quadrupeds walking as laid down in the De incessu an. 14, 712 a 24: *κινεῖται δὲ τὰ ὀπίσθια πρὸς τὰ ἔμπροσθεν κατὰ διάμετρον· μετὰ γὰρ τὸ δεξιὸν τῶν ἔμπροσθεν τὸ ἀριστερὸν τῶν ὄπισθεν κινοῦσιν, εἶτα τὸ ἀριστερὸν τῶν ἔμπροσθεν, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο τὸ δεξιὸν τῶν ὄπισθεν . . . εἰ δὲ τοῖς δεξιοῖς ἀμφοτέροις πρώτοις* [scil. *ἐποιοῦντο τὴν κίνησιν*], *ἔξω*

1460 b 18 ἂν ἐγίγνοντο τῶν ἐρεισμάτων καὶ ἔπιπτον ἄν. He was apparently unaware of the fact that the legs of the horse are actually in the position assumed to be impossible in certain stages of the amble and the rack. A horse with legs in this position is to be seen in modern art in Meissonier's 'Cavaliers en marche' (*Exposition Meissonier*, No. 114—Paris 1893). Illustrations from the life will be found in E. Muybridge's 'Animal Locomotion'—Philadelphia 1872–93.

b 21 **ὁποῖ᾽ ἂν οὖν**, scil. ᾖ or πεποιημένα ᾖ. For the omission of the verb comp. Soph. el. 17, 175 b 27 ὁποτέρῳ γὰρ ἂν οὐδὲν διαφέρει.—Eth. N. 3. 10. 1115 b 19 ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος.—Pol. 6. 3, 1318 a 22 ὅ τι ἂν οἱ ὀλίγοι (also Riddell, Digest of Idioms § 255). We should expect simply ὁποιαοῦν, the formula ordinarily used by Aristotle in passages like the present.

οὐ καθ᾽ ἑαυτήν (scil. ἡ ἁμαρτία τῆς ποιητικῆς) is the apodosis, and the opposite of that in the preceding clause (b 17), αὐτῆς ἡ ἁμαρτία. The general sense of the passage (with the reading τῷ προελέσθαι) is briefly this: If it was through a mistake in his original conception of the thing that either the technical error, or impossibilities of whatever kind they may be, have got into his description, the error in that case does not belong to the art of the poet *per se*, but only *per accidens*.

ὥστε δεῖ τὰ ἐπιτιμήματα κτέ. A Problem in Aristotle's sense of the term is only a kind of question (v. on b 6); but the mere fact of a question being raised in reference to the poet's work involves the possibility of an answer unfavourable to him, i.e. of an ἐπιτίμημα, a censure or condemnation of what he has said. We have had ἐπιτίμημα in this technical sense in 19, 1456 b 14, and the verb ἐπιτιμᾶν in 17, 1455 a 26, in 19, 1456 b 16, and in 22, 1458 b 6. The criticisms to which a poem is exposed Aristotle examines under the three heads indicated in the preceding statement (b 7–21), but in reverse order: (1) the strictures passed on the poet's descriptions of things (b 22–32); (2) those relating to the kind of subject he has chosen to depict (b 32–1461 a 9); and (3) the faults found in his language (1461 a 9–31). After that he shows in what way or ways each kind of criticism has to be answered.

b 23 **τὰ πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην**, scil. τοῦ ποιητοῦ ἐπιτιμήματα, the censures relating to the artistic execution in his imitations.

⟨εἰ⟩ ἀδύνατα πεποίηται. Ueberweg suggests that the traditional ἀδύνατα πεποίηται (without the insertion of εἰ) may be a rhetorical

way of putting the supposition, such as might be used in an actual debate or discussion. In the course of this chapter Aristotle more than once writes as if he were simply reporting a possible debate (v. on b 33 *ἀλλ' ἴσως δεῖ*, and on 1461 a 1 *ἀλλ' οὖν φασι*). 1460 b 23

ἡμάρτηται is the natural opposite of the *ὀρθῶς ἔχει* in the next line; comp. Eth. E. 2. 11, 1227 b 21 *ἔστι δὲ τὸν μὲν σκοπὸν ἡμαρτῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον περαίνοντα ὀρθῶς ἔχειν.*—Eth. N. 8. 12, 1160 b 30 *αὕτη μὲν οὖν* [scil. *ἡ ἀρχή*] *ὀρθὴ φαίνεται, ἡ Περσικὴ δ' ἡμαρτημένη.*—Eth. N. 6. 10, 1142 b 10 *ἐπιστήμης μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρθότης, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἁμαρτία.*—2. 2, 1104 b 32 *περὶ πάντα ταῦτα ὁ ἀγαθὸς κατορθωτικός ἐστιν ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἁμαρτητικός.*

τὸ γὰρ τέλος εἴρηται: a reason for the statement that follows b 24
(see on 21, 1457 b 34). For the use of *εἴρηται* (which has been very unadvisedly questioned and altered into *εὕρηται, αἱρεῖται, εἴληπται*, or *τηρεῖται*) see on 11, 1452 b 11.

εἰ οὕτως ἐκπληκτικώτερον *κτέ.* is appositional to *εἰ τυγχάνει τοῦ* b 25
τέλους τοῦ αὑτῆς. Vahlen compares Metaph. E 3, 1027 a 30 *εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο, ἐξ ἀνάγκης πάντ' ἔσται, εἰ τοῦ γιγνομένου καὶ φθειρομένου μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἴτιόν τι ἀνάγκη εἶναι.*—Plato Gorg. 522 C *εἰ ἐκεῖνό γε ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχοι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὃ σὺ πολλάκις ὡμολόγησας, εἰ βεβοηθηκὼς εἴη αὑτῷ κτέ.*; and Hyperides Euxen. 23, 24, Lysias 3, 38. The clause only gives an illustration, not a complete account of the end of poetry. That surprise is one of the legitimate effects of poetry was definitely said, though the point is nowhere demonstrated, in 24, 1460 a 11; it has been assumed also in 9, 1452 a 4, in 14, 1454 a 4, and in 16, 1455 a 17. For the meaning of *ἐκπληκτικώτερον* see on 14, 1454 a 4.

⟨ἢ μὴ⟩ ἧττον: Metaph. K 5, 1062 a 25 *δόξειε δὲ κἂν οὐχ ἵππον* b 27
εἶναι φάσκων τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἢ μᾶλλον ἢ οὐχ ἧττον ἀληθεύειν ἢ οὐκ ἄνθρωπον.

ἡμαρτῆσθαι here seems to be a dittographia of the *ἡμαρτῆσθαι* b 28
in the next line (J. of Phil. 14, p. 52).

δεῖ γὰρ *κτέ.*: comp. the parallel statement as to the avoidance of *ἄλογα* in 24, 1460 a 28. The general rule is that the descriptions in poetry should be in accordance with the technical standard of correctness; but at the same time there are cases in which some sacrifice of technical accuracy may be requisite to produce the poetic effect (b 24; comp. 1461 b 11 *πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν*), and in these the end justifies the means. This is the only direct answer to an objection of this kind. But if such an answer is not possible, it may perhaps be urged, in mitigation of censure at

1460 b 28 any rate, that the technical error is in a minor matter (b 31), and as such, a venial fault in an imitative art.

b 29 **ἔτι ποτέρων ἐστὶ τὸ ἁμάρτημα κτέ.** is not a *λύσις* proper, but an attempt to minimize the offence. In a *λύσις* proper the point to which the opponent has taken exception is shown to have another aspect, and to be right (*ὀρθῶς ἔχει* b 24) when viewed in that other aspect.

b 30 **τῶν κατὰ τὴν τέχνην**: in matters belonging to his art, i. e. the art of poetry, as distinct from matters outside poetry, and only accidentally (*κατὰ συμβεβηκός*) connected with it. Vahlen draws attention to the change of construction, *κατ' ἄλλο συμβεβηκός* instead of *τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκός*. For the appositional clause after *ποτέρων* comp. Eth. N. 9. 1, 1164 a 22, and Rhet. 3. 5, 1407 b 15.

b 31 **ἔλαφος θήλεια κέρατα οὐκ ἔχει**: H. A. 4. 11, 538 b 18 *κέρατα ἔλαφος θήλεια οὐκ ἔχει.*—De part. an. 3. 1, 662 a 1 *τῶν ἐλάφων οἱ μὲν ἄρρενες ἔχουσι κέρατα, αἱ δὲ θήλειαι οὐκ ἔχουσιν.* The hind seems to have often been represented as having horns not only by poets (v. Nauck, Aristophanis Byz. fr. p. 61), but also by artists; comp. the Scholiast on Pindar Ol. 3, 52: *ἐπιμελῶς οἱ ποιηταὶ τὴν θήλειαν ἔλαφον κέρατα ἔχουσαν εἰσάγουσιν, καθάπερ καὶ τὴν θηλάζουσαν τὸν Τήλεφον γράφουσι καὶ πλάττουσιν.*

b 32 **ἀμιμήτως** is the opposite of *μιμητικῶς*. In Probl. 29. 10, 951 a 6 (the only Aristotelian passage in which it recurs) *ἀμίμητος* is the opposite of *μιμητός*; but it is not uncommon with negative words of this type to have two senses, an active as well as a passive; *ἀναίσθητος*, for instance, is the opposite not only of *αἰσθητός* but also of *αἰσθητικός*. The negative idea in this and similar privative terms must not be pressed too far (see on *ἀήθεις* 6, 1450 a 25); *ἀμιμήτως ἔγραψεν* only means that the picture did not adequately express the artist's meaning, i. e. did not express it in a way to be understood by others. A failure of this kind, which arises *δι' ἀδυναμίαν*, through lack of artistic capacity (see above on b 17), is inexcusable in a *μιμητής*, whose work must be intelligible, if it is to give us the pleasure of a *μίμημα* (v. 4, 1448 b 15).

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κτέ. Aristotle passes on to the *ἐπιτιμήματα* which come under the first of the three heads in the survey in b 8 sqq. The objector is supposed to urge either that the poetic picture is not true to fact (comp. *οἷα ἦν ἢ ἔστιν*, b 10), or that it is not better than the reality (comp. *οἷα εἶναι δεῖ*, b 11), or that it is not in harmony with tradition or opinion (comp. *οἷά φασιν καὶ δοκεῖ* b 10). The answers to these criticisms may take the follow-

ing forms:—(1) If not true to fact, the picture is perhaps better 1460 b 32
than the reality; (2) if neither true to fact nor better than the reality, it is perhaps in accordance with opinion; (3) if not in accordance with opinion, it is perhaps true to fact. There are thus three *λύσεις* for this class of *ἐπιτιμήματα*. Aristotle omits to mention a fourth *λύσις*, the plea of poetic necessity (*πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν*, 1461 b 9), which is, wherever possible, a valid answer to almost any criticism.

ἀλλ' ἴσως δεῖ = *ἀλλ' ἴσως δεῖ εἶναι*, just as in the next line *οἵους δεῖ* b 33
= *οἵους δεῖ εἶναι* (comp. Bon. Ind. 239 a 16). The answer is vividly introduced by *ἀλλά*, the word the defender himself might use in an actual discussion.

οἷον καὶ Σοφοκλῆς: see on 6, 1450 a 37. A similar remark is attributed to the poet Philoxenus, *Φιλόξενος ὁ ποιητὴς εἰπόντος τινός, διατί Σοφοκλῆς χρηστὰς παρεισάγει τὰς γυναῖκας αὐτὸς δὲ φαύλας, εἶπεν, Ὅτι Σοφοκλῆς μὲν οἵας δεῖ εἶναι τὰς γυναῖκας λέγει, ἐγὼ δὲ οἷαί εἰσιν* (S. Maximus Conf. 2 p. 632 Combef.).

ταύτῃ λυτέον. Having introduced an illustration (the saying of b 34
Sophocles), Aristotle adds *ταύτῃ λυτέον*, repeating the sense of the words preceding the illustration. This is an instance of what Riddell, Digest of Idioms § 209, terms the Binary structure with comparisons, when 'the fact illustrated is stated (perhaps only in outline) before the illustration, and re-stated after it.' For other Aristotelian instances see Vahlen, Aristotelische Aufsätze 1 p. 6, and my Textual Criticism of the Nic. Ethics p. 27.

ὅτι οὕτω φασίν = *λυτέον ὅτι οὕτω φασὶν εἶναι*. The construction b 35
λύειν ὅτι ('to refute by saying that') is found in Soph. el. 24, 179 b 34 *ἁμαρτάνουσι καὶ οἱ λύοντες ὅτι ἅπας ἀριθμὸς ὀλίγος*.—Rhet. 2. 25, 1402 b 34 *οὔκουν ἱκανὸν ἂν λύσῃ ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ λύειν ὅτι οὐκ εἰκός*.—Fr. 166 (Teubn.) *ἔστι δὲ λύειν . . . ὅτι τοιαῦτα ἦν*.

τὰ περὶ θεῶν: i. e. the poetic statements about Gods, though neither true nor better than the truth, may perhaps be said to be sanctioned by opinion, and to be what people are in the habit of repeating of the Gods.

ὥσπερ Ξενοφάνει, scil. *ἐστίν*, 'as they are in the view of Xeno- 1461 a 1
phanes' (v. Kühner, Gr. Gr.[3] 2. 1, p. 421). Other Aristotelian instances of this use of the dative are De caelo 3. 8, 307 a 16 *Δημοκρίτῳ δὲ καὶ ἡ σφαῖρα ὡς γωνία τις οὖσα τέμνει ὡς εὐκίνητον*.—De gen. et corr. 1. 8, 325 b 15 *Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ τίνα τρόπον ἔσται γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ καὶ ἀλλοίωσις, οὐ δῆλον*. Xenophanes, we must remember,

1461 a 1 was the first to lift up his voice against Homer and Hesiod, as the great exponents of a false and immoral conception of the Gods (see fr. 10–12 Diels).

ἀλλ᾽ οὖν = 'but at any rate' (Kühner, Gr. Gr.[3] 2. 2 p. 160; comp. Bon. Ind. 33 b 33).

a 2 **ἔγχεα δέ σφιν κτέ.**: Il. 10. 152 *ἔγχεα δέ σφιν ὄρθ᾽ ἐπὶ σαυρωτῆρος ἐλήλατο.* The difficulty here is thus stated in a fragment of the *᾽Απορήματα ῾Ομηρικά* (fr. 160 Teubn. = Porphyr. in Il. l. c. p. 145 Schrader), where the same solution is suggested: *φαύλη δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ τῶν δοράτων ἐπὶ σαυρωτῆρας στάσις· καὶ δὴ πανταχοῦ θόρυβον ἤδη πεποίηκε νύκτωρ ἓν μόνον πεσόν. λύει δ᾽ ᾽Αριστοτέλης λέγων ὅτι τοιαῦτα ἀεὶ ποιεῖ ῞Ομηρος οἷα ἦν τότε. ἦν δὲ τοιαῦτα τὰ παλαιὰ οἷάπερ καὶ νῦν ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις· πολλοὶ δὲ οὕτω χρῶνται τῶν βαρβάρων.* A similar justification of Homer, by reference to a primitive custom still surviving among barbarians, is found in fr. 166 (= Porphyr. in Il. 24. 15, p. 267 Schr.): *διὰ τί ὁ ᾽Αχιλλεὺς τὸν ῞Εκτορα εἷλκε περὶ τὸν τάφον τοῦ Πατρόκλου παρὰ τὰ νενομισμένα ποιῶν εἰς τὸν νεκρόν; . . . ἔστι δὲ λύειν, φησὶν ᾽Αριστοτέλης, καὶ εἰς τὰς ὑπάρχοντα ἀνάγοντα ἔθη, ὅτι τοιαῦτα ἦν, ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν ἐν Θετταλίᾳ περιέλκουσι περὶ τοὺς τάφους.*

a 3 **σαυρωτῆρος.** If the form in the quotation in the *᾽Απορήματα ῾Ομηρικά* is to be trusted, Aristotle's text of Homer would seem to have had *σαυρωτῆρας*, the reading of Aristophanes.

a 4 **καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς** = *πότερον καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς* (v. Kühner, Gr. Gr.[3] 2. 2 p. 532). The objection Aristotle is now considering is the moral objection, the criticism that something said or done by a personage in a poem was not morally right (*οἷον εἶναι δεῖ* 1460 b 11). His point is that, before admitting the validity of such an objection, it is proper to take the circumstances of the word or deed into account, e. g. (1) the person to whom it was said or done, (2) the moment, (3) the instrument used, and (4) the motive in the mind of the speaker or agent. Eth. N. 3, 1, 1111 a 4 contains a fuller statement of the circumstances that may lead us to modify the severity of our moral judgements (comp. fr. 174 Teubn.).

a 7 **πρὸς ὃν κτέ.**: i.e. *πρὸς ὃν . . . ἔπραξεν ἢ ἔλεξεν ὁ πράττων ἢ λέγων.*

a 8 **ὅτε.** Plutarch (De aud. poet. 26 F) defends the four lines in Il. 9. 458–61, which Aristarchus is said to have excised, as being *πρὸς τὸν καιρόν*; comp. Porphyr. in Il. 9. 203, p. 135 Schr. *οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς λέξεως λύουσι . . . οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ καιροῦ, ὅτι νύξ.*

μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ: An. pr. 2. 22, 68 a 35 *αἱρετώτερον δὲ τὸ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἔλαττον κακὸν ἢ τὸ ἔλαττον ἀγαθὸν καὶ μεῖζον κακόν* (comp. Rhet. 1. 10, 1369 b 25).—Porphyr. in Od. 13. 119, p. 117 Schr. *πολλάκις γὰρ τῶν ἐν μιᾷ πράξει καὶ δυσχερὲς ὑπάρχει τι καὶ ἀγαθόν, καὶ μᾶλλόν ἐστιν αἱρετὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ κακὸν φευκτόν· διόπερ οὐκ ἀποδοκιμάζομεν τὰς τοιαύτας πράξεις.* 1461 a 8

τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν *κτέ.* Aristotle's examples show that the difficulties coming under this head are of every possible kind; the one point they have in common is that they turn on language, and may be met by the discovery or adoption of another interpretation of the language in the incriminated statement. a 9

διαλύειν is simply a synonym for *λύειν* (Bon. Ind. 184 a 43; HSt. s.v.). a 10

γλώττῃ: i.e. by taking some word in the passage as a *γλῶττα* (see 21, 1457 b 4). For the instrumental dative, of which there are so many other instances in the context, comp. Soph. el. 24, 179 b 38 *ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ τῷ διττῷ λύουσι τοὺς συλλογισμούς.*

οὐρῆας μὲν πρῶτον: Il. 1. 50 *οὐρῆας μὲν πρῶτον ἐπῴχετο καὶ κύνας ἀργούς.* The difficulty the ancients found here was to understand why the mules were made to suffer first (v. Porphyr. ad loc. p. 4 Schrader). Aristotle's interpretation of *οὐρῆας*, which survives in Hesychius (s. v. *οὐρεῖς* and *οὐρῆας*), is condemned in Schol. Ven. A on Il. l. c. (presumably from Aristonicus): *ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς τινες οὐρῆας τοὺς φύλακας· ἀντιδιαστέλλει γὰρ διὰ τοῦ αὐτοῖσι,* and again on Il. 10. 84: *ἀθετεῖται, ὅτι οὐρήων βούλεται λέγειν τῶν φυλάκων, καὶ οὐκ ἐκράτησεν τοῦ σχήματος· οὖρον γὰρ λέγει ὡς κοῦρον τὸν φύλακα, οὐρέα δὲ τὸν ἡμίονον.*

ὅς ῥ' ἦ τοι εἶδος: Il. 10. 316 *ὃς δή τοι εἶδος μὲν ἔην κακός, ἀλλὰ ποδώκης.* The question raised was apparently this: How could Dolon, if ill-shaped, have been swift of foot? The answer of Aristotle is that *εἶδος κακός* may have meant in Homer not 'ill-shaped', but simply 'ugly' or 'ill-looking'; he suggests that *εἶδος* may have been used not in its normal sense of 'shape', but in a strange sense (as a *γλῶττα*) corresponding to that of the derivative *εὐειδής* in the Cretan dialect. His explanation of the word reappears in Schol. Bachm. on Il. 2. 58: *εἶδος ἐπὶ τοῦ προσώπου,* and in Hesychius (s. v. *εἴδη*): *εἶδος . . . ὄψις, πρόσωπον.* a 12

τὸ γὰρ εὐειδὲς *κτέ.* The traditional reading *τὸ γὰρ εὐειδὲς οἱ Κρῆτες εὐπρόσωπον καλοῦσι* is supposed to mean that the word *εὐειδές* is applied by the Cretans to that which is *εὐπρόσωπον*; comp. Tyrwhitt's rendering, 'Cretenses *εὐειδὲς* vocant quod facie a 13

1461 a 13 speciosum est', and Vahlen's 'vocabulo quod est *εὐειδὲς* Cretes *εὐπρόσωπον* appellant'. The difficulty however is in the absence of the article with the subject, which produces an intolerable ambiguity. I have accordingly ventured to restore ⟨*τὸ*⟩ *εὐπρόσωπον* on the analogy of Aristotelian usage in the context (*τὸ ἄκρατον . . . τὸ θᾶττον*) and in 6, 1449 b 29, as also elsewhere, e. g. in Metaph. Δ 29, 1025 a 11 *τὸ χωλαίνειν τὸ μιμεῖσθαι λέγων.* Vahlen quotes a number of passages from other writers in defence of the vulgate, but as it seems to me, they are not all quite to the point; those from Plato (Theaet. 190 A and Crat. 410 C) at any rate may very well admit of another interpretation. The more important of his instances were discussed by W. Dindorf, Preface to Demosthenes p. lxii ed. Teubn. In two of them the anomaly may be removed at once by the same expedient, the insertion of a second article: Demosthenes 23, 33 *τὰ γὰρ ἄποινα* ⟨*τὰ*⟩ *χρήματα ὠνόμαζον οἱ παλαιοί.*—Xenophon Mem. 3. 14. 7 *ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ ὡς τὸ εὐωχεῖσθαι ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων γλώττῃ* ⟨*τὸ*⟩ *ἐσθίειν καλοῖτο.*

a 14 **ζωρότερον κτέ.**: Il. 9. 202 *μείζονα δὴ κρητῆρα, Μενοιτίου υἱέ, καθίστα, ζωρότερον δὲ κέραιε.* Porphyry's note on this is: *ἀπρεπές· ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ κῶμον ἥκουσιν ἀκρατότερον διδόναι παρακελεύεται. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς λέξεως λύουσι· τὸ γὰρ ζωρότερον εἶναι τάχιον κτέ.* (p. 135 Schrader). Plutarch Qu. conv. 5. 4, 677 F tells us that this was one of the many Homeric statements to which Zoilus took exception.

a 15 **ἄκρατον.** The comparative *ἀκρατότερον* is the usual equivalent for *ζωρότερον* in the Homeric Scholia, and in the lexicographers: Apollonius Lex. p. 81 Bekk. *ζωρότερον ἀκρατότερον.*—Hesychius *ζωρότερον· ἀκρατότερον. ἔνιοι δὲ τάχιον·* The reading *ἄκρατον,* however, is sufficiently certified by Ath. 423 E *τινὲς δὲ καὶ τὸ παρ' Ὁμήρῳ 'ζωρότερον δὲ κέραιρε' οὐκ ἄκρατον σημαίνειν φασίν, ἀλλὰ θερμόν . . . ἄλλοι δὲ τὸ εὔκρατον, ὥσπερ τὸ δεξιτερὸν ἀντὶ τοῦ δεξιοῦ* (comp. Plutarch Qu. conv. 5. 4, 677 D).

ὡς οἰνόφλυξιν: comp. Probl. 3. 5, 871 a 27 *διὰ τί οἱ οἰνόφλυγες τρέμουσι, καὶ μᾶλλον ὅσῳ ἂν ἀκρατοποτῶσιν;*

a 16 **ἄλλοι μέν ῥα κτέ.**: Il. 10. 1 *ἄλλοι μὲν παρὰ νηυσὶν ἀριστῆες Παναχαιῶν εὗδον παννύχιοι* must be the passage Aristotle had in mind; but he seems to have mixed it up with that in Il. 2. 1 *ἄλλοι μέν ῥα θεοί τε καὶ ἀνέρες ἱπποκορυσταὶ εὗδον παννύχιοι.* The difficulty in the passage was its inconsistency with Il. 10. 11–13 (on the revelry and other signs of life among the Trojans), *ἦ τοι ὅτ' ἐς πεδίον τὸ Τρωικὸν ἀθρήσειε, θαύμαζεν πυρὰ πολλά, τὰ καίετο Ἰλιόθι*

πρό, αὐλῶν συρίγγων τ' ἐνοπὴν ὅμαδόν τ' ἀνθρώπων. Aristotle's 1461 a 16
solution, it will be observed, consists in saying that πάντες may mean practically no more than 'many', and be an instance of the metaphorical substitution of a specific in lieu of a generic term (v. 21, 1457 b 8). The word πάντες, therefore, must have appeared somewhere or other in the text of the Aristotelian quotation (comp. Tyrwhitt ad loc.). Gräfenhan found a place for it by writing πάντες instead of ἄλλοι, and Tyrwhitt by restoring πάντες ὁμοῦ for παννύχιοι. A simpler expedient would perhaps be to suppose the passage, as Aristotle remembered it, to have run thus: ἄλλοι μέν ῥα θεοί τε καὶ ἀνέρες εὗδον ⟨ἅπαντες⟩ | παννύχιοι.

ἦ τοι ὅτ' ἐς πεδίον κτέ.: Il. 10. 11–13 (quoted above). The a 18
omission of the line θαύμαζεν πυρὰ πολλά, τὰ καίετο Ἰλιόθι πρό may very well be due to Aristotle himself; it is difficult, however, to hold him responsible for the form the next line has in the MS., αὐλῶν συρίγγων τε ὁμαδόν—which the editors (following Sylburg) have made into αὐλῶν συρίγγων θ' ὁμαδόν (or ὅμαδον); he must have known that the meaning thus given to ὅμαδος was not in accordance with Homeric usage. The accentuation too of the word in the manuscript (ὁμαδόν) is difficult to account for. I think that it may perhaps represent ὅμαδόν, i. e. ὅμαδον with an enclitic after it; so that the reading in the MS. may be the wreckage of an older reading, αὐλῶν συρίγγων τ' ἐ⟨νοπὴν⟩ ὅμαδόν ⟨τ' ἀνθρώπων⟩, in other words, of the line as it appears in the ordinary text of Homer.

τὸ γὰρ πάντες ἀντὶ ⟨τοῦ⟩ πολλοί. Porphyry on Od. 12. 374 a 19
(p. 113 Schrader) records a similar interpretation of πάντα in Il. 3. 277: ἐναντίον τοῦτο [scil. Od. 12. 374] τῷ Ἠέλιός θ' ὃς πάντ' ἐφορᾷς καὶ πάντ' ἐπακούεις· ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ γὰρ ἐχρῆν ἐγνωκέναι τὸν πάντα ἐφορῶντα. λύοιτο δ' ἂν ἡ τῇ λέξει· τὸ γὰρ πάντα δηλοῖ τὰ πλεῖστα κτέ.

οἴη δ' ἄμμορος: Il. 18. 489 (= Od. 5. 275) οἴη δ' ἄμμορός ἐστι a 20
λοετρῶν Ὠκεανοῖο (said of the Great Bear). The astronomical difficulty in the line, which even led some of the Homeric critics of antiquity to alter the text (v. Strabo p. 3 Cas. and Apollonius Lex. p. 29 Bekk.), is thus stated by Porphyry ad loc. (p. 225 Schrader): ἀνιστόρητόν ἐστι τοῦτο· κατηγοροῦσι μὲν γὰρ κατὰ τὸν περὶ τῆς Ἄρκτου λόγον φάσκοντος οἴη δ' ἄμμορός ἐστι λοετρῶν Ὠκεανοῖο· καθόλου γὰρ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀρκτικῷ μὴ δύνειν. Aristotle's solution (which is not mentioned in the Scholia or elsewhere) is to take οἴη as a generic in the place of a specific word, i. e. as an

1461 a 20 instance of a kind of metaphor already recognized in 21, 1457 b 7 (*ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους ἐπὶ εἶδος*).

a 21 **τὸ γὰρ γνωριμώτατον μόνον.** Vahlen quotes Eth. N. 7. 14, 1153 b 35 *διὰ τὸ μόνας οὖν γνωρίμους εἶναι ταύτας* [scil. *τὰς ἡδονάς*] *μόνας οἴονται εἶναι.* For the substitution of *μόνον*, as a synonym for *οἴη*, compare the use of *κωλυθῆναι* in a 34 to represent Homer's *ἔσχετο.*

κατὰ δὲ προσῳδίαν, scil. *δεῖ λύειν* (or *διαλύειν*), understood from a 9 *τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν ὁρῶντα δεῖ διαλύειν.* *κατά* means 'by reference to', as in *κατὰ τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως* in a 27; it is the equivalent of the instrumental dative we find elsewhere in the context (see on a 10) with *λύειν* (or *διαλύειν*).

Προσῳδία with Aristotle comprises accent, breathing, and quantity—all the elements in the spoken word which in the ancient mode of writing were left to be supplied by the reader. For accent as a form of *προσῳδία* see Soph. el. 4, 166 b 1 (v. infra on a 23); 21, 177 b 35; and 23, 179 a 14. Breathing is distinctly said to come under this head in Soph. el. 20, 177 b 3 *τὸ ὅρος καὶ ὄρος τῇ προσῳδίᾳ λεχθὲν σημαίνει ἕτερον. ἀλλ' ἐν μὲν τοῖς γεγραμμένοις ταὐτὸν ὄνομα, ὅταν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν στοιχείων γεγραμμένον ᾖ καὶ ὡσαύτως, κἀκεῖ δ' ἤδη παράσημα ποιοῦνται, τὰ δὲ φθεγγόμενα οὐ ταὐτά.* That quantity also was regarded by Aristotle as a part of *προσῳδία* may be inferred from the position of *μήκει καὶ βραχύτητι* in the enumeration in 20, 1456 b 32 (v. Schmidt, Beitr. zur Gesch. der Grammatik p. 188). His idea of *προσῳδία*, therefore, agreed with that of Choeroboscus (Scholia in Dionys. Thracis art. gramm. p. 124 Hilgard), *ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι ἐν ταῖς προσῳδίαις τρία ἐστὶν εἴδη· ἔστι γὰρ τόνος, χρόνος, πνεῦμα* (comp. Egger, Apollonius Dyscole p. 29, and Schmidt, l. c. p. 185).

a 22 **Ἱππίας.** The view of Sengebusch (Hom. Diss. prior p. 206) is that he lived in the second half of the fifth century, and may perhaps be identified with the Hippias of Thasos mentioned by Lysias (13. 54 and 61) as one of the victims of the Thirty Tyrants. Schrader (Porphyr. in Il. p. 413) doubts whether there is any sufficient evidence for this date.

δίδομεν δέ οἱ. The parallel in Soph. el. 4, 166 b 1 (v. on a 23) shows that *δίδομεν δέ οἱ εὖχος ἀρέσθαι* was the reading in Aristotle's Homer in Il. 2. 15, where our existing vulgate has *Τρώεσσι δὲ κήδε' ἐφῆπται*; the reference too in the parenthesis, *ὥσπερ Ἱππίας ἔλυεν ὁ Θάσιος*, shows that Hippias must have had the same reading before him. It is clear that we have in this instance at any rate

a real variant, and not one of Aristotle's misquotations. *δίδομεν δέ τοι εὖχος ἀρέσθαι* occurs in Il. 21. 297, but in a context very unlike that of Il. 2. 15. The deceptive dream of Agamemnon in Il. 2. 8 sqq. had been criticized by Plato Rep. 382 E, as making Zeus a deceiver; and it was felt to be a difficulty by several of the grammarians (v. Porphyr. in Il. l. c. p. 23 Schr.). As the half-line *δίδομεν δέ οἱ εὖχος ἀρέσθαι* seems to credit Zeus with a direct lie, this was doubtless the difficulty which Aristotle and Hippias thought to remove by the artifice of reading ΔΙΔΟΜΕΝ not as *δίδομεν*, but as *διδόμεν*, i. e. as an infinitive in the sense of an imperative, so as to shift the actual falsehood from Zeus himself to the Dream-god (comp. Wolf, Prolegomena ad Hom. p. 128 ed. Peppmüller). 1461 a 22

τὸ μὲν οὗ καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ: Il. 23. 327 *ἕστηκε ξύλον αὖον ὅσον τ' ὄργυι' ὑπὲρ αἴης, ἢ δρυὸς ἢ πεύκης· τὸ μὲν οὐ καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ.* Our text of Homer embodies the suggestion of Hippias, *οὐ* for *οὗ*. The objection to the older mode of reading the word (*οὗ*) was probably this, that the statement was against scientific truth, oak and pine being held to be among the woods least liable to rot through moisture (Theophr. H. P. 5. 4, 3). a 23

The view of Hippias is given with greater fullness in Soph. el. 4, 166 b 1: *παρὰ δὲ τὴν προσῳδίαν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄνευ γραφῆς διαλεκτικοῖς οὐ ῥᾴδιον ποιῆσαι λόγον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς γεγραμμένοις καὶ ποιήμασι μᾶλλον, οἷον καὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον ἔνιοι διορθοῦνται πρὸς τοὺς ἐλέγχοντας ὡς ἀτόπως εἰρηκότα "τὸ μὲν οὗ καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ". λύουσι γὰρ αὐτὸ τῇ προσῳδίᾳ λέγοντες τὸ ΟΥ ὀξύτερον. καὶ τὸ περὶ τὸ ἐνύπνιον τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος, ὅτι οὐκ αὐτὸς ὁ Ζεὺς εἶπεν "δίδομεν δέ οἱ εὖχος ἀρέσθαι", ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐνυπνίῳ ἐνετέλλετο διδόναι.* On this passage Alexander, or rather Michael Ephesius (p. 33 Wallies), has a comment which, besides serving to explain the passage in the Soph. el., is not without interest for the history of the early criticisms on Homer: *τινὲς οὖν ἐκάκιζον τὸν Ὅμηρον, περισπωμένως τὸ ου ἀναγινώσκοντες καὶ λέγοντες ἄτοπόν τι αὐτὸν εἰρηκέναι διὰ τούτου, ὡς λέγοντα δῆθεν ὅτι τοῦ ξύλου ἐκείνου . . . τὶ μὲν κατασήπεται τὶ δὲ οὐ κατασήπεται· εἰ γὰρ μὴ καὶ τοῦτο ἐδήλωσεν ἐναργῶς, τὸ τὶ δὲ οὐ κατασήπεται λέγουσιν ἄντικρυς δηλοῦσθαι διὰ τοῦ εἰρημένου, τοῦ "οὗ τὸ μὲν καταπύθεται" . . . . ἐπιδιορθοῦται δὲ τούτους [ἐν τῷ περὶ Ποιητικῆς], ὡς αὐτὸς Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῇ Ῥητορικῇ* [read with Vahlen, *ἐν τῷ περὶ Ποιητικῆς*] *φησιν, Ἱππίας ὁ Θάσιος μὴ περισπωμένως ἀναγινώσκων τὸ ου ἀλλ' ἀποφατικῶς, ὅπερ αὐτὸς ὀξύτερον εἴρηκεν, ἵνα ᾖ τὸ λεγόμενον ὡς ἡ πεύκη τὸ δένδρον οὐ καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ . . . .*

1461 a 23 *τὸ δ' ἕτερον* [scil. *παράδειγμα*] *τὸ ἐπαγόμενον, τὸ περὶ τὸ ἐνύπνιον τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος, ὅ φησι τὸν Δία εἰπεῖν τὸ "δίδομεν δέ οἱ εὖχος ἀρέσθαι", οὐδαμοῦ κεῖται ἐν τῇ Ἰλιάδι . . . . εἰσὶν οὖν τὰ ῥήματα τοῦ Διὸς πρὸς τὸν ὄνειρον ὅτι βὰς ταῦτα εἰπὲ τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι ὅτι δίδομεν αὐτῷ πάντες οἱ θεοὶ τὴν νίκην. φασὶν οὖν οἱ ταῦτα λέγοντες ὡς ἐνταῦθα ἁμαρτάνει ὁ ποιητὴς εἰσάγων τὸν Δία διαλεγόμενον ταῦτα τῷ ὀνείρῳ καὶ τρόπον τινὰ ψευδόμενον, ὅπερ οὐκ ἔστι θεοῦ. οἱ γοῦν ἐπιδιορθούμενοι τοῦτόν φασιν ὡς οὐ τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι ὁ Ζεὺς ἔλεγε τὸ εὖχος δοθῆναι ἀλλὰ τῷ ὀνείρῳ κατὰ τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος· ἀναγινώσκουσι δὲ οὕτως, "δίδομεν δὲ οἶ", ἀντὶ τοῦ σοί, τῷ ὀνείρῳ. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ψεῦδος· ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς νοῦς ἐστι κἂν ὁ τόνος ἀναβιβασθείη κἂν περισπασθείη ἡ ἀντωνυμία ἡ οἶ. ποῦ γοῦν [? οὖν] ἐστιν ἡ ἁμαρτία; ἢ οὐκ εἰς τὸ "δέ οἱ" ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ "δίδομεν" . . . . εἰ γοῦν [? μὲν οὖν] τὸ "δίδομεν δέ οἱ εὖχος ἀρέσθαι" ἀναγνῷ τις τὸν τόνον θεὶς εἰς τὸ δι, τὸν Δία ποιεῖ ψευδόμενον, ὡς ὑπισχνούμενον διδόναι τὴν νίκην καὶ μὴ εἰς ἔργον ἐξάγοντα τὴν ὑπόσχεσιν· εἰ δὲ εἰς τὸ δο τὸν τόνον θεὶς ἀναγνῷ τὸ ἑξῆς, καὶ τὸν Δία τοῦ ψεύδεσθαι ἀπολύσει, καὶ τῷ Ὁμήρῳ περιποιήσεται τὸ ἀνέγκλητον, ὡς τοῦ Διὸς λέγοντος τῷ ὀνείρῳ καὶ ἐπιτάττοντος διδόμεναι αὐτὸν τὸν ὄνειρον τὸ εὖχος τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι καὶ μὴ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Διός. καὶ γοῦν ὁ ὄνειρος ὑπισχνεῖται τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι τὸ εὖχος καὶ ψεύδεται, καὶ οὐχ ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτός.*

It will be observed that in the explanation of Il. 23. 328 in the Soph. el. the negative *οὐ* is said to be distinguished from the pronoun *οὗ* by being pronounced *ὀξύτερον*, i. e. *ὀξυτόνως*. This takes us back to a time when *οὐ* was oxytone wheresoever it occurs (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr.[3] 1. 1 p. 331), as it was held to be by more than one of the grammarians: Herodian 1 p. 504 Lentz *τὰ εἰς ου περισπῶνται, πανταχοῦ, ἀγχοῦ, . . . καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πλὴν τοῦ* [? *τὸ*] *ἰδού τὸ δεικτικόν, ἰού τὸ σχετλιαστικόν, καὶ οὔ τὸ ἀρνητικόν· τοῦτο δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ συνεπείᾳ ὀξύνεται.*

τὰ δὲ διαιρέσει, scil. *λυτέον*. *Διαίρεσις*—a wider term than our 'punctuation'—is the opposite of *σύνθεσις* (comp. Soph. el. 4, 166 a 23), and includes every sort of break in reading, even one only just enough to keep words from being taken together in construction. The kind of difficulty to which this solution is applicable, may be seen from the instances in the Sophistici elenchi, *ἐγώ σ' ἔθηκα δοῦλον ὄντ' ἐλεύθερον* (4, 166 a 36), and *ἆρ' ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα σκυτέα μοχθηρὸν εἶναι;* (20, 177 b 14)—where the words are ambiguous and admit of being construed in two different ways. With this may be compared what Aristotle says in the Rhetoric (3. 5, 1407 b 14) on the ambiguities in Hera-

clitus: *τὰ γὰρ Ἡρακλείτου διαστίξαι ἔργον διὰ τὸ ἄδηλον εἶναι* 1461 ^{a} 23
ποτέρῳ πρόσκειται, τῷ ὕστερον ἢ τῷ πρότερον, οἷον ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ αὐτοῦ τοῦ συγγράμματος· φησὶ γὰρ "τοῦ λόγου τοῦδ' ἐόντος ἀεὶ ἀξύνετοι ἄνθρωποι γίγνονται". ἄδηλον γὰρ τὸ ἀεί πρὸς ὁποτέρῳ ⟨δεῖ⟩ διαστίξαι. On the beginnings of formal punctuation in Greece see Schmidt, Beiträge zur Gesch. der Grammatik p. 506, and Meisterhans, Grammatik[3] p. 11.

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς. The passage here quoted appears in the editions ^{a} 24
of Empedocles in a somewhat different form, *αἶψα δὲ θνήτ' ἐφύοντο, τὰ πρὶν μάθον ἀθάνατ' εἶναι, ζωρά τε τὰ πρὶν ἄκρητα, διαλλάξαντα κελεύθους* (fr. 35, 14–15 Diels); and it is known that Theophrastus read it thus, as he adduced it to show that *ζωρότερον* in Homer meant *τὸ κεκραμένον*: Athenaeus 423 F *Θεόφραστος δ' ἐν τῷ περὶ μέθης ζωρότερόν φησιν εἶναι τὸ κεκραμένον.* This is not the place to consider either the reading recognized by Theophrastus or his interpretation of *ζωρότερον* and *ζωρά*. Aristotle has a different reading, *ζωρά τε πρὶν κέκρητο*; and any difficulty that may have been found in it he meets by simply affirming the possibility of another *διαίρεσις*, another way of construing the words. He does not dispute the meaning which was assigned to *ζωρά*; his assumption presumably was that *ζωρά = ἄκρατα* (v. ^{a} 15). The positive *ζωρός* no longer existed in Attic; but in Ionic the comparative *ζωρότερον* was to be found in Herodotus and Hippocrates, in the sense of 'having but a small admixture of water': Herod. 6, 84 *Κλεομένεα δὲ λέγουσι ἡκόντων τῶν Σκυθῶν . . . μαθεῖν τὴν ἀκρητοποσίην παρ' αὐτῶν . . . ἔκ τε τόσου, ὡς αὐτοὶ λέγουσι, ἐπεὰν ζωρότερον βούλωνται πιεῖν, "ἐπισκύθισον" λέγουσι* (where *ζωρότερον πίνειν = ἀκρατοποτεῖν*).—Hippocrates 2, 654 K. *οἶνον, ἢν μή τι κωλύῃ, πίνειν ζωρότερον παλαιὸν ἐπὶ τέσσαρας ἡμέρας.* There is one instance of it in Attic prose, in Theophrastus Char. 4, 9 *δεινὸς φαγεῖν καὶ ζωρότερον πιεῖν* ('ungemischten Wein zu trinken', R. Meister). Aristotle does not say what the question was that had been raised by the critics; it may be supposed, however (comp. Hermann ad loc.), to have turned on the *πρίν* before *κέκρητο*, which owing to its ambiguous position may be construed with either *ζωρά* or *κέκρητο*. If one construes it with *κέκρητο*, the clause will mean 'things pure had been before that mixed'; but in that case an objector might very well urge the inconsistency between this and the statement in the preceding line, in which Empedocles speaks of the 'mortal' forms as assumed by the elements only when mixed up together in the actual world (comp. Zeller, Ph. d. Gr.

1461 a 24 1[5] p. 784). On the other hand, if the πρίν be taken with ζωρά, the sense will be 'things before that pure were found mixed up together' (for the tense of κέκρητο v. Kühner, Gr. Gr.[3] 1. 1 p. 152; Goodwin, Synt. of Gk. Moods and Tenses § 52); and the objection of the critic is answered. The integrity of the text of the present passage has been doubted in recent times by several scholars of distinction. Bergk (Kl. Schriften 2 p. 86) has suggested ζωρά τε πρὶν τὰ κέκρητο; Gomperz (Hermes 31 p. 469) ζωρά τε ἃ (i. e. θ' ἃ) πρὶν κέκρητο; and Diels (on Emped. l. c.) ζωρά τε τὰ πρὶν ἔκρητο (on the analogy of ἔπλητο).

a 25 **ἀθάνατα.** As Aristotle is so apt to curtail his quotations, it is hardly necessary to restore ἀθάνατ' ⟨εἶναι⟩. For the omission of εἶναι see on 24, 1459 b 9.

τὰ δὲ ἀμφιβολίᾳ, scil. δεῖ διαλύειν. Aristotle now passes on to another kind of ambiguous statement, one capable of two interpretations through the presence of an ambiguous term. Such a term is said to be ἀμφίβολον (a 26; comp. Rhet. 3. 5, 1407 a 32); and its effect is ἀμφιβολία. ἀμφιβολία is here the same thing as what Aristotle often calls elsewhere ὁμωνυμία. It may be noted, as an instance of his variations in the use of technical language, that in Soph. el. 4, 165 b 26 ἀμφιβολία is distinguished from ὁμωνυμία, and used to describe the ambiguity arising from some ambiguous collocation of terms.

a 26 **παρῴχηκεν δὲ πλέω νύξ**: Il. 10. 251 ἀλλ' ἴομεν· μάλα γὰρ νὺξ ἄνεται, ἐγγύθι δ' ἠώς, ἄστρα δὲ δὴ προβέβηκε, παρῴχωκεν δὲ πλέων νὺξ τῶν δύο μοιράων, τριτάτη δ' ἔτι μοῖρα λέλειπται. The reading πλέω, which still survives in some of the MSS. of Homer, and was a recognized variant in antiquity, has a certain interest as showing the affinity of Aristotle's Homer with that of Zenodotus, who is known to have admitted forms like ἀμείνω for ἀμείνων, γλυκίω for γλυκίων, and κρείσσω for κρείσσων (La Roche, Hom. Textkr. p. 302; Lobeck, Path. Elem. 2 p. 281).

The problem was to explain how, if *more* than two-thirds of the night had gone, a third could be still left. According to Porphyry ad loc. (p. 147 Schr.) this was one of the earliest difficulties found in Homer: τῶν παλαιῶν ζητημάτων ὡμολόγηται εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτο, ἐν οἷς φησιν "ἄστρα . . . λέλειπται". πῶς γάρ, εἰ αἱ δύο μοῖραι ἐξήκουσιν αὐταί τε καὶ ἔτι τούτων πλέον, ἡ τριτάτη μοῖρα λέλειπται, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τῆς τρίτης μόριον; Among the many solutions he mentions is one from the Aristotelian Ἀπορήματα Ὁμηρικά (fr. 161 Teubn.), ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ τῆς νυκτὸς αἱ δώδεκα μοῖραι εἰς δύο ἴσας μερίδας μερίζεσθαι δύνανται,

εἰς ἕξ, ηὐξήθη δὲ καὶ πλέον γεγονὸς θάτερον μέρος, ἄδηλον δὲ τὸ πόσαις 1461 a 26
ὥραις (καὶ γὰρ μιᾷ καὶ δύο καὶ τρισὶ καὶ πλείοσιν ἡ αὔξησις δύναται γίνεσθαι)· ἀφορίζων ὁ ποιητὴς τὸ ἀόριστον τοῦ πλείονος πόσον ἦν καὶ ὅτι β̄ ὥραις ηὐξήθη, ἐπήγαγεν ὅτι τριτάτη μοῖρα λέλειπται, ὡς ὀκτὼ μὲν γενέσθαι τὰς παρῳχηκυίας ὥρας, καταλείπεσθαι δὲ τέσσαρας, αἵπερ εἰσὶ τοῦ ὅλου τρίτον. This highly artificial interpretation, which makes *πλέω νὺξ τῶν δύο μοιράων* mean 'the greater part of two-thirds of the night', can hardly be what Aristotle has in mind, as he distinctly says that the solution of the difficulty may be found in recognizing *πλέω* as an amphibolous word, i. e. in giving it not its usual sense of 'more', but some different sense. This other sense was probably that of 'full', which is mentioned by Porphyry ad loc. (p. 147) as the suggestion of a certain Metrodorus: *Μητρόδωρος μὲν οὖν τὸ πλεῖον δύο σημαίνειν φησὶ παρ' Ὁμήρῳ· καὶ γὰρ τὸ σύνηθες . . . καὶ τὸ πλῆρες, ὡς ἐν τῷ σὸν δὲ πλεῖον δέπας αἰεὶ ἕστηκε, καὶ ἐν τῷ πλεῖαί τοι χαλκοῦ κλισίαι. νῦν οὖν τὸ πλέον ἀντὶ τοῦ πλῆρες εἰρῆσθαι· πλήρης γὰρ ἡ νὺξ τῶν δύο μοιρῶν γεγονυῖα παρῴχηκε, τριτάτη δ' ἔτι περιλέλειπται.* Aristonicus seems to have accepted this interpretation of *πλέω* as *ἀντὶ τοῦ πλήρης* (Schol. Ven. A. Il. 9. 71); and it survives also in the gloss of Hesychius *πλέω· πλήρης.*

τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως. Vahlen quotes Soph. el. 4, 166 a 14 *εἰσὶ δὲ* a 27
τρεῖς τρόποι τῶν παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν καὶ τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν, εἷς μὲν ὅταν ἢ ὁ λόγος ἢ τοὔνομα κυρίως σήμαινῃ πλείω, οἷον ἀετὸς καὶ κύων· εἷς δὲ ὅταν εἰωθότες ὦμεν οὕτω λέγειν.

τὸν κεκραμένον is to my mind a much more probable correction here than the others that have been suggested, *τὸ κεκραμένον* (Madius), *πᾶν κεκραμένον* (Bursian), ⟨*ὅσα*⟩ *τῶν κεκραμένων* (Vahlen), *τῶν κεκραμένων* ⟨*οἱονοῦν*⟩ (Tucker). *τὸν κεκραμένον*, with *οἶνον* in close proximity in the context, means *τὸν κεκραμένον οἶνον.* There is the same ellipse in Aristoph. Eq. 1187 *πιεῖν κεκραμένον τρία καὶ δύο* (comp. Gildersleeve, Syntax of Class. Gk. 32); and it is certainly not uncommon with *ἄκρατος* (comp. *ἀκρατοπότης*, etc.). The general sense then of the whole passage will be this: In common parlance a mixture of wine and water is said to be 'wine'; and on the same principle Homer's 'tin' may be an amalgam of tin and another metal. Aristotle is apparently replying to some critic who took exception to the idea of the greaves being made of so soft a metal as tin, a point which modern archaeologists also have some difficulty in explaining (comp. Helbig, Das homerische Epos[1] p. 196).

1461 a 27 **οἶνον**: Plutarch Coni. praec. 140 F *τὸ κρᾶμα καίτοι ὕδατος μετέχον πλείονος οἶνον καλοῦμεν.* The fact is recognized and explained in De gen. et corr. I. 5, 321 a 35 *τὸ ἐπικρατοῦν λέγεται ἐν τῇ μίξει, οἷον ὅτι οἶνος· ποιεῖ γὰρ τὸ τοῦ οἴνου ἔργον ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ τοῦ ὕδατος τὸ σύνολον μῖγμα.*

a 28 **κνημὶς νεοτεύκτου κασσιτέροιο**: Il. 21. 592.

a 29 **χαλκέας**. Aristotle adduces this use of *χαλκεύς*, to justify the language in Il. 20. 234, on the assumption that by a similar extension of meaning *οἰνοχοεύειν* may be used for the serving out of nectar as well as that of wine. *χαλκεύς* and its cognates are often found in this more general sense in the literature after Homer: Schol. Ven. B. Il. 19. 283 *παλαιὰ ἡ χρῆσις τοῦ χαλκὸν ὀνομάζειν τὸν σίδηρον. ἀμέλει καὶ χαλκέας λέγομεν τοὺς τὸν σίδηρον ἐργαζομένους.*—Pollux 7. 106 *χαλκεύειν δὲ καὶ τὸ σιδηρεύειν ἔλεγον, καὶ χαλκέας τοὺς τὸν σίδηρον ἐργαζομένους.* The language in these two passages may be a distant reminiscence of Aristotle's words.

a 30 **οἰνοχοεύειν**: Il. 20. 234 *τὸν καὶ ἀνηρείψαντο θεοὶ Διὶ οἰνοχοεύειν.* On the other hand, we are told elsewhere (Il. 5. 341) that the gods do not drink wine, *οὐ πίνουσ' αἴθοπα οἶνον.* For the infinitive—actually found in the Homeric text—comp. An. post. 2. 30, 97 b 6 *τοῦτο δ' εἴρηται μὴ διαφέρειν.*—Top. 2. 3, 110 a 33 *οὔτ' εἰ παντὶ οὔτ' εἰ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχειν εἴρηται.*

a 31 **εἴη δ' ἂν τοῦτό γε κατὰ μεταφοράν.** Aristotle apparently prefers to explain Homer's use of *οἰνοχοεύειν* as a metaphor; referring, it would seem, to the *μεταφορὰ κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον* considered in 21, 1457 b 16 sqq.

δεῖ δὲ κτέ. This is a general word of caution very like that in a 4. Just as we have to consider all the attendant circumstances before condemning an act as wrong or immoral, so too, when the question turns on a word, we should consider its context and its possible meanings in the context before pronouncing it to be improper; we must be quite sure of our interpretation before passing an adverse judgement on the poet.

a 33 **οἷον τῷ** = *οἷον ἐν τῷ*, the preposition being understood from the preceding *ἐν τῷ εἰρημένῳ* (see on 2, 1448 a 10).

τῇ ῥ' ἔσχετο χάλκεον ἔγχος: Il. 20. 267 *οὐδὲ τότ' Αἰνείαο δαΐφρονος ὄβριμον ἔγχος ῥῆξε σάκος· χρυσὸς γὰρ ἐρύκακε, δῶρα θεοῖο· ἀλλὰ δύω μὲν ἔλασσε διὰ πτύχας, αἱ δ' ἄρ' ἔτι τρεῖς ἦσαν, ἐπεὶ πέντε πτύχας ἤλασε κυλλοποδίων, τὰς δύο χαλκείας, δύο δ' ἔνδοθι κασσιτέροιο, τὴν δὲ μίαν χρυσέην· τῇ ῥ' ἔσχετο μείλινον ἔγχος.* The difficulty found here may be seen from the note of Porphyry (p. 244

Schr.): τῆς γὰρ χρυσῆς πτυχὸς δοκούσης πρώτης εἶναι, εἴ γε κόσμου ἕνεκα τὴν χρυσῆν εἰς τὸ ἔξω καὶ ὁρώμενον πρώτην ἐνέθηκεν, ὑπ᾿ αὐτὴν δὲ στερεότητος ἕνεκα τὰς δύο χαλκᾶς, μαλάγματος χάριν καὶ τελευταίας τὰς κασσιτερίνας, πῶς δύο τε διέκοψε πτύχας, καὶ ἐν τῇ χρυσῇ πτυχὶ ἔξω οὔσῃ καὶ διατμηθείσῃ ἐνεσχέθη τὸ δόρυ; The answer of Aristotle was perhaps this, that the plate of gold sufficed to stop the course of the spear, though the spear-point actually pierced it and indented the underlying plates of brass. This is practically the same as the solution quoted from Autochthon in Schol. Ven. B and Eustathius ad loc. Aristarchus also is said to have acknowledged its plausibility: Schol. Ven. A Il. 20. 269 ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῇ λύσεως ἠπορηκέναι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἠθετηκέναι, φησὶν ὅτι τῆς χρυσῆς πτυχῆς πρώτης κατὰ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν κειμένης νοητέον τὸ δόρυ τῆς πλείονος ὁρμῆς ἐγκοπὴν εἰληφέναι [=Aristotle's κωλυθῆναι], διακεκόφθαι μέντοι τὸ σάκος ἕως τῆς τρίτης πτυχῆς, ὃν τρόπον ἐπὶ τῆς πτυχῆς Μενελάου λέγει "ἡ οἱ πλεῖστον ἔρυτο, διὰ πρὸ δὲ εἴσατο καὶ τῆς". 1461 a 33

κωλυθῆναι: Metaph. Δ 23, 1023 a 17 ἔτι τὸ κωλῦον κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ ὁρμήν τι κινεῖσθαι ἢ πράττειν ἔχειν λέγεται τοῦτο αὐτό, οἷον καὶ οἱ κίονες τὰ ἐπικείμενα βάρη, καὶ ὡς οἱ ποιηταὶ τὸν Ἄτλαντα ποιοῦσι τὸν οὐρανὸν ἔχειν ὡς συμπεσόντ᾿ ἂν ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν. a 34

ἐνδέχεται, scil. σημαίνειν (see on 24, 1460 a 34).

ὡδὶ ἢ ὡδὶ = πότερον ὡδὶ ἢ ὡδί (see on a 4). The clause, with the punctuation given in the text, is appositional to ποσαχῶς ἂν σημαίνοι (see on 25, 1460 b 25). For ὡδὶ ἢ ὡδί comp. An. pr. 1. 31, 46 b 28 ἀγνοεῖται τὸ πότερον ὧδε ἢ ὧδε ἔχει.—Soph. el. 18, 177 a 5 ἀναιροῦντες ἢ ὧδε ἢ ὧδε.—Rhet. 3. 1, 1404 a 10 διαφέρει γάρ τι πρὸς τὸ δηλῶσαι ὡδὶ ἢ ὡδὶ εἰπεῖν.

μάλιστ᾿ ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι. The comma (or colon) which recent editors place after this I have removed in order that μάλιστα may be taken with κατὰ τὴν καταντικρύ; comp. Metaph. A 8, 989 a 30 μάλιστ᾿ ἂν ὑπολάβοι κατὰ λόγον ὃν ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὐ διήρθρωσεν κτέ. (also Phys. 7. 3, 245 b 6; Metaph. Z 16, 1040 b 10). a 35

κατὰ τὴν καταντικρύ = ἐξ ἐναντίας or ἐναντίως. The ἢ ὡς which follows Vahlen illustrates from 22, 1458 b 3 ἄλλως ἔχειν ἢ ὡς τὸ κύριον.—An. post. 1. 17, 80 b 35 ληπτέαι ἐναντίως ἢ ὡς ἔχουσιν αἱ προτάσεις.—De caelo 2. 2, 285 b 25 ἐναντίως ἢ ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι λέγουσιν.—Meteor. 1. 12, 348 b 12 τοὐναντίον ἢ ὡς Ἀναξαγόρας λέγει. A similar construction is found after a comparative adverb in Eth. N. 3. 13, 1118 b 23 μᾶλλον ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί. The clause ὅτι ἔνια κτέ. is explanatory of ὡς Γλαύκων λέγει, 'the way described by Glaucon', and apparently a quotation.

1461 b 1 **Γλαύκων.** Aristotle is probably referring to the Glaucon mentioned as an authority in Homeric matters in Plato's Ion 530 D, where the rhapsodist says of himself: *καὶ οἶμαι κάλλιστ' ἀνθρώπων λέγειν περὶ Ὁμήρου, ὡς οὔτε Μητρόδωρος ὁ Λαμψακηνὸς οὔτε Στησίμβροτος ὁ Θάσιος οὔτε Γλαύκων οὔτε ἄλλος οὐδεὶς τῶν πώποτε γενομένων ἔσχεν εἰπεῖν οὕτω πολλὰς καὶ καλὰς διανοίας περὶ Ὁμήρου ὅσας ἐγώ.* The absence of a local appellative here seems to imply that the Glaucon in question was an Athenian. If this inference is right, we cannot identify him with the *Γλαύκων ὁ Τήιος* of Rhet. 3. 1, 1403 b 26 or with Glaucus of Rhegium (comp. Hiller, Rh. Mus. 41 p. 398); he may perhaps be the same as the Glaucus or Glaucon (v. Düntzer, Rettung der aristot. Poetik p. 227) mentioned by Porphyry on Il. 11. 636 (p. 168 Schr.) along with other early interpreters of Homer.

b 2 **αὐτοὶ καταψηφισάμενοι** resumes the idea of *ἔνια ἀλόγως προυπολαμβάνουσιν*, and anticipates that in *τῇ αὐτῶν οἰήσει.* The common rendering, 'postquam ipsi condemnationis sententiam tulerint' (Tyrwhitt), gives *καταψηφισάμενοι* a sense too near to that of the *ἐπιτιμῶσιν* in the following line. The probability is, as Vahlen has seen (comp. Bon. Ind. 376 a 56), that it means in the present instance to 'decide', or to 'affirm' or 'accept' something. As a term of politics *καταψηφίζεσθαι* is the opposite of *ἀποψηφίζεσθαι* (to reject a proposal): Pol. 4. 14, 1298 b 36 *ἀποψηφιζόμενον μὲν γὰρ κύριον δεῖ ποιεῖν τὸ πλῆθος, καταψηφιζόμενον δὲ μὴ κύριον, ἀλλ' ἐπαναγέσθω πάλιν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας. ἐν γὰρ ταῖς πολιτείαις ἀντεστραμμένως ποιοῦσιν· οἱ γὰρ ὀλίγοι ἀποψηφισάμενοι μὲν κύριοι, καταψηφισάμενοι δὲ οὐ κύριοι, ἀλλ' ἐπανάγεται εἰς τοὺς πλείστους αἰεί.*

εἰρηκότος, scil. *τοῦ ποιητοῦ* (see on 6, 1449 b 26).

b 3 **τοῦτο δὲ πέπονθε**: De anima 1. 5, 410 b 27 *τοῦτο δὲ πέπονθε καὶ ὁ ἐν τοῖς Ὀρφικοῖς ἔπεσι καλουμένοις λόγος.*

b 4 **τὰ περὶ Ἰκάριον.** The question which Aristotle regards as based on a mere assumption, survives in Porphyry on Od. 4. 1 (p. 40 Schr.) *διὰ τί ὁ Τηλέμαχος εἰς Λακεδαίμονα ἐλθὼν οὐκ ἐνέτυχε τῷ Ἰκαρίῳ; καίτοι ἄλογον ἐλθόντα τῷ πατρὶ τῆς μητρὸς μὴ ἐντυχεῖν*, and in Schol. Od. 1. 285 (comp. Schol. Od. 2. 52) *πῶς εἰς Σπάρτην ἐλθὼν οὐ συντυγχάνει Ἰκαρίῳ;* The assumption of the critics, that the father of Penelope (called in Homer Icarius) was a Lacedaemonian, Aristotle meets by quoting on the other side the Cephallenian tradition which made him a Cephallenian. This same solution of the difficulty reappears incidentally in Schol. Od. 15. 16 *ὅτι Ἰθακήσιος ὁ Ἰκάριος, οὐ Σπαρτιάτης, ἀδελφὸς Τυνδάρεω . . . ὁ δὲ*

Ἰκάριος ἐκ Μεσσήνης ἦν τῆς Κεφαλληνιακῆς, ἐπεὶ οὐχ ὁρᾶται ἐν Ἰθάκῃ ἀναστρεφόμενος. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ Λάκων· ὅθεν οὐδὲ ἐνέτυχεν αὐτῷ Τηλέμαχος ἐν τῇ εἰς Λακεδαίμονα ἀποδημίᾳ (comp. E. Meyer, Hermes 30 p. 265). 1461 b 4

τὸ δ' ἴσως: comp. An. post. 1. 9, 76 a 29; Soph. el. 1, 165 a 10. b 6

Κεφαλλῆνες. Though the form Κεφαληνία is found in the text of H. A. 8. 28, 605 b 27, there is little doubt that Aristotle must have written the word with a double λ. This is the normal spelling in Attic Inscriptions (Meisterhans, Gr.[3] p. 96), and also in literature, according to Eustathius on Dion. Perieg. 431, τοὺς δὲ Κεφαλλῆνας καὶ τὴν Κεφαλληνίαν ἐν δυσὶ λλ ἡ παλαιὰ χρῆσις ἅπασα ἔχει.

παρ' αὐτῶν γὰρ γῆμαι. For the preposition comp. Plato Polit. 310 C γαμοῦσί τε παρὰ τούτων.—Isocrates 386 A ἔγημεν ἐκ Σερίφου παρ' ἀνθρώπων πολὺ πλείονος ἀξίων ἢ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν πόλιν, ἐξ ἧς ἐγένετο Σώπαλις. b 7

Ἰκάδιον. The name is presumably the same as Εἰκάδιος, on which see Fick, Gr. Personennamen[2] p. 296. b 8

εἰκός ἐστιν, scil. εἶναι (see on 24, 1459 b 9). The alternative is to take the clause (with Madius) as meaning 'it is through an error that the question (i. e. the objection), seems probable and reasonable'. b 9

ὅλως δὲ κτέ. This concluding paragraph, in intention at any rate, puts the main points in the preceding discussion into a more general form. The language in b 23 is to be noticed; *ἀδύνατα* is clearly used as the opposite of the *οἷα ἦν ἢ ἔστιν*, *ἄλογα* of the *οἷά φασιν καὶ δοκεῖ*, and *βλαβερά* of the *οἷα εἶναι δεῖ* in 25, 1460 b 10. Some of the points in the previous statement are either passed over or only just hinted at. On the other hand two new points are introduced: the plea of poetical necessity, instead of being limited to 'impossibilities' (comp. 25, 1460 b 23), is indirectly said to be an excuse for the 'improbable' and the 'morally offensive' also (comp. b 19 *ἀλογίᾳ καὶ μοχθηρίᾳ*); and besides this we have the dialectical rule of caution in b 15, which might very well have found a place in the main discussion, as a pendant to that in a 31. The whole chapter in fact, however excellent in substance, is hardly a model of logical arrangement.

τὸ ἀδύνατον μὲν πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν. Vahlen takes these words together in the sense of 'the impossible in poetry', and supposes only two solutions to be recognized, those denoted by *πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἢ πρὸς τὴν δόξαν.* The chief objection to this view is that

1461 b 9 it seems to exclude the solution given in 25, 1460 b 24, where poetical necessity is said to justify even 'impossibilities'. The reason that follows, *πρός τε γὰρ τὴν ποίησιν κτέ.*, adds a very necessary qualification, viz. that the impossibility has to be disguised and made credible (*πιθανόν*) by arts of expression; comp. 24, 1460 a 27 *ἀδύνατα εἰκότα*, and 24, 1460 b 2 *ἀφανίζει ἡδύνων τὸ ἄτοπον*. A second solution is by reference *πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον*—a point which Aristotle illustrates here from painting, and not as in 25, 1460 b 33 from poetry. A third is by reference *πρὸς τὴν δόξαν*, i.e. by showing that the impossibility has been accepted and sanctioned by opinion (comp. 25, 1460 b 10 *οἷά φασιν καὶ δοκεῖ*, and 1460 b 35 *οὕτω φασίν*).

πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν: Meteor. 2. 3, 357 a 26 *πρὸς ποίησιν μὲν γὰρ οὕτως εἰπὼν* [scil. Empedocles] *ἴσως εἴρηκεν ἱκανῶς (ἡ γὰρ μεταφορὰ ποιητικόν), πρὸς δὲ τὸ γνῶναι τὴν φύσιν οὐχ ἱκανῶς*.—Fr. 147 (Teubn.) *οὐδὲ γὰρ πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν πρὸ ἔργου ἦν ἡ τούτων μνήμη.*

b 10 **ἀνάγειν**, to explain by reference to something (comp. Bon. Ind. 42 a 37).

b 11 **αἱρετώτερον πιθανὸν ἀδύνατον**: 24, 1460 a 26 *προαιρεῖσθαί τε δεῖ ἀδύνατα εἰκότα μᾶλλον ἢ δυνατὰ ἀπίθανα.*

b 12 **οἵους Ζεῦξις ἔγραφεν.** In 25, 1460 b 18 also the allusion is apparently to a picture. We have been told in an earlier chapter (6, 1450 a 27) that the personages of Zeuxis lacked character, i.e. that he sacrificed expression to beauty. The criticism implied in the present passage is that they are 'impossibilities', in other words, of an impossible beauty, not like real men and women (i.e. not *οἷα ἦν ἢ ἔστιν*, 25, 1460 b 10). The answer to this is that they are, like the characters in Sophocles (25, 1460 b 33), better than the reality, what men and women ought to be. This justification of Zeuxis, which recalls what has been said elsewhere of Polygnotus (2, 1448 a 5), and of Homer (15, 1454 b 14), may very well represent Aristotle's own view of him and his work. It was certainly a common view of him in antiquity (comp. Maximus Tyrius Diss. 32. 5).

b 13 **ἀλλὰ βέλτιον** (scil. *τοιούτους εἶναι*) is a vivid way of putting the respondent's answer to the objection (see on 25, 1460 b 33).

τὸ γὰρ παράδειγμα δεῖ ὑπερέχειν. As Aristotle says in 15, 1454 b 9, a true artist, instead of keeping too closely to his model, will make his portrait more beautiful than the real man.

b 14 **πρὸς ἅ φασιν τἄλογα**, scil. *δεῖ ἀνάγειν*. It will be seen that a *δέ* is wanting, and also that the next clause (*οὕτω τε καὶ ὅτι ποτὲ οὐκ*

ἄλογόν ἐστιν) comes in without a conjunction. This may perhaps be taken as another sign of the Poetics being in places only the rough draft of a book (see on 22, 1458 a 30). It would have been easy on revision to make the text read thus: *πρὸς δ' ἅ φασι τἄλογα ἀνάγοντας οὕτω τε λυτέον καὶ ὅτι ποτὲ οὐκ ἄλογόν ἐστιν.* For the ellipse comp. 25, 1460 b 35 *ὅτι οὕτω φασίν*, scil. *λυτέον*. 1461 b 14

τἄλογα. The first appearance of the word in this chapter, though it has been used more than once in chap. 24. *τὸ ἄλογον*, said of a fact or statement, means that which we cannot account for, and thus find a difficulty in accepting as either true or possible (see on 15, 1454 b 6). There is an obvious distinction between it and *τὸ ἀδύνατον*, that which is not and cannot be true, the one being only 'improbable', and the other 'impossible'. The charge of improbability according to Aristotle may be met in two ways: one may urge (1) that the statement criticized has the sanction of opinion (*ἅ φασιν*), or (2) that the incident was not so improbable, if one remembers the time (*ποτέ*) when it is supposed to have occurred. These two solutions have already appeared in the main discussion in 1460 b 35–1461 a 4, but in answer to a somewhat different allegation, that of untruth (*ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ* 1460 b 33). A third answer, the plea of poetical necessity, is indirectly suggested in b 19.

ὅτι ποτὲ οὐκ ἄλογον: comp. fr. 164 (Teubn.) *λύων οὖν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης τὸ τάλαντον οὔτε ἴσον φησὶ τότε καὶ νῦν οὔτε ἀφωρισμένῳ χρῆσθαι σταθμῷ*, and the passages quoted above on 25, 1461 a 2. For the emphatic *ποτέ* comp. Top. 3. 2, 117 a 36 *αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀεὶ ἡ δὲ ποτὲ χρησίμη* (also Top. 5. 1, 128 b 20).

εἰκὸς γὰρ *κτέ.* See on 18, 1456 a 23 (*ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο εἰκός*). The maxim being Agathon's, it might be quoted for controversial purposes when better arguments were not to be had. b 15

τὰ ὑπεναντίως εἰρημένα covers the ground of the group of difficulties considered in 1461 a 9–31. The common point in these is that they turn primarily on the language rather than the matter of the poem, and may be met by finding another interpretation for the word or phrase to which the critic has taken exception. The difficulties themselves are very far from being all of one kind. In the second (*εἶδος κακός* a 12), fourth (*ἄλλοι μὲν* a 16), eighth (*αἶψα δὲ* a 24), and eleventh (*οἰνοχοεύειν* a 30) the supposed fault is clearly some inconsistency or self-contradiction; in the third (*ζωρότερον* a 14) and sixth (*δίδομεν* a 22), however, it is an offence against morals; in the fifth (*οἴη* a 20), seventh (*οὗ* a 23), and ninth

1461 b 15 (πλέω a 26) one against scientific or other truth; and in the first (οὐρῆας a 10) and tenth (κασσιτέροιο a 28) one against general probability. The formula, therefore, ὑπεναντίως εἰρημένα, instead of being restricted to logical incompatibilities, seems to include words and phrases which in the view of the critic are at variance with other standards of judgement. That it was meant to bear this wider sense is shown by the fuller formula in the context, ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸν [scil. ἐναντίως εἰρηκέναι] ἢ πρὸς ἃ αὐτὸς λέγει ἢ ὃ ἂν φρόνιμος ὑποθῆται (b 18).

b 16 **ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔλεγχοι.** The sense shows that a passive verb (σκεπτέοι?) has to be understood. The same sort of ellipse may be the explanation of the nominative ὥσπερ σφαῖρα in De anima 3. 11, 434 a 13, where κινεῖται is probably to be supplied from the κινεῖ which precedes the comparison (see J. of Phil. 17 p. 67). The converse of this, an active understood from a passive, is found in Metaph. I 2, 1053 b 14 πῶς δεῖ γνωριμωτέρως λεχθῆναι καὶ μᾶλλον ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ φύσεως (scil. λέγουσιν). The statement in the text is a word of caution not unlike those we have already had in a 4 and a 31. Aristotle reminds us that the difficulties of language pointed out by the critics are not always real ones, and that, before they are admitted to be real, they should be scrutinized and tested in just the same way as in a dialectical discussion one tests the contradiction or confutation of one's opponent—which is sometimes a genuine confutation (ἔλεγχος ἀληθινός), and sometimes only the semblance of one (ἔλεγχος φαινόμενος: v. Bon. Ind. 235 b 42). The main points to be considered are briefly indicated in the context, εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως. A fuller enumeration of the marks of a genuine ἔλεγχος is found in Soph. el. 5, 167 a 23 ἔλεγχος μὲν γὰρ ἀντίφασις τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἑνός, μὴ ὀνόματος ἀλλὰ πράγματος, καὶ ὀνόματος μὴ συνωνύμου ἀλλὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἐκ τῶν δοθέντων, ἐξ ἀνάγκης, μὴ συναριθμουμένου τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ, κατὰ ταὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς ταὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ.—26, 181 a 1 τοῖς δὲ παρὰ τὸν ὁρισμὸν γινομένοις τοῦ ἐλέγχου . . . ἀπαντητέον σκοποῦσι τὸ συμπέρασμα πρὸς τὴν ἀντίφασιν, ὅπως ἔσται τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ.

b 18 **ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸν κτέ.** = ὥστε καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν ὑπεναντίως εἰρηκέναι ἢ πρὸς ἃ αὐτὸς λέγει ἢ πρὸς ὃ ἂν φρόνιμος ὑποθῆται (comp. Vahlen, Beitr. 4 p. 384). The sense is: The word or phrase in question must be first ascertained to be really inconsistent either with some actual statement in the poem itself, in the context or elsewhere,

or with what may be reasonably assumed as true or probable. In saying ὃ ἂν φρόνιμος ὑποθῆται Aristotle sets aside the hasty or arbitrary assumptions which underlay a good deal of the current poetical criticism (see b 3 sqq.). The statement in the text may be compared with the rule laid down for dialectic in Soph. el. 15, 174 b 19 ἔτι καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐλεγκτικοῖς ὁμοίως τὰ ἐναντιώματα θεωρητέον ἢ πρὸς τὰ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ λεγόμενα ἢ πρὸς οὓς ὁμολογεῖ καλῶς λέγειν ἢ πράττειν. In the note on this passage in his edition Vahlen supposes the clause to mean ὥστε καὶ αὐτόν, scil. σκοπεῖν δεῖ τὸν ποιητήν—as though Aristotle were now offering a word of advice to the poets. It seems to me that he is still thinking of the critics and apologists of poetry, and that he is merely telling them to examine the supposed ὑπεναντία and make quite sure they are real ones. These, to be real, must be like the ἐναντιώματα in a genuine confutation, and capable of standing the same logical tests. The whole point in fact is that the incongruities found in the language of a poem may turn out on examination to be imaginary, just as a confutation in argument may be only a sham confutation. **1461 b 18**

ἀλογίᾳ καὶ μοχθηρίᾳ. For the datives see Bon. Ind. 166 a 61, 281 b 24, and 875 a 53. **b 19**

μὴ ἀνάγκης οὔσης: 15, 1454 a 28 παράδειγμα πονηρίας μὲν ἤθους μὴ ἀναγκαίου οἷον ὁ Μενέλαος ὁ ἐν τῷ Ὀρέστῃ. The plea of poetic necessity was indirectly recognized as a valid answer to certain criticisms in 25, 1460 b 24, and before that in 15, 1454 a 28; comp. also 24, 1460 a 12.

Αἰγεῖ: Eurip. Med. 663. The appearance of Aegeus is in Aristotle's view (1) ἄλογον, because no sufficient reason can be given for it, and (2) unnecessary, because no use is made of it in the after-part of the play. The explanations of certain of the editors of Euripides are hardly an adequate answer to Aristotle's criticism. **b 21**

ἐν Ὀρέστῃ: see on 15, 1454 a 29 (μὴ ἀναγκαίου).

ἐκ πέντε εἰδῶν φέρουσιν. The various heads under which the faults in poetry have been classified are termed εἴδη, because they represent distinct 'kinds' of faults. It is one thing to say of something that it is ἀδύνατον, another that it is ἄλογον, and another that it is βλαβερόν (etc.). For this use of φέρειν comp. 19, 1456 b 14 ἐπιτίμημα φέρεται.—An. pr. 2. 26, 69 b 1 φέρεται ἡ ἔνστασις.—An. post. 1. 14, 79 a 19 φέρουσι τὰς ἀποδείξεις.—Rhet. 2. 18, 1391 b 24 δόξαι καὶ προτάσεις εἰσίν, ἐξ ὧν τὰς πίστεις φέρουσιν. **b 22**

1461 b 23 **ὡς ἀδύνατα,** scil. *ὄντα τὰ εἰρημένα.*

βλαβερὰ: the opposite of the *οἷα εἶναι δεῖ* in 25, 1460 b 11. The word may be a reminiscence of Plato's condemnation of certain legends in Rep. 391 D *οὐθ' ὅσια ταῦτα οὔτ' ἀληθῆ . . . καὶ μὴν τοῖς γε ἀκούουσι βλαβερά· πᾶς γὰρ ἑαυτῷ ξυγγνώμην ἕξει κακῷ ὄντι, πεισθεὶς ὡς ἄρα τοιαῦτα πράττουσί τε καὶ ἔπραττον καὶ "οἱ θεῶν ἀγχίσποροι".*

ὑπεναντία: the *ὑπεναντίως εἰρημένα* of b 15.

b 24 **παρὰ τὴν ὀρθότητα τὴν κατὰ τέχνην** must refer, as Twining has seen, to the technical inaccuracies of description considered in 25, 1460 b 16 sqq. It is to be observed that the present statement clearly recognizes two kinds of error, only incidentally distinguished in the early part of the chapter (25, 1460 b 20), the fault of impossibility and the fault of technical inaccuracy. The distinction is a very real one in controversy; to say of a picture, for instance, that it is not scientifically or historically correct is not quite the same thing as saying that it represents an impossibility. *κατὰ τέχνην* is apparently used as an equivalent for the *καθ' ἑκάστην τέχνην* in 25, 1460 b 19. The older interpreters understand the passage differently. Goulston makes it mean 'tanquam ea quae a poeticae vel alterius artis norma ac veritate discedunt', thus giving *κατὰ τέχνην* a sense wide enough to include poetry as well as *ἰατρική, πολιτική*, etc. Heinsius (after Victorius) renders it by 'ut quae cum ipsa artis poeticae pugnant natura'—just as though the text had either *κατὰ τὴν τέχνην* (which Hermann wished to restore) or *κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην*. The objection to such interpretations is sufficiently obvious. The criticism that something is poetically wrong is not one of the *ἐπιτιμήματα* considered in this chapter; and it cannot be met by any of the counter-arguments which Aristotle has suggested for the use of the apologist.

ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀριθμῶν. The precise meaning of this is far from clear. Goulston's paraphrase[1] is 'ex antedictis formarum numeris, seu specialibus differentiis'; and Vahlen's 'aus den genannten Zahlen oder Stücken' (Beitr. 4, 389). To illustrate the sense of *ἀριθμῶν* Tyrwhitt quotes Isocrates 224 D *ἅπαντας τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς περιλαβὼν ἐξ ὧν ἄριστ' ἄν τις τὰ κοινὰ διοικήσειεν.*—Plutarch De aud. 45 C *τὸ μὲν καλὸν ἐκ πολλῶν οἷον ἀριθμῶν εἰς ἕνα καιρὸν ἡκόντων ὑπὸ συμμετρίας τινὸς καὶ ἁρμονίας ἐπιτελεῖται;*

[1] Goulston may possibly have remembered the expression *τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἑκάστου τῶν νοσημάτων* in Hippocrates 2 p. 27 K. as interpreted by Foes, Oec. Hippocr. p. 92.

comparing also the similar use of *numeri* in Latin. Another of Tyrwhitt's quotations is perhaps more directly to the purpose, Eurip. Ion 1014 ὁ δεύτερος δ' ἀριθμὸς ὃν [ὢν L. Dindorf] λέγεις τί δρᾷ;—to which may be added Eurip. Heracl. 997 εἰδὼς μὲν οὐκ ἀριθμὸν ἀλλ' ἐτητύμως ἄνδρ' ὄντα τὸν σὸν παῖδα, and the passage in Aristotle (cited by Teichmüller) in De gen. an. 3. 10, 760 a 33 αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ γίγνονται, ἄλλο δ' οὐδὲν γεννῶσιν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ ἀριθμῷ πέρας ἔσχεν ἡ γένεσις. It would seem from these instances that ἀριθμός may sometimes have the sense of an item or term in a series, and that ἀριθμῶν in the present passage may thus stand for 'points enumerated'[1]. If this interpretation is possible, the reference in ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀριθμῶν is to the list of assumptions in the opening of this chapter. Twining draws attention to the parallelism between the language in the text, αἱ λύσεις ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀριθμῶν σκεπτέαι, and that in 1460 b 21 ὥστε δεῖ τὰ ἐπιτιμήματα . . . ἐκ τούτων ἐπισκοποῦντα λύειν. The advantage of this view of the reference in ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀριθμῶν is that it simplifies the explanation of the next clause, εἰσὶ δὲ δώδεκα (scil. οἱ ἀριθμοί). It is usual to explain the number by adding up the various λύσεις actually found and described in the preceding discussion (1460 b 21–1461 b 21), and counting in statements like those in 1460 b 29 and 1461 a 4, 31 (v. ad loc.), though they are hardly λύσεις in the present sense of the term (see on 1460 b 29). If we look back, however, to the opening paragraph in the chapter, it will be seen that Aristotle begins by laying down a series of postulates concerning poetry. The first is that, as the poet is an imitator, the poetic picture may represent either οἷα ἦν ἢ ἔστιν or οἷά φασι καὶ δοκεῖ or οἷα εἶναι δεῖ. There are thus, if we separate the alternatives (as Aristotle himself has done in the course of the discussion), five possibilities, οἷα ἦν, οἷά ἐστιν, οἷά φασιν (εἶναι), οἷα δοκεῖ (εἶναι), οἷα εἶναι δεῖ; and they are each of them available in reply to criticism; if the critic, for instance, says that the picture is not of things οἷα εἶναι δεῖ, it is a valid answer to reply that it represents οἷα ἦν (v. 1461 a 2) or οἷά ἐστιν, etc. The second postulate is that, as poetic language is not quite the same as ordinary speech, it may have to be explained by certain arts of interpretation. This point is merely indicated in 1460 b 11–13; the statement there has to be supplemented from

[1] The word seems to bear the same sense in [Dion. Hal.] Ars Rhet. p. 414 R. γίνεται δὲ τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς οἷς εἴπομεν, τοῖς ἑπτά—where ἀριθμοῖς represents the τόποι of p. 400.

1461 b 24 that in 1461 a 9–31, where we are told that six modes of interpretation of the written letter of poetry (*γλώττῃ, κατὰ μεταφοράν, κατὰ προσῳδίαν, διαιρέσει, ἀμφιβολίᾳ, κατὰ τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως*) are available, and may be legitimately assumed, whenever a *λύσις* of difficulties arising from the poet's language is wanted. The third postulate is that poetry, as a distinct art, has a correctness of its own, apart from that of every other art or science—which implies, as the next section (1460 b 23–29) explains, that a description may be poetically right, even though it involves some impossibility, or offends against some technical standard of correctness. The various assumptions, therefore, in this series of postulates may serve as major premisses for the apologist; and as a matter of fact every one of them appears in some form or other in the specimen *λύσεις* in this chapter. It will be seen, too, that they are just 12 (5 + 6 + 1) in number.

b 26 **Πότερον δὲ βελτίων κτέ.** The interpretation of this chapter has been considered at length by Gomperz in Eranos Vindobonensis p. 71 sqq. Aristotle rounds off his theory of Tragedy and epic poetry with an appendix on a question which was, no doubt, often discussed in his time, that of the comparative value of the two forms of art. In the view of certain critics Tragedy was artistically inferior to epic poetry (comp. Plato Laws 658 D). The reasons for this view are stated (1461 b 27–1462 a 4), and then shown to be inconclusive (1462 a 4–14); after which four positive arguments are adduced as turning the scale in favour of Tragedy. The case against Tragedy may be put into the form of an enthymeme *ἐκ σημείων* : The inferior art is one that addresses an inferior public; Tragedy addresses an inferior public; it must, therefore, be the inferior art. The truth of the minor premiss is shown by the evidence, or rather the practice, of actors and other public performers, who may be presumed to know their public and to have taken the measure of its intelligence.

b 27 **φορτική**, 'common' or 'vulgar' (comp. Twining ad loc.), as in Pol. 8. 5, 1340 b 9 *τούτων* [i.e. *τῶν ἦθος κινητικὸν ἐχόντων ῥυθμῶν*] *οἱ μὲν φορτικωτέρας ἔχουσι τὰς κινήσεις οἱ δὲ ἐλευθεριωτέρας.*—Pol. 8. 6, 1341 b 11 *οὐ τῆς αὑτοῦ μεταχειρίζεται χάριν ἀρετῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων ἡδονῆς, καὶ ταύτης φορτικῆς. διόπερ οὐ τῶν ἐλευθέρων κρίνομεν εἶναι τὴν ἐργασίαν ἀλλὰ θητικωτέραν. καὶ βαναύσους δὴ συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι· πονηρὸς γὰρ ὁ σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ποιοῦνται τὸ τέλος. ὁ γὰρ θεατὴς φορτικὸς ὢν μεταβάλλειν εἴωθε τὴν μουσικήν.* Comp. also Aristophanes Vesp. 66 *κωμῳδίας δὲ φορτικῆς σοφώτερον,*

and the Platonic passages in Ast, Lex. s. v. The word is sometimes taken here in the sense of 'extravagant' or 'overdone' ('überladen', Bernays, Zwei Abh. p. 182). 1461 b 27

τοιαύτη, i.e. *ἧττον φορτική*: comp. An. post. I. 24, 85 a 29 *εἰ δὴ βελτίων μὲν ἡ καθ' αὑτό* [scil. *ἀπόδειξις*], *τοιαύτη δ' ἡ κατὰ μέρος . . . καὶ βελτίων ἂν ἡ κατὰ μέρος ἀπόδειξις εἴη*—where *τοιαύτη* recalls the idea of the *καθ' αὑτό* which precedes. The form of argument in this chapter of the Posterior Analytics is very similar to that in the present section of the Poetics.

θεατάς. The term is sometimes used even of the audience of b 28
a purely musical performance (Pol. 8. 7, 1341 b 16; Plato Gorg. 502 A).

ἀεί. For the position of the word comp. Eth. N. I. 5, 1097 b 19 *ἀγαθῶν τὸ μεῖζον αἱρετώτερον ἀεί.*—Pol. 4. 14, 1298 b 40 *ἐπανάγεται εἰς τοὺς πλείστους αἰεί.*

λίαν qualifies the following *φορτική* (Bon. Ind. 430 b 15). For the insertion of *δῆλον ὅτι* comp. Bon. Ind. 173 b 31.

⟨πρὸς⟩ ἅπαντα. The traditional reading, *ἡ ἅπαντα μιμουμένη*, b 29
which is explained as meaning 'the imitation which extends to every circumstance' (Twining), or 'quae motu et gestibus omnia similat' (Vahlen), does not fit into the argument in this passage, though it may perhaps seem to be confirmed by Plato Rep. 397 A. The logic of the present argument requires not *ἅπαντα* but *πρὸς ἅπαντα* (v. J. of Phil. 5 p. 121). The sense is that Tragedy is *φορτική* because, instead of appealing to a select public (*πρὸς θεατὰς ἐπιεικεῖς*, 1462 a 2), it is *πρὸς ἅπαντα*, or as we are told a little further on, *πρὸς φαύλους* (1462 a 3). For this use of *ἅπαντα* ('any one and every one') comp. Top. 8. 14, 164 b 8 *οὐχ ἅπαντι δὲ διαλεκτέον οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸν τυχόντα γυμναστέον.*—Soph. el. 5, 167 a 10 *παντὶ θεωρῆσαι ῥᾴδιον.* Aristotle's estimate of the average *θεατής* in the theatres may be seen from 13, 453 a 34, and from the distinction in Pol. 8. 7, 1342 a 18 *ὁ θεατὴς διττός, ὁ μὲν ἐλεύθερος καὶ πεπαιδευμένος, ὁ δὲ φορτικὸς ἐκ βαναύσων καὶ θητῶν καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων συγκείμενος.* Plato had an equally mean opinion of the theatrical public of his day: Gorg. 502 C *οὐκοῦν πρὸς πολὺν ὄχλον καὶ δῆμον οὗτοι λέγονται οἱ λόγοι* [i.e. those of the tragedians]; . . . *νῦν ἄρα ἡμεῖς ηὑρήκαμεν ῥητορικήν τινα πρὸς δῆμον τοιοῦτον οἷον παίδων τε ὁμοῦ καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ ἀνδρῶν, καὶ δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων* (comp. Laws 658 D).

οὐκ αἰσθανομένων, scil. *τῶν θεατῶν*, understood from *πρὸς ἅπαντα* (see on 6, 1449 b 26).

1461 b 30 **προσθῇ**: used absolutely in the sense of 'adds something' (comp. 24, 1460 a 18).

κινοῦνται: for the change of number see on λέγει in 21, 1457 b 19.

οἱ φαῦλοι αὐληταί: i.e. indifferent flute-players, in their anxiety to make the music intelligible, accompany it by a sort of pantomimic movement of the body. According to Theophrastus (fr. 92 Wimmer) this combination of music and pantomime originated in Sicily: *Θεόφραστος πρῶτόν φησιν Ἄνδρωνα τὸν Καταναῖον αὐλητὴν κινήσεις καὶ ῥυθμοὺς ποιῆσαι τῷ σώματι αὐλοῦντα (ὅθεν σικελίζειν τὸ ὀρχεῖσθαι παρὰ τοῖς παλαιοῖς), μεθ' ὃν Κλεόλαν τὸν Θηβαῖον.* Other references to it will be found in Sittl, Die Gebärden der Gr. u. Röm. p. 244.

b 31 **δίσκον μιμεῖσθαι** seems to mean 'to imitate the act of throwing a quoit'.

b 32 **Σκύλλαν αὐλῶσιν**, 'play music descriptive of Scylla'. Aristotle may be referring to the dithyramb mentioned in 15, 1454 a 31; but the probability is that he is thinking rather of a purely instrumental piece of music (see on 1, 1447 a 15) on the same subject. In the Greek *αὐλεῖν τινα = δι' αὐλήσεως μιμεῖσθαί τινα*, in the same way as *ὀρχεῖσθαί τινα = δι' ὀρχήσεως μιμεῖσθαί τινα.*

b 34 **Μυννίσκος.** On Mynniscus of Chalcis (the protagonist in some of the later plays of Aeschylus) and his younger contemporary, Callipides, see Völker, Diss. Halens. 4 pp. 153, 177. In calling Callipides an 'ape' Mynniscus may have meant no more than this, that his acting was so exaggerated as to be ridiculous and a mere caricature, the ape being a sort of caricature of humanity (comp. Top. 3. 2, 117 b 17 *σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ εἰ ἐπὶ τὸ γελοιότερον εἴη ὅμοιον, καθάπερ ὁ πίθηκος τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ*).

b 35 **Πινδάρου.** Nothing further is known of this actor (Völker l.c. p. 155).

1462 a 3 **σχημάτων**: the attitudes or postures assumed by the dancer. In the dance, which, it is to be remembered, was a species of acting (see on 1, 1447 a 27), *σχῆμα* had the technical sense explained by Plutarch, Qu. conv. 9. 15, 747 C–E *ἡ γὰρ ὄρχησις ἔκ τε κινήσεων καὶ σχέσεων συνέστηκεν, ὡς τὸ μέλος τῶν φθόγγων καὶ τῶν διαστημάτων· ἐνταῦθα δ' αἱ μοναὶ πέρατα τῶν κινήσεών εἰσι. φορὰς μὲν οὖν τὰς κινήσεις ὀνομάζουσι, σχήματα δὲ σχέσεις καὶ διαθέσεις, εἰς ἃς φερόμεναι τελευτῶσιν αἱ κινήσεις, ὅταν Ἀπόλλωνος ἢ Πανὸς ἢ τινος Βάκχης σχῆμα διαθέντες ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος γραφικῶς τοῖς εἴδεσιν*

ἐπιμένωσι . . . . ἐν ὀρχήσει τὸ μὲν σχῆμα μιμητικόν ἐστι μορφῆς καὶ 1462 a 3
ἰδέας, καὶ πάλιν ἡ φορὰ πάθους τινὸς ἐμφαντικὸν ἢ πράξεως ἢ δυνάμεως (comp. Sommerbrodt, Scaenica p. 216).

ὑποκριτικῆς: see on 19, 1456 b 10. a 5

σημείοις: i.e. the significant movements, of hand or head for a 6
instance, by which the spoken word may be accompanied (comp. Aristoxenus p. 411, 13 Marquard, and Ath. 628 D; see also Sommerbrodt l. c. p. 213).

ῥαψῳδοῦντα. The *ῥαψῳδός* is tacitly assumed to be a kind of *ὑποκριτής* (see on 5, 1449 a 15).

Σωσίστρατος . . . Μνασίθεος. Nothing further is known of either. a 7
It is evident that the one was a rhapsodist and the other a professional singer.

διᾴδοντα. As Tyrwhitt (quoting Theocritus 5. 22) points out, *διᾴδειν* is 'certatim sive in certamine canere'; it implies that Mnasitheus sang, no doubt as a *κιθαρῳδός*, in an *ἀγών*, i.e. in a public performance in the theatre. The word is explained in the Lexicon in Bekker's Anecdota 37, *διᾴσασθαι τὸ διαμιλλήσασθαι ἐν ᾠδῇ τινι.* The same idea of competition is found in *διαθεῖν*, *διακολακεύεσθαι*, *διαπίνειν*, etc. Gomperz aptly compares the saying ascribed to Diogenes the Cynic (Stob. Fl. 4. 112), *Διογένης ἔλεγε διαπαλαίοντας μὲν πολλοὺς ὁρᾶν καὶ διατρέχοντας, διακαλοκαγαθιζομένους δὲ οὔ.*

ἀποδοκιμαστέα. *ἀποδοκιμάζειν*, 'to reject as inadmissible', is the a 8
opposite of *δοκιμάζειν*, 'to approve, or sanction' (Pol. 8. 7, 1342 a 34; comp. Bon. Ind. 80 b 48).

φαύλων, 'turpium personarum' (Victorius)—not as Paccius a 9
renders it, 'ineptorum', as we hardly need to be told that bad acting is to be rejected. What Aristotle means is clear from his instance: Callipides in his impersonations of the heroines of Greek Tragedy, did not make them move and deport themselves like ladies. The assumption here is that character comes out in movement, and that some sorts of movement are naturally noble and others ignoble; comp. Pol. 8. 5, 1340 b 7 *τὸν αὐτὸν γὰρ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἦθος ἔχουσι στασιμώτερον οἱ δὲ κινητικόν, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν φορτικωτέρας ἔχουσι τὰς κινήσεις οἱ δὲ ἐλευθεριωτέρας.*

διὰ γὰρ τοῦ ἀναγινώσκειν φανερὰ ὁποία τίς ἐστιν: comp. infra a 17 a 12
τὸ ἐναργὲς ἔχει καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀναγνώσει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων, and 6, 1450 b 18 *ἡ γὰρ τῆς τραγῳδίας δύναμις καὶ ἄνευ ἀγῶνος καὶ ὑποκριτῶν ἔστιν.* But though Aristotle draws a line between a tragedy

1462 a 12 as literature and its stage presentation (comp. 14, 1453 b 2), he has no idea of a reading as distinct from an acting tragedy; a tragedy with him is essentially something to be acted. The notion of a reading play has been found in Rhet. 3. 12, 1413 b 12, in the use of the word *ἀναγνωστικοί* of Chaeremon and others. The term, however, merely denotes a fact of style; these writers were *ἀναγνωστικοί* because their language could be read by any one, not requiring any special arts of elocution to bring out the meaning (comp. Demetrius De eloc. 193).

a 14 **ἔπειτα** corresponds with the *πρῶτον μὲν* in a 5. There is the same or an even greater interval between the words in Metaph. N. 2, 1089 a 15, in Pol. 5. 11, 1314 b 14, in Aeschines in Tim. 161, in Isocrates 197 A, and in Alcidamas De Soph. 3. The answer to the opponents of Tragedy is twofold: (1) that their reasoning is not quite conclusive; and (2) that they ignore a whole series of facts which tell in favour of Tragedy. The series begins with *διότι πάντ' ἔχει ὅσαπερ ἡ ἐποποιία,* and ends with *ἔτι ἧττον μία ἡ μίμησις ἡ τῶν ἐποποιῶν* (b 3); all that follows as far as *μίμησις* in b 11 is a justification of this last proposition. To this, however, is added a further point, *ἔτι τῷ τῆς τέχνης ἔργῳ* (scil. *διαφέρει*), in the short formula which summarizes this part of the argument in b 12, *εἰ οὖν τούτοις διαφέρει πᾶσιν καὶ ἔτι τῷ τῆς τέχνης ἔργῳ.*

a 15 **τῷ μέτρῳ**: as for instance in Soph. Trach. 1009, Phil. 840, and Eurip. Troad. 590 (Tyrwhitt).

οὐ μικρὸν μέρος, scil. *ἔχει.*

a 16 **δι' ἧς** refers to *τὴν μουσικήν,* which is the more important of the two things (comp. 6, 1450 b 16). The neglect of *καὶ τὰς ὄψεις* in the construction is not unlike that of *καὶ περιπέτεια* in 11, 1452 a 38. Other instances to be explained on the same principle are Soph. el. 16, 175 a 21 *ἰδεῖν καὶ λῦσαι τὴν μοχθηρίαν* (i. e. *ἰδεῖν . . . τὴν μοχθηρίαν*), and De anima 3. 7, 431 b 7 *λογίζεται καὶ βουλεύεται τὰ μέλλοντα πρὸς τὰ παρόντα* (i. e. *λογίζεται . . . τὰ μέλλοντα κτέ.*).

a 18 **τὸ ἐν ἐλάττονι . . . εἶναι**, scil. *ἔχει*; comp. 24, 1460 a 30 ⟨*ὁ*⟩ *Οἰδίπους* (scil. *ἔχει*) *τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι.* The same construction is found after *λαμβάνειν* in Isocrates 225 A *τὸ μηδένα τῶν μαχίμων ἄνευ τῆς τῶν ἀρχόντων γνώμης ἀποδημεῖν . . . ἔτι δὲ τὸ μηδενὸς τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀποροῦντας τῶν κοινῶν προσταγμάτων ἀμελεῖν, μηδ' ἐπὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις διατρίβειν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὅπλοις καὶ ταῖς στρατείαις προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, ἐκεῖθεν ἅπαντα ταῦτ' εἰλήφασιν.*

b 1 **πολλῷ κεκραμένον τῷ χρόνῳ**: Plato Critias 121 A *πολλῷ τῷ θνητῷ καὶ πολλάκις ἀνακεραννυμένη.* The lengthiness of the statement is

said to dilute the pleasure of the story and make it thin and watery 1462 b 1
(b 7 *ὑδαρῇ*). The clause which follows (*λέγω δ' οἷον κτέ.*) is an illustration of this: if the matter of the Oedipus Tyrannus (see on 11, 1452 a 24) were treated at great length, in a poem as long as the Iliad, for instance, it would be only a thin and diluted pleasure that we should derive from it in its amplified form.

ἡ Ἰλιάς, scil. *κεῖται*, understood from the preceding *θείη*. b 3

πλείους τραγῳδίαι: comp. 23, 1459 b 2. b 5

ἐὰν μὲν ἕνα μῦθον ποιῶσιν, scil. *οἱ ἐποποιοί*; another instance of *μέν* solitarium (see on 6, 1450 a 3 *τῆς μὲν πράξεως*). In order to provide an antithesis, the old editors, with certain of the apographs (e.g. Par. 2038), re-write the text after *ὑδαρῇ* (b 7) thus: ⟨*ἐὰν δὲ πλείους,*⟩ *λέγω δὲ οἷον ἐὰν ἐκ πλειόνων πράξεων ᾖ συγκειμένη,* ⟨*οὐ μία*⟩, *ὥσπερ κτέ.*; and both Vahlen and Gomperz assume a lacuna after *ὑδαρῇ*. All that Aristotle has to show, however, is that the epic *μίμησις* is in the nature of things *ἧττον μία*; and he does this by an indirect argument, by insisting that an epic is always a failure, if the dramatic rule of Unity of action is too strictly observed in it.

μείουρον. Although *μύουρον* is the spelling both here and else- b 6
where in the principal MSS. of Aristotle, the evidence (v. HSt. s. v.) is on the whole in favour of the alternative form *μείουρος*—that in use in the writers on metre[1]. Both spellings are found in the existing text of Galen, but his explanations (8 p. 524 and 9 p. 509 K.) show that he connected the first syllable with *μειοῦν*; so that *μείουρος* must have been the form he had before him. The proper sense of the word is said to be 'contracted, or thinning away, at the end': Etym. Magn. *μύουρον· τὸ ἐπὶ τελευτῆς λεπτυνόμενον.* In Greek medicine *σφυγμὸς μείουρος* (or *μύουρος*) meant a tapering-off pulse: Galen 8 p. 524 K. *ἔστω τοίνυν ὁ μὲν δεύτερος σφυγμὸς τοῦ πρώτου βραχὺ μικρότερος· ὁ δὲ τρίτος τοῦ δευτέρου τοσούτῳ πάλιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ τέταρτος τοῦ τρίτου τῷ ἴσῳ, καὶ τοῦτ' ἄχρι πλείονος ἐφεξῆς γενέσθω. τοὺς τοιούτους σφυγμοὺς μειουρίζοντάς τε καὶ μειούρους καλοῦσιν, ἀπὸ τῶν εἰς ὀξὺ τελευτώντων σχημάτων τοὔνομα μεταφέροντες.* In metre an hexameter which 'halts' through a metrical deficiency at the end, like the Homeric *Τρῶες*

[1] Eustathius on Il. 12. 208 recognizes both forms: *Ἐν δὲ τῷ "Ἐρρίγησαν . . . ὄφιν" στιχηρόν ἐστι πάθος, ὃ λέγεται καὶ μυουρία διὰ διχρόνου τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ μειουρία διὰ τῆς* $\overline{\epsilon\iota}$ *διφθόγγου, ὡς ἐν τῷ τέλει πυρριχισθέντος τοῦ στίχου καὶ συστολὴν παθόντος κατὰ μυὸς οὐράν, ἢ κατὰ μείωσιν οὐραίου ἤτοι τέλους ἄκρου.*

1462 b 6 δ' ἐρρίγησαν, ὅπως ἴδον αἰόλον ὄφιν (Il. 12. 208), was termed a *στίχος μείουρος* (Athenaeus 632 E; comp. Schol. Hephaest. 194–6 Gaisf.). The Latin rendering of it in this sense is *ecaudis*. Aristotle has the word in a physical sense in two places of the De Partibus, 3. 1, 662 a 24 and 4. 13, 696 b 34, where the carnivorous fishes are said to have an *ἀνερρωγός*, and the non-carnivorous, a *μύουρον στόμα*. In both passages *μύουρον στόμα* denotes a mouth with a narrow orifice, i.e. one with an opening small by comparison with the interior cavity, just as *ἀνερρωγὸς στόμα* means one with a wide orifice. In the Rhetoric, where it is a term of literary criticism, *μύουρος* is applied to a clause or period which seems too short and to end abruptly: Rhet. 3. 9, 1409 b 17 *δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ κῶλα καὶ τὰς περιόδους μήτε μυούρους εἶναι μήτε μακράς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ μικρὸν* [= *τὸ μύουρον*] *προσπταίειν πολλάκις ποιεῖ τὸν ἀκροατήν· ἀνάγκη γάρ, ὅταν ἔτι ὁρμῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πόρρω καὶ τὸ μέτρον, οὗ ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὅρον, ἀντισπασθῇ πανσαμένου, οἷον προσπταίειν γίγνεσθαι διὰ τὴν ἀντίκρουσιν.* This is apparently the sense of *μείουρος* in the present passage also—where it is usually rendered by 'curtus' (Tyrwhitt), 'truncatus' (Hermann), 'in extremo imminutus' (Victorius), or the like. The general meaning is clear enough: If the epic poet takes a story that is one in the strict dramatic sense of the term, and tells it with befitting rapidity and without diffuseness, the result will be that it will seem to end up too soon. The assumption is that an epic is naturally, and is always expected to be, a work of considerable length (comp. 5, 1449 b 12; 24, 1459 b 17; 24, 1460 a 3).

b 7 **τῷ τοῦ μέτρου μήκει.** In lieu of this Bernays suggested *τῷ συμμέτρῳ μήκει*. As the hexameter, however, has been said to be the only metre fit for a long poem (24, 1460 a 3), it is possible that *τῷ τοῦ μέτρου μήκει* may be meant to stand for *τῷ τοῦ μέτρου οἰκείῳ μήκει*, the length one ordinarily associates with this description of verse. The rendering of Gomperz, 'wenn er der Länge des epischen Versmasses entspricht', has met with the approval of Zeller (Arch. f. Gesch. d. Phil. 9 p. 539).

ὑδαρῆ: Dionysius Hal. 5 p. 659 R. *ὑδαρής τε γὰρ καὶ ἀσθενὴς καὶ ψυχρός ἐστιν* (scil. *ὁ λόγος*). Similarly in Pol. 2. 4, 1262 b 15 Aristotle describes affection as becoming a *ὑδαρὴς φιλία* when spread over too large a circle of friends or relations.

λέγω δὲ οἷον ἐὰν ἐκ πλειόνων πράξεων ᾖ συγκειμένη illustrates the principal statement, *ἧττον μία ἡ μίμησις ἡ τῶν ἐποποιῶν* (b 3); for the position of the illustration see on 6, 1450 a 34. The main

point is proved by showing that even the best epics, those of Homer, are made up of a plurality of actions, each of them of some magnitude and importance by itself. 1462 b 7

τοιαῦτα μέρη: i. e. sections embodying so many distinguishable *πράξεις* or stories. b 9

καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἔχει. It is usual to write here ⟨ἃ⟩ *καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἔχει* with certain of the apographs; but a subject (*τὰ μέρη*) may easily be supplied from the preceding *τοιαῦτα μέρη* (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr.³ 2. 1 p. 35, and Riddell, Digest of Idioms § 234).

καίτοι ταῦτα τὰ ποιήματα. The error here in A^c, *καὶ τοιαῦτ' ἄττα* b 10
ποιήματα, is fellow to that in it in Rhet. 1. 2, 1358 a 16 *καὶ τοῖ͡αυτα* (sic) for *καίτοι ταῦτα*.

εἰ οὖν τούτοις κτέ. In summing up the series of reasons intro- b 12
duced by *διότι* in a 14 Aristotle changes his construction, treating them as a series of assumptions. Here also, at the last moment as it were, he recognizes another and an even more important point of superiority, the superior emotional effect of Tragedy (*τῷ τῆς τέχνης ἔργῳ*). An additional argument is introduced in just the same way in De caelo 2. 14, 297 b 17, and 3. 5, 304 b 19, and in De part. an. 2. 10, 656 a 9.

τῷ τῆς τέχνης ἔργῳ. In Aristotle's view epic poetry has the same end as Tragedy; and its immediate effect (*ἔργον*) is the same in kind, the pleasurable excitement of the emotions of pity and fear. The affinity of the Homeric Epic and Tragedy in this respect was acknowledged in antiquity by the ancient commentators on Homer (Adam, Die aristotelische Theorie vom Epos p. 33 sqq.) as well as by Plato (Rep. 605 c). Aristotle's view is that the difference between them is mainly one of manner; so that apart from that they are fundamentally alike—with the same literary elements, the same canons of procedure, the same emotional effect, and the same ultimate end and justification.

τὴν τυχοῦσαν ἡδονήν: Pol. 8. 5, 1339 b 32 *ἔχει γὰρ ἴσως ἡδονήν* b 13
τινα καὶ τὸ τέλος, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν.

αὐτὰς: i. e. Tragedy and epic poetry. The pleasure they give is essentially the same (see above on b 12), though Tragedy gives it in a finer and more concentrated form.

τὴν εἰρημένην: 13, 1452 b 32 and 14, 1453 b 10. b 14

περὶ μὲν οὖν κτέ. This list of points in the preceding theory b 16
of Tragedy and epic poetry is preparatory to a discussion on another matter, no doubt the theory of Comedy (see 6, 1449 b 22). Summaries of the same type are constantly introduced by Aristotle

1462 b 16 as connecting links between one discussion and another; see more especially De gen. et corr. 2. 1, 328 b 26; Meteor. 1. 14, 353 a 25; De mem. 2, 453 b 8; H. A. 3. 1, 509 a 26; Eth. N. 7. 15, 1154 b 32; Pol. 6. 1, 1316 b 31; Rhet. 2. 1, 1377 b 15. To judge from these parallels, the next paragraph must have opened with *περὶ δὲ κωμῳδίας λοιπὸν εἰπεῖν* or some equivalent formula.

APPENDIX

ADDITIONAL NOTE ON 6. $1449^b 27$

The following synopsis of versions and paraphrases of the clause δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν may give some idea of the variations of opinion at different times in regard to this much-debated passage. The extracts without references are to be understood to come from commentaries or translations.

1527. Paccius: 'per misericordiam ... atque terrorem perturbationes huiusmodi purgans.'

1549. Segni: 'conducendo l' espurgatione degli affetti . . . per via di misericordia et di timore.'

1559. Minturnus (De Poeta p. 63): 'tragica poesis id sibi potissimum proponit, ut misericordia captanda incutiendoque terrore animum a perturbationibus expiet.' Comp. his Arte Poetica (1564) p. 77.

1560. Victorius: 'per misericordiam et metum conficiens huiuscemodi perturbationum purgationem.'

1570. Castelvetro: 'induca per misericordia e per ispavento purgazione di così fatte passioni.' In his commentary he explains this as meaning that: 'la tragedia con le predette passioni, spavento e misericordia, purga e scaccia dal cuore degli huomini quelle predette medesime passioni.'

1572. Piccolomini: 'a fine che . . . col mezo della compassione e del timore, si purghino gli animi da così fatte lor passioni & perturbationi.'

1587. Riccobonus: 'per misericordiam et metum inducens talium perturbationum purgationem.'

1588. Denores (Poetica f. 6r): 'per purgar gli spettatori col diletto che nasce dalla imitatione, & dalla representatione dal terrore, & dalla misericordia.'

1590. Rossi (Discorsi f. 21r): 'per purgare gli animi, con la compassione, & con lo spavento da simili affetti.'

1596. Pinciano (Philosophia antigua poetica p. 332): 'Tragedia dixera yo que es imitacion activa de accion grave, hecha para limpiar los animos de perturbaciones, por medio de misericordia y miedo.'

1610. Heinsius: 'ut . . . per misericordiam et metum inducat

similium perturbationum expiationem.' Comp. his De Tragoediae constitutione p. 29 ed. 1611.

1613. Benius: 'per misericordiam et metum peragens talium perturbationum purgationem.'

1621. Gallutius (Virgilianae Vindicationes p. 252): 'Id igitur ait Aristoteles Tragoediam agere ac veluti finem intueri: ut sicut affecta corpora purgatis atque abstersis curantur humoribus, ita animum sanet ipsa, duobus affectibus nominatim, commiseratione ac metu purgatis, hoc est, ab ea liberatis exsuperantia, a qua animi quaedam aegrotatio promanabat.'

1623 Goulston: 'per misericordiam metumque factis expressum eiusmodi vehementes animorum perturbationes undequaque purgans expiansque.'

1626. Ordoñez: 'conduciendo la expurgacion de los afectos . . . por via de misericordia y terror.'

1633. Gonçalez de Salas (Nueva Idea de la Tragedia antigua p. 11): 'de modo sea imitada la Accion [p. 17: 'de modo sea su Representacion'], que mueva a Lastima, y a Miedo, para que el animo se purgue de los affectos semejantes.'

1640. Mesnardière (Poétique p. 8): 'qui produit par elle mesme la terreur et la pitié, et qui sert à modérer ces deux mouvemens de l'âme.'

1671. Milton (Pref. to Samson Agonistes): 'Tragedy . . . said by Aristotle to be of power, by raising pity and fear, or terror, to purge the mind of those and such-like passions.' But his Latin version of the words is: 'per misericordiam et metum perficiens talium affectuum lustrationem.'

1692. Dacier: 'qui . . . par le moyen de la compassion et de la terreur, achève de purger en nous ces sortes de passions et toutes les autres semblables.'

1705. Anon.: 'which . . . by means of Compassion and Terror perfectly refines in us all sorts of Passions, and whatever else is like them.'

1753. Curtius: 'welche . . . uns vermittelst des Schreckens und Mitleidens von den Fehlern der vorgestellten Leidenschaften reiniget' (comp. Bullinger, Metakritische Gänge p. 24).

1763. Moor (On the End of Tragedy p. 42): 'And thus, says Aristotle, Tragedy, by calling in Musick to its aid in exciting Pity and Terror, proposes to CHARM away, out of human life, such calamities as are exhibited in the Drama.'

1768. Lessing (Hamburgische Dramaturgie St. 77): 'Die Tragödie ist die Nachahmung einer Handlung, die . . . vermittelst des Mitleids und der Furcht die Reinigung dieser und dergleichen Leidenschaften bewirkt.'

1771. Batteux: 'pour opérer . . . par la terreur et par la pitié la purgation de ces mêmes passions.' Comp. his paraphrase in the Mém.

de l'Académie des Inscriptions for 1771: 'qui se fait . . . par un spectacle de terreur et de pitié, pour nous faire ressentir ces deux passions purgées de ce qui les rend désagréables.'

1775. Anon.: 'with Terror and Pity, effectually purifying such like Passions.'

1789. Twining: 'effecting through pity and terror the correction and refinement of such passions.'

1792. Pye: 'effecting through the means of pity and terror the purgation of such passions.'

1794. Tyrwhitt: 'per misericordiam et metum hujusmodi affectuum purgationem efficiens.' In his note he explains the meaning to be that 'affectus misericordiae et metus, qui in tragoediis vehementissime excitantur, non ex eo nutriri et validiores effici, quod Plato criminabatur, sed contra levari et exhauriri' (comp. Matthiae, Misc. Phil. 2. 1, p. 24).

1798. Buhle: 'um durch Mitleid und Furcht die Veredlung gewisser Leidenschaften zu bewirken.'

1802. Hermann: 'miseratione et terrore harum et similium perturbationum purgationem perficiens.'

— Sahl: 'ut per misericordiam metumque velut lustrationem quandam talium calamitatum perficiat.'

1811. Taylor: 'through pity and fear effecting a purification from such like passions.' In the Introd. to the ed. of 1818 the meaning is said to be that 'the terror and pity excited by tragedy purify the spectator from those perturbations which form the catastrophe of the tragedy.'

1821. Gräfenhan: 'durchgehends durch Mitleid und Furcht, die im Zuschauer erregt werden, die Reinigung eben solcher unwillkührlich entstehenden Gefühle bewirkend.'

1824. Weise: 'welche durch Mitleid und Furcht eine Reinigung dieser Gemüthsbewegungen bewirkt.'

1826. Goethe (Nachlese zu Aristoteles Poetik): 'die . . . nach einem Verlauf aber von Mitleid und Furcht mit Ausgleichung solcher Leidenschaften ihr Geschäft abschliesst' (comp. Stisser, Norden Progr. 1884).

1839. Ritter: 'miseratione ac metu perficiens talium perturbationum purgationem.'

1848. Weil (Verh. der zehnten Versammlung deutscher Philologen zu Basel p. 140): 'Die Tragödie bewirkt durch Mitleid und Furcht die solchen Affecten eigenthümliche Reinigung.' In 1889 (Études sur le drame antique p. 162) thus in French: 'La tragédie est l'image d'une action . . . qui, par la pitié et la crainte, accomplit la catharsis propre aux émotions de cette nature.'

1849. Egger (La Critique chez les Grecs p. 321): 'employant la terreur et la pitié pour purger les passions de ce genre.'

1857. Bernays (Zwei Abhandlungen p. 21): 'Die Tragödie bewirkt

durch (Erregung von) Mitleid und Furcht die erleichternde Entladung solcher (mitleidigen und furchtsamen) Gemüthsaffectionen.'

1858. Saint-Hilaire: 'arrivant, tout en excitant la pitié et la terreur, à purifier en nous ces deux sentiments.'

1859. Stahr (Aristoteles und die Wirkung der Tragödie p. 32): 'welche . . . durch Mitleid und Furcht (die beiden nothwendigen Elemente jeder solchen Handlung, welche keiner tragischen Dichtung fehlen dürfen) die reinigende Erleichterung von solchen Erleidnissen zu Wege bringt.'

1865. Susemihl: 'und dies Alles in einer Weise, dass diese Darstellung durch Furcht und Mitleid eine Reinigung eben dieser Affecte erzielt.' In his ed. of 1874: 'eine Reinigung von eben dieser Art von Affecten erzielt.'

1869. Ueberweg: 'welche durch Erregung von Mitleid und Furcht die (zeitweilige) Befreiung von derartigen Gefühlen zum Enderfolg hat.'

1875. M. Schmidt: 'so angelegt, dass sie durch Furcht und Mitleid eine von derartigen Affecten reinigende Wirkung übt.'

1876. Barco: 'la quale per via della pietà e del terrore libera l'animo da siffatti sentimenti.'

— Doering (Die Kunstlehre des Aristoteles p. 254): 'Durch Mitleid und Furcht, d. h. durch Erregung von Mitleid und Furcht, vollbringt die Tragödie die Katharsis der jenen gleichartigen Affekte.'

— Manns (Emmerich Progr. p. 5): 'Die Tragödie bewirkt durch Mitleid und Furcht die solchen Affecten (oder . . . die solchen Mitteln) eigenthümliche Reinigung' (comp. his Lehre des Aristoteles von der tragischen Katharsis und Hamartia p. 25).

1878. Reinkens (Aristoteles über Kunst p. 158): 'welche durch Mitleid und Furcht die Reinigung von solchen Affekten bewirkt.'

1883. Ruelle: 'opérant par la pitié et la terreur la purgation des passions de la même nature.'

1885. Günther (Grundzüge der tragischen Kunst p. 258): 'Die Tragödie bewirkt durch Rührung und Erschütterung die gerade auf derartige Seelenzustände sich erstreckende Gemüthsklärung.'

1887. Baumgart (Handbuch der Poetik p. 424): 'welche die Kraft besitzt, durch die Empfindungen des Mitleids und der Furcht die Läuterung der entsprechenden Gemüthsbewegungen zu vollenden.'

1891. Wecklein (Ueber die Stoffe und die Wirkung der griechischen Tragödie p. 35): 'die Tragödie ist eine Nachahmung, welche durch Mitleid und Furcht die Erleichterung von dieser Art von Gemüthserregungen erzielt.'

1892. Bosanquet (History of Aesthetic p. 64); 'producing by (the stimulation of) pity and fear the alleviating discharge of emotions of that nature.'

1894. Bernardakis (Mon édition d'Euripide p. 60): 'qui par la pitié et la crainte mène à sa fin l'expiation des faits de mal qui causent cette pitié et cette crainte.'

1895. Butcher: 'through pity and fear effecting the proper purgation of these emotions.'

1896. Laehr (Wirkung der Tragödie nach Aristoteles p. 65): 'Eine Nachahmung, welche durch Mitleid und Furcht die Reinigung derartiger Gefühle . . . vollbringt.' Explained in p. 69 as meaning: 'die Tragödie vollbringt durch Mitleid und Furcht die Reinigung aller derartigen Gefühle.'

1897. Gomperz: 'eine Darstellung, welche durch Erregung von Mitleid und Furcht die Entladung dieser Affecte herbeiführt.'

1899. Hatzfeld et Dufour: 'opérant par la pitié et la crainte (au théâtre) la purification des passions de ce genre (dans la réalité).'

INDEX OF GREEK WORDS

The references are to Bekker's pages and lines as given in the margin of this edition of the text. The first two figures are omitted; so that Bekker's 1456b 36, *for instance, becomes here* 56b 36.

A + after a reference means that the word recurs more than once in the context.

INDEX TO THE COMMENTARY

The references are to the marginal numbers, the first two figures of which are here omitted.

OXFORD
PRINTED AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
BY HORACE HART, M.A.
PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY

CLARENDON PRESS BOOKS

LATIN AND GREEK

Grammars and Exercise Books

Extra fcap 8vo

Mr. J. B. Allen's Elementary Series

Rudimenta Latina. Comprising accidence and exercises of a very elementary character for the use of beginners. 2s.

An Elementary Latin Grammar. 238th thousand. 2s. 6d.

A First Latin Exercise Book. Eighth edition. 2s. 6d.

A Second Latin Exercise Book. Second edition. 3s. 6d.

Key (see note p. 35) to both Exercise Books. 5s. net.

An Elementary Greek Grammar. Containing accidence and elementary syntax. 3s.

Mr. J. B. Allen's Latin Readers

With notes, maps, vocabularies and English exercises; stiff covers, 1s. 6d. each. These books are of the same and not of graduated difficulty.

Lives from Cornelius Nepos.

Tales of Early Rome.
Tales of the Roman Republic, Part I.
Tales of the Roman Republic, Part II.
} Adapted from the Text of Livy.

Other Latin Readers, etc

Tales of the Civil War, edited by W. D. Lowe. 1s. 6d.

Scenes from the Life of Hannibal. Selected from Livy. Edited by W. D. Lowe. 1s. 6d.

Extracts from Cicero, with notes, by Henry Walford. In three Parts. Third edition. Part I. Anecdotes from Grecian and Roman History. 1s. 6d. Part II. Omens and Dreams: Beauties of Nature. 1s. 6d. Part III. Rome's Rule of her Provinces. 1s. 6d. Parts I–III, 4s. 6d.

Extracts from Livy, with notes and maps, by H. Lee-Warner. New edition. Part I. The Caudine Disaster. Part II. Hannibal's Campaign in Italy. Part III, by H. Lee-Warner and T. W. Gould. The Macedonian War. 1s. 6d. each.

A First Latin Reader, by T. J. Nunns. Third edition. 2s.

An Introduction to Latin Syntax, by W. S. Gibson. 2s.

Mr. C. S. Jerram's Series

Reddenda Minora; or easy passages, Latin and Greek, for unseen translation. For the use of lower forms. Sixth edition, revised and enlarged. 1s. 6d.

Anglice Reddenda; or extracts, Latin and Greek, for unseen translation. First Series. Fifth edition. 2s. 6d. Also Latin extracts (First and Second Series), 2s. 6d.; Greek extracts, 3s. Vol. I, Latin, 2s. 6d.; Vol. II, Greek, 3s. Second Series. New edition. 3s. Third Series. 3s.

Greek Readers and Primers

Greek Reader. Selected and adapted with English notes from Professor von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff's *Griechisches Lesebuch*, by E. C. Marchant. Crown 8vo. 2 vols., each (with or without Vocabulary), 2s.

Selections from Plutarch's Life of Caesar. Crown 8vo, large type. Edited with notes by R. L. A. Du Pontet. 2s.

Greek Readers; Easy, by Evelyn Abbott. In stiff covers. 2s. **First Reader,** by W. G. Rushbrooke. Third edition. 2s. 6d. **Second Reader,** by A. M. Bell. Second edition. 3s. **Specimens of Greek Dialects;** being a Fourth Greek Reader. With introductions etc, by W. W. Merry. 4s. 6d. **Selections from Homer and the Greek Dramatists;** being a Fifth Greek Reader. With explanatory notes and introductions to the study of Greek Epic and Dramatic Poetry, by Evelyn Abbott. 4s. 6d.

A Greek Testament Primer. For the use of students beginning Greek, by E. Miller. Second edition. Paper covers, 2s.; cloth, 3s. 6d.

Xenophon (see p. 43)

Easy Selections, with a vocabulary, notes, illustrations carefully chosen from coins, casts and ancient statues, and map, by J. S. Phillpotts and C. S. Jerram. Third edition. 3s. 6d.

Selections, with notes, illustrations, and maps, by J. S. Phillpotts. Fifth ed. 3s. 6d. Key (see p. 35) to §§ 1-3, 2s. 6d. net.

A Greek Primer, for the use of beginners in that language. By the Right Rev. Charles Wordsworth. Eighty-sixth thousand. 1s. 6d. Graecae Grammaticae Rudimenta. Nineteenth edition. 4s.

An Introduction to the Comparative Grammar of Greek and Latin. By J. E. King and C. Cookson. Extra fcap 8vo. 5s. 6d.

Latin Dictionaries

A Latin Dictionary. Founded on Andrews's edition of Freund's Latin Dictionary. Revised, enlarged, and in great part rewritten, by Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short. 4to. 25s.

A School Latin Dictionary. By C. T. Lewis. 4to. 12s. 6d.

Elementary Latin Dictionary. By C. T. Lewis. Square 8vo. 7s. 6d.

Greek Dictionaries

A Greek-English Lexicon. By H. G. Liddell and Robert Scott. Eighth edition, revised. 4to. 36s.

An Intermediate Greek Lexicon. By the same. 12s. 6d.

An Abridged Greek Lexicon. By the same. 7s. 6d.

Latin and Greek Prose Composition

Mr. J. Y. Sargent's Course. Extra fcap 8vo

Primer of Latin Prose Composition. 2s. 6d.

Passages for Translation into Latin Prose. Eighth edition. 2s. 6d. Key (see note below) to the eighth edition, 5s. net.

Primer of Greek Prose. 3s. 6d. Key (see note below) 5s. net.

Passages for Translation into Greek Prose. 3s.

Exemplaria Graeca. Select Greek versions of the above. 3s.

Other Prose Composition Books. Extra fcap 8vo

Ramsay's Latin Prose Composition. Fourth edition.
Vol. I: Syntax and Exercises. 4s. 6d. Or Part 1, First Year's Course, 1s. 6d.; Part 2, Second Year's Course, 1s. 6d.; Part 3, Syntax and Appendix, 2s. 6d. Key (see note below) to the volume, 5s. net.
Vol. II: Passages for Translation. 4s. 6d.

Jerram's Graece Reddenda. Being exercises for Greek Prose. 2s. 6d.

Unseen Translation

Jerram's Reddenda Minora and Anglice Reddenda. See p. 33.

Fox and Bromley's Models and Exercises in Unseen Translation. Revised edition. Extra fcap 8vo. 5s. 6d. A Key (see note below) giving references for the passages contained in the above, 6d. net.

Latin and Greek Verse

Lee-Warner's Helps and Exercises for Latin Elegiacs. 3s. 6d. Key (see note below) 4s. 6d. net.

Rouse's Demonstrations in Latin Elegiac Verse. Crown 8vo. 4s. 6d. (Exercises and versions.)

Laurence's Helps and Exercises for Greek Iambic Verse. 3s. 6d. Key (see note below) 5s. net.

Sargent's Models and Materials for Greek Iambic Verse. 4s. 6d. Key (see note below) 5s. net.

Nova Anthologia Oxoniensis. Edited by Robinson Ellis and A. D. Godley. Crown 8vo buckram extra, 6s. net; on India paper, 7s. 6d. net.

Musa Clauda. Being translations into Latin Elegiac Verse, by S. G. Owen and J. S. Phillimore. Crown 8vo boards, 3s. 6d.

Latin Prose Versions. Contributed by various Scholars, edited by G. G. Ramsay. Extra fcap 8vo, 5s.

NOTE AS TO KEYS

Application for all Keys to be made direct to the Secretary, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Keys can be obtained by teachers, or bona fide private students, on application to the Secretary, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Annotated editions of Latin Authors

For Oxford Classical Texts see p. 41 ; for Oxford Translations, p. 21.

Aetna. A critical recension of the Text, with prolegomena, translation, commentary, and index verborum. By ROBINSON ELLIS. Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d. net.

Avianus, The Fables. With prolegomena, critical apparatus, commentary, etc. By ROBINSON ELLIS. 8vo. 8s. 6d.

Caesar, De Bello Gallico, I–VII. In two crown 8vo volumes. By ST. G. STOCK. Vol. I, Introduction, 5s.; Vol. II, Text and Notes, 6s.

The Gallic War. By C. E. MOBERLY. Second edition. With maps. Books I–III, 2s.; III–V, 2s. 6d.; VI–VIII, 3s. 6d.

The Civil War. New edition. By the same editor. 3s. 6d.

Catulli Veronensis Liber rec. ROBINSON ELLIS. Second edition, with notes and appendices. 8vo. 21s. net.

Commentary. By the same. Second edition. 8vo. 18s. net.

Carmina Selecta. Text only, for Schools. 3s. 6d.

Cicero, de Amicitia. By ST. GEORGE STOCK. 3s.

de Senectute. By L. HUXLEY. 2s.

in Catilinam. By E. A. UPCOTT. Third edition. 2s. 6d.

in Q. Caecilium Divinatio and **in C. Verrem Actio Prima.** By J. R. KING. Limp, 1s. 6d.

pro Cluentio. By G. G. RAMSAY. Second ed. 3s. 6d.

pro Marcello, pro Ligario, pro Rege Deiotaro. By W. Y. FAUSSET. Second edition. 2s. 6d.

pro Milone. By A. C. CLARK. 8vo. 8s. 6d. By A. B. POYNTON. Second edition. Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d.

Philippics, I, II, III, V, VII. By J. R. KING. Revised by A. C. CLARK. 3s. 6d.

pro Roscio. By ST. GEORGE STOCK. 3s. 6d.

Select Orations, viz. in Verrem Actio Prima, de Imperio Gn. Pompeii, pro Archia, Philippica IX. By J. R. KING. Second edition. 2s. 6d.

Select Letters. With introductions, notes, and appendices. By A. WATSON. Fourth edition. 8vo. 18s. Text only of the large edition. By the same. Third edition. Extra fcap 8vo. 4s.

Selected Letters. By C. E. PRICHARD and E. R. BERNARD. Second edition. 3s.

De Oratore Libri Tres. With introduction and notes. By A. S. WILKINS. 8vo. 18s. Or separately, Book I. Third edition. 7s. 6d. Book II. Second edition. 5s. Book III. 6s.

LATIN AUTHORS

Horace, Odes, Carmen Saeculare, and Epodes. By E. C. Wickham. 8vo. Third edition. 12s. Crown 8vo. Second edition. 6s. Selected Odes, with Notes for a Fifth Form. By the same. 2nd ed. 2s.

Satires, Epistles, De Arte Poetica. By the same. Crown 8vo. 6s. Odes, Book I. 2s.

Text only: miniature Oxford edition. On writing-paper for MS notes, 3s. net; on Oxford India paper, roan, 4s. 6d. net.

Iuvenalis ad satiram sextam additi versus xxxvi exscr. E. O. Winstedt. With a facsimile. In wrapper, 1s. net.

Thirteen Satires. By C. H. Pearson and Herbert A. Strong. Second edition. Crown 8vo. 9s.

Livy, Book I. With Introduction and Notes. By Sir J. R. Seeley. Third edition. 8vo. 6s.

Books V–VII. By A. R. Cluer. Revised by P. E. Matheson. 5s. Separately: Book V, 2s. 6d.; Book VI, 2s.; Book VII, 2s.

Books XXI–XXIII. By M. T. Tatham. Second edition, enlarged. 5s. Separately: Book XXI, 2s. 6d.; Book XXII, 2s. 6d.

Lucretius, Book V (783–1457). Edited, with Notes for a Fifth Form, by W. D. Lowe. Crown 8vo. 2s.

Noctes Manilianae. Being elucidations of Manilius, with some conjectural emendations of Aratea. By Robinson Ellis. Crown 8vo. 6s.

Martialis Epigrammata Selecta (W. M. Lindsay's Text and critical notes). Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d. On India paper. 5s.

Books I–VI, VII–XII. Edited by R. T. Bridge and E. D. C. Lake, each 3s. 6d. Notes only, each 2s.

Nepos. By Oscar Browning. Third edition, revised by W. R. Inge. 3s.

Nonius Marcellus, de compendiosa doctrina I–III. Edited, with introduction and critical apparatus, by J. H. Onions. 8vo. 10s. 6d.

Ovid, Heroides, with the Greek translations of Planudes. Edited by Arthur Palmer. 8vo. With a facsimile. 21s.

Ibis. With scholia and commentary. By Robinson Ellis. 8vo. 10s. 6d.

Metamorphoses, Book XI. Edited, with introduction and notes, by G. A. T. Davies. Crown 8vo. 2s. With or without vocabulary.

Tristia. Edited by S. G. Owen. 8vo. 16s. Extra fcap 8vo. Third edition. Book I, 3s. 6d. Book III, 2s.

Selections, with an Appendix on the Roman Calendar by W. Ramsay. By G. G. Ramsay. Third edition. 5s. 6d.

Persius, The Satires. With a translation and commentary, by John Conington. Edited by Henry Nettleship. Third edition. 8vo. 8s. 6d.

Plautus, Captivi. By Wallace M. Lindsay. Second edition. 2s. 6d.

Mostellaria. By E. A. Sonnenschein. Second edition. Fcap 8vo. Text interleaved. 4s. 6d.

Rudens. By the same. 8vo. 8s. 6d. Editio minor, Text and Appendix on Metre interleaved. Second edition. 4s. 6d.

Trinummus. By C. E. Freeman and A. Sloman. Third edition. 3s.

Plauti Codex Turnebi. By W. M. Lindsay. 8vo. 21s. net.

Pliny, Selected Letters. By C. E. Prichard and E. R. Bernard. Third edition. 3s.

Propertius. Index Verborum. By J. S. Phillimore. Crown 8vo. 4s. 6d. net. **Translation** by the same. Extra fcap 8vo. 3s. 6d. net.
Selections. See Tibullus.

Quintilian, Institutionis Oratoriae Lib. X. By W. Peterson. 8vo. 12s. 6d. School edition. By the same. Extra fcap 8vo. Second edition. 3s. 6d.

Sallust. By W. W. Capes. Second edition. 4s. 6d.

Scriptores Latini Rei Metricae. Edited by T. Gaisford. 8vo. 5s.

Selections from the less known Latin Poets. By North Pinder. 7s. 6d.

Tacitus. Edited, with introductions and notes, by H. Furneaux. 8vo.

Annals. Books I–VI. Second ed. 18s. **Books** XI–XVI. Second edition, revised by H. F. Pelham and C. D. Fisher. 21s.

Annals. (Text only.) Crown 8vo. 6s.

Annals, Books I–IV. Second edition. 5s. Book I. Limp, 2s. Books XIII–XVI (abridged from Furneaux's 8vo edition). By H. Pitman. 4s. 6d.

De Germania. Vita Agricolae. 6s. 6d. each.

Dialogus de Oratoribus. Edited, with introduction and notes, by W. Peterson. 8vo. 10s. 6d. net.

Terence, Adelphi. By A. Sloman. Second edition. 3s.

Andria. By C. E. Freeman and A. Sloman. Second edition. 3s.

Phormio. By A. Sloman. Second edition. 3s.

'Famulus.' By J. Sargeaunt and A. G. S. Raynor. 2s.

Tibullus and Propertius, Selections. By G. G. Ramsay. Third edition. 6s.

Velleius Paterculus, libri duo ad M. Vinicium. By Robinson Ellis. Crown 8vo. 6s.

Virgil. By T. L. Papillon and A. E. Haigh. Two volumes. Crown 8vo. Cloth, 6s. each; or stiff covers, 3s. 6d. each.

Text only (including the minor works emended by R. Ellis). Miniature Oxford edition. By the same editors. 32mo. On writing-paper, 3s. net; on Oxford India paper, roan, 4s. 6d. net.

Aeneid, Books I–III, IV–VI, VII–IX, X–XII. By the same editors. 2s. each part. Book IX, by A. E. Haigh, 1s. 6d.; in two parts, 2s.

Bucolics and Georgics. By the same editors. 2s. 6d.

Bucolics. 2s. 6d. **Georgics,** Books I, II, 2s. 6d. Books III, IV, 2s. 6d. **Aeneid,** Book I. Limp cloth, 1s. 6d. All by C. S. Jerram.

Latin Works of Reference

Lewis and Short's Latin Dictionaries. See p. 34.

The Latin Language, being an historical account of Latin Sounds, Stems, and Flexions. By W. M. Lindsay. 8vo. 21s.

Selected Fragments of Roman Poetry. Edited, with introduction and notes, by W. W. Merry. Second edition. Crown 8vo. 6s. 6d.

Fragments and Specimens of Early Latin. With introductions and notes. By J. Wordsworth. 8vo. 18s.

Selections from the less known Latin Poets. By North Pinder. 8vo. 7s. 6d.

Latin Historical Inscriptions, illustrating the history of the Early Empire. By G. McN. Rushforth. 8vo. 10s. net.

Scheller's Latin Dictionary. Revised and translated into English by J. L. Riddle. Folio. 21s. net.

Professor Nettleship's Books

Contributions to Latin Lexicography. 8vo. 21s.

Lectures and Essays. Second Series. Edited by F. Haverfield. With portrait and memoir. Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d. (The first series is out of print.)

The Roman Satura. 8vo. Sewed. 1s.

Ancient Lives of Vergil. 8vo. Sewed. 2s.

Professor Sellar's Books

Roman Poets of the Republic. Third edition. Crown 8vo. 10s.

Roman Poets of the Augustan Age. Crown 8vo. viz.: **Virgil.** Third edition. 9s., and **Horace and the Elegiac Poets,** with a memoir of the Author, by Andrew Lang. Second edition. 7s. 6d.

(A limited number of copies of the first edition of *Horace*, containing a portrait of the Author, can still be obtained in Demy 8vo, price 14s.)

Post-Augustan Poetry from Seneca to Juvenal. By H. E. Butler. 8vo. 8s. 6d. net.

The Principles of Sound and Inflexion, as illustrated in the Greek and Latin Languages. By J. E. King and C. Cookson. 8vo. 18s.

Manual of Comparative Philology. By T. L. Papillon. Third edition. Crown 8vo. 6s.

Professor Ellis's Lectures

8vo, each 1s. net. Published by Mr. Frowde.

Juvenal, The New Fragments. — Phaedrus, The Fables. — The Correspondence of Fronto and M. Aurelius. — Catullus in the Fourteenth Century. — A Bodleian MS of Copa, Moretum, and other Poems of the Appendix Vergiliana. (Cr. 8vo.) — The Elegiae in Maecenatem. — The Annalist Licinianus, with an Appendix of Emendations of the Text.

OXFORD CLASSICAL TEXTS

The prices given of copies on ordinary paper are for copies bound in limp cloth; uncut copies may be had in paper covers at 6d. less per volume (1s. less for those priced from 6s. in cloth). All volumes are also on sale interleaved with writing-paper and bound in stout cloth; prices on application.

Greek

Aeschylus. A. Sidgwick. 3s. 6d. (India paper, 4s. 6d.)

Antoninus. J. H. Leopold. 3s. (India paper, 4s.)

Apollonius Rhodius. R. C. Seaton. 3s.

Aristophanes. F. W. Hall, W. M. Geldart. (India paper, 8s. 6d.)
I. Ach., Eq., Nub., Vesp., Pax, Aves. 3s. 6d. (India paper, 4s. 6d.)
II. Lys., Thesm., Ran., Eccl., Plut., fr. 3s. 6d. (India paper, 4s. 6d.)

Bucolici Graeci. U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff. 3s. (India paper, 4s.)

Demosthenes. S. H. Butcher. (India paper, 12s. 6d.)
I. Orationes I–XIX. 4s. 6d. II. i. Orationes XX–XXVI. 3s. 6d.

Euripides. G. G. A. Murray. (Vols. I and II, India paper, 9s.)
I. Cyc., Alc., Med., Heracl., Hip., Andr., Hec. 3s. 6d.
II. Suppl., Herc., Ion, Tro., El., I. T. 3s. 6d.
III. Hel., Phoen., Or., Bacch., Iph. Aul., Rh. [In the press.

Hellenica Oxyrhynchia cum Theopompi et Cratippi fragmentis. B. P. Grenfell, A. S. Hunt. [In the press.

Herodotus. K. Hude. (India paper, 12s. 6d.)
Vol. I (Books I–IV). 4s. 6d. Vol. II (Books V–IX). 4s. 6d.

Homer, 3s. per volume.
Iliad. (Vols. I and II.) D. B. Monro, T. W. Allen. (India paper, 7s.)
Odyssey. (Vols. III and IV.) T. W. Allen. (India paper, 6s.)

Hyperides. F. G. Kenyon. 3s. 6d.

Longinus. A. O. Prickard. 2s. 6d.

Plato. J. Burnet. Vols. I–III, 6s. each (India paper, 7s. each). Vol. IV. 7s. (India paper, 8s. 6d.) Vol. V. 8s. (India paper, 10s. 6d.)
I. Euth., Apol., Crit., Ph.; Crat., Tht., Soph., Polit.
II. Par., Phil., Symp., Phdr.; Alc. I, II, Hipp., Am.
III. Thg., Chrm., Lch., Lys.; Euthd., Prot., Gorg., Men.; Hipp. ma., mi., Io, Menex.
IV. Clit., Rep., Tim., Critias. Also Republic, separately, 6s.; on quarto writing-paper, 10s. 6d.
V. Minos, Leges, Epinomis, Epistulae. Definitiones, Spuria.
First and fifth tetralogies separately, paper covers, 2s. each.

Theophrasti Characteres. H. Diels. [In the press.

Thucydides. H. Stuart Jones. (India paper, 8s. 6d.)
I. Books 1–4. II. Books 5–8. 3s. 6d. each.

Xenophon. E. C. Marchant. Vols. I–III. (India Paper, 12s. 6d.)
I. Historia Graeca. 3s.
II. Libri Socratici. 3s. 6d.
III. Anabasis. 3s.

Latin

Asconius. A. C. CLARK. 3s. 6d.

Caesar, Commentarii. R. L. A. DU PONTET. (India paper, 7s.)
Bellum Gallicum. 2s. 6d. Bellum Civile. 3s.

Catullus. R. ELLIS. 2s. 6d. (With Tibullus and Propertius, on India paper, 8s. 6d.)

Cicero, Epistulae. L. C. PURSER. (India paper, 21s.)
I. Epp. ad Fam. 6s.; II. ad Att., Pars i (1–8), Pars ii (9–16), 4s. 6d. each: III. ad Q. F., ad M. Brut., Fragm. 3s.

Orationes. (India paper, 18s. 6d.)
Rosc. Am., I. Pomp., Clu., Cat., Mur., Cael. A. C. CLARK. 3s.
Pro Milone, Caesarianae, Philippicae. A. C. CLARK. 3s.
Quinct., Rosc. Com., Caec., Leg. Agr., Rab. Perduell., Flacc., Pis., Rab. Post. A. C. CLARK. [In the press.
Verrinae. W. PETERSON. 4s.

Rhetorica. A. S. WILKINS. (India paper, 7s. 6d.)
I. De Oratore. 3s. II. Brutus, etc. 3s. 6d.

Horace. E. C. WICKHAM. 3s. (India paper, 4s. 6d.)

Lucretius. C. BAILEY. 3s. (India paper, 4s.)

Martial. W. M. LINDSAY. 6s. (India paper, 7s. 6d.)

Nepos. E. O. WINSTEDT. 2s.

Persius and Juvenal. S. G. OWEN. 3s. (India paper, 4s.)

Plautus. W. M. LINDSAY. (India paper, 16s.)
I. Amph.—Merc. II. Miles—fragm. 6s. each.

Propertius. J. S. PHILLIMORE. 3s. (India paper, see Catullus.)

Statius. (Complete on India paper. 10s. 6d.)

Silvae. J. S. PHILLIMORE. 3s. 6d.

Thebais and Achilleis. H. W. GARROD. 6s.

Tacitus, Opera Minora. H. FURNEAUX. 2s.

Annales. C. D. FISHER. 6s. (India paper, 7s.)

Terence. R. Y. TYRRELL. 3s. 6d. (India paper, 5s.)

Tibullus. J. P. POSTGATE. 2s. (India paper, see Catullus.)

Vergil. F. A. HIRTZEL. 3s. 6d. (India paper, 4s. 6d.)

Appendix Vergiliana. R. ELLIS. 4s.

Annotated Greek Classics

For Oxford Classical Texts, see p. 40; for Oxford Translations, p. 21.

Extra fcap 8vo

Aeschylus. By ARTHUR SIDGWICK. New editions with the text of the *Oxford Classical Texts.*

Agamemnon. Sixth edition revised. 3s. Choephoroi. New edition revised. 3s. Eumenides. Third edition. 3s. Persae. 3s. Septem contra Thebas. 3s.

Prometheus Vinctus. By A. O. PRICKARD. Fourth edition. 2s.

Aristophanes. By W. W. MERRY.

Acharnians. Fifth edition. 3s. Birds. Fourth edition. 3s. 6d. Clouds. Second edition. 3s. Frogs. Fifth edition. 3s. Knights. Second edition. 3s. Peace. 3s. 6d. Wasps. Second edition. 3s. 6d.

Cebes, Tabula. By C. S. JERRAM. Stiff covers, 1s. 6d.; cloth, 2s. 6d.

Demosthenes. By EVELYN ABBOTT and P. E. MATHESON.

Against Philip. Vol. I: Philippic I, Olynthiacs I–III. Fourth edition. 3s. Vol. II: De Pace, Philippic II, de Chersoneso, Philippic III. 4s. 6d. Philippics I–III (reprinted from above). 2s. 6d.

On the Crown. 3s. 6d.

Against Meidias. By J. R. KING. Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d.

Euripides.

Alcestis. By C. S. JERRAM. Fifth edition. 2s. 6d. Bacchae. By A. H. CRUICKSHANK. 3s. 6d. Cyclops. By W. E. LONG. 2s. 6d. Hecuba. By C. B. HEBERDEN. 2s. 6d. Helena. By C. S. JERRAM. Second edition. 3s. Heracleidae. By C. S. JERRAM. 3s. Ion. By C. S. JERRAM. 3s. Iphigenia in Tauris. By C. S. JERRAM. New edition revised. 3s. Medea. By C. B. HEBERDEN. Third edition. 2s.

Herodotus, Book IX. By EVELYN ABBOTT. 3s.

Selections. With a map. By W. W. MERRY. 2s. 6d.

Homer, Iliad. By D. B. MONRO. I–XII. With a brief Homeric Grammar. Fifth edition. 6s. Book I, with the Homeric Grammar, separately. Third edition. 1s. 6d. XIII–XXIV. Fourth edition. 6s.

Book III (for beginners), by M. T. TATHAM. 1s. 6d. Book XXI. By HERBERT HAILSTONE. 1s. 6d.

Homer, Odyssey. By W. W. MERRY.

I–XII. Sixty-sixth thousand. 5s. Books I and II, separately, each 1s. 6d. Books VI and VII. 1s. 6d. Books VII–XII. 3s.

XIII–XXIV. Sixteenth thousand. 5s. Books XIII–XVIII. 3s. Books XIX–XXIV. 3s.

ANNOTATED GREEK CLASSICS

Lucian, Vera Historia. By C. S. Jerram. Second edition. 1s. 6d.

Lysias, Epitaphios. By F. J. Snell. 2s.

Plato. By St. George Stock. **Euthyphro.** 2s. 6d. **Apology.** Third edition. 2s. 6d. **Crito.** 2s. **Meno.** Third edition. 2s. 6d.

Euthydemus. With revised text, introduction, notes, and indices, by E. H. Gifford. Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d.

Menexenus. By J. A. Shawyer. Crown 8vo. 2s.

Selections. By J. Purves with preface by B. Jowett. 2nd ed. 5s.

Plutarch, Lives of the Gracchi. By G. E. Underhill. Crown 8vo. 4s. 6d.

Coriolanus (for Junior Students). With introduction and notes. 2s.

Sophocles. By Lewis Campbell and Evelyn Abbott. New and revised edition. Two volumes: Vol. I text 4s. 6d.; Vol. II notes 6s.

Or singly 2s. each (text and notes), Ajax, Antigone, Electra, Oedipus Coloneus, Oedipus Tyrannus, Philoctetes, Trachiniae.

Scenes from Sophocles, edited by C. E. Laurence. With illustrations. 1s. 6d. each. (1) **Ajax.** (2) **Antigone.**

Select Fragments of the Greek Comic Poets. By A. W. Pickard-Cambridge. Crown 8vo. 5s.

Golden Treasury of Ancient Greek Poetry. By Sir R. S. Wright. Second edition. Revised by E. Abbott. Extra fcap 8vo. 10s. 6d.

Golden Treasury of Greek Prose. By Sir R. S. Wright and J. E. L. Shadwell. Extra fcap 8vo. 4s. 6d.

Theocritus. By H. Kynaston. Fifth edition. 4s. 6d.

Thucydides, Book III. By H. F. Fox. Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d.

Xenophon. (See also p. 34.)

Anabasis. Each of the first four Books is now issued in uniform cloth binding at 1s. 6d. Each volume contains introduction, text, notes, and a full vocabulary to the Anabasis. Book I. By J. Marshall. Book II. By C. S. Jerram. Books III and IV. By J. Marshall. Books III, IV, 3s. *Vocabulary to the Anabasis,* by J. Marshall. 1s.

Cyropaedia, Book I. 2s. Books IV and V. 2s. 6d. By C. Bigg.

Hellenica, Books I, II. By G. E. Underhill. 3s.

Memorabilia. By J. Marshall. 4s. 6d.

Editions etc of Greek Authors mostly with English notes

Appian, Book I. Edited with map and appendix on Pompey's passage of the Alps, by J. L. Strachan-Davidson. Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d.

Aristophanes, A Concordance to. By H. Dunbar. 4to. £1 1s. net.

Aristotle.

Ethica Nicomachea recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit I. Bywater. Post 8vo, cloth. 6s. The same, on 4to paper, for marginal notes. 10s. 6d. Also in crown 8vo, paper covers. 3s. 6d.

Contributions to the Textual Criticism of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. By I. Bywater. Stiff cover. 2s. 6d.

Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics. By J. A. Stewart. 2 vols. Post 8vo. £1 12s.

The English Manuscripts of the Nicomachean Ethics. By J. A. Stewart. Crown 4to. 3s. 6d. net.

De Arte Poetica Liber recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit I. Bywater. Post 8vo, stiff covers. 1s. 6d.

The Poetics. A revised Greek text, with critical introduction, English translation and commentary, by I. Bywater. 8vo. (In the press.)

Selecta ex Organo Capitula: in usum Scholarum Academicarum. Crown 8vo, stiff covers. 3s. 6d.

The Politics, with introduction, notes, etc, by W. L. Newman. 4 vols. Medium 8vo. 14s. net per volume.

The Politics, translated into English, with introduction, notes, and indices, by B. Jowett. Medium 8vo. 2 vols. £1 1s.

Aristotelian Studies. On the Structure of the Seventh Book of the Nicomachean Ethics. By J. Cook Wilson. 8vo. 5s.

On the History of the Aristotelian Writings. By R. Shute. 8vo. 7s. 6d.

Physics, Book VII. With introduction by R. Shute. 2s. net.

The Works of Aristotle. Translated into English under the Editorship of J. A. Smith and W. D. Ross. 8vo.

Parva Naturalia. By J. I. Beare and G. R. T. Ross. 3s. 6d. net.

De Lineis Insecabilibus. By H. H. Joachim. 2s. 6d. net.

Metaphysica. (Vol. VIII.) By W. D. Ross. 7s. 6d. net.

Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition from Alcmaeon to Aristotle. By J. I. Beare. 12s. 6d. net.

Aristoxenus. Edited, with introduction, music, translation, and notes, by H. S. Macran. Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d. net.

GREEK AUTHORS

Demosthenes and Aeschines on the Crown. With introductory essays and notes, by G. A. Simcox and W. H. Simcox. 8vo. 12s.

Heracliti Ephesii Reliquiae. Edited by I. Bywater, with Diogenes Laertius' Life of Heraclitus, etc. 8vo. 6s.

Herodas. Edited, with full introduction and notes, by J. Arbuthnot Nairn. With facsimiles of the fragments and other illustrations. 8vo. 12s. 6d. net.

Herodotus, Books V and VI. Terpsichore and Erato. Edited, with notes and appendices, by E. Abbott. With two maps. Post 8vo. 6s.

Homer, A Concordance to the Odyssey and Hymns; and to the Parallel Passages in the Iliad, Odyssey, and Hymns. By H. Dunbar. 4to. £1 1s. net.

Odyssey. Books I–XII. Edited, with English notes, appendices, etc, by W. W. Merry and J. Riddell. Second edition. 8vo. 16s.

Books XIII–XXIV. Edited, with English notes, appendices, and illustrations, by D. B. Monro. 8vo. 16s.

Hymni Homerici codicibus denuo collatis recensuit A. Goodwin. Small folio. With four plates. £1 1s. net.

Scholia Graeca in Iliadem. Edited by W. Dindorf, after a new collation of the Venetian MSS by D. B. Monro. 4 vols. 8vo. £2 10s. net. See also p. 47.

Opera et Reliquiae, recensuit D. B. Monro. Crown 8vo, on India paper. 10s. 6d. net. 'The Oxford Homer.'

Homerica. Emendations and Elucidations of the Odyssey. By T. L. Agar. 8vo. 14s. net.

Index Andocideus, Lycurgeus, Dinarcheus, confectus ab A. L. Forman. 8vo. 7s. 6d. net.

Menander's Γεωργός, the Geneva Fragment, with text, translation, and notes, by B. P. Grenfell and A. S. Hunt. 8vo, stiff covers. 1s. 6d.

Plato, Philebus. Edited by E. Poste. 8vo. 7s. 6d.

Republic. Edited, with notes and essays, by B. Jowett and L. Campbell. In three volumes. Medium 8vo, cloth. £2 2s.

Sophistes and Politicus. Edited by L. Campbell. 8vo. 10s. 6d. net.

Theaetetus. Edited by L. Campbell. 2nd ed. 8vo. 10s. 6d. net.

The Dialogues, translated into English, with analyses and introductions, by B. Jowett. Third edition. Five volumes, medium 8vo. £4 4s. In half-morocco, £5. *The Subject-Index to the second edition of the Dialogues*, by E. Abbott, separately. 8vo, cloth. 2s. 6d.

The Republic, translated into English, by B. Jowett. Third edition. Medium 8vo. 12s. 6d. Half-roan, 14s.

Selections from Jowett's translation, with introductions by M. J. Knight. Two volumes. Crown 8vo. 12s.

Polybius, Selections. Edited by J. L. Strachan-Davidson. With maps. Medium 8vo, buckram. 21s.

Sophocles, The Plays and Fragments. Edited by L. CAMPBELL.
Vol. I: Oedipus Tyrannus. Oedipus Coloneus. Antigone. 8vo. 16s.
Vol. II: Ajax. Electra. Trachiniae. Philoctetes. Fragments. 8vo. 16s.

Strabo, Selections. With an introduction on Strabo's Life and Works. By H. F. TOZER. With maps and plans. Post 8vo, cloth. 12s.

Thucydides. Translated into English by B. JOWETT. Second edition, revised. 2 vols. 8vo. 15s.
Vol. I: Essay on Inscriptions, and Books I–III.
Vol. II: Books IV–VIII, and Historical Index.

Xenophon, Hellenica. Edited, with introduction and appendices, by G. E. UNDERHILL. Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d. Also with the Oxford Text by E. C. MARCHANT, one volume. 7s. 6d. net.

Older Clarendon Press Editions of Greek Authors

The Greek texts in fine and generally large type; the Scholia (and some of the texts) have not appeared in any later editions. The annotations are in Latin.

Aeschinem et Isocratem, Scholia Graeca in, edidit G. DINDORFIUS. 8vo. 4s.

Aeschylus ex rec. G. DINDORFII. Tragoediae et Fragmenta. Second edition. 8vo. 5s. 6d. Annotationes. Partes II. 8vo. 10s.
Quae supersunt in codice Laurentiano typis descripta edidit R. MERKEL. Small folio. £1 1s. net.

Apsinis et Longini Rhetorica recensuit JOH. BAKIUS. 8vo. 3s.

Aristophanes ex rec. G. DINDORFII. Comoediae et Fragmenta. Tomi II. 8vo. 11s. Annotationes. Partes II. 8vo. 11s. Scholia Graeca. Partes III. 8vo. £1. J. Caravellae Index. 8vo. 3s.

Aristoteles ex recensione IMMANUELIS BEKKERI. Accedunt Indices Sylburgiani. Tomi I–XI. 8vo.
The nine volumes in print (I (Organon) and IX (Ethica) are out of print) may be had separately, price 5s. 6d. each.

Choerobosci Dictata in Theodosii Canones, necnon Epimerismi in Psalmos edidit THOMAS GAISFORD. Tomi III. 8vo. 15s.

Demosthenes ex recensione G. DINDORFII. Tomi IX. 8vo. £2 6s. Separately: Textus, £1 1s. Annotationes, 15s. Scholia, 10s.

Etymologicon Magnum. Edited by T. GAISFORD. Folio. Out of print.

Euripides ex rec. G. DINDORFII. Tragoediae et Fragmenta. Tomi II. 8vo. 10s. Annotationes. Partes II. 8vo. 10s. Scholia Graeca. Tomi IV. 8vo. £1 16s. Alcestis. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

Harpocrationis Lexicon ex recensione G. Dindorfii. Tomi II. 8vo. 21s. net.

Hephaestionis Enchiridion, Terentianus Maurus, Proclus, etc. edidit T. Gaisford. Tomi II. 12s. 6d. net.

Homerus

Ilias, cum brevi annotatione C. G. Heynii. Accedunt Scholia minora. Tomi II. 8vo. 15s.

Ilias. Ex rec. G. Dindorfii. 8vo. 5s. 6d.

Scholia Graeca in Iliadem. See p. 45.

Scholia Graeca in Iliadem Townleyana recensuit Ernestus Maass. 2 vols. 8vo. £1 16s.

Odyssea. Ex rec. G. Dindorfii. 8vo. 5s. 6d.

Scholia Graeca in Odysseam ed. G. Dindorfius. Tomi II. 8vo. 15s. 6d.

Seberi Index in Homerum. 8vo. 6s. 6d.

Oratores Attici ex recensione Bekkeri: Vol. III. Isaeus, Æschines, Lycurgus, etc. 8vo. 7s. Vols. I and II are out of print.

Paroemiographi Graeci edidit T. Gaisford. Out of print.

Index Graecitatis Platonicae confecit T. Mitchell. 1832. 2 vols. 8vo. 5s.

Plotinus edidit F. Creuzer. Tomi III. 4to. 42s. net.

Plutarchi Moralia edidit D. Wyttenbach. Accedit Index Graecitatis, Tomi VIII. Partes XV. 8vo, cloth. £3 10s. net.

Sophoclis Tragoediae et Fragmenta. Ex recensione et cum commentariis G. Dindorfii. Third edition. 2 vols. Fcap 8vo. £1 1s.

Each Play separately, limp, 1s.; text only, 6d.; text on writing-paper, 8s.

Tragoediae et Fragmenta cum annotationibus G. Dindorfii. Tomi II. 8vo. 10s.

The text, Vol. I, 5s. 6d. The notes, Vol. II, 4s. 6d.

Stobaei Florilegium ad MSS fidem emendavit et supplevit T. Gaisford. Tomi IV. 8vo. £3 3s. net.

Eclogarum Physicarum et Ethicarum libri duo: accedit Hieroclis Commentarius in aurea carmina Pythagoreorum. Recensuit T. Gaisford. Tomi II. 8vo. 11s.

Suidae Lexicon. Edited by T. Gaisford. Three vols. Folio. Large paper copies, £6 6s. net. (A few copies remain.)

Xenophon. Ex rec. et cum annotatt. L. Dindorfii.

Historia Graeca. Second edition. 8vo. 10s. 6d.

Expeditio Cyri. Second edition. 8vo. 10s. 6d.

Institutio Cyri. 8vo. 10s. 6d.

Memorabilia Socratis. 8vo. 7s. 6d.

Opuscula Politica Equestria et Venatica cum Arriani Libello de Venatione. 8vo. 10s. 6d.

Greek Literature

The Attic Theatre. By A. E. Haigh. Third edition, revised and in part rewritten by A. W. Pickard-Cambridge. Illustrated. 8vo. 10s. 6d. net. A few copies of the second edition can still be obtained.

The Tragic Drama of the Greeks. By A. E. Haigh. With illustrations. 8vo. 10s. 6d. net.

The Ancient Classical Drama. A Study in Literary Evolution. By R. G. Moulton. Second edition. Crown 8vo. 8s. 6d.

Modes of Ancient Greek Music. By D. B. Monro. 15s. net. (For Aristoxenus, see p. 44.)

The Rise of the Greek Epic. By Gilbert Murray. 8vo. 6s. net.

The Interpretation of Greek Literature. An Inaugural Lecture by Gilbert Murray. 8vo. 1s. net.

Greek Historical Writing and Apollo. Two Lectures by U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff. Translation by Gilbert Murray. 8vo. 2s. net.

The Erasmian Pronunciation of Greek. A Lecture by I. Bywater. 8vo. 1s. net (published by Mr. Frowde).

The Value of Byzantine and Modern Greek. A Lecture by S. Menardos. 8vo. 1s. net.

Ionia and the East. By D. G. Hogarth. 8vo. With a map. 3s. 6d. net.

Coins and Inscriptions

Historia Numorum. A Manual of Greek Numismatics. By Barclay V. Head. [Second edition in the press.]

A Manual of Greek Historical Inscriptions. By E. L. Hicks. New edition, revised by G. F. Hill. 8vo. 10s. 6d. net. A few copies of the first edition are still procurable at 10s. 6d.

The Inscriptions of Cos. By W. R. Paton & E. L. Hicks. Ry. 8vo. £1 8s.

A Grammar of the Homeric Dialect. By D. B. Monro. 8vo. Ed. 2, 14s.

The Sounds and Inflections of Greek Dialects (Ionic). By H. W. Smyth. 8vo. £1 4s.

A Glossary of Greek Birds. By D'Arcy W. Thompson, C.B. 8vo. 10s. n.

Practical Introduction to Greek Accentuation. By H. W. Chandler. 8vo. 2nd ed. 10s. 6d. Also an abridgement. Ext. fcap 8vo. 2s. 6d.

Palaeography: Papyri

Catalogus Codicum Graecorum Sinaiticorum. Scripsit V. Gardthausen. With facsimiles. 8vo, linen. £1 5s.

On abbreviations in Greek MSS. By T. W. Allen. Royal 8vo. 5s.

An Alexandrian erotic fragment and other Greek papyri, chiefly Ptolemaic. Edited by B. P. Grenfell. Small 4to. 8s. 6d. net.

New classical fragments and other papyri. Edited by B. P. Grenfell and A. S. Hunt. 12s. 6d. net.

Revenue laws of Ptolemy Philadelphus. Edited by B. P. Grenfell and J. P. Mahaffy. £1 11s. 6d. net.

Palaeography of Greek papyri, by F. G. Kenyon. 8vo. 10s. 6d.